

Yes, the professional Chekist Beria had a clear line and followed it consistently. And the "professional" apparatchik Ponomarenko rushed from the "concept" of small detachments to the recognition of the existence and usefulness of formations of several thousand fighters like Kovpakovsky. In July 1942, Ponomarenko prepared a draft order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, that is, Stalin, on strengthening the partisan struggle, which remained a project - he was very stupid, vague, divorced from reality and sustained in the worst traditions of party bureaucracy.

Ponomarenko wrote:

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"Experience shows that large partisan formations, sometimes reaching up to several thousand people, are inactive, easily detected by the enemy ... poorly controlled ...

I order:

4. Stop the practice of creating (this passage, with its party spirit, simply touched me. - S.K.) large partisan formations ... since experience has shown that the most successfully operating is a well-knit, maneuverable detachment of 60-100 people ..

5. Without the knowledge of the partisan movement, do not make any movements in the command staff ... "etc.

At that time, Sidor Kovpak was conducting another raid of the two thousandth formation, Alexei Fedorov-Chernigovskiy increased his own to a similar size ... And entire partisan regions were already formed with new commanders who had come forward without the knowledge of Ponomarenko. In reality, everything was determined locally by life itself, and not by the pieces of paper of the TsSHPD.

A true partocratic masterpiece, I would call a memorandum Ponomarenko to Stalin dated March 4, 1943. I'll give it in full:

"As a result of the successes of the Red Army in Belarus and Ukraine, the partisan movement is growing rapidly. In Belarus, the number of partisan detachments has reached 460 with over 60,000 partisans, and hidden reserves reach up to 200,000 people. In Ukraine, only in the Zhytomyr, Rivne and Chernigov regions, the reserves of partisan detachments number up to 60,000 people.

Please accept for a report and instructions on the fundamental issues of the further development of the movement.

P. Ponomarenko.

No, "hidden reserves" are great! "I recognize the zealous horses by their scorched brand, I recognize the arrogant Parthians by their high hoods," wrote Pushkin. But a partocratic "party" secretary can be recognized by one

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"hidden reserves"! Alas, Stalin himself sometimes sinned like this, but he knew how to correct his mistakes.

Beria sent more than 2,000 operational groups with a total of 15,000 people behind the front line. Little compared to Ponomarenko's numbers? How can I say... These were not just people with weapons, but people who had been trained, who had targeted tasks, radio communications with Moscow. On the spot, as needed, they "overgrown" with new people.

However, not only operational groups, but also most of the effectively operating detachments and formations had the core of the NKVD personnel. Heroes of the Soviet Union partisans Dmitry Medvedev, Stanislav Vaupshasov, Dmitry Emlyutin, Viktor Karasev, Alexander Saburov, Nikolai Prokopyuk, Evgeny Mirkovsky - these are all personnel Chekists.

Heroes of the Soviet Union, heads of underground centers Viktor Lyagin, Ivan Kudrya, Viktor Molodtsov are also career Chekists.

And this is only a part of the glorious, heroic names of the glorious subordinates of the Commissar-Chekist Beria.

In 1943, Gauleiter of Belarus Kube was blown up in his own bed in Minsk. Three women - Elena Mazanik, Maria Osipova and Nadezhda Troyan - on November 4, 1943 received the Stars of Heroes of the Soviet Union for this operation. But the operation itself is the development of NKVD operatives in cooperation with the GRU of the General Staff.

The acts of vengeance in Rovno of the Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Kuznetsov (Paul Siebert) were developed by professionals from the Lubyanka, prepared by Dmitry Medvedev and Alexander Lukin - also professionals from the Lubyanka, but Nikolai Kuznetsov himself was a professional. And also from the Lubyanka!

Yes, in fact, in the leadership of the TsSHPD, as well as the republican headquarters, there were mostly representatives of the NKVD, including security officers Strokach, Sprigis.

Nevertheless, Beria, by his directive dated July 13, 1942, prohibited the transfer to the headquarters of the partisan movement of personnel of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of special forces operating in the German rear, reconnaissance residencies, couriers and communications, as well as correspondence on NKVD partisan formations (summaries, reports,

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reports, radiograms) ... He is now reproached for this, but everything was true. What Beria retained in the competence of the NKVD was very "subtle matters." And to give them into inept hands would be unwise. And here Beria was not concerned about his own ambitions, but about the strictest secrecy and the safety of those people who lived every day in the enemy rear under the threat of failure.

Beria's fears were certainly well founded. There is an amazing historical document in terms of self-disclosure (albeit involuntary, unconscious) - a letter from the head of the TsSHPD P.K. Ponomarenko to the secretary of the Smolensk regional party committee D.M. Popov dated February 10, 1943, where Ponomarenko noted that:

"... some comrades organize district committees in the occupied territory, as a rule, according to the usual type, more or less broad composition, arrange meetings, meetings, hear reports from political workers of brigades and detachments ... and at the same time do not pay attention ... on the construction and organization of a deeply conspiratorial Bolshevik underground.

Could intelligence networks, cadres, communications be trusted to such "pro-sessions"? It would seem that the answer is obvious, but even here Beria did not please those about whom Shota Rustaveli accurately said: "Everyone fancies himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the outside" ... So, in 2001 in Minsk, under the general editorship of the notorious Taras, book V .AND. Boyarsky Partisans and the Army. (History of Lost Opportunities)", which states:

"A number of gross miscalculations and mistakes were the result of erroneous actions ... of the leadership of the NKVD, dictated by departmental interests, the desire to ensure not only penetration into all accessible areas along the security line, but also the line of influence, if not the leadership."

In this one phrase, all the depth is revealed (or rather, pettiness?) misunderstanding of the essence and meaning of the activities of Beria and his associates during the war. Of course, the Chekists were people and therefore were not always alien to ambition, and it was not always healthy, but at the right time,

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when for miscalculations in the work they can be severely *asked*, on their own initiative, only *volunteers* take on an additional burden . And they, as you know, are not overwhelmed by careerist motives.

And to finish with the topic of the "partisan" of Beria, I will acquaint the reader with extracts from another letter from P.K. Ponomarenko, written by him in early March 1943 to a member of the Military Council of the 4th shock army A.A. Stulov. Perhaps the reader remembers this "partocratic" surname from the report of the military prosecutor of the Vitebsk garrison? This is the same Stulov. In 1943, he was still the secretary of the Vitebsk regional committee, and Ponomarenko wrote to him:

"I received a note from you <...> that some commanders and commissars of brigades and detachments are taking the wrong line of conduct in relation to the regional party committee. <...> It is absolutely clear that the role of the regional committee and district committees ... in the leadership of the partisan movement in the region should rise. The Regional Committee of the Party is obliged to stop all attempts ... to belittle or, all the more so, to tear off the Regional Committee ... from the leadership of partisan detachments and brigades. <...>

In the current situation, when the regional committee is not located in the Vitebsk region, of course, you will continue to encounter facts when, in some cases, materials will come past you ... Another thing is if the regional committee is located where the partisans are. Then the regional committee, of course, will have all the threads of communications and all the questions of the activities of detachments and brigades ... "

The first secretary of the Chernigov regional committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine, Fedorov, was just where the partisans were, at the head of a powerful partisan unit. That's why he earned - by personal military labor - two Gold Stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union. And his colleague in party work, Stulov, just as he started the war mediocre and cowardly, continued it like that, only sat on one more chair - a member of the Military Council of the Army ... And he could not sit on one properly for business.

After all, this was not a master of management, unlike Beria and his combat associates Sudoplatov, Vaupshasov, Medvedev, Prokopyuk ...

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ABOUT THE ROLE OF Beria in the defense of the Caucasus, if it was possible to find deaf references, then only in the usual way for the "antiberiad" - the tyrant de Beria, sent by the "tyrant" Stalin as a representative of the Headquarters of the VTK to the Caucasus, interfered in every possible way with defending the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. You don't have to look far for an example - Triumph and Tragedy by Dmitry Volkogonov:

"Beria's military operations in the Great Patriotic War are limited to his two trips as a member of the GKO to the Caucasus (he was sent there by Stalin not only as a member of the GKO, but in fact as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in the manner of the same Zhukov. - S.K.) in August 1942 - March next year. The archives testify: here, on behalf of Stalin, he instilled fear in military workers, filmed people who were objectionable to him, and shot them. He was accompanied on those trips by Kobulov, Mamulov, Milshtein, Piyashev, Tsanova, Rukhadze, Vlodzimirsky, Karanadze, Kakuchaya, his own son. Tyulenev, Sergatskov, other military leaders got it.

Volkogonov strove to pose as an analyst, although he was simply a scoundrel, and even stupid, because smart scoundrels subtly "correct" the historical truth, and do not lie totally. After all, it is easy to expose a total lie - there are too many "punctures" in it!

What is funny, Volkogonov did not put the word "combat operations" in quotation marks, although formally Beria did not participate in the hostilities - it was not then Stalin on Caucasus sent. However, in the course of German air raids, sometimes they had to risk their lives ... Several officers from Headquarters who arrived in the Caucasus with Beria and Colonel Shtemenko, who was in charge of the Caucasian direction in the General Staff (in 1953, although he would renounce Beria, he would suffer "for communication with him) was killed. Lazar Kaganovich, a member of the Front's Military Council, was wounded in the head, Admiral Isakov was wounded (he had to take his leg off) ...

But back to the quote from Volkogonov ... To the list of Beria's associates in the defense of the Caucasus, taken by him there, he could

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add Merkulov, Sudoplatov, Maslennikov, Khomenko, Orlov ...

Almost all of those listed by Volkogonov, as well as Merkulov, Maslennikov - this is the old "team" of Beria in the Transcaucasus, who knew the situation perfectly and was able to start acting "half a turn." And Chekist Sudoplatov, border generals Piyashev, Khomenko - these are also long-verified cadres, but already according to the allied NKVD. Sergo Beria was also in the "team", but he took him, firstly, Shtemenko, and secondly, he was clearly useful both with his knowledge and

intelligence.

In general, the fact that Beria took his own on a difficult trip just proves that he knew how to fully trust people. But - only to those who have been tested by him more than once in specific cases.

The situation in the Caucasus by August was critical. Demonstrating his intention to deliver the main blow to Moscow by Army Group Center in 1942, Hitler considered the Blau plan to seize the oil of the Caucasus and enter the Volga in the Stalingrad region as the main one.

We know the Stalingrad epic (where, by the way, Malenkov was sent as a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command) we know well. We know Caucasian much worse. And, perhaps, it happened because Beria played one of the key roles in it. Once on the direct front, it worked effectively here too, but that is precisely why Khrushchev and other partocratic "historians" objectively depict the struggle for the Caucasus after July 1953 became impossible.

I do not intend to analyze the operational situation on the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts, however, I will give an assessment of the situation given by the "Pospel" "History of the Great Patriotic War", where on page 461 of volume 2 it is said:

"The command of the German Army Group A believed that the Soviet troops in operations in the North Caucasus had lost their combat effectiveness and could no longer offer significant resistance. Therefore, from mid-August, the enemy began to regroup troops with the aim of simultaneously developing an offensive against Baku and Batumi.

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step ... in the direction of Grozny-Makhachkala-Baku. The 17th Army received the task of advancing from the Krasnodar region to Novorossiysk, capturing it and developing an offensive along the Black Sea coast to Sukhumi-Batumi. The 491st Mountain Rifle Corps was supposed to strike from the Cherkessk region through the passes of the Main Caucasian Range, reach the Sukhumi region and facilitate the breakthrough of the 17th Army to the Black Sea coast ...

On August 18, fighting began in the passes ... "

That was the situation when Beria was once again the first figure in Transcaucasia. He knew everyone here, and everyone knew him, so everything immediately accelerated in all directions. And now, at the disposal of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Beria had "his own" sensible military men on whom he could rely -

First of all, Ivan Maslennikov. And on August 8, 1942 - even before Beria left for the Caucasus - the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front was created, commanded by Lieutenant General Maslennikov.

The idea of this appointment belonged, of course, to Beria. However, the creation of the Northern Group and the appointment of Maslennikov took place only after the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Colonel General Vasilevsky, and the head of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, Colonel Shtemenko, on August 6

talked about it with Tyulenev. They informed him that Maslennikov might be with him "in two or three days."

And soon Beria himself arrived with Shtemenko to T. Yulenev in Tbilisi. And the big work began.

The passes were urgently fortified - the experience of Sudoplatov and Merkulov in mobilizing climbers, organizing ambushes, sniper groups, setting minefields helped a lot here. Sudoplatov recalls how Stalin reprimanded Merkulov for "taking an unjustified risk in carrying out mine-laying operations: he put his life in danger and could be captured by the advanced units of the Germans." Beria also flew in, and he warmed up Sudoplatov for the poor care of the first deputy people's commissar.

Well, war in critical moments is toughness. Beloved by the "democrats", Zhukov at such moments, except for obscenities, did not use anything in conversation and shot ruthlessly

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But. Beria was only cruel, but not cruel, and if he shot, then in extreme cases. It is not for nothing that the same Volkogonov does not give specific names of those who were shot, but only claims that "Tyulenev, Sergatskov got it" ...

Fifty-year-old Army General (already in 1940!) Ivan Vladimirovich Tyulenev commanded the troops of the Moscow Military District before the war, and shortly after it began he was appointed commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, which became the Transcaucasian Front in May 1942. Tyulenev commanded them until ... June 1945. Lacking outstanding military qualities, he was, as they say, a strong middle peasant, that is, a fairly reliable figure, especially in defense. And nothing else was required of him, except for the strong protection of the Caucasus and Baku oil.

And Beria helped him strongly in this. First of all, Beria helped in what he could and was obliged to help in the Transcaucasus - in mobilizing people, reserves and the economy. I will give specific examples, and now I will say that Beria also helped militarily! Tyulenev later wrote (without mentioning Beria's name, of course):

"Some of us considered the main task of the troops to be the defense of the Black Sea coast, where the main forces of the 46th Army were deployed.

Only the intervention of the Headquarters corrected our mistake. On instructions from Moscow, we developed a new plan for the defense of the passes of the Main Caucasian Range: it was divided into areas, headed by experienced commanders and staffs.

Tyulenev sets out here such a concept of defense, behind which Beria is immediately visible. I think, not without Beria, on September 1, 1942, Stalin also made the decision to unite the North Caucasian and Transcaucasian fronts into one Transcaucasian front.

It was necessary to create a defense in depth. And during August and September 1942, five or six defensive lines were built on the approaches to Ordzhonikidze, Grozny and Makhachkala, and more than ten on the approaches to Baku. 90 thousand people of the local population were mobilized for this construction every day. And everything was on a member of the GKO Beria. However, he usually does not

climbed into the

opera 426

rational decisions - where and what units to send, how to plan strikes, etc. He himself was so professional in what he was professional in that he always respected professionalism in others.

But the selection and placement of personnel - Beria understood this, and with some of whom he really figured out ... So, Volkogonov mentioned Sergatskov. 1898

born, Vasily Sergatskov managed to fight on the Western Front in the First World War, in the rank of lieutenant he commanded a company. In the Red Army he commanded a regiment and divisions. From May 1941 he became a senior lecturer at the Academy of the General Staff ...

On August 28, 1942, Beria removed Major General Sergatskov from command of the 46th Army and appointed Major General Leselidze in his place. Well, let's say Beria was unfair to Sergatskov. But who prevented him from unfolding in all his military talent later? However, Sergatskov continued to fight in the middle and from the post of commander of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps in January 1944 was "for health reasons" transferred to "command" the department of general tactics of the Frunze Academy. Although later lived with "bad health" is not so little. He died in 1975 in Moscow at the age of 77.

But what about General Leselidze? Born in Georgia in 1903, in the Red Army since 1921. He began the war on the Western Front as the chief of artillery of the 2nd Rifle Corps, fought bravely near Moscow. After the Caucasus, he fought in the Kuban, in Ukraine, in 1943 he became a colonel-general, was mortally wounded and on February 21, 1944 died of his wounds in a Moscow hospital. Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). He fought for the freedom of Georgia, he died for Ukraine, and if it's for sure, for our Soviet Motherland.

The "godson" of Beria was also the same age as Leselidze, the future Marshal Andrei Grechko, who was appointed commander of the 47th Army on September 8, 1942. True, later Grechko kept quiet about such a "kinship".

So, in a purely military, partly even military, attitude, Beria did not "fail". However, without exaggeration, the role of Beria in the organization of 427

rear support of the front. I will again resort to an extensive quote from volume 2-th "Pospel" 6-volume "History ... of the war" edition of 1961 (of which Grechko was a member of the editorial committee), and then I will illustrate this text with another quote.

So:

"... On September 9, martial law was declared in the republics of Transcaucasia.

Due to the fact that the main communications connecting Transcaucasia with the industrial regions of the country were intercepted by the enemy, in Transcaucasia, on the instructions of the State Defense Committee, the plan for the production of military products was increased ... Many enterprises, especially local industry, were completely transferred to the production of ammunition, weapons and equipment for the army ... The increase in the production of military materials in the Transcaucasian republics allowed the State Defense Committee to reduce centralized supplies to the troops defending the Caucasus. The troops stationed in Transcaucasia now received from the industrial centers of the country only the most important types of military equipment - aircraft, tanks, guns. Mortars, machine guns, grenades, cartridges, various equipment and uniforms were produced on the spot.

This is also all Beria, my dear reader! All this was done in Transcaucasia during his stay there, and to no small extent *6 was the strength* of his stay there. Of course, we are talking about the efforts of millions of people. But the initial impulse of these efforts is he. In the autumn of 1941, he was enriched with new experience as a curator of defense production and now he used it, as they say, "to its fullest."

Moreover, it must be remembered that the battle for the Caucasus took place against the backdrop of the beginning battle for Stalingrad, and therefore Beria and his comrades in Transcaucasia also defended him, allowing him to transfer the maximum

possible due to the fact that the Caucasus began to do a lot on its own.

And now - a "concrete", illustrating quote. The head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev, writes in his memoirs:

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"... Simultaneously with the Battle of Stalingrad, a grandiose battle for the Caucasus unfolded. Moreover, on a huge front stretching from the Black to the Caspian Seas. And if the supply of weapons and ammunition to our troops in the Stalingrad region was difficult, then the Caucasian epic in this respect was generally unsurpassed in its complexity ...

The supply of weapons and ammunition to the troops defending here ... should was to go in a roundabout way - through Central Asia, Krasnovodsk, Baku ...

However, the transports were...

The industrial enterprises of Transcaucasia also worked with a huge load. Under the leadership of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (whose work was led by Beria. - S.K.) , they switched to military production and gave the front thousands of guns, mortars and ammunition.

It's hard to believe, but it happened. Somehow I was informed that something similar to an equipment factory had been created in Baku. And on the basis of ... urban waste. And in Tbilisi, the building of the slaughterhouse was adapted for this. And at such and such "factories" for five months of work, 647 thousand hand grenades, 1.2 million mines, 549.5 thousand artillery shells were equipped!

Yakovlev exclaims: "Is this not a manifestation of the selfless devotion of the working people of Transcaucasia to their socialist Motherland!" Yes, that's right! But this is also another proof of how Beria skillfully organized these workers.

And it was also impossible to lose sight of the fact that Turkey, although neutral, was nearby, but if the situation worsened, it was ready to enter the Transcaucasus. After all, she did this twenty years ago ... And just in company with Germany. Beria also took this moment into account, in the most critical days, restraining the army from the temptation to withdraw troops from the border to strengthen the front. Already the pre-war leader of Transcaucasia and his native understood that as a result a dangerous temptation could arise among the Turks.

The critical situation made me think through all the options - up to the worst. Sudoplatov testifies:

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"Fears that Tbilisi, and indeed the entire Caucasus, could be captured by the enemy were real. My task was to create an underground intelligence network, in case Tbilisi was under the Germans. Professor Konstantin Gamsakhurdia (father of Zviad Gamsakhurdia) was one of the candidates for the post of head of the intelligence network in Georgia. He was the oldest informer of the NKVD. He was also attracted to cooperation by Beria... Ironically, before the war he was known for his pro-German sentiments... He did not seem very reliable to me. In addition, all his previous experience as an informer was to report ... and not to exert ... influence ... "

Here is the assessment of the Mingrelian Gamsakhurdia, with which one cannot but agree and which was given to him by the Russian subordinate of another Mingrelian, Lavrenty Beria. Yes, as I said, he was his own in the Caucasus, because the Caucasus was his own. Beria, in any case, of course, would have given all his best in the Caucasus to the end, as well as on any other sector of the front, where Stalin would have sent him. However, in the Caucasus, Beria defended not only the great homeland - the Soviet Union, but also the "small" homeland ... So for the general mobilization of Transcaucasia for the struggle, the Caucasian Beria was an ideal figure in every respect. He was born here, he was here

a fish in the water, he had authority, he relied on people he had found and put forward in his time.

The "Pospel" "History ..." on page 467 says that in the November 1942 battles for Ordzhonikidze, a member of the Military Council of the Transcaucasian Front, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia A.N. Sajaya... But he was one of the most experienced Georgian Chekists, brought up by Beria.

During the war, representatives of Moscow visited different fronts and at different times: Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Kaganovich ... Someone had a greater influence on the situation, someone less ... However, Beria's role in protecting Transcaucasia (and, by the way, also in the preparation of operations in the North Caucasus in March-April 1943) in the still unwritten objective

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the history of the war should be highlighted. Perhaps in no other military case has the individual so clearly shown *his* influence, powerfully contributing to the collective success. And it's time to admit it!

IT IS 1943.

On April 14, the NKGB was again separated from the NKVD, and Vsevolod Merkulov again became an independent people's commissar, but this did not affect Beria's workload, because, removing some problems from him, Stalin "thrown" him others ... Yes, and not Stalin, but herself life: it was still necessary to work hard in the economy, it was necessary to establish business in the liberated areas.

Yes, and in the NKVD, new areas of work appeared ... In the country, especially where the occupation lasted for a long time, banditry, including political, increased. The problem of prisoner-of-war camps arose, combined with the problem of their massive use for the reconstruction of the country.

In the autumn of 1943, Beria was also officially entrusted with ensuring the protection of the Soviet delegation at the Tehran "conference of three". Unofficially, I also had to answer for President Roosevelt, who settled for security reasons in the Soviet embassy. Beria had the same order at the Berlin Conference in Potsdam in the summer of 1945, and a little earlier - at the Yalta Conference of 1945, where he was already officially responsible for the security of all delegations ...

The war went on for Russia more and more successfully, the country even developed, grew stronger, gained new strength, but Beria did not get easier and simpler - since 1944 he was also appointed Deputy Chairman of the GKO I.V. Stalin. Considering that by this time Stalin had to focus on operations at the front and diplomatic preparations for the future world, then ...

Then almost the entire organization of the work of the rear for the needs of the front fell on the shoulders of Beria ... And he was already tired. History asked Stalin. This, of course, is a big responsibility. But Stalin asked Beria. And it was hard

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say in which case the tension and the load of psychological pressure were greater.

No, I'm not talking about fear here...

Certainly not about him.

AVIATION DESIGNER A.S. Yakovlev recalled that in July 1941 he and Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Dementyev had the following conversation with Stalin:

— Comrade Stalin, it has been more than a month since our deputy commissar for engines, Balandin, was arrested. We don't know why he's in prison, but we can't imagine him being an enemy. He is needed in the people's commissariat - engine building management

very weakened...

- Yes, he has been in prison for forty days, but he does not give any evidence. Maybe for there is nothing for him ... It is very possible ... And it happens, "Stalin answered.

"And the next day, Balandin," writes Yakovlev, "haggard, with his hair cut bald, already took his office in the people's commissariat and continued to work as if nothing had happened to him."

A few days later, Stalin asked:

- Well, how is Balandin?

- Works, Comrade Stalin, as if nothing had happened.

- Yes, they planted it in vain.

And in response to Yakovlev's puzzled look, they say, how can you imprison the innocent? Stalin explained:

— Yes, that's how it happens. An intelligent person, works well, they envy him, they undermine him. And if he is also a brave man, says what he thinks, he causes discontent and attracts the attention of suspicious Chekists, who themselves do not know the case, but willingly use all sorts of rumors.

What does this case say?

Firstly, that Balandin was arrested before the unification of the people's commissariats, so Beria had nothing to do with his arrest. But the people's commissar of the aviation industry Shakhurin had, because without his visa the arrest warrant was invalid. But Balandin was released already under the NKVD Beria.

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Secondly, it follows from Yakovlev's story that Balandin was not beaten at the Lubyanka - they only cut his head, but this is understandable. But if so - for forty days not a single bruise, then it turns out that under Beria, in any case, there was no assault. But there was a war!

Thirdly...

Thirdly, this is what follows from this case ... Dementiev and Yakovlev were confident in Balandin and vouched for him. And Stalin (but Beria too!) believed this guarantee, and Balandin was released. However, more than one Balandin was arrested in the aviation industry. The same Tupolev with employees until July 19, 1941, formally worked while still in prison.

So why didn't Yakovlev and Dementiev, and the People's Commissar Shakhurin himself, vouch for them?

Were you afraid?

And why weren't they afraid to ask for Balandin?

Was it necessary?

Were others not needed?

Need!

And the leadership of the People's Commissariat was not responsible for them. So it wasn't sure. in the total innocence of those arrested in the Tupolev case?

It would seem that the precedent created by the release of Balandin should have inspired Shakhurin's "team" to further petitions. But no feat ... So what claims can be made to Beria? After all, unlike Shakhurin, Dementyev, Yakovlev and other industry leaders, he knew workers in industries worse or did not know at all. He was guided by operational materials, but they were not arrested out of the blue ...

But there was a war going on.

But it was not for everyone ... And I will tell the reader very interesting information about the people's commissar of the aviation industry Shakhurin. And not only about him...

At the end of the thirties and in the forties, a certain Konstantin Umansky labored in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs ... The author of the book "Stalin's Secret Policy" G. Kostyrchenko considers him "uncommon and at the same time tragic

personality "and, having distorted a lot, continues:

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"An excellent connoisseur of the Russian avant-garde in painting, a friend of the journalist M.E. Koltsov, in the 30s he worked as a TASS correspondent in Western Europe, then he was sent to the NKID (for the first time he worked in the central office of the NKID from August to October 1922. - S.K.), where he took the position of head (at *first* - deputy head. - S.K.) of the press department, which was inherited after him by E.A. Gnedin, (a figure even darker than Koltsov and Umansky himself. - S.K.). In 1939, Umansky was sent as an ambassador to the United States (in the beginning, from 1936 to 1938, he was an adviser to the embassy. - S.K.). And on the critical days of November 1941 for the Soviet Union, Umansky was recalled to Moscow ... "

Umansky was replaced by Max Litvinov, who had stronger positions in the USA, although they were not bad with Umansky either. And until May 1943, this "friend of the journalist Koltsov" hung out as a member of the Collegium of the NKID, and in May he was appointed ambassador to Mexico (in January 1945 he died there in a plane crash).

Having said this, I will further quote Kostyrchenko's work, which has the status of a serious monograph (and is indeed rich in interesting factual material):

"... great grief entered the Umansky family (in May 1943. - S.K.) . His daughter Nina, studying at a school for children of the highest nomenclature (Stalin's son Vasily studied at a regular school. - S.K.), became friends with Volodya Shakhurin, the son of the people's commissar of the aviation industry, and a romantic feeling arose between them, which became the cause of the tragic events that followed soon . When ... it became known that Nina was leaving for Mexico ... the young people agreed on a farewell meeting. During their meeting on the Stone Bridge, a stormy explanation took place, ending with the fact that the son of the people's commissar, in a fit of despair from the impending separation, shot the girl first, and then mortally wounded himself ... "

Dear reader! If someone is sorry for this newly-minted Romeo, then I can only shrug my shoulders about his antics. A hardest war was going on ... Everything honest and clean in the country strained its strength in order to be in this war

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useful to the people. Young girls went to the front, in Krasnodon, the peers of Shakhurin and Umanskaya risked their lives, which by that time they had already martyred (January 15, 16 and 31, 1943, the Germans, partly alive, partly shot, threw 71 people into the pit of mine No. 5, 53 meters deep).

And here is some overgrown fool ...

In short, the investigation began. It was conducted by Lev Sheinin, the head of the investigative department of the USSR Prosecutor's Office (I note that at first the case was not conducted by the NKVD). And it was established that the Walther pistol, handed over to Shakhurin's son by the son of Anastas Mikoyan - Vano, served as the murder weapon.

The killer's mother, Shakhurin's wife S.M. Lurie, claimed that there is a provocation by the Gestapo (who actually did not work behind the cordon. - S.K.).

And ... something related to the Third Reich, this story is related really had ... I will again directly refer to Kostyrchenko:

"According to the records of Volodya Shakhurin's diary discovered during the search, he and his friends from the families of A.I. Mikoyan, A.S. Alliluyeva, surgeon A.N. Bakulev, the American businessman A. Hammer (as in Kostyrchenko, p. 240, but this is hardly a mistake, Armand Hammer had a Russian wife. - S.K.) and others (I would like to know "others" too! - S.K.), having read "Mein Kampf" borrowed from the fathers (the Russian translation of the book was distributed at the direction of

Stalin in a narrow circle of Soviet leaders), created the organization "Fourth Empire" and secretly called themselves "Reichsführers" and "Gruppenführers". Of course, the state security agencies (which then, by the way, again left the subordination of Beria. - S.K.) *took up the investigation of these circumstances ...* "

The case was hushed up, and eight young men were deported from Moscow at the end of the investigation. As representatives of the current "elite", already gravitating towards the Anglo-Saxons, say, "no comments".

Here, of course, one could do without "comments". But I note that Shakhurin, perhaps because he did not intercede for the same Tupolev, because he did not have objective

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reason to believe in his own son's loyalty to the Soviet regime - that's how Shakhurin raised him. But was Shakhurin himself loyal to the Soviet government, I ask, if so? He is loyal not to that state machine, in the "wheel" of which he was not the last "spoke", but in relation to the Soviet power as the power of the masses and *for the masses*}

I have doubts about this last one both about Shakhurin and about many other young "leaders" who have come to the fore during the years of Soviet power and thanks to it. Kostyrchenko writes that, returning home from foreign trips, representatives of the new "worker-peasant" elite did not hide their admiration for "European chic", and this enthusiasm was passed on to their "Kremlin children" ...

Well, not for everyone, but for many it was. Beria's son graduated from intelligence school at the beginning of the war and participated in very delicate operations ... And Shakhurin's son played "fuhrer". But the apple falls not far from the apple tree, not from the birch. And according to the fate of the son of Beria, one can judge the personality of his father. As well as, perhaps, about the personality of Shakhurin according to the fate *of his* son.

Alas, the insides of many and from this - only emerging - "elite" somewhere began to rot. And when someone was "taken", those who had a hidden weakness thought to themselves: "Maybe for the cause?" And instead of saying: "Yes, I'm responsible for him with my head," they pretended that everything was going as it should, only in rare cases standing up for those who they were, firstly, desperately needed, and secondly, in whom they believed *more than in themselves*.

Konstantin Meretskov in his *memoirs* presented the case in such a way that he, they say, on June 2, 1937, at an expanded meeting of the Military Council under the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, defended Uborevich right in front of Stalin ... But if the dear reader gets acquainted with the transcript of Meretskov's speech at that council, he will see that Uborevich should have been shot already on the fact of his then assessment by Meretskov.

Uborevich, of course, is a conspirator... He should have been shot! He was shot... But why put on clean robes for dirty deeds? After all, when you compare memoirs

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Meretskov and the transcript, the conclusion suggests itself:

Meretskov was "taken" for the case both times, but due to circumstances *they were spared*.

No, they weren't sure of themselves. And from Stalin, from Yezhov, from Beria demanded that they believe in everything, always and in everything ...

AMONG the large and small slander against Beria, there is also some slander about the plot of "Beria-Sorge" - in the reference to Sorge, given in the biographical dictionary of K. Zalessky, it is stated: "Wife 3. - Ekaterina Alexandrovna Maksimova (1903-1943) 4.9.1942 by order of L.P. Beria was arrested and died in the camps "...

Only the date of Maksimova's arrest is accurate here. However, Elena Prudnikova, in her book about Sorge, documents that, to the failure of Sorge, the arrest of Catherine - a year after her husband was arrested in Tokyo, he had no relationship. Maksimova, who had left for evacuation, was arrested on the testimony of her relative Elena Haupt, who was arrested in May 1942. Moreover, Haupt hardly slandered Catherine, she just seemed suspicious of the way of life of Maximova, associated with the "incomprehensible foreigner."

On November 17, 1942, Maksimova was transferred to Moscow, and on March 13, 1943, a Special Meeting under the People's Commissar sentenced her to 5 years of exile for connections suspicious of espionage. On May 15, she arrived (on her own) in the village of Bolshaya Murta, 120 kilometers from Krasnoyarsk, and on May 21 she wrote to her sister: "Dear sister! Here I am again enjoying the sky, the air and complete freedom.

Maksimova began to work, judging by the future, in a dangerous production, because already on May 29, 1943, she was taken to the Murta hospital with an extensive chemical burn and died on July 3. In the hospital, not in the camp...

And her sad story, seemingly "fastened" by slanderers to the activities of Beria, is an extra drop, which reflects the life story of Beria himself, slandered both "big" and "little".

Yes, the scoundrels have the audacity to pour dirt on Beria even during the war, when he was the most active member of the State Defense Committee!

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Colonel Souvenirs in his published by decision of the Academic Council

The Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation "Labor" writes:

"With the outbreak of the war, things got to the point that they began to kill (yes. - S.K.) simply on the personal instructions of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. So, in October 1941, Colonel General A.D. Loktionov and Hero of the Soviet Union G.M. Stern, Lieutenant General of Aviation F.K. Arzhenukhin, Heroes of the Soviet Union I.I. Proskurov and P.V. Rychagov, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Ya.V. Smushkevich, division engineer I.F. Sacrier, major generals P.S. Volodin, M.M. Kayukov, G.M. Savchenko, brig engineer SO. Sklizkov "...

One could say "a few words" about almost every one of those shot. Actually, I have already spoken about Smushkevich and Rychagov, and here I will add that I found vague information from K. Zalesky that Stalin, immediately before the war, entrusted Rychagov with a secret inspection of the border. If this is so, then the motives for the arrest of Rychagov immediately after the start of the war become completely clear - he gave Stalin false information.

However, I will explain in detail the guilt of Major General Pavel Volodin...

On June 10, 1941, People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov issued Order No. 0035, which began like this:

"On May 15, 1941, the German Yu-52 non-scheduled aircraft was allowed to pass across the state border without hindrance and flew across Soviet territory via Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk to Moscow. No measures were taken to stop its flight by the air defense authorities ... "

How do you like it, dear reader? And General Volodin ... However, I'd better give the corresponding place in NPO order No. 0035:

"... The Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the KA, Major General of Aviation Volodin and the Deputy Chief of the 1st Department of the Headquarters of the Air Force, Major General of Aviation Grendal, knowing that the Yu-52 aircraft arbitrarily flew over the border, not only

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took measures to detain him, but also facilitated his flight to Moscow by allowing him to land at the Moscow airfield and instructing the air defense service to ensure the flight ... "

Then Volodin was only reprimanded, but on June 27, 1941, he was arrested. After all, the situation on June 10 and June 27 differed like heaven and earth. However, Volodin and the rest were shot on the hardest day of October 27, 1941, not on the "personal instructions" of Beria, but by decision of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, which, after the outbreak of war, received the right to sentence as an emergency measure to capital punishment.

By the way, immediately after the war, Beria raised the issue of abolishing such rights, but was not supported in that.

POSSIBLE, the reader noticed that, having told about some side of Beria's activities during the war, then, after some time, I return to it again, but it's simply impossible otherwise ... Beria during the war looks like a real Figaro - he managed everything and everywhere . So, once again rereading this chapter, I suddenly discovered that I had not said anything about Beria as a member of the special group of employees of the People's Commissariat of Railways (NKPS) and the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the General Staff (UPVOSO) created on March 13, 1942 by decision of the State Defense Committee headed by Kaganovich, Malenkov and Beria.

Former head of the UPVOSO, later - People's Commissar I.V. Kovalev in Pravda of April 15, 1982 wrote about it this way:

"On the night of February 14, I was invited to a joint meeting of the State Defense Committee and the Politburo ... I expressed the opinion of the UPVOSO about the imperfection of the management of the transport system and proposed the creation of a Transport Committee under the State Defense Committee - a single governing body for all types of transport of rail, road and air transport and river transport ...

It was a big event. The Transport Committee, which included four members of the Politburo, was able to mobilize all the resources of the transport system, eliminated the confusion in the use of all modes of transport, and ensured their interaction.

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Three members of the Politburo, not named then by Kovalev, are named above by me. As for the fourth member, this meant Stalin himself, who was the first to support Kovalev's proposal and agreed purely formally, "for the authority" of the TC, to assume the title of its chairman. But practically here, at least a third of the load was pulled by the same Beria. And that's why the stories about his military love affairs look not only mean, but simply ridiculous. Not only was he not a womanizer by nature (remember how he got on Serov, who was on a spree with a Polish prima donna), he didn't have time for all this!

Marshal Yakovlev recalled how dissatisfied Stalin was even in 1943 (!) When Poskrebyshchev could not find the head of the GAU for "full" forty minutes, because Voroshilov first took him to TsAGI, and then dragged him to his apartment in the Kremlin for lunch , and Yakovlev was absent from GAU somewhere from noon to six o'clock in the evening. But on Yakovlev there was only GAU! And Stalin needed him much less often than Beria!

Yes, Beria was something like Figaro, but without Rosina as entertainment. But he always experienced satisfaction from the work.

There is such a thing - "Hamburg account". It traces its history back to absolutely closed world wrestling championships, which were periodically organized by circus wrestlers at the beginning of the 20th century, having rented a circus in Hamburg for this. Wrestlers' entrepreneurs arranged their ratings in a way that was beneficial for circus commerce, so often the strongest were forced to lose to the weakest. However, the carpet masters also wanted to know the true strength of each. So they fought in an empty circus - no fools. And only the "Hamburg" champion was valued among professionals.

So, if you build a "Hamburg rating" of personal merits in the Great Patriotic War, then the absolute "champion" is obvious - this is Joseph Stalin. But the second step must be given to Lavrenty Beria!

I have already said that the party cultural bureaucrats recommended that an article about Lavrenty Pavlovich himself be cut with a razor from the fifth volume of the TSB. But Beria meant too much in the USSR until June 26, 1953, and he

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did for the country before this date, so that like this - with a swipe of a razor - to remove it, if not from the official history, then from all volumes of the TSB published before June 26, 1953.

Therefore, in volume 12, signed for publication on May 28, 1952, on page 318 in the article "State Defense Committee" *and after June 26, 1953*, one could read in any library of the Union:

"The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 30, 1943 noted the special merits of the members of the GOKO in strengthening the production of weapons and ammunition and supplying the army in difficult wartime conditions: in the field of tank production - the deputy chairman of the GOKO V.M. Molotov; in the field of production of weapons and ammunition - a member of the GOKO L.P. Beria; in the field of production of aircraft and engines for them - a member of the GOKO G.M. Malenkov; in the field of setting up the matter of supplying the Soviet Army with food, fuel and clothing allowances - a member of the GOKO A.I. Mikoyan. By this decree, they were awarded the titles of Heroes of Socialist Labor."

As we know (from completely "democratic" sources), Beria also oversaw the production of tanks, aircraft and engines. But he received the Star of the Hero only for weapons and ammunition, although Lavrenty Pavlovich every now and then had to insure both the official "aviator" Malenkov, and - especially - "tanker" Molotov, whom he quickly replaced even officially.

In the biographical encyclopedic dictionary of Konstantin Zalessky, it is said about Molotov that "during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 he was deputy. prev. State Defense Committee - the second person after Stalin. But was it really so? Until the death of Kalinin in 1946, he was the formal head of the USSR, and after his death, Shvernik. This is *formally the second* Molotov was in the State Defense Committee from the very beginning of the war, if we have in mind the specific daily work on organizing the work of the economy.

But in reality, Beria was already the second, having become the second person after Stalin even officially since May 1944.

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Even Zalessky (who hates Beria, as befits a liberal) reports that "through the GKO, B. was entrusted with control over the production of weapons, ammunition and mortars, and also (together with G.M. Malenkov) over the production of aircraft and aircraft engines." About Molotov, the same Zalessky writes that in the State Defense Committee "his duties included, first of all, negotiations with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition."

And who controlled the production of tanks?

That's it! To admit that control over the production of tanks was on Beria, it would be too much for Zalessky! But it is no coincidence that there were so many former "tankers" in the leadership of the uranium problem that Beria oversaw! V.M. Malyshev, N.L. Dukhov, B.G. Muzrukov - Beria knew all of them and many others from joint affairs in tank building.

And here is how in 1995, in the collective monograph "The Creation of the First Soviet Nuclear Bomb", academician Petrosyants, who knew him in a business way since the war, assessed Beria:

"... Being by nature a very smart person, with good technical acumen (in his youth he graduated from a mechanical and construction technical school,

was fond of architecture), he became the largest organizer of military equipment in the prewar and war years. Supervising the military industries on behalf of Stalin during the war years, leading the relevant people's commissariats, he managed to organize the production of many thousands of tanks, self-propelled gun mounts, many millions of ammunition, shells, ensured the uninterrupted operation of metallurgy in the rear - ferrous and non-ferrous, etc.

Among all the members of the Politburo ... and other top leaders of the country, Beria turned out to be the most prepared in matters of technical policy and technology. I knew all this firsthand, but from personal contacts with him on many technical issues related to tank building and nuclear issues.

To understand the weight of this opinion, one must know who the person who expressed it was. Andranik Melkonovich Petrosyants in 1933 after graduating from the Ural Polytechnic

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Nikolai Institute began as an ordinary engineer at the Ural Plant of Heavy Engineering. S. Ordzhonikidze and quickly rose to the position of chief engineer. In 1939, he was appointed a member of the board and deputy people's commissar of heavy engineering, and since 1940 - the first deputy people's commissar of the machine-tool industry. From October 1941 - Deputy

commissar of the tank industry. And since 1943, Major General of the Tank Engineering Service Petrosyants worked in the State Defense Committee of the USSR - along the same "tank" line. Looking ahead, I will say that at the end of 1946, Beria took him to the uranium problem - deputy head of the First Main Directorate, and Petrosyants became one of the major figures in the rapidly emerging nuclear technology, later - Hero of Socialist Labor, academician.

Alas, dear reader, I have not yet given the entire characterization given to Beria by Petrosyants, and only now I will fill this gap. Petrosyants began his story about Lavrenty Pavlovich like this:

"L.P. Since 1938, Beria headed the NKVD of the USSR, before that he worked in the bodies of the Cheka and the NKVD of Azerbaijan and Georgia. These departments, under the leadership of Beria, carried out mass arrests and executions, brutal operations to deport the indigenous inhabitants of Ingushetia, Chechnya, Ossetia, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks and other nationalities to the remote steppes of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. During the war with Nazi Germany, Beria created SMERSH and barrage detachments, which brought death to many people.

But Beria, the punisher and organizer of mass arrests, had something else. face. Being by nature ... "and further on the above text.

I don't know about the reader, but as I reread the lines I've just quoted, I smiled, although there was nothing funny about that. Personally, Petrosyants knew only one face of Beria - a brilliant organizer, able to work and able to create conditions for work, selfless, seven-core (if you calculate his duties only according to Petrosyants' list) Bolshevik, giving all his strength for the victory of the country.

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The other, the "face" of the alleged punisher, could not be **personally** known to Petrosyants, he never **personally** encountered those situations that he writes about as negative for Beria's assessment. He even distorts the pre-war biography of Beria and condemns Beria from **other people's** words.

Alas, this, as the reader could already see more than once, is repeated over and over again: the positive **personal** impressions that quite adequately characterize Beria, and then the uncritical perception of his negative image,

imposed from outside.

MY STORY about Beria of the war years is coming to an end. However, something else

I should say here...

On May 9, 1945, the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders ended. And now it was possible to compare the course and results of the two world wars that befell Russia.

First, let's look at the First World War, in which the old Russia participated. And here's what happens...

Tsarist Russia - according to the assurances of the "democrats" - was not a country, but full of raspberries! And there was a "sovereign" "by the grace of God", and statesmen ... One Pyotr Arkadevich Stolypin was worth something! As the white pique vests from the famous Florida cafe in the unforgettable Ilfo-Petrovsky Chernomorsk would say: "This is the head!"

Yes, and soldiers - brave kids, and big-faced "patriots" - thorny merchant hunters - were present. And the guardian of the Russian land was - St. John of Kronstadt, unsurpassed Chrysostom.

There were also other, and other, and other ...

This Russia started a war with Germany, which immediately grew (as the Golden International planned) into a world war, of its own free will. At first, she even badly patted the "German" in East Prussia.

The top leadership, including the emperor, did not experience psychological shock from the start of the war, because there was nothing unexpected in what was happening - Russia was even the first to announce mobilization!

The industry of Russia that started the war had everything

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the ability to work without interruption at full strength - during the entire war, not a single German or Austro-Hungarian bomb or projectile fell on any of Russia's strategically important industrial or military facilities. And all of them remained intact **throughout the war**. Completely - the whole war - remains (because of small losses in Poland) - in general, the entire economic potential of Russia.

And from the very beginning of the war, the Germans were forced to fight on two fronts, because from the very beginning of the war, that **Russia had powerful allies**. And then...

And only then - when the war was further developed, Russia was trampling on its borders, gradually surrendering its albeit marginal, but still - its territory!

Warsaw...

Riga...

And it fell apart more and more, more and more climbed (as the Golden International planned) into external debts. And more and more there were not enough rifles, shells (although sometimes they say the opposite), there were not enough resources.

And most importantly, they lacked that morale, which, according to Napoleon's accurate assessment, correlates with the material factor as three to one. During the years of *that* war, not a single significant work of art was created - only "anyanyas in champagne, anyanyas in champagne" ... Rylov geese, rustling over the Russian North with their wings: "What space!" not counting - they were already flying to the future new Russia.

And in the end, the tsarist Russia of Nicholas II - as a result of the war - collapsed! Shameful and disgraceful!

And what about Soviet Russia? How about Stalin's USSR? According to the assurances of the same "democrats" and the eternally dissatisfied Russian "intellectuals", it was not a country, but a gloomy concentration camp, which was ruled, having intimidated the people before that, by the two main "executioners" - Stalin and Beria.

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Talented people were in this prison country in the corral, and they were sent in batches to Kolyma.

Incompetent party and Soviet workers (that is, power) people the masses hated it. And so on...

And now the insidious and strong enemy inflicts on this "colossus with feet of clay" a powerful, previously unprecedented in history - in terms of territorial and material scope - a military blow. The front is falling apart, entire formations are being captured. The enemy is rapidly occupying thousands of square kilometers of the country's territory. Many government officials shamefully flee to the east, leaving everything to the mercy of fate. In some places Germans are greeted with bread salt...

"Tyrant" Stalin and his "satraps" are on the verge of collapse. Control is lost. There is little outside help, no active allies, no second front. A significant part of the country is occupied, part is under bombardment... Even the capital is bombed, and the second capital is under blockade.

Thousands of the most important industrial enterprises are either lost due to the occupation, or destroyed, or evacuated to the east. Coal production fell from 165.9 million tons in 1941 to 75.5 million tons in 1942. Steel smelting - from almost 15 million tons in 1940 to 4.8 million tons in the same 1942, pig iron - from 18 million tons to 8 ...

And then...

And only then, when the war developed further, Russia powerfully went forward, taking back first spans, crumbs, and then ... And then reaching the "Europe"!

This new Soviet Russia was able during the war to recreate such a powerful economy that gave the army tens of thousands of tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, hundreds of thousands of aircraft, artillery pieces!

And what tanks!

What guns!

This Russia has become a single military camp. Not in words, but in deeds, she lived with the call: "Everything for the front, everything for the Victory!" This Russia created outstanding works of art during the war: symphonies and truly folk songs, novels and stories, poems and plays...

This Russia even built new metro lines and stations!

And what stations!

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And, in the end, she defeated the enemy, came to Berlin, casting a medal from military bronze for his capture, and for the capture of Budapest and Vienna, and for the liberation of Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade ...

As a result of this World War II, which became Russia's second Patriotic, Russia finally took shape as a great superpower.

What glory!

What a result!

And what a contrast compared with the results of that first, "tsarist" war.

WHY? How? For what? And under whose direction?

In 1944, in the Urals, the party organization, of which Boris Glebovich Muzrukov was also a member, received an application for admission to the CPSU (b) from the 74-year-old Academician Paton.

Here is what he wrote:

"When the Soviet government took over the administration of our country, I was already 47 years old. Having worked for many years under the conditions of the capitalist system, I assimilated his worldview... I considered the undertakings of the new government unviable...

its implementation. Time passed, work on the Dneprostroy began, which was not given to the previous government. I began to understand my mistake as new construction projects were carried out ... My worldview changed more and more. I began to understand that what brings me closer to Soviet power is that work, which is the basis of my life, the Soviet power puts above all else. I was convinced of this in practice ... The outbreak of the Great Patriotic War was a brilliant confirmation of the power and stamina of the Soviet system. Before my eyes passed the last two wars - Japanese and imperialist. I had the opportunity to compare the situation then with what is happening now, during the Patriotic War. I am amazed by the endurance and heroism with which the Soviet people are fighting on the fronts and in the rear under the firm leadership of the party and the Soviet government ... "

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Here's an assessment from the outside...

Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin was an enemy, but a smart and experienced enemy: he fought in Poland, in France, in the Balkans, in Africa, on the Eastern Front, and then again in France, in the Ardennes and in Germany itself ... Finished the war chief of staff of the 5th Panzer Army in the Ruhr pocket. In 1956, his book "Panzer battles - 1939-1945", published in our country in 1957 ("Tank battles. 1939-1945"), was published in London. Chapter XIX of his memoirs is called "The Red Army", and below I will give excerpts from it.

So, a hereditary German officer, Wehrmacht General F.V. Mellenthin:

"The Russian soldier loves his "mother Russia", and therefore he fights for the communist regime, although, generally speaking, he is not a political fanatic. However, it should be borne in mind that the Party and its organs have enormous influence in the Red Army. Almost all commissars are urban dwellers and come from working class backgrounds. Their courage borders on recklessness; These people are very smart and determined. They managed to create in the Russian army what it lacked in the First World War - iron discipline. <...> Discipline is the main trump card of communism, the driving force of the army. It was also a decisive factor in the achievement of Stalin's enormous political and military successes. <...>

The industrialization of the Soviet Union, carried out persistently and ruthlessly, gave the Red Army new equipment and a large number of highly qualified specialists.<...>

... during the war, the Russians were constantly improving, and their top commanders and headquarters received a lot of useful things by studying the experience of the combat operations of their troops and the German army. They learned to react quickly to any changes in the situation, to act energetically and decisively <...>

... the Russian, in general, is certainly an excellent soldier and, with skillful leadership, is a dangerous adversary

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<...> The skillful and persistent work of the communists has led to the fact that since 1917 Russia has changed in the most amazing way. There can be no doubt that the Russian is increasingly developing the skill of independent action, and the level of his education is constantly growing.

Russian divisions<...> advanced, as a rule, on a narrow front<...> They appeared as if from under the ground, and it seemed impossible to contain the impending avalanche.<...> Only battle-hardened soldiers were able to overcome fear that gripped everyone.<...> After 1941, to the human masses of Russians were added masses of tanks. It was, of course, much more difficult to repulse such attacks, and it cost much more nervous tension.<...>

My remarks<...>concerned<...>the actions of the Russian infantry, which during the Second World War fully preserved the great traditions of Suvorov and Skobelev. <...> Russian artillery, like infantry, is also used massively.<...> During the war, the Russians improved and developed artillery tactics in the offensive. Their artillery preparation turned into a genuine flurry of destructive fire.<...> Russian artillery is a very formidable branch of the armed forces and fully deserves the high appreciation that Stalin gave it.<...>

The extraordinary development of the Russian armored forces deserves the closest attention from those who study the experience of the war. No one doubts that Russia can have its own Seidlitz, Murat or Rommel - in 1941-1945, the Russians, of course, had such great commanders. <...> The tankers of the Red Army were tempered in the crucible of war, their skill increased immeasurably. Such a transformation must have required exceptionally high organization and unusually skillful planning and leadership."

The military himself, General Mellenthin, praised the purely military leadership of the USSR: "The Russian high command knows its business better than the command of any other army." But knowing what we know, we can

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to say: "Knows thanks to the political leadership, which formed during the war and in front of it the competent potential of such a command"!

Other evidence can be cited, but I will limit myself to the confessions of the famous German aircraft entrepreneur and designer Heinkel. Aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev wrote that the fulfillment of Soviet orders in the early 1930s forced the German to sharply improve technological discipline and factory control methods. "I thought," Heinkel was surprised, "that I have an excellent factory, but the Bolsheviks work better."

Russian "democrats" put candles in front of the images of the "innocently murdered by villainous Bolsheviks" of "Saint" Nicholas II... But the greatness of the state was ensured by the era of Stalin.

And it is the era of Beria.

And it provided not at the expense of detachments and fear, but at the expense of the creative, creative forces of the people, headed by the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin and his deputy L.P. Beria, about whom in all post-war editions of the history of the Great Patriotic War, if a couple of words were said, then only slanderous and abusive.

Chapter 17

FOUNDER OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

ON AUGUST 21, 1944 in Dumbarton Oaks on the outskirts of Washington, in a three-story mansion built in 1802 and owned by Harvard University, a conference of representatives of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain opened. The aim of the conference was to work out the foundations of the future United Nations.

Usually, the ancient building was filled with students studying ancient and Byzantine art, and now three delegations, together with technical staff numbering more than seven dozen people, have occupied it for more than a month - not so much for a representative international conference...

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Opening the conference, Secretary of State Cordell Hull said that the preservation of peace and security in the future is the main goal

international cooperation.

Nearly six months earlier, in March 1944, full-scale planning began at Los Alamos National Laboratory as part of the Manhattan Project for the first US atomic bomb test, codenamed Trinity. And during the conference in Dumbarton Oaks, members of the Military Technical Committee in charge of the Manhattan Project, V. Bush and D. Conant, in a memorandum addressed to Secretary of War G. Stimson, proposed including the Soviet Union in the system of control over nuclear weapons that have not yet been created "to avoid undesirable complications in the relationship." This proposal was rejected, having, in fact, no chance of acceptance. Effective control could be implemented only in two cases: either with a controlled general renunciation of these weapons, or with controlled production of these weapons both in the USA and in the USSR, moreover, with a prearranged mutual minimization of future nuclear arsenals. America, on the other hand, was satisfied only with a monopoly, and it was moving towards it very rapidly. Well, when there is money, everything (or *almost* everything) is solved quickly.

So far, however, the atomic bomb has been the "skin" of not only an unkill, but also a generally problematic "bear". Nevertheless, the issue turned out to be potentially so serious that even in the Soviet Union, which was waging the most difficult war, nuclear work was already underway, although so far their scale was forced to be small compared to the "Manhattan" one.

But the work was carried out, carried out quite consciously, and just on the closing day of the conference in Dumbarton Oaks - September 28 - it was exactly two years since the adoption of GKO order No. 2352ss of September 28, 1942 "On the organization of work on uranium". Then everything still did not leave the stage of the first (and not very intelligible) organizing documents, and everything revolved around Molotov. And Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, as an organizer of technical projects, has not proven himself from the best side - tankers have already abandoned him

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went in favor of Beria, and the atomic scientists - I will say this, looking ahead - still had to give it up ...

And also - in favor of Beria!

On February 11, 1943, the next GKO order No. GOKO 2872ss was adopted, which began and ended like this:

"For the purpose of more successful development of work on uranium:

1. Assign to TT. Pervukhina M.G. (then - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry. - S.K.) and Kaftanova SV. (Chairman of the Committee for Higher Education under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and authorized by the State Defense Committee for Science. — S.K.) the duty to supervise the work on uranium on a daily basis and provide systematic assistance to the special laboratory of the atomic nucleus of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The scientific management of work on uranium is entrusted to Professor Kurchatov I.V.<...>

11. To oblige the head of the special laboratory of the atomic nucleus (laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. - S.K.) prof. Kurchatova I.V. carry out the necessary research by July 1, 1943 and submit to the State Defense Committee by July 5, 1943 a report on the possibility of creating a uranium bomb or a uranium fuel.

*Chairman of the State Defense Committee
V. Molotov.*

I don't know why Molotov was called someone he never was (Stalin was the permanent Chairman of the GKO), but this is how it is in the document.

Yes, the best way to understand an era is to read its documents. And if we turn to them, then immediately collapses, for example, one of the old and

stable "atomic" fictions: they say, Stalin did not understand the significance of the atomic problem even after he was "enlightened" by US President Truman at the Berlin (Potsdam) conference in 1945.

After getting acquainted with the now declassified Soviet documents of **1939 (thirty-ninth)-1944**, the following, for example, a place in Marshal Zhukov's "Memoirs and Reflections" can only cause a smile:

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"I don't remember exactly what date (it was July 24, 1945, 8 days after the first bomb was tested at the Alamogordo (New Mexico) test site on July 16. - S.K.) ... Truman *informed* I.V. Stalin about the presence of an unusually large bomb in the United States, without calling it an atomic weapon.

At the time of this information, as they later wrote abroad, W. Churchill dug into the face of I.V. Stalin, watching his reaction. But he did not betray his feelings in any way ... Both Churchill and many other Anglo-American authors believed that, probably, Stalin ... did not understand the meaning of the message made to him.

Actually... I.V. Stalin, in my presence, told V.M. Molotov about conversation with Truman. V.M. Molotov immediately said:

- They inflate their own value. I.V. Stalin laughed:
- Let them beat it. It will be necessary to have a talk with Kurchatov about speeding up our work.

I realized that it was about the atomic bomb ... "

I don't know if Zhukov really understood anything then, because he was not even close to the information on our atomic work then. And the name of Kurchatov hardly meant anything to Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov then. But, besides Marshal Zhukov, there was another Marshal of the Soviet Union in Potsdam, and although he is not mentioned in Zhukov's memoirs, the name Kurchatov was familiar to him. Moreover, this marshal was familiar with Professor (in fact, by that time already an academician) Kurchatov for more than a year. And less than a month after the end of the Potsdam Conference, they will start working together—closely and fruitfully.

This Marshal of the Soviet Union was Beria, who was in charge of guarding the Soviet delegation. However, in a letter from his cell in 1953, Beria reminded Molotov that although he was in Potsdam "by the nature of his work," Molotov suggested that Beria be a direct member of the delegation.

In any case, even without formally being a delegate,

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Beria remained Deputy Chairman of the GKO. However, this is not even why Stalin could not immediately inform Beria about Truman's information. He simply had to do this, because on December 3, 1944, he himself approved GKO Decree No. 7069ss, the final paragraph of which read:

"Assign to Comrade Beria L.P. monitoring the development of work on uranium".

If we recall that at first these duties were assigned to Pervukhin and Kaftanov, and that the name Molotov appeared in the first documents of the State Defense Committee (GOKO), it becomes clear that the war had not yet ended, and Beria had already been prepared for a new and still "that" job that others did not very much pulled even at the initial stage of development of the problem. To make what I have said more convincing, I will cite extracts from one memorandum and one letter.

On May 19, 1944, Kurchatov wrote a note addressed to Stalin "On the state of works on the problem of uranium on May 20, 1944, "where there were such words:

"Attention and help, which were invariably provided to laboratory No. 2, comrade. V.M. Molotov, direct and daily management of its activities by comrade. M.G. Pervukhin, support from Comrade. ST. Kaftanov helped ... the laboratory to overcome difficulties, get stronger, start

work and get a number of important results ... "

Tov. M.G. Pervukhin on the same day sent a note from Kurchatov to Stalin with in his own letter, where in the fifth paragraph he proposes:

"...5. Create a Uranium Council under the GOKO for day-to-day control and assistance in carrying out work on uranium with approximately the following composition: 1) Comrade L.P. Beria. (chairman of the board); 2) comrade V.M. Molotov; 3) Comrade Pervukhin M.G. (vice-chairman); 4) Academician Kurchatov I.V. ..."

In the light of paragraph 5 of Pervukhin's letter, Kurchatov's curtsy towards Molotov looked like just an act of courtesy towards the outwardly imperturbable, but in reality quite touchy Molotov. But on the eve of a great work, those who were to deal with its organization and management in practice preferred to have

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to with the most powerful manager of the state - Beria. For the business of the power, which was still waging war, was to be unprecedentedly difficult, and Russia, like the Yankees, had not so much money for it.

But before starting the topic of Beria in the uranium problem, I will finish the topic of Beria's marshalship. On July 9, 1945, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Did Lavrenty Pavlovich deserve this title?

In order to correctly answer this question, let us first ask ourselves another question: "Did the aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev, who had never been at the front for a single day, deserve the rank of colonel general? Or the designer of heavy tanks Leonid Dukhov - the rank of major general, albeit in the tank engineering service? .. "

Beria's contribution to the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was enormous, truly marshal's. And he risked his head (in war as in war) no less than any of the front marshals. So he received his marshal rank, perhaps by right. After all, he participated in such a war, where the rear was also a front, where victory was ensured only by the tension of all the forces of the state, brought together without division into purely military and purely economic.

But in general, these are, so to speak, emotions ... And if you stick to dry facts, then Lavrenty Pavlovich received the title of Marshal for the reason that the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 6, 1945 abolished special ranks for the commanding staff of the NKVD - NKGB, introduced on October 7, 1937, bringing them to the combined arms. The highest special rank of the General Commissar of Security of the USSR was reasonably equated at one time with the highest military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. And only Beria was the General Commissar of Security. Someone about the "Lubyansk Marshal" was ironic, but after all, Stalin did not spend a single day at the front, and he deserved the title of Generalissimo without a doubt.

People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR Merkulov -

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commissar of the State Security Service of the 1st rank, became an army general, commissars of the State Security Service of the 2nd rank Abakumov, Krugloye, Serov, Kobulov, Chernyshev, Goglidze, Pavlov became a general colonels, etc.

HOWEVER, almost immediately after the end of the war - less than six months had passed, the essence and nature of the state activities of Marshal Beria changed dramatically - he became the main curator of the uranium problem, but in fact - founder of our nuclear industry. And that's why his contribution to a new business for the country was also outstanding.

Although...

Although by the summer of 1945, not so much, I repeat, and *the new ones* were "atomic"

affairs both for many Soviet people and personally for L.P. Beria.

First, already in the thirties, the USSR had a good domestic material base for nuclear physics and good personnel who quite adequately looked at the nuclear prospects of mankind. On December 31, 1940, Izvestia published an article with the significant title "Uranium-235".

True, the physicist Pyotr Kapitsa, in a conversation with an activist of the writers of the journal "Children's Literature", published in the April issue of the journal for 1940, in response to the question: "Is it impossible to expect anything from the development of chain reactions?", Answered: "If such a reaction happened, it could not stop and the Earth would not exist ...". However, Kapitsa - for all his talent - was more ambitious than brilliant, and five years later the fallacy of his point of view would be revealed after the implementation of an explosive chain reaction on July 16, 1945 in Alamogordo.

Not on Kapitsa, however, physics converged, and in 1940 the Uranium Commission was created under the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The memorandum of Academicians Vernadsky, Fersman and Khlopin addressed to Bulganin dated July 12, 1940 stated:

"Works on the physics of the atomic nucleus led ... to the discovery of the fission of atoms of the element uranium ... in which a huge amount of intra-atomic energy is released ... If the question of technical use inside

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atomic energy will be resolved in a positive sense, then this should fundamentally change the entire applied energy industry."

However, on August 8 and 9, 1945, "a huge amount of intra-atomic energy" incinerated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And this fact determined Russia's "nuclear" priorities for many years to come.

And HERE now, perhaps, you can go to the "atomic" line in the life of Beria. Having begun in the war years, it, without interruption, continued literally until his last day at the heights of the highest state power.

This line began, as one might expect, in its Chekist, intelligence aspect. And one of the first tasks for "atomic" intelligence was set in the operational letter No. 1 of the 5th department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR to the deputy resident of the New York residency, Gayk Ovakimyan, even before the war - on January 27, 1941. The letter to Gennady-Ovyakimyan was signed by Viktor (the operational pseudonym of the head of foreign intelligence Pavel Fitin), but this task was sanctioned, of course, by Pavel, that is, Beria, because the letter went to New York, albeit shortly before the division of the NKVD into the NKVD and the NKGB, but all before this separation. So, Beria knew about the possibility of obtaining "a new substance with enormous energy, exceeding the energy of coal by several million times" (as was said in the letter), at least from the beginning of 1941, even before the war.

With the unification of the NKVD and the NKGB after it began, intelligence issues again became the responsibility of Beria. The Germans were on the outskirts of Moscow, but the flow of intelligence information did not stop even when Beria was not very much up to him. So, a note from the head of the 4th special department (Special Technical Bureau) of the NKVD of the USSR V. Kravchenko to People's Commissar L.P. Beria about work on the use of atomic energy for military purposes abroad and the need to organize this work in the USSR is dated October 10, 1941.

It started like this:

"Sent from England owls. secret materials of the British government concerning the work of English scientists

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scientists in the field of using atomic energy of uranium for military purposes,

contain two reports of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the British Defense Committee on the question of uranium atomic energy ...

Judging by these materials, great attention is paid in England to the problem use of uranium atomic energy for military purposes ... "

And even then, Kravchenko proposed "to create a special commission under the State Defense Committee of the USSR from among the prominent scientists of the USSR ... which should be instructed to present considerations on the possibility of carrying out work in the USSR on the use of atomic energy for military purposes."

However, Beria sent an official letter from the NKVD of the USSR to the GKO addressed to Stalin and Molotov No. 1720 / b only on October 6, 1942 - almost a year after the preparation of the first draft letter based on Kravchenko's note.

Some delay in Beria's information compared to the date of the adoption of the GKO Decree (September 28, 1942) on the resumption of work on uranium cannot be recognized as significant. The decision of the GKO was conditioned by the understanding of the problem by Soviet physicists, and Beria's letter was based on information about the understanding of the problem by foreign physicists. Moreover, Beria instructed to conduct an "internal" examination of intelligence materials by the NKVD specialists, which was not superfluous. The materials could be misinformation (say, academician Kapitsa would very likely evaluate them in this way), and before the report, Stalin had to carefully weigh everything.

Beria's letter was accompanied by a highly informative certificate from the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR "The use of uranium as an energy source and as an explosive." And further, the intelligence materials received from the People's Commissariat of Beria, on behalf of Molotov, were analyzed by Kurchatov. On November 27, 1942, in the conclusion of his memorandum addressed to Molotov, he wrote:

"1. In research into the problem of uranium, Soviet science has lagged considerably behind the science of England and America and at the present time has an incomparably smaller material base for carrying out experimental work.

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6. To manage this complex and enormous task, it seems necessary to establish a special committee under the State Defense Committee of the USSR under your chairmanship ... "

At the same time, for the first time at the highest state level, the names of professors Alikhanov, Khariton, Zeldovich, Kikoin, Aleksandrov and Shalnikov appeared ...

The next day, November 28, Molotov addressed Kurchatov's note to Stalin. A "chain reaction" of state work on the uranium problem began, although almost three years would have elapsed before the establishment of the Special Committee proposed by Kurchatov even at that time.

In 1943, the NKGB was separated from the NKVD, and Beria was temporarily withdrawing from operational information on nuclear matters ... Nevertheless, the matter was moving forward - although not shaky or rolled. In 1943-1944, the rate of intelligence materials coming from behind the cordon was, perhaps, even faster than our own work on the uranium subject.

The head of laboratory No. 2, Professor Kurchatov, wrote reviews of intelligence materials, wrote memos to Pervukhin, but it was far from breakthrough actions, and the reason was, I think, not only wartime. It's just that managers have been dealing with this problem so far, although they are experienced (the same Pervukhin), but they do not reach the level of the problem. And at the end of 1943, on December 22, Kurchatov sent M.G. Pervukhin another note on the non-compliance by the departments of the "uranium" decisions of the State Defense Committee.

Yes, the problem was still waiting for its Manager... And the events in the world

developed, and the formidable beginning of the atomic era was already close.

On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union, in fulfillment of its obligations to the Allies, declared war on Japan. On the same August 8, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and the next day on Nagasaki.

September 2, 1945, representatives of the Japanese Supreme
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1st command aboard the USS Missouri signed an act of unconditional surrender.

Ninety-one years earlier, in 1854, Commodore Perry, under the muzzles of naval guns, "opened up" Japan, which had been in self-isolation for almost three hundred years. Perry was the first Yankee to dictate "the will of the white man" to the Japanese. And now General MacArthur had ordered Perry's flagship to be delivered to the Missouri, and, placed in a glass case and installed in a conspicuous place, this flag once again indicated Japan its place. The Yankees love symbolism that is associated with pleasant memories for them.

Two days later, on September 4, 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished. On December 29, 1945, Beria, by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces, was relieved of his duties as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. On January 10, 1946, he and the new People's Commissar Kruglov signed an act of acceptance and delivery of cases for the People's Commissariat, and on January 15, several lines appeared in the Izvestia newspaper in the Chronicle section:

"The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted the request of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Comrade L.P. Beria to release him from the duties of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR due to his overload with other central work. Comrade S.N. was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Kruglov.

Nothing was reported about the essence of the other "central work", and nothing could be reported, because the GOKO Decree of August 20, 1945 No. 9887ss / op "On the Special Committee under the GOKO" was stamped "Top Secret (Special Folder)". And by this resolution, a Special Committee with emergency powers was created to solve any problems of the "Uranium Project".

It included: L.P. Beria - chairman; G.M. Malenkov -

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU; ON THE. Voznesensky - Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR; B.L. Vannikov - People's Commissar of Ammunition; A.P. Zavenyagin - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, head of the 9th Directorate of the NKVD; I.V. Kurchatov - Head of Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Academician, scientific supervisor of the problem; P.L. Kapitsa - aka

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Demik, director of the Institute of Physical Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences; M.A. Makhnev - Secretary of the Special Committee; M.G. Pervukhin - People's Commissar of the Chemical Industry of the USSR.

Molotov, as we see, did not figure here in any capacity. And in what capacity could he appear here in a *businesslike* way?

For "immediate management of research, design, organizations and industrial enterprises for the use of intra-atomic energy of uranium and the production of atomic bombs" the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, subordinate to the Special Committee, was organized. Vannikov, who was relieved of his duties as People's Commissar of Ammunition, became the head of the PGU, and his deputies: A.P. Zavenyagin (first deputy), N.A. Borisov (from the State Planning Committee of the USSR), P.Ya. Meshik (ensuring secrecy), P.Ya. Antropov (exploration and development of uranium ore deposits) and A.G. Kasatkin (deputy people's commissar of the chemical industry).

Perhaps the reader will find the surname N.A. Borisov. Yes it was

the same Borisov from the group under the GKO member A.P. Beria, who during the war provided the current management of the production of weapons and ammunition. Now the deputy of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Borisov actually transferred to the PGU. And Beria took him to him - he knew how to appreciate professionals, and since he already got the right to take anyone into the Special Committee system, he chose not just the best, but those of the best who were tested in practice by himself.

Vannikov, Zavenyagin and, of course, Meshik and Makhnev were brought to atomic affairs, too, Beria.

Paragraph VII of the protocol No. 6 of the meeting of the Special Committee of September 28, 1945 provided for the organization of a certain Bureau No. 2 as part of the Special Committee, with subordination directly to Beria. The functions of this Bureau were already visible from the one who headed it. Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, the deputy head of foreign intelligence, who is well known to us, became the head of the Bureau, and N.S. Sazykin, N.I. Eitingon and A.P. Vasilevsky. These were also old employees of Beria, and their involvement would also

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Lo, of course, not accidental - everyone had a more than serious matter.

Such an attitude towards personnel proved better than any verbal assurances that Beria remembered and respected those who knew how and wanted to work. And one who is able to understand the importance of the "human factor" for success cannot treat others with disdain. And already by this criterion, we can confidently dismiss the stories of even "eyewitnesses" about Beria's alleged rudeness, especially since, upon closer examination, such stories turn out to be either retellings or clearly decorated with "artistic" details in the spirit of political correctness, both partocratic and anti-Soviet.

Sometimes, however, we are dealing with a desire to somehow embellish our own role. There are, for example, supposedly Vannikov's recollections that, allegedly, on the eve of the adoption of the GKO decision on the formation of the Special Committee, Stalin called him to consult on whether to agree with Beria's proposal to close the leadership of the Atomic Project to the NKVD. Vannikov allegedly cautiously expressed doubts about the expediency of such an option, and Stalin listened to the advice, coming to the idea of "party control" over the project.

Such a style of making decisions was, it must be said, not typical for Stalin, and Vannikov for Stalin was not a figure of the level to consult with him, and even on "atomic" matters, about which Vannikov then hardly had a clear idea. A careful look at the "reliable" "evidence" turns out that the son of Vannikov, who died in 1962, passed these "memories" to a certain V.A. Baranov, and then they were uncritically reproduced in the book "The End of the Atomic Monopoly. How it was...", published by the Russian Federal Nuclear Center in Arzamas-16.

In reality, already on January 25, 1945, Stalin personally spoke with Kurchatov for the first time, and Beria and Molotov took part in this conversation, so that the outlines of the general scheme of the Special Committee began to take shape even then, without the mythical "participation" of Vannikov. Alas, such "reliable gossip" associated with the "atomic" Beria (as well as with

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Beria in general), even roams about seemingly "authoritative" *literature* a lot. And I will say something about this later. But what is certain is that all the work on the uranium problem from the very beginning proceeded under Stalin's constant control and with his day-to-day knowledge of the progress of the work. Here is a typical example... On January 31, 1946, Academician A.I. Alikhanov sends a letter to Stalin:

"Dear Joseph Vissarionovich! Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria informed me that you are interested in questions about:

- 1) what role does the study of cosmic rays play in modern physics;
- 2) what we have done in this field of science;
- 3) in what directions should these works be developed and, finally,
- 4) what activities can help this work.

The first three questions are answered in the attached note; as for the answer to the latter, it is given in a separate appendix ... "

And then followed a detailed note and application. Upon acquaintance Stalin imposed a sweeping resolution: "I agree. I. Stalin.

And in the lower left corner of the letter is Beria's visa (typewritten): "The issue of cosmic rays was resolved by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated March 4, 1946 No. 503-208ss" and by hand: "Comrade . *Makhnev. L. Beria. 4/III 46*".

Actually, the organization of the matter was structured like this ... All serious issues were considered and prepared in the apparatus of the PSU, in the secretariat of the Special Committee and in the apparatus of the Technical Council of the Special Committee.

Then the issues were considered at the next meeting of the Special Committee and formalized by its minutes. The meetings were convened on Fridays at 9 pm in the Kremlin (actually, this did not always work out, however). On the basis of the protocol, draft resolutions of the State Defense Committee (later - the Council of People's Commissars and even later - the Council of Ministers) of the USSR were prepared, which were then transferred to Stalin for signature. Sometimes Beria signed them.

The staff of the central office of PSU in 1946 was

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762 units, 50 of them belonged to the secretariat, and this was not accidental - the accuracy of the work of the PSU in general depended to a large extent on the precise and efficient work of the technical assistants to the leadership of the PSU. The salaries in the apparatus were as follows: head of the PGU - 4,500 rubles, deputies - 4,000 rubles, senior engineer - 2,000 rubles, draftsman-designer - 1,200 rubles, cleaner - 400 rubles. Initially, the PGU allocated a building in Krivokolenny Lane, and the secretariat of the Special Committee (not PGU) sat in ten rooms in the Kremlin - where Beria was also, whom nuclear duties did not release from his duties as Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

ENTERING Lavrentiy Pavlovich into the uranium problem turned out to be gradual, but firm. And Beria, as already mentioned, until the end of his public life remained the competent leader of the Soviet Atomic Program. But under Stalin, he no longer directed the work of the special services (and he no longer supervised this work in the first place).

And here it is necessary to make an explanation ... In the cadres of the Special Committee and its working body - the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, people from various departments were gathered, including those who came from the NKVD and the NKGB. This was understandable - Beria gathered his "atomic" guard from everywhere, where there were smart workers he personally knew. But now they were not employees, for example, of the NKVD. Beria, as deputy chairman of the council of ministers and chairman of the Special Committee, could give orders to the people's commissar (and later to the minister) of internal affairs, Kruglov, but only in part of "atomic" affairs.

It was the same with intelligence issues. Beria did not dispose of it - this was the prerogative of the Ministers of State Security Merkulov, Abakumov, Ignatiev, although he had influence on this side of the matter, because paragraph 12 of the Decree of the GKO, signed by Stalin, on the formation of the Special Committee read:

"Instruct comrade. BERIA to take measures to organize *overseas intelligence work* (in italics added by hand. - S.K.) to obtain more complete technical and economic information about *uranium*

industry

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and atomic bombs, entrusting him with the leadership of all *intelligence* work in this area, carried out by the *intelligence agencies* (NKGB, R.U.K.A., etc.).

I highlighted the words "in this area" in bold type. And let me remind you that all business documents of this kind, signed by Stalin, did not even have a hint of uncertainty. If it is said: "in this area", then not a single intelligence material on atomic topics should have passed by Beria, but only on "atomic" topics.

So, Beria was entrusted with the general management of atomic work, that is, in fact, the leadership in the creation of a new branch of the national economy. And although the first atomic work in the USSR began during the war and even before the war, now it was necessary to give them a qualitatively different scope.

Exploration of uranium deposits, organization of the extraction of uranium raw materials in the USSR, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, conversion of old and creation of new plants and factories, new production of various materials (for example, graphite of such high purity was required, which had not been produced in the country before), ensuring scientific research, living conditions at the "objects" - none of this could be overlooked ... And all this was within the sphere of constant (and competent and active) attention of the chairman of the Special Committee, L.P. Beria.

And the fact that what was said is not a routine phrase is convincingly proved by the documents. It must be said that the "atomic" Beria turned out to be "documented" most fully, since today an honest researcher has at his disposal the capital publication "Atomic Project of the USSR: Documents and Materials ...", published in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 17. 95, No. 160 on work on the identification, selection and publication of official, previously strictly classified "atomic" materials.

It was their special secrecy that saved them from the "attention" of such prominent destroyers of historical documents as Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites, Gorbachev and Gorbachev-Yeltsin. I have made extensive use of these materials, although the book includes only a small part of what I am sure would be of interest to the reader. And just to mention the study

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of that edition finally clarified for me the true image of the outstanding son of Russia - Lavrenty Beria. Moreover, without having at its disposal this array **of accurate** information, nothing worthwhile not only about the "atomic" Beria, but also about Beria in general - as an organizer and a person, write, perhaps,

impossible.

There are no memoirs, personal opinions in the already published eight books. Here are only meticulously processed (with a message about all visas, signatures, notes, underlining, outlines, etc.) declassified documents. Vultures: "Top Secret" and "Top Secret (Special Folder)", "Keep on a par with the cipher." The information is specific and business-like, although sometimes documents capture no less than a detective novel.

These weighty, excellently published volumes are a phenomenon in the world practice of publishing historical documents, no doubt unique, primarily because for many years they have been prepared for publication not by historians, but by "atomic" professionals, the prominent weapons physicist I mentioned, the Lenin Prize winner, Hero of Socialist Labor Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences German Arsenyevich Goncharov and Colonel Pavel Petrovich Maksimenko. Their work is completely devoid of subjectivity, opportunism and

unprofessionalism and is distinguished by thoroughness and a complete understanding of what is being discussed in the documents published by them from the archives of the "atomic" departments, as well as intelligence.

And from thousands of letters, memorandums, protocols, reports, resolutions and orders addressed to Beria or signed by him, the leading role of Lavrenty Pavlovich is DOCUMENTALLY clear both in solving the first, most urgent task - the creation of an atomic bomb, and in solving an even more complex and majestic task - creation of the domestic nuclear industry.

Visas and notes show that the head of the Atomic Program was able to brilliantly organize the work of a new huge undertaking, delving into the details if necessary, and, if necessary, looking at the issue broadly. And, I emphasize, **without any hint of punitive measures!**

Of course, outgoing documents signed by the Chairman
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others prepared for PGU (this is standard practice). But he did not sign them mechanically, just as numerous *incoming* documents addressed to him bear traces of the addressee's thoughtful work on them (copious underlining, outlines and, most importantly, businesslike and smart resolutions and orders, indicating an adequate assimilation by Lavrenty Pavlovich of the essence question).

HERE I open the first book of the II volume of documents and materials of the Atomic Project, where on pages 242-255 there are three minutes (Nos. 53, 54 and 55) of the meetings of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR on January 28, February 7 and February 27, 1948, and I write out a list of the issues under consideration, indicating those who were related to them.

I draw the reader's attention to the fact that the order of surnames each time is determined not by hierarchy, but by the level of involvement and responsibility of a particular person. So, in the protocol already No. 56 on issue IV "On measures for the manufacture of tubular filters", the responsible "TT. **Beria**, Pervukhin", and on issue V "On the organization of pilot production of corrosion-resistant materials for gaskets in the equipment of plant No. 817 and plant No. 813" - "TT. Pervukhin, **Beria**."

And I will immediately warn the reader that below I give the first, but not the last, tedious list to read. So what to do?! Or we want to understand who and what Beria was in the history of the country, and then we deal with this "without fools"! That is ACCORDING TO DOCUMENTS!!! Or...

Well, I am sure that among the readers of this book there will not be those who will not be interested in the acquaintance with the following. So (without breakdown by date), all the questions of the three ordinary meetings of the Special Committee:

On the work plan of KB-11 (comrades Khariton, Zernov, Makhnev, Aleksandrov, Malenkov, Voznesensky, Pervukhin, **Beria**).

On the plan of special work for 1948 (comrades Borisov, Malenkov, **Beria**, Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, Voznesensky, Kruglov, Makhnev, Cherepenev).

On measures to ensure in 1948 work on the
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following cosmic rays (comrades **Beria**, Malenkov, Vavilov, Pervukhin, Kruglov, Borisov).

About the resettlement from the regime zone of the plant No. 817 (comrades Rodionov, **Beria**).

On changing the boundaries of the Training Ground No. 2 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (comrades Antonov, **Beria**, Pervukhin, Makhnev).

On the term for the development of an operational plan for conducting research at the Training Ground No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comrades **Beria**, Pervukhin).

On the procedure for financing special construction projects of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (comrades Zavenyagin,

Beria, Voznesensky, Kruglov)

On measures to help the Scientific Research Vacuum Institute of the Ministry of Electrical Industry in the production of prototypes of high-vacuum equipment (comrades Borisov, Komarovsky, Meshcheryakov, **Beria**).

On the allocation of foreign currency to PGU for 1948 (comrades **Beria**, **Voznesensky**, **Pervukhin**).

Note by comrade Vannikov (comrades **Beria**, Voznesensky, Malenkov).

On the allocation of a turbogenerator to plant No. 544 (comrades Zhimerin, Klochkov, Zavenyagin, Pervukhin, **Beria**).

On the organization in the USSR Ministry of Finance of a department for financing and controlling the expenditure of special funds, rare and precious metals (comrades **Beria**, Voznesensky).

On measures to provide personnel for plant No. 817 and plant No. 813 (comrades Pervukhin, **Beria**, Vannikov, Voznesensky, Pronin, Kruglov, Meshik, Kurchatov, Zavenyagin).

On the organization of the production of highly refractory products (comrades Voznesensky, **Beria**, Tevosyan, Vannikov, Mit-rakov, Borisov).

On the plan for research work at the "Ms" installation in 1948 (comrades Kurchatov, **Beria**).

On the progress of the construction of the "M" installation (comrades Mints, **Beria**, Kabanov, Vannikov, Makhnev).

On the development of deposits B-9 (thorium. - S.K.) on the territory of the Yakutzoloto trust of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (comrades **Beria**, Malenkov, Kruglov, Mamulov, Melik Stepanov, Lomako, Malyshev, Vannikov).

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On measures to ensure the protection of hydroxylin (heavy water. - S.K.) (vols. Pervukhin, **Beria**, Kruglov).

On the use of repatriates and special settlers in construction objects of the First Main Directorate (comrade **Beria**).

On the plan for the extraction of P-9 (code name for uranium ore. - S.K.) in Poland (comrades **Beria**, Zavenyagin).

On the results of the verification of an anonymous letter about the disorder in the Soviet joint-stock company "Vismuth" (comrades Meshik, Voznesensky, Malenkov, **Beria**).

And so in each protocol: this or that participation of Lavrentiy Pavlovich was envisaged in resolving practically **all** issues that were in the field of view of the Special Committee. Therefore, we have the right and even the obligation to say today: the creation of the nuclear industry and the solution of the Nuclear problem is the result of the complex efforts of hundreds of thousands of our compatriots: scientists, engineers, intelligence officers, builders, production workers, but L.P. Beria must be defined as outstanding.

He knew how to combine the work of many into a single whole. And the fact that the Soviet Union liquidated the US nuclear monopoly so quickly is due to its organizational and human talent.

Eliminating the threat of US dictate was then really a matter of life and death for Russia! Already in 1949, when the first bomb was tested, Stalin once said in a narrow circle that if we were late with our bomb for a year and a half, then we would probably "try" it on ourselves. So it would be.

On February 22, 1946, Chargé d'Affaires a.i. in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, sent a telegram from Moscow to the US Secretary of State. Known as the "Long Kennan Telegram," the note to Washington was published in the summer of 1947 by Foreign Affairs as the article "Sources of Soviet Behavior" under the famous pseudonym "X." Kennan, accusing Moscow of being insensitive to the "logic of reason", argued:

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"Without being provoked by the forces of intolerance and subversive forces, the 'capitalist' world is today quite capable of living in peace with itself and with Russia."

And on September 27, 1946, the USSR Ambassador to the USA N. Novikov, in a note sent by him to Moscow at the request of Foreign Minister Molotov, began with the opposite statement:

"The foreign policy of the United States, reflecting the imperialist tendencies of American monopoly capital, is characterized in the post-war period by the striving for world domination"...

Molotov emphasized the last two words, and they really reflected the essence of the situation. The first plan for a nuclear attack on the USSR "Totality" was developed in the United States by the end of 1945. 20 atomic bombs were to be dropped on 17 cities of the USSR, including Moscow, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov...

And then it went - July 1946: the Pincher plan ("Pincers"),,, 50 bombs in 20 cities (Moscow, Baku, the Ural industrial region, etc.) from mid-1946 to mid-1947.

Late 1948: Plan "Sizzle" ("Sizzling Heat"). 133 bombs in 70 cities (8 bombs on Moscow, 7 on Leningrad).

And so on - incrementally. And all these plans were laid by the intelligence of the Minister of State Security Abakumov on Stalin's table. The deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, the chairman of the Special Committee, Beria, also received these materials.

In the summer of 1947, the United States proposed the Marshall Plan to Europe, with the aim of bringing Europe closer to the United States economically. Russia rejected it, and it could not be otherwise with such an orientation of the Marshall plan. The Marshall Plan laid the line for NATO as well.

By early 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed the Dropshot (Instant Strike) plan, the main goal of which was to eliminate the Soviet Union as a state in four stages.

The first step was to be the atomic bombardment

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the development of 200 of our cities using 300 atomic bombs with the destruction of up to 85 percent of the economic potential. I ask the reader to imagine what form our Motherland would have acquired then.

That is, the confrontation took shape completely, but either scoundrels or fools could blame the Russians for this. Russia has just completed such a war that ... Oh, yes, it's clear that!

In some respects, the five war years of the life of the USSR fit into several columns of figures for the country's economic development, calculated as a percentage in relation to 1940. And this is what the picture looked like over the years:

	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
National income	92	66	74	88	83
Gross products industry	98	77	90	104	92

including people's commissariats of aviation, tank industry and ammunition armament industry <small>And</small>	140	186 224	251		
Capital attachments V folk economy	86	53	53	72	89
State budget revenues	98	92	113	149	168

Throughout the war years, as we see, only military production grew sharply and continuously, to the detriment of everything else. But the war is over. And let the reader not be embarrassed by the fall in the national income of gross industrial output in 1945 - it was a beneficial fall, because it marked the beginning of a peaceful restructuring of the economy. And this was expressed in the growth of capital investments in the national economy and in the growth of budget revenues. However, half of the economically developed part of Russia still lay in ruins...

In 1939 we produced 43.2 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, and in 1945 also 43.3 billion. We smelted 12.3 million tons of steel in 1945 against 17.6 million tons in 1939, and produced 19.4 million tons of oil

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instead of 30.3 million tons. Cereals of all kinds were harvested at 47.3 million tons against 97.4 million tons in 1937.

What kind of "aggressiveness" of Russia could we talk about?

But we had to have our own bomb. And as soon as possible...

ONLY a classic "democratic" political scientist or journalist who has never lifted anything heavier than a glass of cognac and the hem of a woman's skirt can think that big scientific and technical projects are implemented overnight and thanks to "geniuses" like Andrei Sakharov or Lev Landau. In fact, success in such projects is ensured by daily branched work, which includes:

- dozens of people as the main generators of ideas in all areas;

- hundreds of people as key, hard-to-replace executors called

develop basic ideas and generate private ideas;

- thousands of people as assistants to these performers,

and, finally, tens and hundreds of thousands of technicians and workers in design bureaus and research institutes, at factories and construction sites, who carry out specific instructions and work according to clearly formulated tasks.

But all this work is successful when it has a true leader. Beria was. All important organizing documents of the uranium problem are resolutions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,

signed by Stalin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers or Beria as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. But in any case, they went through Beria. In addition, there is a huge array of Beria's letters to Stalin, the protocols of the Special Committee signed by Beria, and letters addressed to Beria. Sometimes documents were sent directly to Stalin, for example, by Vannikov and Pervukhin, but they were still looked through by the chairman of the Special Committee. Of course, he was not in a position to make any technical adjustments to this or that decision - this side of the matter was in charge of specialists in private

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questions. But Beria delved into them in such a way that he was always able to either approve the right decision, or make it himself.

For example, without ultra-pure graphite there is no reactor for producing plutonium... And there is no ultra-pure graphite without new technological equipment. And this equipment does not exist without new methods of cleaning ... And these methods should be developed by chemists and engineers who in their lives will not even come close to an atomic bomb and may not even know that they are direct participants in the project to create an atomic bomb.

Beria did not solve this pile of "graphite" problems, but he should have known about them. As well as about all other problems - more or less significant. And they were depressingly many.

So I open at random the book of the 3rd volume of II documents and materials "The Atomic Project of the USSR" on page 173 and, leafing through the pages, I begin to write out only the numbers and names of the documents, reminding the reader that A-9 is the code name for natural uranium, and B-9 is the code name for thorium (such code substitutions for the names of all special "atomic" materials were standard practice for CCGT documentation).

So, let's begin...

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of March 24, 1947 No. 656-232ss "On the production of special powerful mercury rectifiers for the needs of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR" (signed by Stalin).

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of March 24, 1947 No. 657-233ss "On the organization of the production of A-9 from Krivoy Rog iron ores" (signed by Stalin).

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of March 25, 1947 No. 2919-rs on the transfer of protection of buildings of the CCGT under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (signed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Beria).

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated March 29, 1947 No. 3183-rs on search and exploration work on the A-9 and B-9 in the area of the Vanch Range in the Pamirs (signed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Beria).

Order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated April 9, 1947 No. 3745-rs on approval contingents accepted at the centralized 473

nee supply (including dependents of adults in Moscow, Leningrad and 43 cities - a total of 16,220 people and children under 12 years of age - a total of 23,770. - S.K.), and supplementary food limits for the II quarter. 1947 (signed by Stalin).

Letter to L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin dated April 19, 1947 with the submission for consideration of a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on measures to ensure the construction of the "M" installation (a powerful cyclotron with an electromagnet weight of 6-7 thousand tons for accelerating elementary particles to energies of 250 MeV, the construction of which was planned in the area of the Ivankovskaya hydroelectric power station 125 km from Moscow - S.K.).

Letter to L.P. Berii I.V. Stalin dated April 19, 1947 with the submission for consideration of the draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the organization at the plant number 92

(Gorky Machine-Building Plant, which manufactured diffusion machines for uranium enrichment. - S.K.) of the Ministry of Armaments for the mass production of special turbochargers and measures to help this plant.

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 20, 1947 No. 4285-rs on conducting reconnaissance at A-9 and on organizing experimental production of A-9 in North Karelia (signed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Beria).

Enough, dear reader?

I think yes...

But we, after scrolling through a dozen pages, stopped only on page 184 of a single volume of 895 pages. And there are more than six thousand of these pages in seven directly "Beria" volumes, which contain only *declassified* documents specially *selected for publication*, many of which went through Stalin and all through Beria!

Many of them have very intriguing headlines, for example:

"Instruction L.P. Beria B.L. Vannikov, M.G. Pervukhin and A.P. Zavenyagin according to work with German specialists", August 1946;

"On the search for a uranium deposit from an airplane", August 1946;

"On the results of the work of the Geophysical Complex Expedition", October 1946;

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"On the extraction of bismuth and cobalt ore in Saxony (in the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany)", October 1946;

"On the construction of a refinery on the basis of warehouses of the Naval Forces", August 1947;

"Letter to V.A. Makhneva L.P. Beria about the program for the development of the general plan for the use of atomic energy for 20 years, September 1947;

"On the organization of the radiological office at the biological department of the USSR Academy of Sciences", October 1947;

"Report SI. Vavilova L.P. Beria on the publication of the results of research on cosmic rays, February 1948 ...

Etc. and so on.

NOW I - to tire the reader, so to tire! - no longer at random, but after a conscious selection of an example, I will give the headings of sections and subsections of the report dated December 23, 1946 by Kurchatov, Vannikov and Pervukhin addressed to Stalin on the state of work on the problem of using atomic energy for 1945-1946 years:

I. Raw material base of uranium Uranium deposits in the USSR Uranium deposits abroad Enterprises for the extraction of uranium ore Obtaining pure metallic uranium Thorium

II. About work on uranium-graphite boiler Work on protection of uranium blocks from corrosion Production of pure graphite

Work on obtaining pure graphite

Studying with the help of test benches the hydrodynamic issues of the project

Study of corrosion resistance of materials used for the manufacture of uranium-graphite boiler and resistance to radiation

Product transport from the boiler

Water treatment design

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Boiler power control Separation of plutonium from the boiler

Construction of a uranium-graphite boiler and plant No. 817 (I ask the reader to remember this number. - S.K.)

III. On separation by the diffusion method of isotope separation

Diffusion method of isotope separation Work of Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and involved organizations on the diffusion method

The main elements of the separation plant Raw material - uranium hexafluoride The problem of filters

Superchargers (compressors), sealing and lubrication Works at the plant. Stalin in Gorky Lubricants and barrier fluids Light isotope enrichment analysis Automatic process control

IV. Electromagnetic methods of isotope separation and electromagnetic installations

Main goals

Institutes, design bureaus and laboratories involved in the development of methods and their tasks Development of new calculation methods Work of sector No. 5 of laboratory No. 2 Work of sector No. 1 of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology Work of the Design Bureau of the Elektrosila Plant Work of the Central Vacuum Laboratory New installations for the development of nuclear physics The need to organize a vacuum industry

V. On the state of work on the production of heavy water

Purpose of heavy water

Research and other organizations working on heavy water

Methods for obtaining heavy water

Production by water electrolysis

Plant for the final concentration of heavy

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Loy water CHEKHK (Chirchik electrochemical plant. - S.K.)

Construction of new electrolysis plants

Water electrolysis with isotope exchange

Moscow electrolysis plant

Preparation of heavy water by water distillation

Obtaining heavy water by the method of distillation of water from nitrogen-hydrogen

mixtures

Production of heavy water by distillation of ammonia

Physico-Chemical Institute. Karpov

Institute of Physical Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR

VI. On the state of work carried out in KB-11 at Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR

Placement of works

Status of works

Development of composite charge elements from conventional explosives

Development of a methodology for studying the processes of metal compression by an explosion

Development of electric detonators

Development of a high-voltage installation for undermining detonators

Development of the design of the atomic bomb case

Development of a simultaneous shot from two barrels

Development of a fuse that fires at a given height

Development of the neutron fuse

Calculation and theoretical work

VII. Research work in the field of the use of atomic energy and the development of molecular physics

The work of the Leningrad FTI

Electrolytic separation method

The work of the Kharkov FTI

Work of the Radium Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR

Laboratory work No. 2

Laboratory work No. 3

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VIII. Work on radiation protection

IX. About the use of German specialists

Placement of German specialists in the USSR and organization of scientific institutions

Dr. Riel's group

Institute "A" (Director - Professor Ardenne. - S.K.)

Institute "G" (director - Nobel Prize winner in 1925 Professor Hertz. - S.K.)

Laboratory "B" (supervisor - Professor Pose. - S.K.)

I do not know if the reader had the strength to read in one sitting the plan of this report to Stalin, which occupies 67 pages in book three of volume II of the documents of the Soviet Atomic Project. But Beria studied it carefully, with a pencil in his hands! And all in order to later give the order, recorded on the back of the last sheet by the Secretary of the Special Committee, General Makhnev: *"At the direction of Comrade Beria L.P. the report was not sent anywhere. V. Makhnev."*

And such a decision was quite justified - the report turned out to be redundant - for Stalin - detailed. But for Beria and his staff, it was quite acceptable and useful, allowing once again to cover all the problems and tasks at once.

Well, how, I ask the reader, does all this very much resemble the circle of interests and the way of life of a "monster", "devil", "ghoul", "executioner"? Yes, plus - also a "sexual maniac" who only thinks about "what other ninth-grader to order to drag into his" black crow "...

PAST Beria did not pass questions even, it would seem, of secondary importance. So, on April 10, 1948, Academician Alikhanov, director of laboratory No. 3 of the USSR Academy of Sciences, addressed "Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Comrade Beria L.P." with a detailed letter substantiating the necessity of publishing "in closed form a number of manuals on various issues of atomic energy production and, first of all, with a request for permission to publish in closed form for official use the book of A. Akhiezer and I. Pomeranchuk."

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The monograph on the general theory of reactors was meant, and Beria instructed the unchanging V.A. Makhnev (we will talk about him later) to send a copy of Alikhanov's letter "for the conclusion of the Scientific and Technical Council."

What did Beria understand in the theory of reactors? He had more than a general idea about the processes taking place in them, and he was aware of this. And the rest knew. And Alikhanov too.

However, Alikhanov knew that if you turn to someone else, they will "wrap up" for a long time. Yes, it was so, because the academician explained:

"This book (by Akhiezer and Pomeranchuk. - S.K.) ... is extremely valuable and useful, but meanwhile the manuscript lies without any movement in the archives of the Technical Council, and so far no steps have been taken to publish it in closed form for office use. This circumstance does not allow the use of the book by either researchers or students.

That is why Alikhanov wrote directly to Beria, knowing that he would decide everything promptly. Moreover, Lavrenty Pavlovich did not begin to delve into the essence of the matter - he did not understand it. But I decided competently - as a manager! He was not indignant at the "pettiness" of the subject of the letter, but forwarded it through Makhnev to Zavenyagin and to the Scientific and Technical Council. Realizing that since the "question" has already come into Beria's field of vision, then it will no longer lie "without any movement" - they will not decide for themselves, so General Makhnev will remind anyone who needs to be reminded.

And here, perhaps, it is necessary to say at least a few words about Vasily Alekseevich Makhnev himself - a modest man, but, according to knowledgeable people, unique. Vyatich, born in 1904 (died in 1966). After graduating in 1926 from the Institute of National Economy and working in Vyatka and Gorky in the system of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, in 1940 he became deputy to the Committee of Soviet Control under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In 1941-1945 he was Deputy People's Commissar of Ammunition, being from 1942 at the same time a deputy member of the State Defense Committee of Beria.

Since 1945, Makhnev has been a member of the Special Committee and head of its secretariat. In 1949, after testing the first atomic bomb, he became a Hero of Socialist Labor, in 1951

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year - the winner of the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree, and in 1953 - the 2nd degree.

As I understand it, he was for Beria something like Poskrebyshev for Stalin. Perhaps he can also be called Beria's "gray atomic cardinal", not forgetting that although the "gray reverend" Joseph du Tremblay was extremely smart, his boss, Cardinal Richelieu himself, was great.

The French say: "What is the master - such is the servant." And Vasily Makhnev was worthy servant - not Beria, but Russia, the Soviet Union.

The READER is already familiar with Andranik Petrosyants. Beria knew him well from the People's Commissariat for the tank industry, and then from joint work in the State Defense Committee, and at the end of 1946 he achieved his transfer to the nuclear industry. At PSU, Petrosyants ensured the construction and commissioning of plants No. 813 and No. 418 for diffuse and electromagnetic separation and enrichment of uranium 235, and almost ten years after Beria's death, in 1962, he became chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy. Earlier, I gave his assessment of the role and merits of Beria during the war. And here is how he said about the "atomic" Beria:

"Beria ... managed to fully justify Stalin's trust, using the entire scientific potential of scientists in nuclear science and technology ... He gave all work on the nuclear problem the necessary scope, breadth of action and dynamism. He possessed great energy and efficiency, was an organizer, able to bring any business he started to the end. He often traveled to sites, got acquainted with the progress and results of work, always provided the necessary assistance and at the same time sharply and severely cracked down on negligent performers, regardless of their rank and position. In the process of creating the first Soviet nuclear bomb, his role was immeasurable in the full sense of the word. Its efforts and capabilities in the use of all types and areas of the country's industries in the interests of creating nuclear

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industry, scientific and technical potential of the country <...> provided him with complete freedom of action and victory for the Soviet people in this scientific and technical

epic"...

Alas, dear reader, I released something in this characterization of Beria by Petrosyants. Instead of an ellipsis in bold angle brackets, Petrosyants' text is as follows: "... and huge masses of prisoners, fear of him ..."

As for "fear" - this, alas, is a cowardly equivocation of Academician Petrosyants in the direction of "democracy" that was rampant by 1995. And if, after reading the words "he dealt with negligent performers", a thick "camp dust" rises before the reader's mind's eye, then I can assure him that he should not close his eyes - this dust will not eat out his eyes due to the lack of its presence. I will later give examples confirming what has just been said, but, touching on this topic, I will immediately say the following ...

An objective study of declassified documents and specific (without the general "camp dust") memories of those of the atomic scientists who directly dealt with Beria allow us to draw a completely unambiguous conclusion that the role of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria in the Soviet Atomic Project was not only outstanding - this is obvious, but also quite positive from the standpoint of ensuring a normal business climate in the industry.

Here is how, for example, the appointment of Boris Glebovich Muzrukov as director of plant No. 817 took place.

Combine No. 817, also known as: State Chemical Plant, object No. 859, "Project No. 1859 of the Mining and Processing Plant", Base-10, Plant "A" or "Unit No. 1" is a complex of structures of the first industrial plutonium-producing reactor, built 16 kilometers east of the city of Kyshtym, on the shores of Lake Kyzyl-Tash in the Chelyabinsk region. Its modern name: production association (PO) "Mayak". The closed city that arose at the plant was later named "Chelyabinsk-40" (now Ozersk) - colloquially "sorokovka".

By the way, Vasily Vasilyevich Chernyshev, first Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Beria, and then -

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Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov (K. Zalesky in his biographical dictionary calls General Chernyshev "the owner of millions of Gulag slaves") in 1947-1949 he almost constantly lived in the "sorokovka" with his family, controlling the construction of nuclear enterprises in the Southern, Middle and Northern Urals. He died only 56 years old in 1952 (such of his former "slaves", such as Lev Razgon, safely polluted the minds and souls of fellow citizens even in the 90s of the last century).

Beria came to this "object" more than once, and he had a special account of it, because for all the general enormity of the problem, its key and most expensive link was to obtain active, fissile weapons-grade materials in the required quantities - highly enriched uranium-235 and plutonium.

Here, in contrast to the work on the scheme and design of the atomic bomb, there was less "fine" science, but a lot of "rough" organizational routine, which constantly threatened to turn into a web. And here Beria was able to see, without consulting scientists, reserves for acceleration and optimization, including personnel.

At one time, the "object" was in a fever. The chief engineer Slavsky and the representative of the Council of Ministers Tkachenko (the same one who came to Izhevsk during the war, the NKVD general) sent reports to Beria about the trouble.

Somewhat digressing from the story about Muzrukov, I will quote Beria's instructions from June 27, 1947, which is not signed by him, but *written* by him:

"TT. Kruglov (convocation), Vannikov, Zavenyagin, Chernyshev (Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. - S.K.), Borisov (PSU and Gosplan of the USSR. - S.K.), Komarovskiy (a major builder, head of Glavpromstroy of the NKVD of the USSR. - S.K.)

1. Urgently review the memos vols. Slavsky and Tkachenko and report on the measures being taken to speed up and streamline construction work at construction site No. 859.

2. Contact tt. Khrulev (Head of Logistics of the Soviet Army. - S.K.) and Kaftanov (Minister of Higher Education of the USSR. - S.K.) and together with them develop

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those measures of an additional parcel for the construction of No. 859 of the necessary

the number of junior and middle engineering and technical staff from young builders graduating from universities, as well as from among the commanders of military construction battalions.

3. Tov. Kruglov to send the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade Chernyshev for a period of 2-3 months to build No. 859 to strengthen construction management and take all necessary measures on the spot to ensure the completion of construction and installation work within the time frame set by the government.

4. Tt. Chernyshev, Zavenyagin, Kurchatov, Komarovskiy, Borisov, who are leaving for construction, to review the state of construction and installation of plant No. 817 on the spot, take the necessary measures and report on the results.

Tov. Kruglov and tov. Vannikov to take control of the construction and installation work at plant No. 817 and report every 10 days on the state of affairs at this construction and on the measures taken.

L. Beria.

However, the situation did not improve, and on July 8, 1947, Beria first came to Base-10 himself, removed the director P.T. Bystrov (he remained in the swing) and appointed Efim Pavlovich Slavsky in his place (we will meet with him more than once). However, Slavsky also had problems, and V.A. went to the Urals. Malyshev - People's Commissar of Transport Engineering, without five months -

Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

A conflict arose already between the imperious Malyshev and the extremely self-confident Slavsky. Vyacheslav Alexandrovich called Beria and offered to immediately remove Slavsky. As a result, on October 20, 1947, Beria again arrived at the plant. And then Malyshev proposed to replace Slavsky with Muzrukov, who was well known to Beria and Malyshev from the war in tank affairs, according to Uralmash. Lavrenty Pavlovich agreed, turned to Stalin and, having received his consent, summoned Muzrukov to Moscow.

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After listening to the proposal (not an order!) Beria, Boris Glebovich thought about it - the matter was new to him. And this is how Beria did it... He didn't stamp his feet (I think he never stamped his feet or pounded the table with his fists - not his style). He didn't order. He first brought Muzrukov and Kurchatov together. And Igor Vasilyevich conducted an operational and intelligible "educational program" of a potential colleague. Only after that Muzrukov came to Beria and agreed under two conditions.

First... Kurchatov had previously formally been listed as the scientific director of the plant, but Muzrukov asked to appoint him as his deputy "on the case" (naturally, with Kurchatov's consent).

Second... Responsible representatives of the general designer of the plant - GSPI-11 and the general developer of equipment - NIIkhimmash, as well as CCGT itself, will manage the construction and installation not from Leningrad and Moscow, but on the spot, quickly resolving all "sick" issues with Muzrukov.

At first, they wanted to demote Slavsky greatly (to the chief engineer of one of the plants of the plant), but Muzrukov asked Beria to leave him as the chief engineer of the entire plant. Slavsky worked selflessly (at that time there was enough radiation at the plant for everyone, including the authorities!), He became the Hero of Socialist Labor Thrice, having received the first Star under Beria. But, being a man, alas, vindictive, Slavsky then held a grudge against Muzrukov all his life, and after all, over the years, Efim Pavlovich became the "atomic" minister. And Muzrukov, having one Star of the Hero of Labor for tanks and a second for the first

Soviet plutonium never received a well-deserved third Star for managing the largest weapons center at Arzamas 16 from 1955 to 1972.

However, the latter fact has nothing to do with Beria, but the fact that Beria not only did not boil over Muzrukov's conditions, but completely agreed with them, promising full support, suggests that there were no unhealthy ambitions for Lavrenty Pavlovich.

But unhealthy gossip around the name of Beria was subsequently woven a lot of. And the same displacement of Slavsky yes

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some honored veteran gunsmiths in their later memoirs (!) described in such a way that the initiator of the removal of Slavsky turned out to be, moreover, on an absurd occasion, Beria, who allegedly behaved rudely with Slavsky.

No, Lavrenty Pavlovich proceeded from the considerations of the case and respected everyone who thought the same way ... And if they were people of an idea, then he forgave them even serious mistakes. So, already being the director of plant No. 817, Muzrukov recklessly, without the sanction of the PSU, held negotiations on the possibility of inviting a person to work, in a "regime" questionable. This case was considered even by Stalin, but it all ended with a strict suggestion to prevent such a thing from happening in the future.

In total, Beria visited the Sorokovka four times. The second visit, on October 20, 1947, ended with the appointment of Muzrukov. The third time Beria came in October 1949 - to personally reward people for their heroic work.

What is significant - in Chelyabinsk-40, Beria held the then unprecedented 86th meeting of the Special Committee on the agenda. It became one of the few traveling ones, and although its protocol is printed on a standard form with the typographical position "Mr. Moscow, the Kremlin", here it is crossed out and printed on top: "Combine No. 817".

The entire meeting was devoted to one issue, and its protocol is so expressive that I will quote it in full! The old-timers of the Sorokovka, if we recall the legends, said that everything began to spin after Beria, having entered the store, witnessed the dissatisfaction of one of the townspeople with the meager assortment of the gastronomic department. I think it's still a legend. But the protocol is a reliable historical document.

Here he is:

*"Combine No. 817 October 22, 1949 **Strictly secret (Special folder)***

In attendance: tt. Beria L.P., Vannikov B.L., Kurchatov I.V., Makhnev V.A.

Present (when considering relevant issues): Deputy.

Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Comrade Bo

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rice, pom. Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Comrade Sazykin, Head of Glavpromstroy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade Komarovsky, Secretary of the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade Beloborodoe, Director of Combine No. 817 Comrade Muzrukov, Construction Manager of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 247 Comrade Tsarevsky, ch. plant engineer comrade Slavsky, authorized by the Council of Ministers of the USSR comrade Tkachenko, deputy. director of the plant Bystrov, deputy. director of the plant for personnel comrade Surmach, head of the political department of the plant comrade Morkovin, head of the political department of construction comrade Antonov, deputy. T. Smirnov, director of the plant for working supplies, pom. Comrade Ovchinnikov, director of the plant for everyday life, Comrade Moiseyev, head of the medical unit of the plant, Comrade Rosenthal, head of the office of the construction trading pit, deputy. the head of the office of the trading pit of construction, comrade Ivanov.

On complaints about shortcomings in trade, medical and cultural maintenance of workers and employees of the plant No. 817

(t. Beria)

1. Instruct TT. Kostygov, Muzrukov, Tsarevsky, Chestnykh and Panichkin, within 5 days, check the available signals about the facts of the unsatisfactory state of trade, medical, cultural and community services for workers and employees of the plant No. 817 and construction, take prompt measures to eliminate shortcomings and attract those responsible for these shortcomings to

responsibility.

Submit proposals on measures to decisively improve trade and cultural and community services for the workers and employees of the plant and on measures to strengthen the management of these sectors to be submitted to the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 7 day time.

2. To oblige the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR within a month to re-examine the state of trade and cultural and consumer services for workers and employees of the plant and report on the results.

Chairman of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR L. Beria.

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The very composition of those called to the meeting says that it was a completely "social" event and not a single social issue was forgotten there. And the reader can be sure that the meeting was held on the initiative of Beria. After all, back in 1920 in Baku he was engaged in improving the life of workers. And he learned the lessons of those days in the way that a real public Bolshevik leader must learn them.

Of course, the significance of the meeting of the Special Committee, which was unusual in terms of venue and agenda, went far beyond the life of only the "maggie". The rumor that Beria held such an event at Muzrukov's house naturally spread throughout the industry, this fact was taken into account by all the directors of all "nuclear" facilities, so as not to get into an awkward position themselves. I think that Lavrenty Pavlovich was also guided by this consideration when he gathered his management at the 817th combine for participation in the 86th meeting of the Special Committee.

But in Sarov ("Arzamas-16"), in KB-11, he never came to General Zernov and Professor Khariton. There are also enough legends on this score, but the fact that Beria was never directly documented in the center for the development of the atomic bomb itself was precisely documented.

He, no worse than Kurchatov, who was fully admitted to all intelligence "atomic" information from the United States, knew that a workable design of the bomb itself would be developed - after all, in addition to his ideas, the leading developers had an American scheme at their disposal, known in sufficient detail. And Beria understood: if there is a "product" of plant No. 817, then the state will also have a nuclear shield.

So why would he visit physicists? In the Urals, his experience and authority could help rectify failures. And they helped. And what could he suggest to theorists, experimenters and designers of KB-11? He was not in the habit of carrying out "general interference in the affairs of his subordinates".

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NO, Beria did not manage with the help of fear, even in critical situations. But this did not rule out - if objectively necessary - reasonable rigidity. In the region of the Ural village of Verkh-Neyvinskoye (the closed city of Sverdlovsk-44, later Novouralsk), plant No. 813 was created for the production of weapons-grade uranium-235 by the gas diffusion method. However, things did not go well, and Beria, having arrived at the facility, finally firmly stated that the development of a specific technology is a state task, and if it is not completed on time, it will be considered that the team has not coped with it.

There were no threats, and it is unlikely that they would have helped here. Solving a complex engineering and design problem is not like digging a ditch. But the rigidity and high status of the task played a role. Instead of the previous "rocking", the real work began in the "brainstorming" mode -

they sat at the drawing boards and in the workshops day and night, everything was decided quickly and amicably - without formalities and bickering.

And the task was completed, but how! Such production was created, which *to this day* has no analogues in the world in terms of cheapness and productivity. enriched uranium! It has no analogues in the world! And the work on that assignment from Beria at the enterprise is remembered as a legend, being proud of it and ... And paying tribute to Lavrenty Pavlovich.

Yes. The Soviet Union solved the nuclear problem at an accelerated pace! On August 30, 1945, the First Main Directorate was formed.

April 9, 1946 marked the beginning of KB No. 11 (the very first, which disappeared almost immediately, the names are also "Laboratory No. 5" and "KB-5") with deployment in the village of Sarovo, Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. General Zernov was appointed head of this research complex for the design of nuclear weapons, Professor Khariton was appointed chief designer, and Shchelkin, a physical chemist, was appointed his deputy.

And in August 1949, "Training Ground No. 2 of the Ministry of the Armed Forces (Defence) of the USSR" in Kazakhstan - our first nuclear test site, was already preparing for the first test. August 27, 1949, at 2 am, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov approved the signed by Zernov, Khariton

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and Shchelkin and executed by hand in a single copy as early as August 21 "Operational plan for the final assembly and detonation of the product" ... "Product" was the name of our atomic first-born - the RDS-1 bomb.

The final and irreversible countdown has begun. At 8:00 am on August 27, 1949, the dispatcher on duty, a Muscovite, a graduate of Moscow State University, a candidate of technical sciences, a former employee of the Moscow Power Engineering Institute, and in KB-11, a senior researcher of department 25, Sergey Sergeevich Chugunov, took up duty at the command post. According to the schedule, 48 hours remained before the experiment. By this time, everyone involved in the experiment and responsible for it had already gathered at the training ground.

Chairman of the State Commission Beria, together with Kobulov and Makhnev, visited the assembly building on the morning of August 28. A natural feeling of preoccupation, and - presumably - simple human curiosity, led him there for a while. However, Lavrenty Pavlovich did not stand "over his soul" among the gunsmiths, although in the morning of the next day both he and everyone who had lived in anticipation of an approaching event for the last four years had a final exam.

In Sergo Beria's book about his father, he writes that he was also present at that first test, but this could not be and was not. Only those whom the tests concerned in a direct, official way were strictly allowed to the test site. Even such a major rocket scientist as Sergei Pavlovich Korolev only got to the test site in November 1955, when our first "two-stage" thermonuclear charge RDS-37 was tested - a prototype of nuclear combat equipment for the first intercontinental ballistic missile R-7 developed by OKB Korolev. Moreover, Sergo Beria's description of the course of the experiment shows that he writes about what he was not a witness, although Elena Prudnikova, for example, took his stories at face value.

And here is the testimony of such an authoritative expert as Julius Borisovich Khariton. It has been published in various publications, but I quote it from

collective monograph "Soviet military power from Stalin to Gorbachev", which says:

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"A heap of gross errors, hoaxes, or even simply a misunderstanding of the issue under discussion ... is replete with almost the entire chapter "Nuclear Shield" of S. Beria's book.

In the interview book "The Son of Lavrenty Beria tells ..." R. Chilachava ... S. Beria agreed that he and I.V. Kurchatov, "business cooperation consisted in developing the design of nuclear charges," although Kurchatov, heading the Soviet atomic project, was not directly involved in the design of charges. Moreover, S. Beria was not engaged in the "development of the design of nuclear charges ..."

So, the assembly work went according to plan ... The hitch that occurred during the installation of the "piston" with the plutonium core, although it brought unpleasant minutes, had the same reason as the Americans - precision assembly caused an air "cushion" under the piston, but the air was gradually bled through the thinnest annular gap, and everything fell into place. Finally, the last assembly operations were completed.

The time has come to lift the "product" and fix it on the working platform of the 37-meter steel truss tower. In the free air, near the tower, stood Beria and Kurchatov. Shchelkin approached them - for permission to take the charge out of the DAP assembly building.

The "team" of KB-11 rolled out the "product" along the rail track and installed it in the tower's freight elevator cage. The roll-out was observed by the DAF's external officer guards - several colonels from the USSR Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan.

Beria went to the command post of the experiment. After some time, Zavenyagin and Shchelkin arrived there from the empty area around the tower. At 6.18 the Chairman of the State Commission L.P. Beria and scientific supervisor of the experiment I.V. Kurchatov was reported on full readiness to undermine.

The head of the range, General Kolesnikov, confirmed the full readiness of the range and his subordinates. Responsible for aviation, General Komarov - Hero of the Soviet Soyu

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for, during the war - the commander of an assault division, unlike them, did not please. Due to bad weather, the departure of aircraft with photographic equipment was delayed.

Beria, Pervukhin and Kurchatov left the KP building under the open sky in the hope of seeing at least some clarification. However, as the report of K.I. Shchelkin, "the weather did not bode well." In these places, with such weather, one could expect anything at this time of the year - up to a thunderstorm.

Many years later, one of the participants in the RDS-1 assembly, Hero of Socialist Labor, Professor D.A. Fishman recalled:

"The bad weather on the night of August 28-29, as it were, repeated the situation during the 1st American explosion in Alamogordo."

In Alamogordo, before the test, the weather really deteriorated, and also unexpectedly, contrary to the weather forecast. General Leslie Groves, in his famous book Now It Can Be Told, wrote:

"The main trouble was related to the weather ... That evening turned out to be rainy and windy. Many insisted that the test be delayed for at least 24 hours."

Fearing the vagaries of the weather, the Americans were forced to postpone the explosion for some time - although less than a day. We did the opposite...

Kurchatov, fearing surprises from wind and rain, decided to postpone the explosion from 8.00 to 7.00. And at 6.33 Shchelkin and employees of KB-11 Matveev and Davydov, on the instructions of Kurchatov, in the presence of MGB General A.N. Babkin removed the seals from the door to the control room, opened it and turned on the power of the automation system.

1300 instruments and 9700 indicators were completely ready to register all phenomena of the explosion.

Kirill Ivanovich Shchelkin in his report described these last incomplete half an hour before the explosion in great detail and vividly:

"Dispatcher of the last stage of the experiment, Comrade Malsky A.Ya. announced over the broadcast warning system in a somewhat mournful voice: 25 minutes left. Everyone at the command post fell silent. The electric clock measured the seconds. Tov. Malsky A.Ya. periodically singsongly announced the time remaining before the explosion.

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12 minutes before the explosion, the field machine was turned on. In 10 minutes, the machine turned on the glow of all the lamps in the devices placed along both radii experimental field.

Long minutes passed...

Of course, not only the filaments of the radio tubes glowed, but the glow also grew inside those who were now at the command post. Three minutes before time "H" Beria, Kurchatov, members of the Special Committee Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, Makhnev, the leaders of KB-11 not directly involved in finishing operations, approached the open door, prepared dark goggles ...

I will turn again to the authority of Yu.B. Khariton to refute another myth associated with Beria:

"In one of Golovin's books (I.N. Golovin - an employee of the Kurchatov Laboratory No. 2, a well-known physicist. - S.K.) it was written that when the automatic stage-by-stage switching on of all ignition devices for capsules was launched, Beria told Kurchatov that you probably won't get anything. But this was not the case. Golovin was not at these works, and all sorts of rumors spread ... "

Here you can see the same desire to present Beria as a kind of provocateur, which didn't really exist.

20 seconds before the explosion, the operator, at the command of the head of the explosion, turned on the main connector (switch) connecting the product with the automation system.

"From that moment," Shchelkin wrote, "all operations were performed by an automatic device. However, it remained possible to stop the process with one movement of the hand at the command of the chief. There was no reason to stop, and at exactly 00 the whole area was lit up with a dazzling light. Approximately 30 seconds later, a [shock] wave approached the command post.

It became clear to everyone that the experiment was a success."

YES, At 7:00 AM on August 29, 1949, the countdown ended. The real moment "0" came ... And over the Kazakh feather grass steppe that morning, as if the sun rose for the second time ...

However, it really was the morning of a new day on the planet - the day when Russia acquired the nuclear shield that

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could hold back the nuclear sword of world evil already raised above it.

The future academician and future scientific director of the test site M.A. Sadovsky described the first minutes of the new era as follows:

"What was there! We rushed to each other, hugged, congratulated each other friend and themselves, shouting: "We have it!", "We managed to make it! .."

Beria also hugged - everyone remembers how he impulsively hugged Kurchatov. He embraced Khariton as well, and he kept struggling, trying to close the door before the shock came.

waves.

Everyone was happy, but at the CP of the first test, Lavrenty Pavlovich was the only one who knew what an important event in the history of Russia had just happened. After all, only he, of all those gathered here, not even as chairman of the Special Committee, but as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, had all the information about the plans for US nuclear aggression against Russia.

Julius Borisovich Khariton recalled how Beria kissed him on the forehead ... Surely it was so ... But the famous Georgy Nikolaevich Flerov remembered a particularly interesting episode, and another major gunsmith, Alexander Ivanovich Veretennikov, Flerov's student, spoke about him in his memoirs ...

The neutron background from the "neutron fuse" (NC) of the charge was recorded by a mechanical counter installed at the test command post. The constancy of the background (in other words, the number of clicks of the counter with a frequency of 2-3 pulses per minute) proved the safety of the NS until the moment of explosion.

Veretennikov wrote:

"When the explosion occurred, no one paid any attention to the counter, and Beria looked at his readings and found that the last time he ... registered 3-4 impulses in both channels at once. He immediately demanded an explanation, what happened to NZ? GN (Flerov. - S.K.) replied that these were, apparently, pickups on the equipment. And at that moment, none of those present knew that one of the first registrations of electromagnetic phenomena accompanying a nuclear explosion unexpectedly took place here.

Flerov could not invent this, but when did Beria

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sang catch a burst of momentum? This phenomenon is instantaneous, and he could not expect it in advance! So how do you need to control yourself in order to fix such details as the clicks of a counter in a state of nervous expectation! And, it turns out, the only attentive observer-experimenter who for the first time in the USSR recorded the phenomenon of an electromagnetic pulse turned out to be, whatever one may say, Beria. And his observation was not wasted - scientists remembered both the fact and Beria's question, and when the excitement subsided, they thought. So the inquisitiveness of their chief curator subsequently helped to understand that we are dealing with a new

phenomenon.

In the memoirs of the same Mikhail Alexandrovich Sadovsky, published in the 11th edition of the History of the Atomic Project of the Kurchatov Institute, which has, alas, a meager circulation of 750 copies in 1997, there are two more striking pieces of evidence concerning Beria. Sadovsky writes that immediately after the explosion, "taking advantage of the situation", he went to the field.

In its center, where the tower stood, he saw a relatively small depression and "a shiny, glassy layer of melted soil. Slipping, on it, jumping, crawled a burnt golden eagle. Sadovsky knew that it was impossible to stay here for a long time (in fact, immediately after the explosion there were so many x-rays at this point that it was impossible to be here at all, but ...), and headed back.

"We are driving back," Sadovsky recalled, "and suddenly we see another car driving out from behind the ruins. It turned out that L. Beria himself with his close associates (the anti-Beria "negative" was hammered into everyone so that M.A. could not find another word, although Beria was traveling not with "close associates", but with comrades and colleagues. - S.K.) one of the first, if not the first, managed to get to the place of the explosion. He asked me what I saw, and when I said that a burnt eagle, Beria and his team laughed for a long time, saying: "He saw an eagle!"

There was no heartlessness in such a reaction of Beria. And it's not just that him and his "team" four years ago

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came out of such a war that the sensitivity was inevitably dulled. Laughter became a nervous discharge after the stress experienced. In addition, those traveling to the epicenter of the explosion again experienced tension - they knew that it was very dangerous to go there! However, the desire and *the need to see for yourself* overcame caution.

Two years earlier, in 1947, due to panic radiophobia, the director of the Voskresensky chemical plant, who had arrived with Muzrukov, had to be replaced at plant No. 817. He, who was appointed chief engineer, said that he was physically unable to work at a nuclear facility (although chemical production facilities had never been resorts either). It was the refusal of the resurrectionist that allowed Muzrukov to ask Beria to appoint Slavsky to the post of chief engineer.

But Beria had strong nerves and had considerable inquisitiveness. And further - sense of responsibility. He was obliged to report to Stalin: "Yes, Comrade Stalin! I was in the center myself, personally! I saw everything and stood on a glass crust! There is a bomb! Although Stalin will watch the film, the first viewers of which were the participants in the experiment, along with Beria. Here is how Sadovsky described this historical film show without exaggeration:

"They also managed to develop a film, which, in connection with the urgent departure of Beria, they decided to demonstrate directly in the optical laboratory of the test site. The birthday boy... was my friend G.L. Shnirman ... They decided that he deserved the honor of personally demonstrating to Beria the results of his work. In ... the laboratory ... they installed a movie camera, adjusted the blackout. About 30 spectators gathered, including Beria and his entourage (alas, again! - S.K.). Georgy Lvovich took up the film projector with undisguised pleasure, loaded the film, darkened the room and asked permission to start. Having received consent, he turned on the projector, and suddenly there was a strong flash, an explosion! .. Everyone was horrified, silence. Finally, Georgy Lvovich declares: "The light bulb has burst. Let's put in a new one." I put it on, turned it on, everyone looked with pleasure and cheerfully dispersed.

They parted merrily ... And none of the "close associates" of the "Stalinist satrap" Beria after the flash and explosion (!) Not ki

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rushed in the dark to grab the "terrorist" Shnirman... After the session, no one began the investigation with prejudice. Everyone parted happily. Because they were normal people with normal reactions, and this incident could not cause anything but laughter.

SUCCESS is success, and everyone understood that those who ensured it would be rewarded. But another anti-Beria slander also entwined around the first "atomic" awards: they say that Beria ordered to give awards according to the principle: to whom, in case of failure, execution was determined, to give the Star of the Hero. To whom - the maximum term of imprisonment is the order of Lenin, etc. This slander was not disdained, for example, by Professor V.Ya. Frenkel in an article published in Zvezda magazine No. 7, 1990.

Another myth - about possible repressions in case of failure - was spread after the execution of Beria even by respectable people from the weapons environment, but this was also just an anti-Beria myth, like the tales of Kurchatov's alleged constant fear of Beria. Professor V.A. Zuckerman, Hero of Socialist Labor from Arzamas-16, in the book People and Explosions, reports that Kurchatov, who liked to invent "sharp words and phrases," publicly used the word "rukrebyata" (abbreviated "leading guys"), calling everyone like that, "starting from the Deputy Minister.

So what kind of "fear" are we talking about here? And about what "doubblers" who, in case of failure, allegedly started new work instead of the repressed Kurchatov and his colleagues?! This is nonsense even from a purely business point of view! All the best forces of the country were employed in the work on the uranium problem, and Stalin is wonderful knew.

In some respects, the lie about the fear of "atomic" reprisals reminds me of the lie about the company being shot down by its own barrage detachment. After such an idiotic execution, the detachment would have been forced to take the blow of the attacking German troops on itself, since it would have deprived itself of a "shield" in the form of a company. And for this reason, no one has ever shot a single company of their own. So and

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here! No one thought of any possible repressions - then! It was already in Khrushchev's times after the first "refusal" in the tests, a certain gallant colonel of state security wanted to "start an investigation." But even then Minister Malyshev simply rudely rebuffed him. Although this episode, already often walking through the pages of "historical research", is known only from the words of the long-term Chief Designer of Nuclear Charges, Academician, Lieutenant General E.A. Negin and cannot be considered absolutely reliable. There were 15 versions of Savinkov's capture in the Chekist environment, but even among the gunsmiths there is their own folklore ...

As for the awards, the issue of them was resolved calmly and in a businesslike manner. General A.S. Alexandrov from PGU (then he was for some time the head of KB-11 in Sarov), recalling, testified that it was Beria, after RDS-1 was successfully tested, when discussing the issue of how to reward gunsmiths, he initiated the construction - as a reward at the expense of the state - dachas for leading gunsmiths, allocation of cars to them, etc.

However, this is only a legend, although for the "image" of Beria and positive. But I, writing this book about Beria, do not even need "white" tales about Lavrenty Pavlovich. The truth about the hierarchy of atomic awards is this...

Almost two and a half years before the RDS-1 was successfully tested, the top secret Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 627-258ss dated March 21, 1946, signed by Stalin, was issued, where the types of awards and incentives for scientific discoveries and technical achievements were **predetermined** in the field of the use of atomic energy.

There were five types of awards. And about the first prize it was said like this:
"1. The first prize is awarded for solving one of the following tasks:

- a) for the development of a proven and accepted for industrial use plutonium production method;
- b) for the development of a proven and accepted for industrial use uranium-235 extraction method;
- e) for the creation of a proven design of the atomic bomb ... "

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That is, everything: the titles of Heroes and laureates, large cash prizes (up to a million rubles), furnished mansions, cars, the right to free travel for himself and family members within the USSR by all modes of transport (Khrushchev took away this right from gunsmiths) and etc., all this was determined in advance!

But gunsmiths were awarded secretly. Secretly because the very fact of success was hidden - the TASS message of September 25, 1949, made "in connection with the statement of US President Truman about an atomic explosion in the USSR," had a strategic disinformation character. The fact of the explosion was denied, and

fixing it by the West was associated with "construction work on a large scale."

The TASS statement, in particular, stated:

"As for the production of atomic energy, TASS considers it necessary to recall that as early as November 6, 1947, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov made a statement regarding the secret of the atomic bomb, saying that "this secret no longer exists" ... The scientific circles of the United States of America accepted this statement by V.M. Molotov as a bluff, believing that the Russians can master atomic weapons no earlier than 1952. However, they were wrong...

It should be said that the Soviet government, despite the fact that it has atomic weapons, stands and intends to stand in the future on its old position of unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons ... "

Such a bluff was based on Stalin's precise and clever calculation to create that psychological effect of the uncertainty of the result of nuclear aggression against Russia, which to this day keeps the nuclear deterrence regime, or rather, nuclear stability. Let the Yankees think that the Russians have had the bomb for a long time!

It is significant that in a letter sent to Beria by the head of the General headquarters S.M. Shtemenko November 19, 1949, in particular, it was said:

"... the Americans believe that if the bomb tests were successful, then, Apparently, mass production of atomic weapons has already begun in the USSR.

As you can see, the utmost secrecy was useful. And by

this gunsmiths were awarded secretly, but generously: Gold Stars, orders, Stalin Prizes and simply large prizes ...

Zavenyagin, Kurchatov, Slavsky, Dollezhal, academicians Khlopin and Bochvar, corresponding members Vinogradov and Khariton, Zernov, Shchelkin, employees of KB 11 Alferov, Zeldovich, Flerov and a number of nuclear scientists became Heroes of Socialist Labor.

Kurchatov, Slavsky, Khariton, Shchelkin and Zeldovich would later become Heroes three times, Zavenyagin and Zernov twice. And the precedent for the secondary awarding of the Gold Star was created in 1949. At the suggestion of Stalin, Vannikov, Muzrukov and Dukhov became the first Heroes twice (Nikolai Leonidovich Dukhov, like Vannikov, would later receive a third Star).

Became a Hero of Socialist Labor - also at the suggestion of Stalin - German professor Riehl.

But what about Beria?

On October 29, 1949, the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers adopted Decree No. 5039-1925ss and on his award.

"For organizing the business of producing atomic energy and successfully completing the test of atomic weapons," Beria received a) gratitude; b) Certificate of honor; c) Order of Lenin; d) the Stalin Prize of the first degree.

And that's it!

But such an official formulation of merits is actually a recognition that he, Lavrenty Beria, organized the production of atomic energy (in other words, the nuclear industry)! And the volume of his efforts and the efforts of his associates is also visible from the fact that in the period from August 1945 until the moment the RDS-1 was tested, more than 1000 decisions and orders of the State Defense Committee, the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Ministers of the USSR were adopted! Approximately 20 per month. And each of them was not an empty clerical paper, but the result of a serious study of the issues that these resolutions and orders dealt with. And one way or another, Beria was related to all of them.

A thousand organizing documents of only the highest, governmental, level! And there was also a daily flow

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a stream of other papers behind which there were big and small problems.

When is there to catch girls in the alleys!

The current "democratic" reformers have almost ruined the Sovereign Cause, which was organized by the supposedly "totalitarian", but who, according to Academician Khariton, knows how to be "polite, tactful and just a normal person" Lavrenty Beria. And then - at the turn of the forties and fifties - this business after the first success developed rapidly.

And so the story about him must continue.

Chapter 18

WEEKDAYS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND GOSSIP ABOUT THEM...

ANY big business is overgrown with legends. When I, having arrived at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, stood in the early July morning of 1981, leaning on the balustrade of the platform above the Irtysh not far from the test site headquarters building, I was told that from this very place Beria admired de air nuclear explosion.

This is a harmless legend.

But the legend, say, that the work of Soviet nuclear scientists took place in custody under the harsh hand of the "gloomy" 9th Directorate of the NKVD is a maliciously caricatured legend. At the beginning of 1946, in the structure of the NKVD of the USSR (People's Commissar - S.N. Krugloye), indeed, the 9th Directorate (Department of Special Institutes) appeared, headed by Deputy People's Commissar A.P. Zavenyagin, formed by order of the People's Commissar No. 0081 of January 26, 1946.

On March 15, 1946, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, like all other people's commissariats, was transformed into a ministry. And from that moment on, the 9th Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was in charge of:

- Institute "A" in Sukhumi, located in the premises of the sanatorium "Sinop", with a German director, Professor Ardenne, the creator of the electron microscope;

- Institute "G" near Sukhumi, located in the building

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sanatorium "Agudzery", with German director Professor Hertz, Nobel Prize winner;

- Laboratory "B" (object "Lakes") near the city of Kasli, Chelyabinsk region on the basis of the sanatorium "Sungul", where the study of protection against ionizing radiation was carried out and where the head of the radiobiological department was "Zubr" N.V. Timofeev-Resovsky, who worked here with the same German colleagues with whom, on behalf of the leadership of the Third Reich, he dealt with the issues of breeding a race of superhumans, for which he received a "voucher" from the Soviet country to the Sungul sanatorium.

- Laboratory "B" in the Kaluga region, near the Obninskoye station, located in the premises of the former colony of Spanish children and gave rise to the Institute of Physics and Energy. In 1947-1949, the development of laboratory "V" was led from the 9th department by such a "densely uneducated" person as a full member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR A.I. Leipunsky.

As you can see, only the Germans and some of our specialists, convicted of very real sins, worked in the conditions of imprisonment (in a sanatorium, by the way). And to illustrate Beria's style, as well as for a more voluminous picture of the era, it will be useful to acquaint the reader with an extract from Beria's instructions of August 16

1946:

"TT. Pervukhin and Zavenyagin to check on the state of affairs at the institutes "A" and "G" (taking Comrade Leipunsky with him), take the necessary measures and, within 2 weeks, submit their proposals to ensure maximum use of the Germans.

At the same time, keep in mind the need to establish regular monitoring of fulfillment of tasks by the Germans (both in terms of quality and timing).

Persons who successfully complete tasks should be presented for a bonus, and people who skimp on work should be withdrawn from institutes and sent to camps.

L. Beria.

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And although camps are mentioned here (where none of the Germans were sent), there is no notorious "camp dust" here either.

In March 1948, Krugloye and Zavenyagin turned to Beria with a written request to transfer all these "sanatoriums" from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the jurisdiction of PGU, since the subject of their work was completely "pegushny" and all work issues were resolved at PSU. Beria communicated with Pervukhin, he spoke with the head of the PGU Vannikov and on March 27, 1948, told Beria that Vannikov "categorically objects to the admission of these institutions to the First Main Directorate".

Only on August 15, 1948, did the Council of Ministers decree No. 3091-1248ss / op signed by Stalin come out on the transfer of all objects of the 9th department from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to PGU, and paragraph 6 of the decree prescribed to Minister Kruglov: "a) to enroll generals and officers of the 9th Directorate and the institutes, laboratories and facilities under its control into the active reserve of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; b) provide them with the required uniform; c) keep the apartments they occupy."

And this point had its own background ... On July 28, 1947, the deputy head of the PGU, Pavel Yakovlevich Meshik, turned to Beria with a letter. Personnel Chekist (born in 1910, in 1932 he graduated from the Central School of the NKVD), he was responsible for personnel and the regime at PSU. A lot of vile things have also been written about him, but according to the memoirs of KB-11 veterans, for example, he was a tough but fair person (an assessment that applies to Beria), but in life - also kind. In 1953, he, like Beria, was arrested and shot at the end of 1953.

So Meshik wrote:

"To Comrade Beria L.P.

A significant number of officers from the Ministries of the Armed Forces, Internal Affairs and State Security work in the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

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By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of October 5, 1945 ... the generals and officers seconded or transferred to work in the First Main Directorate were retained all the rights and benefits provided for the generals and officers of these ministries and they are listed as personnel on all the time of their work in the First Main Directorate.

However, PGU officers under the Council of Ministers of the USSR are deprived of many rights and benefits, i.e. do not receive a monetary allowance for officer ranks, as a rule, the assignment of the next officer ranks is delayed, they are not presented for long service awards and are not provided with sanatorium treatment.

We ask you, Lavrenty Pavlovich, to help the officers of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to receive the

government benefits in accordance with the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 5.X.45, No. 2531-678 ss.

P. Meshik.

The problem was serious - due to the uncertainty of their position, many sought to leave the "honorary" service at PSU back to their departments. And Beria addresses a letter to the Minister of the Armed Forces Bulganin with a visa: *"I ask you to urgently consider and resolve the issue of officers of the First Main Directorate. A. Beria. 12.VIII.1947.*

And such prompt concern for people doing the same thing with him was characteristic of Lavrenty Pavlovich. He even gave the cut he received for the People's Commissar's overcoat, after the overcoat was cut, to his colleagues. In contrast, by the way, from Marshal Zhukov, who stored trophy cuts at home for kilometers.

For example, in early July 1947, Beria personally visited the construction of plant No. 817. Visited for the first time. We know that on his third visit he held a special "social" meeting of the Special Committee there. But even after the first visit, he was concerned about the situation in the social sphere in the Sorokovka. And immediately gave

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an instruction to Vannikov to improve the housing and living conditions of the workers of the plant. And already on August 20, Vannikov reported to him that:

"- for 1947, a housing construction plan of 15,000 square meters was established. meters, but it was decided to build another 5,500 sq. m. standard wooden single-family and semi-detached houses;

- it was decided to build 4500 sq. m of permanent residential stone and wooden buildings" for temporary settlement by builders with their transfer to the plant upon completion of construction;

- a ten-year school, a bathhouse, a laundry, a canteen-restaurant, a kindergarten, a nursery, a central boiler room (by October 5), a temporary wooden cinema, and a permanent bakery have already been built in 1946 year."

At the end, Vannikov suggested:

"In order to improve the cultural and community services for the workers of plant No. 817, it is necessary to speed up the opening of commercial stores, cafe restaurants, tea houses ..."

Moreover, all these measures applied not only to workers yet of the "plutonium" plant under construction, but also to the builders themselves.

TO SAY that Beria enjoyed universal love is impossible ... He was not prone to lipping by nature, and many years of such a life, when, in fact, continuously, day after day, it was necessary to make many diverse decisions, they could not help but work out from him naturally resolute manners. And she could not please everyone, and certainly could not please people of a cold soul and petty mind.

And if objective observers (the same Academician Khariton or the German Professor Riehl) noted Beria's politeness, then this speaks of the initially very high internal culture and self-discipline of Lavrenty Pavlovich, because few people, placed in Beria's conditions, would have retained the ability to treat to the okru

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reaping with understanding. And to treat with *understanding* - at this level - this is a lot!

Managers at Beria's level are extremely busy. To emphasize the importance of this or that business person in the West, they say that a minute of his work costs so many thousand dollars. A minute of Beria cost tens of thousands of dollars.

And if it was wasted, it brought a loss not to him personally, but to the country. Therefore, a sharp, resolute, and if necessary (alas, often occurring) and tough style of conversation was almost inevitable.

I say "almost" because, judging by the style of the visas on the documents, and by a number of memories, Beria was, as a rule, quite restrained in expressing his emotions.

And the charm?

He didn't even have time to be charming! After all, this implies the opportunity to chat a little, joke, smile ... And when could he act like that? Only in a very close circle, not just close employees, but those who were devoted to him. There were few admitted to sincerity. But there were quite a few who respected him not only as a leader, but also as a person, only for many decades of defamation of Beria, they almost all managed to die out, without being able to tell the truth about him. But someone was able to pass it on, so to speak, the baton.

In 2003, the Minsk publishing house "Belarusian Encyclopedia" published a book by Fyodor Dmitrievich Popov "The Atomic Bomb and the KGB". The author got to "object 550" (KB-11, base No. 112, Privolzhskaya office of Glavgorstroy), that is, to the nuclear weapons development center in Sarov - "Arzamas-16", in 1954, when Beria was long betrayed by official ostracism.

And now the operational commissioner of the "objective" department of the KGB, Captain Popov, introduces himself to the head of his department, Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Bronnikov, and a detailed conversation begins about the "atomic" history of the "object", about the former Sarov Desert, about the features of the operational situation, and so on.

F.D. Popov writes:

"Bronnikov noted that Kurchatov, Khariton and Beria played a decisive role in the development of the atomic epic. "If

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if not for them, then the atomic bomb in the USSR would hardly have been tested in 1949, " - he said".

This, dear reader, is an episode of 1954 (fifty-fourth), when Beria at the highest level was declared an agent of international capital!

Captain Popov was not familiar with Lavrenty Pavlovich, but he knew both those who knew him personally and those who worked "in the time of Beria." And therefore, Fedor Dmitrievich, albeit second-hand, but also was able to tell the truth about him - in modest but honest sizes:

"The wide deployment of activities in KB-11 in its main profile was strictly regulated by the availability of housing ... Many specialists huddled in an overcrowded monastery hotel, which was previously used by pilgrims of the Sarov monastery.

The situation with housing changed dramatically after the intervention of Beria. On his instructions, under the Department No. 880 (for the construction of a "facility" in Sarov. - S.K.) ... a specialized unit for housing construction was created. In 1948-1950. many residents of Arzamas-16 celebrated housewarming. For three years, more than 200 residential buildings were occupied. They were different - and semi-detached cottages, and Finnish prefabricated panel boards, and multi-apartment stone and cobblestones. Next to the old monastic buildings stood three- and four-story houses. The monastery itself with temples, chapels, a bell tower, cell houses and a refectory turned out to be in the very center of the object "...

This is verbal proof of Beria's concern for the ordinary participants in the Atomic Project. And here is a documentary example from the "upper floor" of the project... On July 12, 1946, Kurchatov wrote a top secret letter on the letterhead of Laboratory No. 2 with the following content:

"To Comrade Beria L.P.

I report that recently the state of health of comrade. Khariton Yu.B.

Examination in the central polyclinic of the Ministry of Health of the USSR showed that there is a functional disorder of the nervous system and the heart.

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noy activity (pulse 120 per minute) with general severe overwork and exhaustion of the body. According to the conclusion of the chief doctor of the polyclinic, Dr. Sosyan, a break in the work of Comrade. Khariton for sanatorium treatment.

I consider it possible to provide Yu.B. Khariton is on vacation for a month and a half.

I ask for your decision and help.

Academician I. Kurchatov.

So, once again, Beria had to move from the general problems of the uranium problem to seemingly minor issues ... And what, Kurchatov was afraid to take responsibility for Khariton's vacation? Of course not! But he knew that if he turned to Beria, then Lavrenty Pavlovich would also make sure that Khariton was treated in the first class and that in general everything was in the first class ...

And so it happened: Beria imposes a visa right there, by hand, without entrusting it to the typist: *"mm. Chadaev and Busalov. Provide everything you need. A. Beria. 12/VIII.*

Moreover, Lavrenty Pavlovich, with all his care, put an extra dash in the date, because Kurchatov's letter lay on his desk on the day of writing - July 12, and already on July 18 Makhnev's assistant A. Vasin noted: "By order of Comrade Busalov, Comrade Khariton was granted treatment in the sanatorium "Barvikha". A. Vasin.

The pulse of Beria himself was not taken into account by anyone. He had no one to ask for leave - except perhaps from Stalin. Yes, and Kurchatov also worked in the mode of constant overload. Fourteen years later, in the winter of 1960, at the age of 57, he died instantly on a garden bench during a conversation with Khariton, in fact, in his arms. By that time, almost seven years had passed since the death of Beria.

After reading Kurchatov's letter, I thought - why didn't he turn to Vannikov with this?

To Malyshev?

To Pervukhin?

To Zavenyagin?

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After all, they all also possessed considerable, it would seem, power ...

And he turned to Beria.

Or here's another case.

On March 9, 1948, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Nikolai Andreevich Borisov wrote to Beria about the problems with the allotment of land for "the construction of cottages for German specialists currently living in the Lakes ..."

It was inconvenient for the Germans to get to work in laboratory No. 2 and NII-9, and Zavenyagin prepared a draft government decree on the construction of cottages in a suburban area. However, the executive committee of the Moscow City Council categorically objected, motivating the refusal by the fact that "this site is part of the forest park protective belt of the city of Moscow and is not subject to development."

Today, any "oligarch" or a major official solves such problems in their favor casually, ruthlessly cutting down not only protective zones, but

National parks. But in the "totalitarian" USSR, even PGU had problems here.

So, Zavenyagin insisted, Borisov believed that "as an exception" you can agree.

And how does Beria decide? He immediately finds a quite obvious (after being found) way out. His visa is:

"T. Zavenyagin A.P. It is necessary to dispense with the construction of special cottages for these specialists, but to find a residential building near their place of work and adapt it. L. Beria. April 10, 1948".

All right! Why damage the protective belt of the capital, when everything can be solved easier and cheaper? Why didn't Zavenyagin, with all his managerial experience, think of this before? Why did Beria have to think about the forests around Moscow?

And what a "monster"! So, you see, they would build a group of cozy cottages in fabulous places, near Moscow (15-20 km), and then the Germans would leaving is fine (their contracts provided for returning home after work was completed). And in the cottages you can settle higher

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state bureaucracy. And the "ghoul" (the term of the "general" Volkogonov) Beria took, but he hacked everything in the bud ... He didn't cut down the forest, but administrative stupidity!

I will talk in DETAILS about the resolutions of Beria on the official documents of the Atomic Project. But how often the need for these resolutions was caused not by the objective complexity of the issue, but by the elementary unwillingness of Beria's colleagues to decide on their own in cases where everything could be decided without the chairman of the Special Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers ...

In July 1946, the United States announced two nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. On July 1, a powerful atomic bomb from an aircraft was to be dropped on the atoll lagoon, where 73 obsolete ships were stationed, and on July 25 an underwater nuclear explosion was supposed. And in the USSR, a natural idea arose to organize a special complex research expedition in the Pacific Ocean to obtain information about these tests.

On June 11, 1946, Beria, as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed the order of the Council of Ministers No. 7877-rs, obliging the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the Academy of Sciences, the Main Directorate of the Hydrometeorological Service under the Council of Ministers to take the necessary actions. And it started...

On June 26, Admiral Galler asks for Beria's instructions on the allocation of fuel for ships and aircraft in excess of the limits, and Beria authorizes the expenditure from the mobilization reserve of the Pacific Fleet ...

On July 2, Academicians Semyonov, Kurchatov and Alikhanov approached Beria with a proposal to send an aircraft to the test area to take samples from the radioactive cloud of the explosion.

On July 2, for some reason, Vannikov asked Beria to give additional instructions to Admiral Kuznetsov.

On July 3, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, considering the idea of three academicians "acceptable", informs Beria that it is necessary to give instructions to the Minister of the Navy of the USSR Shirshov (one of Papanin's four, drifting at the station

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"North Pole-1") on the provision of transport "Yerevan" to the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yumashev, as well as on the allocation of fuel - additional to additional.

On July 5, Chief of Staff of the Navy Admiral Golovko, in addition to Kuznetsov's letter, actually disavows the idea of academicians, referring to the fact that the Americans declared the test area dangerous, and declares "a low probability of obtaining gaseous explosion products outside this area" ...

The position of the fleet looks strange! A dangerous area is not a restricted area. These are international waters, you can go into them! And everyone who turns to Beria has already received grounds for action - the order of the Council of Ministers No. 7877-rs. Now the risk is the problems of the fleet. Later, American ships constantly entered those areas of the World Ocean that were declared dangerous for navigation by TASS in connection with the launches of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Nevertheless, "decision makers" do not accept them, so on July 5, Academician Semenov reformulates the idea of sampling and writes to "deeply respected Lavrenty Pavlovich":

"... Lavrenty Pavlovich, of course, there is no guarantee that the result will be obtained (the theory is inaccurate, you can make a mistake in the direction of the wind, the explosion can be carried out very deep under water, i.e. at a depth of more than 10-20 meters, etc.). P.). However, there is a chance of success, and the information obtained is of exceptionally great interest.

To have time to do it, you need to give an immediate order.

Vannikov, in a letter to Beria dated July 6, supports Semenov and again asks "give instructions to Admiral Kuznetsov."

But even Beria seems tired of all this paper storm in the vast ocean of clerical ink, and he sends a letter from Semenov dated July 5 to the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR Bulganin, writing on it by hand: "Comrade . *BULGA*

NINA. At your discretion. A. Beria. 6/ VII".

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Bulganin, on the other hand, is not a ministerial matter, to think, - he imposes a resolution on the letter: "*AM to Vasilevsky. I ask you to consider this issue with a call to comrade. Kuznetsova. N.G. Bulganin. 7/7/46".*

Everyone involved in the ups and downs associated with the Bikini had a solid basis for any action - the order of the Council of Ministers. And all of them possessed considerable independent state powers. Imagine that there was a war going on and the changed operational situation would require the urgent preparation of a major operation at sea. Couldn't the fleet, represented by Admirals Kuznetsov, Galler, Golovko, Yumashev, have found fuel reserves without turning to Beria?

The Marshall Islands are not a passing light, but was it really impossible to change the plans for the combat training of the Pacific Fleet so that the sending of Soviet ships there was considered as a planned combat training campaign?

Yes, for this it was necessary to urgently break the approved schedules, estimates, etc., but if real managers are in charge, everything becomes possible, and becomes possible in the shortest possible time. Rocketeer Korolev said: "Whoever wants to do business will find a means, and whoever does not want to, will find a reason for refusal." Alas, the admirals and the military chose the second option. After all, it's theirs did not concern...

Seven years will pass, and many participants in this story will take part in the creation of the primary "antiberiad". And they will agree when Beria begins to attribute the most ridiculous "crimes" and "sins." And Beria will not even have the opportunity to object, because he will be deprived not only of the right to work for the good of the state, but also of the right to life in general.

He was loaded every day, managing to control all the key

moments. Say, from the Urals, from plant No. 817, at the beginning of August 1949, they should bring precious things to the Volga region in KB-11 (yes, "precious" - priceless!) plutonium "ball" for control assemblies before sending the "product" to the landfill in Kazakhstan. And all the movements of the letter train are personally monitored by Beria.

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This is not a reinsurance and not distrust. And not only heightened responsibility. It is also competence, understanding that this is the only way to help resolve all possible pressing issues in real time! After all, he is Beria! He will make everything right!

In April 1948, officials from the Ministry of Cinematography deprived KB 11 of the right to receive feature films on the grounds that the applications for films did not indicate "the exact geographical coordinates and the name of the ordering organization." And General Zernov and the head of the political department of the "object" Razorenov write a letter to Beria with a request to settle the matter.

And he settles.

Bureau No. 2 of Sudoplatov receives American materials on industrial residential construction for the personnel of nuclear plants in Clinton and Hanford. And Beria immediately addresses them to the main "atomic" builder A.N. Komarovskiy with a clear hint - we need to build no worse ...

But how exhausting it all was! And if he still knew what he would receive from his descendants, from the country for these great and daily works in decades? .. And what are the descendants - in four years his name will be trampled into the mud by his own colleagues in the leadership of the country.

It's sad, comrades...

Alas, when we come across the "memories" about Beria, "told" to us many years after Beria was presented as a villain for the first time at the July plenum of the Central Committee, we must be very careful even in cases where the memoirists turn out to be doctors of sciences, or even academicians. Cautious because when Beria is presented as a "monster" and "executioner", we are not told about the real historical Beria. We are being rehearsed with the rumors that he has acquired over many decades of blasphemy against him. And if engineers and scientists turn out to be unscrupulous in relation to the memory and good name of Lavrenty Pavlovich, then what can we say about "creative" people who are supposed to make up fictions by the nature of their activity!

And "reliable testimonies of the victims" about "torture led by personally by Beria", about his hands "to the elbow in

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blood" ... Well, why is it necessary "to the elbow"? They would have written - on the shoulder, or at least on the forearm ...

Here is another example... The book I mentioned about Zavenyagin was published with the support of the Norilsk Nickel Mining and Metallurgical Company, because Zavenyagin, having graduated from the Mining Academy, was one of the founders of the Norilsk Combine. In terms of the number of citations from sources malicious at Beria, it can be attributed, I repeat, to the classical ones, and the manuscript of "I.I. Novikov" from the archive of the author and compiler M.Ya. Important. The name index to the book says briefly about the memoirist: "Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences", and Important cites his revelations as follows:

"Zavenyagin, better than anyone else, realized how important it was to create an atomic bomb in the shortest possible time, and, moreover, so that it was not a single copy ... but that at the same time production was launched to ensure the production of the required number of such bombs.

The strategic task formulated by Zavenyagin, Vannikov,

Kurchatov (exactly in this sequence. - S.K.), was to create industrial production of nuclear weapons as soon as possible ... " etc. and so on. Zavenyagin at PSU was actually Vannikov's deputy for general issues, and in accordance with the distribution of duties of the leadership of PSU, he directly observed (I quote from the documents): "1) the issue of metallurgy;

- 2) the issue of refining and mining enterprises;
- 3) questions of geology;
- 4) construction;
- 5) GSPI-11 (State Union Design Institute. - S.K.);
- 6) control group;
- 7) labor protection;
- 8) general supply;
- 9) transport".

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These are all important questions, but they are not key. Zavenyagin was not particularly involved in strategic problems, although he also had to decide something. Sometimes - and in the strategic realm. But who is Academician Novikov himself? What contribution did he make to the Soviet Atomic Project? Judging by another of his passages, cited in a book published by Polymedia, the academician did a great job in the weapons problem and knew everything to the point, for example:

"Hard work, which, moreover, took place in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust on the part of Beria, constant threats and denunciations encouraged by Beria, exhausted the body and undermined the health of Zavenyagin, Vannikov, Kurchatov ..." Or:

"On the eve of the first explosion of the atomic bomb, Beria prepared proscription lists for Kurchatov and his employees, whom he intended to severely punish if the test failed," etc. and so on.

So who is this expert on the "atomic" history of the country? In the reference book of the Ministry of Atomic Energy for 1995 "Who is who in nuclear energy and industry", such an atomist was not found, but in the all-Russian reference book it was stated: "Novikov Ivan Ivanovich, full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, b. 1916, adviser to the directorate of the Institute of Metallurgy. The main areas of scientific activity: fundamental research of the gaseous state, especially water vapor "...

That's so "gunsmith"! That's the "expert"! A trace of Ivan Ivanovich was also found in the reference book of the USSR Academy of Sciences for 1977. Then still a corresponding member, Novikov, being in the Department of Physical and Technical Problems of Energy, worked at the same Institute of Metallurgy named after A.A. Baikov. As a heating engineer, he seemed to be related to work on nuclear energy, but he was not absolutely oriented in weapons problems. However, the infamy about Beria, under the guise of an academic toga, launched into public circulation.

Perhaps some of the readers will find my tone in relation to a well-deserved person inappropriate. But

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while working on this book, more than once I simply became stubborn from the vile irresponsibility of such "water vapor specialists", who, in their old age, decided to acquire additional qualifications of specialists in "camp dust". So for his evil irony in their address, he does not intend to ask for forgiveness from anyone. And this connoisseur of the "gaseous state" also poured mud on Pavel Sudoplatov:

"Apparently, in order to intimidate, Beria introduces into the apparatus of the Special Committee as the head of the technical department (this is how the academician calls Bureau No. 2

on intelligence. - S.K.) political killer Sudoplatov ... "What can I say? Sometimes, not only by their deeds, as Christ affirmed, but also by their words, you can recognize *them*... Especially since the word is also a deed.

LOVERS of throwing "camp dust" into the eyes of gullible people wrote a lot about draconian-de regime measures, about the sinister "authorized" Beria, who hung like lead over the soul of nuclear scientists. Indeed, there were representatives of the Council of Ministers of the USSR at nuclear facilities. However, they were selected from among the technically educated Chekists. Arkady Konstantinovich Krugloye, the author of one of the first serious and professionally accurate books about the nuclear industry, Atomprom Headquarters, wrote about them as follows:

"Naturally, the style of work of these commissioners was different and could not please everyone in the conditions of that race of work on the Atomic Project, however, the label "informer" or "supervisor", which, with the light hand of journalists, and a number of specialists, became widespread, is very primitive and non-objectively characterizes the activities of these people.

Beria, as we remember, was an experienced intelligence officer and counterintelligence officer (which is not often successfully combined in one person), and the introduction of the institution of representatives of the Council of Ministers into the structure of atomic work was his successful idea. Moreover, much of our "regime" was taken from the experience of organizing regime security measures used in the US Manhattan Project - after all, they were the first.

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And the "regime" in the "democratic" States was by no means benign. The reader should remember the name of Vladimir Kozmich Zworykin, who emigrated to the USA in 1919. Zworykin is the inventor of television, the largest specialist in the field of electronic optics, president of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). The US Army used his night vision devices during World War II!

Having nothing to do with politics, Zworykin in 1943 headed, however, the New York branch of the Fund for Relief of the Victims of the War in Russia (even the wife of President Roosevelt participated in its work). And in 1945, Zworykin was included in a group of specialists tasked with searching for scientific and technical secrets of the Reich in Germany. But when he appeared with a group at the Washington airport, it turned out that he was forbidden to leave the United States. Zworykin recalled it this way:

"I found out that my passport was withheld by the State Department because I am a member of the Russian War Victims Relief Fund... Needless to say, a bitter pill after... so much work given to my new country. I... felt like I was in a cage. I had to... prepare to be fired from RCA, as I lost my security clearance to work on secret projects. Here, General Sarnoff (head of the research firm David Sarnoff. - S.K.) *stood up for me* ... In the end, in 1947, my passport was returned to me, and I again became a free man.

I gave this example not to condemn the actions of the US authorities. Each country has the right to protect its secrets as it sees fit. But to complete the topic of the reasonableness and usefulness of regime restrictions, I will cite one more story with the same Zworykin.

In 1935, the RCA company entered into a major contract with the People's Commissariat for the Electrical Industry of the USSR for the supply of technical documentation and equipment for the production of electrovacuum devices. The last time Zworykin came to Leningrad and Moscow in connection with this was in 1936. Today, it is sometimes argued that subsequently Zworykin until 1959 even refrained from official trips to the USSR in connection with the expansion of repressions, but

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nye, allowing to explain this abstinence differently. In September 1934, 28 Leonid Kubetsky, a summer scientist from Leningrad, demonstrated to a Russian American his new development - multi-stage electron multipliers. It was a phenomenally fruitful idea, useful for many practical purposes. Having sketched Kubetsky's scheme on the first scrap of paper that came across, Zworykin quickly developed his own multiplier upon arrival in the United States, received a patent for it, and in October 1935 made a report on this new class of electronic devices at the New York branch of the Institute of Radio Engineers. However, of course, he did not refer to Kubetsky's priority.

Is anyone interested in the fate of Kubetsky? Well, in 1948 he received the Stalin Prize and just in the year of Beria's death he was awarded an article about himself in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia ... But he was frank with Zworykin all the same in vain. And if, at the time of their conversation, there was, say, an authorized representative of the Council of Ministers, Lieutenant General Tkachenko, then perhaps the New World would have had one less discovery.

I remembered exactly I.M. Tkachenko is not in vain. At the beginning of the war, he was the head of the 7th department of the NKVD, which was responsible for the Chekist service for the production of mortars, and in the Atomic Project he became an authorized Council of Ministers of the USSR at plant No. unlike Novikov the heat engineer) made Tkachenko almost a fool. And he was just a useful pedant. He did not forbid anything - he had no such rights. He informed and, say, on June 24, 1948, wrote to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Comrade L.P. Beria. about violation of safety regulations by Kurchatov and Slavsky:

"Academician Kurchatov I.V. sometimes ignores all safety rules and precautions (especially when something goes wrong) ... Comrade Slavsky E.P. behave even more recklessly.

So, on June 21, Comrade Kurchatov went down in an elevator to minus 21 meter into the room moisture alarm 517

ditch at a time when the activity in it was over 150 allowable doses.

The security guards of the MGB attached to him, not being instructed in this regard, and the employees of the radiometric service, bowing to his authority, did not interfere with Comrade. Kurchatov...

Since there is no need for him to visit infected places, I personally asked Comrade. Kurchatov to be more circumspect in the future ...

I ask for your instructions ... "

And Beria personally and strictly warns the "violators" - in the name of their own health. The same Tkachenko pointed out that deviations from the project of plant "B" of plant No. 817 and the insufficient participation of the supervisor (that is, Kurchatov) in the reconstruction of the plant could lead to its early shutdown and environmental pollution. They did not listen to Tkachenko and eventually got an ecological catastrophe.

I do not know the fate of Tkachenko after the death of Beria, but I know that the year of his birth is 1910, and his death is 1955. And, most likely, he shared the fate of his boss, whose modest and honest employee was for long and turbulent years in a great era.

And NOW, without a direct connection with the previous one (although it's how you look at it!) I intend to give the reader two debts, which I have owed to myself since the "military"

chapters of this book.

I have in mind the topic of "forced migration of peoples", the main culprit of which is customarily called Beria. Sometime after all, it is necessary to say at least a few words about her.

On September 1, 1942, a request was sent from the General Staff to the member of the GKO Beria and the commander of the Transcaucasian Front Tyulenev:

"Urgently. Beria and Tyulenev.

Maslennikov (commander of the Northern Group of Forces. - S.K.) and the Chechen-Ingush Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ask permission from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command:

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1. Transfer the national Chechen-Ingush cavalry regiment and cavalry division to the active units of the Northern Group of Forces.

2. Allow to start accepting volunteers in the ranks of the Red Army ...

At the same time, Maslennikov reports:

a) Ingush and Chechens want to fight the Germans;

b) there are over 45,000 conscripts in the republic who are not drafted into the Red Army, and considers it necessary to launch a movement among the Chechens and Ingush for their voluntary entry into the Red Army ...

Tov. Stalin ordered to ask for your opinion on these issues.

Beria was skeptical of such an idea, and he was right. Border Guard General Maslennikov, with whom the reader is already familiar, had the open soul of a soldier and could not imagine that a whole nation was capable of betraying the Motherland. In addition, it was tempting for the general to receive replenishment under fifty thousand people in difficult days. But Beria knew and understood what sometimes only experienced doctors and experienced counterintelligence officers know and understand ...

The Chechens were a thorn in the body of Tsarist Russia, and the course of military events proved Beria right: it was impossible to trust Chechnya! Therefore, when the military situation allowed, the Chechens were evicted from Chechnya.

OK! Suppose Stalin and Beria showed injustice to the people *as a whole* by deporting all Chechens in a row in 1944 to the hinterland of the country ... But why, since 1991, this "innocently injured" people - the people *as a whole*, although not everyone is guilty of it - became one of the factors of the decomposition of Russia?

I think, honestly reflecting on this question, the reader himself will find the answer to the question - did Stalin and Beria have reason to do what they did? Moreover, the real KGB operation in the Caucasus was carried out without those excesses that are now full of its "democratic" descriptions.

As for the Crimean Tatars, I will cite a document that

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ry in the 60s was kept in the archives of the Crimean regional party committee (fund 151, inventory 1, file 17):

"The list of dead partisans in the Yalta detachment from 26.III/42:

26.III. - When attacking a dignity. dugout of the former 3rd group killed opponent: Sergeev, Ptashinsky, Goremykin, Kazachek, m / s Nikolaev.

28.III. - The fighter Godin died, the cause is illness, influenza.

2.IV. - Afonin died - heart disease.

2.IV. - Killed by a traitor - Smirnov, Vyaznikov, Ageev. 5.IV. - Died Kachalov, the reason is exhaustion. 7.IV. - Dolgov died, the reason is exhaustion

10.IV. - Garbuzov died, the reason is exhaustion

12.IV. - Died tt. Bolotin, Shostik, Borshinov... Zibarev. From hunger.

13.IV. - Comrade Grebenshchikov died. Hunger.

14.IV. Gardas died. From hunger.

18.IV. - Zuev A.A. died. From hunger.

21.IV. - Sokolsky, Mukhin died. From hunger.
24.IV. - Rastorguev died. From hunger.
May 19 - Shutenko died. From hunger.
21.V. Grishko is dead. From hunger.
21.V. - I.P. died. Doroshenko. From hunger.
20.V. Alekseev died. From hunger.
21.V. Ponomarenko was killed.
30.V. Orekhov died. From hunger. 6.V. Timokhin died. From hunger.
10.V. Korenyuk died. From hunger.
15.V. - Kravchenko died. From hunger.
17.V. - Loboda died. From hunger.
22.V. - Zagosa D.V. died. From hunger.
26.V. - Kuzerin died. From hunger.
26.V. - Died Kondratenko V.A. From hunger".

This is the result of the fact that the Crimean Tatar guides gave the Germans almost all the food bases of the partisans in the Crimean mountains.

There were dozens of prisoner-of-war camps in the Crimea - the Germans wanted to make the Crimea impregnable, and labor was required for fortification work. The guards of the camps are Tatars. If among the prisoners there was a Red Navy sailor (arr.

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flannels, vests, a pinned anchor), then death for such a Slavic guy from the Smolensk or Poltava regions became a deliverance after standard abuses: carved stars, stripes of a "vest", gouged out eyes, cut off genitals ...

Read, read, dear reader, and let the "democrat" read it. I deliberately do not give here numerical data, although they indicate that the percentage of Crimean Tatars loyal to the Soviet regime did not exceed 20 percent.

But only on May 9, 1945, it became known that the war ended on May 9, 1945, and ended with our victory. The Germans did not consider themselves defeated even in January 1945 and had reason to do so - the Reich was still strong and delivered powerful blows to the Russians in the Lake Balaton area, to the allies in the Ardennes. And already in 1944, many in the Reich (no matter what they wrote the opposite) were sure that failures were a temporary phenomenon. So, could Russia afford the luxury of having in its rear in 1944 potential centers of uprisings in the Caucasus and Crimea, supported from outside?

And again, let's look at the current situation. What did the return of the "repressed Tatar people" to Crimea bring? Blood, growing ethnic conflict. And its source is the people, "innocently injured" by the "executioner" Beria.

I was distracted by plots that at first glance are far from atomic, but in fact are connected with them by the fact that any plot associated with Beria, like a nut shell, is covered with a solid crust of petrified mud. But if this crust is broken, then we get the "core" of the truth about Beria. And this truth about his pre-war, military and post-war activities proves the enormous human scale and human worth of the one who carried it out.

As a statesman, he was neither kind nor evil, he was adequate to the historical situation. And what more can we ask of prominent statesmen? But also as a statesman he was never ruthlessly

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walls and soulless. He did not have such a beginning of life that in his soul grew cruelty and butchery.

Throwing a bridge from the topic of "repressions" to the "atomic" topic, I will acquaint the reader with the letter of P.M. Zernova B.L.

Vannikov from the same February 12, 1949, when Zernov allegedly waved at Beria with either a candelabra, or a paperweight, or a club carved from a spreading cranberry. Zernov wrote:

"... over the past eight months, a completely abnormal environment.

By decision of the Government in 1947, in order to ensure security at the facility ... all persons who had a criminal record or other compromising data in the past were evicted from the zone (500 people were evicted, including family members, with the provision of new housing and loans, with payment compensation, etc. - S.K.) ...

However, things changed radically for the worse, starting in April 1948.

The construction department No. 880 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR released from prison began to leave them at the construction site as civilians. As a result of such persons, more than 1,750 people have accumulated in the zone ...

Among those released from the camp and now living freely in the village a lot of hooliganism, theft, robbery and there were cases of murder ...

There are always crowds of former prisoners in public places. Scientific and engineering workers (we are talking about the elite of the Atomic Project. - S.K.) cannot get into the cinema, they began to be afraid to walk the streets in the evenings and at night ...

Three times I submitted memos on this issue addressed to Comrade L.P. Beria, but since there are no decisions, I don't know if they were reported to him? Knowing the level of the "regime" directly within the walls of KB-11, it is hard to believe in such a collision *next to them* ! But that's the way it was. And today, those who worked at "atomic" construction sites in the camp padded jacket are written exclusively as "victims of the regime." And you involuntarily regret that in public places filled with that "criminally promoted

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"by that" crowd of "victims" of "executioner" Beria, it is impossible to transfer the asset of "Memorial" and other "denouncers" of Lavrenty Pavlovich's "crimes" for at least half an hour. Perhaps then gossip and insinuations around his activities would have diminished ...

And also about the "atmosphere of fear", supposedly hovering around everything related with the activities of Beria. On March 8, 1947, Zavenyagin wrote to Beria:

"The First Main Directorate is guarded by watch guards, staffed by civilians.

Despite systematically applied disciplinary measures... have place sleep on duty, desertion and a number of other serious misdemeanors.

Experience has shown that the watch guard is completely unreliable, not ensuring the safety of the secret documentation of the First Main Directorate.

This is also hard to believe. But that was it too! And now let's think, if *the then* popular rumor attributed to Beria some kind of "butchery", would the watchmen behave so irresponsibly? And what is the fate of these negligent watchmen? Erased "in the camp dust"? Sent to the "slavery" of the Gulag? No, Zavenyagin is only asking to transfer security functions to the Ministry of State Security.

State Security Minister Abakumov refuses on the grounds that the MGB is guarded only by the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee. Minister of the Interior Krugloye also refuses in the same style. Then on March 24, 1947, N.A. also wrote to Beria. Borisov from Gosplan. And on March 25, the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Beria appears on the transfer of protection of the buildings of the CCGT under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

But Beria would not have been Beria if he had not instructed

Zavenyagin and Borisov, in connection with the transfer of the guards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, "to reduce the staff of the commandant's office and guards, respectively," established almost a year ago. Beria knew how to be not only efficient, but also economical - "on a grand scale" and in little things.

And one can only wonder how he managed to do both with the ever-increasing range of the most important issues of state life entrusted to him. After all, his tasks were not limited to the Atomic Project ...

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Chapter 19

BERIA + KUKSENKO = "BERKUT"

NO, dear reader, Beria in this formula bore the name not Lavrenty, but Sergo. Although Lavrenty Beria was directly involved in the birth of this formula.

And before starting a story about the Berkut system and the Third Main Directorate under the USSR Council of Ministers, I will offer the reader a saying. In the summer of 1941, the front was steadily approaching the capital. And, as the aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev, at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was decided to hold a military game to repel an air raid on Moscow.

The game was played in that mansion near the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry, where the Stavka was located, while the Kremlin bomb shelter was being prepared for it. In a small hall hung with maps and diagrams, Stalin gathered, Air Force Commander P.F. Zhigarev, his deputy I.F. Petrov, People's Commissar of Aviation Industry Shakhurin, his deputies Dementyev and Yakovlev, aviation generals.

The commander of the air defense of Moscow, Major General Gromadin, reported and Commander of Air Defense Fighter Aviation Colonel Klimov.

Perhaps Beria was also there, since, as a member of the GKO, he was also responsible for questions Air Force, but history, as well as Yakovlev (aircraft designer), are silent about this.

Yakovlev writes:

"Throughout the entire exercise, Stalin carefully watched and listened to everything, but did not utter a word. When the game was over and, as expected, the imaginary enemy planes were repulsed, he silently walked around the tablet. One got the impression that the variants played out did not convince him... Finally, lighting his pipe, he said as if through his teeth:

I don't know, maybe that's how it should be...

Then he silently went to the office, inviting Shakhurin, Dementiev, Zhigarev, Petrov and me...

Just like us, this military game did not make a serious impression on him: somehow everything is schematic and paper.

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However, Moscow's air defense was already far from being a "paper tiger". A.G. Fedorov, the author of the 1975 monograph "Aviation in the Battle of Moscow", reports that, according to the Decree of the State Defense Committee of July 9, 1941, the Moscow air defense zone had 585 aircraft, 1044 anti-aircraft guns (and Soviet anti-aircraft guns were very good!), 336 anti-aircraft machine guns, 618 searchlight stations, 124 barrage balloon posts and 702 VNOS posts (air surveillance, warning and communications).

For comparison, it is also reported that London covered 452 guns. large, medium and small caliber, Berlin - 724.

Here we must also add the first 8 domestic radar stations of the Redut and RUS-2 types.

Moscow was covered powerfully - it was not overnight that such a force was gathered and equipped here! The Moscow air defense system was built as a circular one;

200 kilometers from the city, and fight to the outer border of the anti-aircraft fire zone (28-32 kilometers from the city center). Fighters were forbidden to enter the last zone, except in cases of enemy pursuit that was launched outside the anti-aircraft guns' coverage area.

And yet, as we see, Stalin doubted, although the Moscow air defense really worked well - in the first raid on the capital on July 22, the Germans lost 12 aircraft shot down by air defense fighters, and 10 from anti-aircraft fire. Only single bombers broke through to Moscow. At the same time, anti-aircraft artillery units of the 1st Air Defense Corps used up 29 thousand shells and about 130 thousand machine-gun cartridges.

In total, 471,000 shells were expended over the two-month period of repelling raids on Moscow, while the average expenditure per reflected aircraft was 2,775 shells. This pleasure is not cheap - a downed plane.

But then already in the air defense system there were, as it was said, radar stations. So, when using RAS, the average consumption of shells per reflected aircraft with

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put only 98 shells. And one anti-aircraft artillery shell then cost a pair of chrome boots.

When the Germans withdrew from Moscow, measures to protect the capital did not weaken. By decree of the State Defense Committee of April 5, 1942, the Moscow Air Defense Front was created, which in July 1943 was transformed into the Special Moscow Air Defense Army. The front moved more and more to the west, things were getting better, and at some point even the theoretical threat of raids disappeared.

German raids ... However, immediately after the war, Stalin again began to be occupied with the problem of Moscow's air defense. After all, with the advent of atomic bombs in the United States, this problem changed fundamentally. Even a single plane over Moscow could now provide the Russian capital with the fate of Hiroshima.

But after such a "telling" you can lead the story itself ...

Actually, here I rely on the evidence, in particular, of such a competent expert as Major General, Doctor of Technical Sciences Alexander Pavlovich Reutov. A prominent scientist and designer in the field of radar, after graduating in 1950 from the N.E. Zhukovsky started in that KB-1, which laid the foundation for the modern air defense of Moscow.

He cites the story of the founder of KB-1, Major General Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko, also a prominent scientist and radio engineer, about how one night in 1950 Kuksenko called Stalin to him and said that the last enemy aircraft flew over Moscow on July 10, 1942 year, and it was a lone scout. And after that, Stalin said that now it was necessary to build such an air defense system in Moscow that, even in the event of a "star" (that is, from all directions) massive raid, would not let a single aircraft capable of carrying an atomic bomb pass to the capital.

When asked by Stalin what kind of air defense should be, Kuksenko replied that a promising air defense system should be built on the basis of a combination of radar and guided missiles "ground-to-air" and "air-to-air".

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Stalin questioned Kuksenko in detail, according to Reutov, because

The problem was new to him. But I do not rule out that Stalin simultaneously tested the fifty-two-year-old specialist, because the significance of radar became clear to him even before the war, at least after his conversations with Admiral Axel Ivanovich Berg (father - Swede, mother - Italian, Berg himself is a purebred hare).

In order for the reader to understand that we did not slurp cabbage soup in "totalitarian" times, I will inform you that the first serial Gneiss-2 airborne radar developed by V.V. Tikhomirov was created in July 1942 and was installed on the Pe-2 bomber in the interceptor version. And the Council for Radar at the GKO, whose deputy chairman was Axel Berg, was formed in July 1943. By the way, Malenkov was the chairman of the Council, but here, too, he did not distinguish himself as a competent manager-"technocrat". In the end, and radar - as an interested person in the top leadership - was supported by Beria.

Kuksenko, during the war, with the rank of captain of the State Security Service, was the chief engineer of the numbered research institute of the NKVD of the radio engineering profile, and Beria, of course, knew him. In 1947, at the age of 51 (born in 1896, died in 1980), Pavel Nikolayevich became a doctor of technical sciences, and a year before that he received the Stalin Prize for the development of a new bomber sight. It is very likely that it was Beria who "brought" him to Stalin.

One way or another, Stalin told Kuksenko that it was necessary to immediately start creating Moscow's air defense, designed to repel a massive raid from any direction. Soon, Design Bureau No. 1 (KB-1) of the Ministry of Armaments was formed - a large design and research and production concern for the development of radio-controlled missile weapons systems. Professor Kuksenko and the young Sergo Beria, who graduated from the Academy of Communications in Leningrad, were placed at the head of KB-1.

Grigory Vasilievich Kisunko - in 1946, a teacher at the academy, and later - one of the veterans of both KB-1 and missile defense works, Hero of the Socialist

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Truda, laureate of the Lenin Prize, lieutenant general, in 1996 published the book "Secret Zone". Kisunko's book in terms of assessments, especially political ones, turned out to be shallow, but valuable in describing the factual side of the matter.

About Sergei Beria, he writes that he was not distinguished by arrogance, was educated and tactful, and "his head cooked well" ... Kisunko reports that Stalin, having convinced himself that Kuksenko was able to give an effective air defense system, "no longer considered it necessary to call Pavel Nikolaevich for personal conversations, leaving the "Berkut" to the full care of L.P. Beria".

So, the rocket business fell on the same person who was already doing business atomic...

FOR THE FIRST TIME, Beria encountered them at least three years before the war, which almost no one remembers now. Moreover, he immediately came across such a powerful "rocket" personality as Sergei Pavlovich Korolev. Yes, at that time Korolev was convicted and imprisoned. But I can inform the reader that the journal of visits to Stalin's Kremlin office recorded the appearance of Sergei Pavlovich in this office in October 1938 (October 15 from 22.15 to 23.40). It was a long conversation with the participation of Voroshilov, who entered Stalin at 21.50 and left him already at ten minutes to two on October 16th.

So the stories that the future Chief Designer of Cosmonautics has been rocking the breed for years can be given to the Antonov-Ovseenkas. The queen had, of course, a hard time, but Beria was not to blame - they arrested

Queen before Lavrenty Pavlovich came to Lubyanka. But after Beria arrived there - among the many cases on the direct, so to speak, profile of his "office" - he carefully got acquainted with the rest.

One of the founders of the GIRD - the Group for the Study of Jet Propulsion - at the Rocket Research Institute Korolev since 1934 was engaged in guided cruise missiles: 201, 212, 216, 217 ... The 212 ground-to-ground missile was launched using a powder rocket catapult from rail guides, and her first flight took place on January 29, 1939.

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Then, when Korolev was a "prisoner". And already on April 3, 1939, he reappears in Stalin's office, this time - together with Beria!

And the three of them sat there from 18.00 to 18.35. A little more than half an hour, but it was half an hour of a personal conversation with the head of state! And the conversation, most likely, was about how best to organize the work of Korolev, than Beria can and should help ... And since all three interlocutors were people of business and did not tolerate chatter, they discussed everything in half an hour.

But, apparently, Stalin was also interested in purely technical details, because the next day Korolev was brought to Stalin again. And they already talked alone for another hour - from 18.00 to 19.00.

In the book of the undoubtedly outstanding figure in Soviet rocket science, Boris Evseevich Chertok, "Rockets and People," it is stated that Stalin was "usually reported" about all the latest in the field of weapons, but about "ground (for a professional, the term is actually strange. - S.K.) jet shells, Stalin had no information until 1941.

As you can see, he had.

Moreover, we note, here is the innocently convicted Korolev before Stalin. We have long been accustomed to the tale of sighs: "Oh, if only Stalin knew!" But Stalin knows... After all, he cannot fail to know *where* a young talented rocket scientist *is brought* to him from . Well, why doesn't this rocket man fall on his knees and ask: "Have mercy on me, comrade tsar-sovereign! Don't lose your soul!

No - there is a business conversation, and both understand that there was a certain sin, and that it is necessary to work it out by deed, and that it will be worked out, and this will be followed by honor, and awards, and ... And, most importantly, new tasks and tasks . New exciting job!

After all, they all lived by it then - the new Soviet people ...

And Korolev.

And Stalin.

And Beria.

And already on February 28, 1940, test pilot V.P. Fedorov performed the first flight on the RP-318 rocket plane designed by Korolev, based on his own SK-9 glider, with a working liquid-propellant rocket engine. And in 1942—

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In 1943, Korolev was developing an aircraft rocket booster for the Pe-2R aircraft, for which he was awarded an order in 1945.

After the war, Korolev, among others, worked in Germany, studying the richest experience of German rocket scientists, and there his paths crossed with General Zernov, who then also, as an authorized representative of the Special Committee under the State Defense Committee, was involved in "rocket" searches.

Beria was aware of all these issues and at the turn of 1945-1946 he became one of those who signed a memorandum to Stalin with a proposal to organize work on rocket technology in the USSR and Germany (the Nordhausen Institute was deployed there). They signed it, besides him, G.M. Malenkov, N.A. Bulganin, N.A. Voznesensky, as well as the Minister of Armaments D.F. Ustinov and

Head of GAU Marshal of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev.

On April 14 and 29, 1946, two meetings on this topic were held in Stalin's Kremlin office, and on May 13, 1946, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1017-419ss "On issues of jet weapons" was issued. Under the Council of Ministers, a Special Committee on Jet Technology was created, consisting of: G.M. Malenkov (Chairman), D.F. Ustinov and I.G. Zubovich (deputy chairmen), N.D. Yakovlev, P.I. Kirpichnikov (the reader should remember him from his work in a group with a member of the GKO Beria during the war), A.I. Berg, P.N. Goremykin, I.A. Serov (in his memoirs, Chertok stubbornly calls him, Deputy Minister of the Interior Kruglov, Beria's deputy), N.E. Nosovsky.

Beria was not included in this Committee No. 2, but here is P.I. Kachur, author of the article "Missile technology of the USSR: the post-war period until 1948" in No. 6 of the Energia magazine of the Russian Academy of Sciences for 2007: "In fact, rocket science was led by L.P. Beria. G.M. Malenkov did not deal with organizational and production issues and was the formal chairman of the committee "...

The B.E. Chertok also confirms that Malenkov, like Bulganin, who soon replaced him, "did not play a special role in the formation ... of the industry. Their high role was limited to reviewing or signing draft resolutions that were prepared by the committee's apparatus.

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Everything was repeated, as in the case of the "aviators" Malenkov and Molotov during the war. They presided, Beria pulled the cart.

Also this one.

But again I draw the reader's attention to the name of Kirpichnikov. Beria and in the missile Special Committee had a reliable assistant, tested by him during the war years.

At first, the same approach was adopted in the development of rocket technology as in the uranium problem - the reproduction of the German prototypes V-1 and V-2. The initiative for this is usually attributed to Stalin, but B.E. Chertok reports that Ustinov insisted on the exact reproduction of the German V-2, about which "he had serious conflicts with Korolev more than once." Copying then, however, was a reasonable way out - the Germans in rocket work went as far ahead of the rest as the Yankees - in atomic work.

But their own research and development was also actively carried out - in 1947, full-scale tests of experimental missiles were carried out at the Korolev Design Bureau. OKB employee since 1946 A.N. Volfitsin in the eighties recalled that some launches "rather resembled a demonstration of aerobatics" - almost immediately from the launch of the rocket, instead of vertical flight, they turned into intricately curvilinear.

In 1948, Stalin again met with a meeting where Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev (another "innocent" victim of Stalin and Beria) spoke out sharply against the adoption of rocket technology, motivating the refusal by the complexity and low reliability of rockets, as well as the fact that the same tasks are being solved aviation. Korolev just as sharply spoke "for"...

Our first ballistic missiles were really imperfect. But their appearance in the troops would be a serious impetus to the improvement of technology, and at the same time the military would gain operating experience. Stalin spoke out in this spirit, noting that Comrade Korolev needed to make such a rocket so as not to "disappoint our military" ...

By the way! Those who are trying to present the matter in such a way that our rocket men, squeezed by Stalin's instructions, in the early years only reproduced German models, would not hurt

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know that already in 1948 Korolev invited a specialist in the layout of aircraft cockpits, engineer A.V. Afanasyev from the Yakovlev Design Bureau, to develop a project for a manned spacecraft. Then this project "did not go", but Afanasiev subsequently took an active part in the development of the Vostok and Soyuz spacecraft ...

In Special Committee No. 2, the Minister of Armaments Ustinov decided a lot, but the "rocket" significance of Beria can be understood from one conversation from the time of 1952, described by G. Kisunko.

Then problems arose with one of the designs of KB-1, and Ustinov called an interdepartmental meeting at which Kisunko first met Korolev. At the end of the meeting, Kisunko asked Korolyov to give him a ride on Pobeda and, already in the car, reproached his colleague for not supporting KB-1 in the best way, whose representative at the meeting was Kisunko ...

I am not a supporter of quoting direct speech from memoirs, since this is always something, if not fictional, then not reliable, but I will quote Korolev's answer as presented by Kisunko:

"- And if I overdid it a little, then this is also understandable: I have my own minister (Ustinov. - S.K.), and you have your own bosses, who, even at his request, did not want to take part in the meeting, where representatives from of the LP itself... I had to shift the accents a little towards KB-1... You are your own for the LP: you can do nothing more than reproach"...

Kisunko treats Beria (father) negatively, and therefore such words of Korolyov look especially convincing in his presentation, which show a respectful attitude towards Sergey Pavlovich's LP. Among rocket scientists and nuclear scientists, such abbreviations ("SP" - Korolev, "YuB" - Khariton, etc.) were used only in relation to those who were respected.

BACK, however, to the air defense of Moscow.

In 1950, according to the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426ss / op of August 9, the Moscow air defense system received the name "Berkut". The exact origin of such a name cannot be established today, but KB-1 veterans agree on

volume,

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that it is formed from the initial syllables of the names of the main designers of the system - Beria and Kuksenko. And to "ensure the development, design and manufacture of the means included in the air defense system of the Berkut system, on February 3, 1951, the Third Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was formed under the direction of V.N. Ryabikov with direct subordination to the Special Committee, that is, Beria.

Ryabikov was transferred to TSU from Special Committee No. 2, but in acute situations, Beria also connected Vannikov to him. Moreover, Vannikov, according to the testimony of the same Kisunko, sometimes spoke very harshly, for example: "I ... am going to report to the LP that all of you here have forgotten what responsibility is ... You have been spoiled and think that everything is allowed to you. They gave you everything you asked for... And now that's enough, now let's go..." However, as even Kisunko admits, "there was no need to look for... scapegoats."

Now, as chairman of the Special Committee, Beria oversaw:

- The first main department headed by B.L. Vannikov;
- The second main department headed by P.Ya. Antropov, who was in charge of the extraction and processing of uranium raw materials into concentrate, and also carried out production and technical management of the extraction of uranium from deposits developed in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland, and control over geological exploration for uranium and thorium;

- The Third Main Directorate for Guided Missiles and Air Defense Systems, headed by V.N. Ryabikov.

S.I. became Ryabikov's deputy. Vetoshkin, scientific director of TSU - Academician A.N. Schukin. And KB-1 was included in the TSU. Kuksenko and Sergo Beria had the status of Chief Designers, while the future Academician and Hero of Socialist Labor A.A. was appointed the only Deputy Chief Designer. Raspletin, the creator of the B-200 central guidance radar, which provided simultaneous tracking of up to 20 targets. The radars of the first American Nike Ajax anti-aircraft missile systems, unlike Raspletin's multifunctional sector radar, could track only one target.

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The well-known aircraft designer Semyon Alekseevich Lavochkin became the chief designer of anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) of the Berkut system. The Lavochkin missile received the B-300 index.

The head of the design bureau, in fact the head of the pilot production, Beria chose the Hero of Socialist Labor Amo Sergeevich Elyan. During the war, General Yelyan was the director of the head artillery plant for the production of the most massive medium-caliber field and tank guns (100,000 guns were fired by Victory Day). And then Yelyan entered the sphere of influence of Beria as an experienced and skilled manager. As in the "atomic" business, Beria saw the key to the success of "rocket" affairs in competent personnel and therefore transferred Yelyan, who had previously worked in the PGU system, to the system of the new Third State Guidance.

If in the uranium problem "the first violin" was played by physicists, whose problems could be fully understood by a very small number of physicists, then in the rocket problem everything was clearer, more tangible. And dynamic teams of young enthusiastic rocket scientists, engine engineers, creators of ground and onboard control systems quickly grouped around it. And as the same Kuksenko later recalled, the work unfolded with incomprehensible speed. In 1951, the stage of manufacturing prototypes began.

In November 1952, the first launch of the V-300 SAM against an air target took place. On April 26, 1953, a specially redesigned - remotely controlled unmanned - bomber "Tu-4", used as a target aircraft, was shot down. And in May 1953, the first stage of the launch program for real radio-controlled aircraft was completed.

Here are two later assessments of the contribution of Beria Sr. to these achievements.

General M.I. Naumenko:

"He repeatedly visited the Kapustin Yar training ground, where, by the way, his son Sergey participated in the tests ... During the construction period until 1953, while Beria from

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I was responsible for the implementation of the project, there was not a single failure from the very beginning ... "

Lieutenant General, Academician A.G. Basistoe (the value in Soviet work on missile defense is already outstanding):

"In August 1952, I reported to Lavrentiy Beria on the state of the polygon sample of the Moscow air defense system. Beria came to our facility ... He spoke calmly, respectfully ... On that visit, he solved the problem of food for us. We worked for 18 hours, and there was really nowhere to eat. And after it

visit immediately everything appeared ... "

I will interrupt the quotation of Anatoly Georgievich Basistov in order to acquaint the reader with the "evidence" of a certain nameless (even in 2000) "commander of one of the air defense missile bases near Moscow", taken from

"investigation" by E. Zhirnov, published on June 6, 2000 in Kommersant POWER under the heading "They dissolved Beria in alkali." According to the author, this "combat officer, who went through the Patriotic War from the first to the last day, and decades later, his knees began to shake when he remembered meetings with Beria" ... The reader himself will compare this "revelation" with Basistov's memoirs, but I will only remind that by the time Beria was arrested there were no air defense missile bases near Moscow - the Berkut system was experimental then, and the army did not operate it. Fat, by the way, also cites another statement by this unlikely "officer" that Beria's corpse was allegedly dissolved in alkali after the execution, hence the title of the cited magazine libel.

Returning to the assessment of Beria by the Basistovs, I will give its final part: "He didn't know much about technology, but on the top level was strong, stronger, perhaps, was not at the time time"...

A restrained assessment "I didn't understand too much ..." from the lips of a high professional is worth another enthusiastic one. And it is especially valuable against the background of the statements of one of the well-deserved veterans of KB-1 and NPO Almaz, Karl Samuilovich Alperovich. Laureate of the Lenin and State Prizes, having

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Order of Lenin and the Red Banner of Labor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor, in September 2007 (then he was in his eighty-sixth year) gave an interview to the weekly Military Industrial Courier, where he spoke extremely negatively about Sergo Beria, condescendingly about Kuksenko, and regarding the role of Beria in the creation of the Moscow air defense, he said this:

"The special position of Lavrenty Beria in the leadership of the country and his special "character" (and here is a false allusion to the fact that Beria headed the de "pompous department", although Krugloye and Ignatiev were then the heads of the special services. - S.K.) ensured the attraction of unlimited material and human resources ("nuclear scientists", it turns out, got "leftovers" from rocket scientists? -

S.K.). When we, for example, addressed our requests to any ministry, we were never refused - no one wanted to feel the wrath of Lavrenty. That is, being under the auspices of this person allowed our leaders to resolve any issues without delay (but for some reason only Beria solved the problem of feeding engineers at the training ground. - S.K.). As for the essence of the problems we were solving, Beria had no idea about them and actively did not want to get acquainted with them even at the most simplified, "murzil" level, because he did not have such abilities. The recent attempts to present Beria as an effective manager have no basis. He was simply not capable of being him ... "

In such an assessment, only the indestructible, blind, metropolitan "elite" malice towards the "villain" "Lavrenty" ... By the way, Alperovich blamed his son for the fact that "with the arrest of Lavrenty Beria ... Sergo stopped visiting the enterprise altogether" ... Sergo was then at all He was arrested and then expelled from Moscow, but even under these conditions, over the years he acquired a completely worthy professional status - unlike another rocket scientist, Sergei Khrushchev. It is interesting, by the way, how does Alperovich feel about this former colleague of his, who drove off to the States, while the son of Beria served his country until the end of his life?

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As for Alperovich's accusations against Beria Sr., they

prove a complete misunderstanding by Karl Samuilovich of the essence of the "managerial" activity of Lavrenty Pavlovich. It was Khrushchev who could "benevolently" delve into the technical details of specific problems at the "murzil" level and make **managerial** decisions **at the same** level ! And Beria, as Zavenyagin complained about him at the July plenum of the Central Committee (I will talk about this later), on the contrary, scolded the managers subordinate to him for trying to get into details. "You - organizers," Beria emphasized and demanded the ability to organize a business, and not utter "profound" proposals like Zavenyagin's - according to the hydrogen bomb scheme. This proposal of theoretical physicists was immediately ironically dubbed the "candelabra" (isn't it this "candelabra" that Beria "swung" at Zernov?).

Therefore, Lavrenty Pavlovich did not want to "get acquainted" with the "essence of the problems being solved" by Alperovich, because, being a high management professional, he saw **his** task in providing Alperovich and his colleagues with everything necessary **for them to solve these problems**.

And Beria always solved this problem brilliantly!

Here are a few more words on the topic... "Democrats" from science complain about the clampdown on cybernetics in the USSR in the 40s, but in reality, at the end of the 40s, in accordance with government assignments, the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering and Instrument Engineering began organizing design and production calculating-analytical and mathematical electronic digital machines. Minister P.I. Parshin (who was well acquainted with Beria from the mortar commissariat during the war) reported this to Lavrenty Pavlovich on April 29, 1949 and asked the PGU to take part in drawing up the technical specifications for the design of the ECM. Such machines were needed both for calculating thermonuclear charges and for air defense systems.

The Berkut system was developed for many reasons, the main of which was the real threat of US nuclear aggression. But the fact that it was developed quickly was also explained by the leadership of Beria - by the beginning of the 50s, he had already acquired such knowledge about the economy, about the possibilities

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countries and such experience that all his undertakings were doomed to success.

In the "rocket" Beria plot there is another dimension - a purely human one, and the comparison here suggests itself. I already touched it above. Both Beria's son Sergo and Khrushchev's son Sergei became rocket men.

The son of Lavrenty Beria lived as a rocket scientist and died as a rocket scientist. And although, after the death of his father, his service career was cut short rudely and unfairly, he entered the history of rocket technology as one of its pioneers. And despite all the obstacles, he remained faithful to his profession until the end of his life.

Nikita Khrushchev also "put" his son "into rockets". And it seems to me that he did so not only because it was, as they say now, prestigious, but also in spite of Beria, whom Khrushchev certainly hated quietly, secretly and enviously - as mediocrity is capable of in relation to talent.

After the death of Beria, they tried to throw his son out of his beloved business, even changing his last name to his mother's - Gegechkori. But Sergo was only deprived of his chair, not his abilities. And over time, he even grew administratively. But then Khrushchev fell from the pinnacle of power, and Sergei Khrushchev was also thrown out of his chair in Chelomey's missile design bureau. However, there was no return to the previous place.

Colleagues remembered Sergo Beria many years later. And Sergei Khrushchev was firmly forgotten, just as new generations will increasingly forget his dad. But Father Sergo Beria, Russia, if it has a future, will begin to remember more and more loudly!

Finally, let's take into account the fact that the son of an "international intelligence agent"

Beria died in his native land, without going anywhere from it in search of happiness. And his antipode, the son of the "faithful Leninist" Nikita Khrushchev, drove off to live in America.

And this is very revealing!

Nikita Khrushchev saw only an external effect in the development of rocket technology, and for the sake of realizing his rocket and space ambitions, he neglected the development of other types of promising technology.

Lavrenty Beria saw a broad prospect for the development
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of the country's defense in the interconnection of various systems of modern weapons.

They were antagonists here, as in everything else ...

The role of Beria in the formation of the rocket industry of science and technology was all the more significant because, apart from Beria himself, she had only one influential supporter in the country's top leadership - Stalin. Aviation designers, with the exception of Lavochkin, treated rocket technology with restraint, to put it mildly. As, however, at first, and to jet aircraft. According to the testimony of the same B.E. Chertoka, Alexander Sergeevich Yakovlev "was unfriendly to ... work on BI (the missile interceptor of Bereznyak and Isaev with a liquid-propellant rocket engine Dushkin. - S.K.) and the work of AM Lyulka on the first domestic version of a turbojet engine" and even published in " Pravda, a sensational article, where he characterized German work in the field of jet aviation as *the agony* of Nazi engineering.

And Beria immediately supported the rockets. Actually, the fact that the People's Commissar for Armaments Ustinov (who to some extent can be considered "Beria's man"), and not the People's Commissar of the aviation industry Shakhurin (who to some extent can be considered "Malenkov's man"), began to oversee rocket affairs, immediately reveals the influence of Beria. It was with Ustinov that he established working contacts during the war, and Ustinov's appointment as a "rocketeer" could hardly have happened apart from Lavrenty Pavlovich.

In a letter from his cell, Beria wrote on July 1, 1953 to Malenkov:

"I should especially note our joint active long-term work in the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers on the creation of atomic weapons, and later on the Kometa and Berkut systems - guided missiles.

According to the Berkut, the tests were completed successfully. Now it's all about providing batch production and
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leading personnel, and in this area a lot is being done by the relevant ministries. Most importantly, on the basis of the "Kometa" and "Berkut" there are enormous opportunities for further improvements in the field of guided projectiles, both in terms of accuracy, and in terms of speed and range. A special report is being prepared for the government. This weapon must be moved forward, this is the real future, with which the army of our country must be armed. The United States and Britain attach exceptional importance to this. I repeat, all this was achieved because the Party and the Government wanted it, but I wanted to say, and here we worked together ... "

As for Beria, he worked, but Malenkov, rather, "jointly" met, but I think Beria wrote this not only because he was sitting in a bunker, but also because he was always a man of the "team" and laurels shared with others without greed.

As far as I understand, his son Sergo was the same. However, readers familiar with Sergo Beria's book may have noticed that I have not quoted a single line from it here, although one of the founders of KB-1 wrote quite interesting things about the history of Berkut.

Nevertheless, I am critical of the book of the son of L.P. Beria, especially in

parts of pre-war, military and post-war history. I do not refer to his positive assessments of his father - they can be perceived by someone as biased. In addition, Sergo Beria did his father not the best service by trying to describe him in contrast to the figure of Stalin, who committed crimes in which his father allegedly had to participate as a fatal executor of Stalin's will.

But neither Stalin nor Beria had anything to do with villainy and Machiavellianism. All their "Soviet" life they were busy building the state and lived this construction. That is why Russia's successes were so significant because, despite all the costs of the real historical process, it was led *wisely*.

And people always feel it.

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AS Beria Sr. wrote, by the summer of 1953, things were going well for Berkut. But here Beria is arrested. And how events unfolded further in relation to KB 1, I will report, based on the information of G. Kisunko. Two positions of Chief Designers of KB-1, which were occupied by the founders - according to Kisunko - of this organization Kuksenko and Sergo Beria, were abolished.

"Sergo," wrote Kisunko, "after a short detention, he was sent to live and work in Sverdlovsk under a new surname (mother's — Gegechkori. — S.K.) and even with a changed middle name. I had a chance to read the circular letter of the Higher Attestation Commission on the cancellation of the award of the scientific degree of Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences to Sergey Lavrentievich.

Kuksenko - "one of the elders of domestic radio engineering", according to the same Kisunko - was declared "a protege of Beria", but was not arrested, but only interrogated at the USSR Prosecutor's Office.

And the Berkut air defense system became known as the S-25. Raspletin was appointed chief designer of the C 25. Kisunko states: "Berkut", like Sergey, was changed not only his last name, but also his patronymic, and even a stepfather was appointed."

The S-25 was finally accepted and put under guard in Moscow in May 1955 and subsequently modernized many times. So this brainchild of Beria was also judged for a long life - unlike Lavrenty Pavlovich himself, who gave a lot of his own vitality to the rocket business, and besides, he gave his own son to it ...

UNFORTUNATELY, the "rocket" Beria is "documented" immeasurably more poorly than the "atomic" Beria. And this topic is still waiting for its researcher, because to this day those documents have not been made public, without which serious work is impossible. And our rocket scientists, aviators, electronics engineers, and other gunsmiths should be directly reproached for this! Unlike the atomic scientists, they did nothing significant to declassify the information of the 1940s and 1950s, which made it possible to objectively shed light on the role of Beria in the formation of

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an integral military-industrial complex of the USSR, which provided the country with a reliable nuclear missile shield and priority positions in many pioneer areas of scientific and technological progress.

Or aircraft construction ... Perhaps, only from the fifth edition (Political Publishing House, 1987) of the notes of the aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev, one can judge the degree of influence of Beria already on aviation affairs. And it is clear that Beria was also firmly connected with them. Yes, this is not surprising, given that the problem of Moscow's missile defense was interconnected with the problem of new aircraft manned interceptors (what is today called the "air interception complex").

Yakovlev does not have the slightest sympathy for Beria ... And his behavior at that meeting with Stalin, where the problems of creating a long-range heavy

Air defense interceptor aircraft, Yakovlev describes in extremely negative tones, exposing Lavrenty Pavlovich as an intriguer, discrediting the development of his design bureau in favor of Lavochkin Design Bureau. Yakovlev also reports that the Yak-25 he proposed (and went into production) supposedly "had a flight duration and range twice that of the MiGs."

But it is not so. The I-320 (R-2) experimental aircraft of the Mikoyan Design Bureau had characteristics similar to the Yak-25 in terms of speed and range, but instead of two 37 mm caliber guns, the Yak-25 was armed with three such guns, and the ceiling was higher. The same could be said about the Lavochkin La-200 aircraft, which was patronized by Beria, and had fewer structural problems than the I-320.

Yes, such an authoritative specialist as the author of the "History of Aircraft Design in the USSR" V.B. Shavrov, finishing the story about the I-320, wrote that this aircraft (like the La-200) was not accepted for serial construction, because "the Yak-25 was launched into the series ... superior as the La -200" and "I-320". But it is a fact that over time, all modern aviation interception systems were given to the country by the design bureaus of Mikoyan and Sukhoi, and not Yakovlev.

Lavochkin then conceived the supersonic fighter-missile carrier La-250 with a purely delta wing and plumage - a powerful, pioneering machine, the development of which turned out to be burdened by a number of failures, but which promised

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breakthrough qualities, if only ... If not at first the death of Beria, which could not but affect the position of Lavochkin, and then, in 1960, the death of Lavochkin himself.

But this, dear reader, is not all...

The Berkut air defense system included the following systems as components:

A-100 - target detection radar;

B-200 - radar station for targeting;

V-300 - anti-aircraft guided missile developed by Lavochkin Design Bureau;

**G-400 - fighter-interceptor equipped with air-to-air missiles
air".**

The fourth system, the G-400, was never brought to series and had to be abandoned. And, most likely, because Yakovlev "interrupted" the order for an interceptor from Lavochkin, and the La-200B and the development of the idea - La-250 were just supposed to become elements of the G-400. After all, Lavochkin made missiles for Berkut, and therefore he would also develop an interceptor aircraft taking into account experience in missiles.

However, Yakovlev took over the work on the aircraft. That is, it turns out that Yakovlev, very likely, disrupted such an air defense architecture, into which, already in the early 50s, an air interception complex would be built in as an integral part of the system.

And Beria saw the problem in a complex way. So, with a careful approach, it turns out that here we are not dealing with the intrigues of Beria, but with a tendentious description of his position, which in fact is quite justified precisely from the standpoint of the interests of the state.

Chapter 20

RESOLUTIONS OF BERIA AND LETTERS OF KAPITSA

BERIA was a master of management, and, I think, for the reader of this book, such a statement is already trivial. Even people prejudiced against him are forced to admit that Beria, although a "villain", was an outstanding organizer and "knew how to work."

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But with my book I strive to show and prove also the large purely human scale of Lavrenty Pavlovich, who - I am now convinced of this - was not only an outstanding personality, but also a morally sound personality!

Above, I have already cited, as it seems to me, evidence-based examples on this subject, but I have more to say about Beria, a man and a citizen ... For example, Yuli Borisovich Khariton cites a characteristic episode that became known to him from General A.S. . Aleksandrov, who headed KB-11 from 1951 to 1955.

Through the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Beria oversaw, among other things, the fuel industry, and in 1946 a decision was made to divide the Ministry of the Coal Industry into two ministries - the coal industry of the western regions and the eastern regions. The first was to be headed by the former "general" minister V.V. Vakhrushev, the second - D.G. Onika. Beria, calling them to him, offered to share everything, including personnel and the social sphere, amicably. After the appointed time, he called again and asked if there were any mutual claims? Vakhrushev said no (in fact, he had, of course, more opportunities during the division), and Onika protested - they say, Vakhrushev took the best personnel and sanatoriums for himself.

Beria's decision was instantaneous and systematically accurate: if so, let Vakhrushev take the ministry intended for Onika, and Onika - "Vakhrushev's" ... And this decision can be cited as an exemplary example in management textbooks, because Beria's logic is indestructible:

- a) if the division was fair, then no one remains offended;
- b) if Vakhrushev cheated, he will pay for it;
- c) if Onika was capricious, now he won't even dare to hint that he had bad "starting" conditions.

Yes, and everyone else was taught a substantive lesson about the fact that under Beria It's better to be honest than dishonest!

And here is a description of another meeting, given by one of its participants, moreover, by a person who has an extremely negative attitude towards Lavrenty Pavlovich. This is Grigory Kisunko, who at the end of February 1953 was called to Be

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rii from the Kapustin Yar training ground ... A year before this, Kisunko's paths had already crossed with the paths of the LP, but in absentia. Then, in February 1952, having invited Grigory Vasilyevich to his office, the chief engineer of the 8th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Armaments, Sergei Nikolayevich Savin, put a folder with a "cart" on the table in front of him, which began like this:

"To the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, Comrade Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich

DEAR IOSIF VISSARIONOVICH!

I can no longer remain silent about, to put it mildly, the sabotage actions of the leaders of the development of the Berkut system, Doctor of Technical Sciences Kisunko. By inviting Grigory Vasilyevich and Candidate of Technical Sciences Mikhail Borisovich Zakson ... "etc.

In the upper left corner there was a resolution: "*TT. Ryabikov, Ustinov, Elyan. Understand and report. A. Beria.*"

Savin suggested that Kisunko himself should write Minister Ustinov's reply to this "cart", which he did. It all ended in nothing. Moreover, Kisunko did not understand that Beria deserves respect even if only for the fact that he addressed the denunciation for trial exclusively to the technical leadership, without including the department of Minister of State Security Ignatiev here. But father Kisunko was shot in 1938 as dispossessed in 1930.

A year has passed, and now face-to-face acquaintance was coming, but according to what exactly about, Kisunko did not know. Kuksenko brought him to the Kremlin in his ZIM.

And besides them, the head of TSU V.M. Ryabikov, Minister of Armaments D.F. Ustinov, "locator" Professor A.A. Raspletin, "radio operator" V.D. Kalmykov (the future Minister of Radio Industry of the USSR), Ryabikov's deputy for scientific and technical part, Academician A.N. Schukin.

Beria's assistant Sergei Mikhailovich Vladimirovsky was also present.
(his polite smile at the invitation

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Kisunko defined guests in Beria's office as "a grimace that is part of the stencil of courtesy") ...

In Kisunko's description of the appearance of Beria, Grigory Vasilyevich's consideration of some unsuccessful photographs of Beria, published during the "catastrophe" time, is clearly traced. But the fact that not devoid of panache (and even a pose - all the more so, he wrote poetry, and even with "feelings") Kisunko accurately remembered Beria's clothes, I believe: "a magnificent, brand-new suit made of soft dark fabric, a snow-white shirt with an exquisitely tied tie in the neckline of a single-breasted jacket" ... Kisunko seems to reproach Beria for his style of dress, as if it would be better if the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of a great power appeared in public in a worn jacket with short trousers, a shirt with a dirty collar and with an "eternal" tie with an elastic band that has strayed to one side ...

The description of Beria's huge writing desk, "lined with telephones" is accurate... Well, a huge desktop is a necessary, although not a sufficient condition for the effective work of a very busy person. At such tables, they usually do not *manage*, but really *work*, conveniently laying out a lot of papers so that they can be kept in sight, etc.

When everyone settled into their chairs, Beria ...

However, at first I confess that I am quoting Kisunko with one correction: those words from the mouth of Beria, which he gives with a "Caucasian" accent (obviously thinking that this will cause additional negative feelings in the reader), I quote in the usual normative transcription - for comfort

reader...

So:

"First, let's get acquainted with one document," Beria began, rising from his chair (I am extremely grateful to Kisunko for this valuable detail, because it proves that Lavrenty Pavlovich was a well-mannered person, and not a bossy boor who, lounging in an armchair, utters "deep" instructing a subordinate "riff-raff". - S.K.) and taking a folder from the table. - I'll read it to you now: "Dear Lavrenty Pavlovich! We report to you

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that launches of anti-aircraft missiles of the Berkut system against real targets cannot be started due to the fact that the antennas delivered to the test site by plant No. 92 turned out to be of poor quality. The plant treated its work irresponsibly... and the representative of KB-1 Zaxon arbitrarily allowed the shipment of antennas with these deviations. We ask for your instructions. Kalmykov, Raspletin.

Who wrote this encryption? Beria asked.

- We, Lavrenty Pavlovich, - rising in a military way, answered Kalmykov and Raspletin. - We are together.

- How is it together? Who was holding the pen? (Personally, the accuracy and "juiciness" of this question delighted me! It immediately, "on the vine" cut off the possibility of fogging, planting turuses on wheels, etc., but it established an atmosphere of concreteness. - S.K.) .

- The text was discussed together, and I wrote in the notebook with my fountain pen, - Kalmykov explained.

I realized that the read out cipher was a surprise not only for me, but for all those present (Kisunko expressed himself inaccurately: for Raspletin and Kalmykov, the only surprise was that Beria would read their libelous cipher so directly and immediately in front of all honest people! - *With .K.*)... That's what, it turns out, the authors of the encryption were doing secretly from me and Zaxon at the training ground... It's scary to work with such people...

"And now let's read another document," continued Beria. - "Dear Lavrenty Pavlovich! We report to you that the A-11 and A-12 antennas, manufactured by serial factories with deviations from the specifications (technical specifications. - *S.K.*), fixed by military acceptance, according to our decision, are shipped for installation on Berkut system combat facilities. Ryabikov, Ustinov, Kalmykov, Shchukin, Kuksenko, Raspletin, Kisunko.

What document would you like to believe? Beria asked. - At the training ground, the antennas are unusable, but for military objects the same antennas turn out to be suitable? Explain this paradox to me, Comrade Ryabikov.

- Lavrenty Pavlovich, apparently, comrades Kalmykov and Raspletin got excited and, with no advice 547

yas, hurried with the encryption. We consulted with the chief designers and we believe that the antennas are suitable, "Ryabikov replied.

- Or maybe they didn't get excited, but they were pressured in Moscow and forced to sign this other document on the shipment of antennas to objects? Where will we ship from there? To the landfill?.."

Any person who has ever been engaged in business, and not chatter and took part in meetings, already by the way Beria began this meeting, will understand, firstly, how strong a manager he was, and secondly, and how he will treat a person him with respect. So only a humanly bright and *benign* personality will talk and "wrap up" the case !

Beria also asked a number of specific clarifying questions, listened to the answers of Kisunko, Kuksenko, and then ...

"After a pause, Beria summed up:

"I am convinced that this is not a simple matter. It is necessary to sort out a special commission. Ryabikov, Ustinov, Elyan, Kuksenko.

"And Shchukin," Ryabikov added.

"Good ... Report the results of the commission's work to me on March 6, on Monday."

And this time everything for Kisunko ended in "nothing". He sees the reason for this not in the objectivity of Beria, but in the death of Stalin that followed almost immediately after the meeting. However, this death did not violate the usual order of work in any way. First, neither in the Second, nor in the Third Main Directorate, and even the order of work of Beria himself changed only for a short time (as evidenced by the documents). So even after March 5, 1953, Beria, if real sins had been revealed for Kisunko, would not have forgotten about him. And the apparatus of Lavrenty Pavlovich (not repressive, but managerial) was not such as to lose *sight* of serious issues, especially personnel.

Alas, malice is blind, and Kisunko remained a hater of Beria the Elder for the rest of his life. But Kisunko described his only contact with him, in terms of the factual, authentically and objectively confirmed (unwittingly) not only

quality.

And let's see how they behaved - from the standpoint of the highest state interests - some of those who are presented as an "innocent victim" of the "executioner" Beria ... For example, the aircraft designer Tupolev ...

On November 1, 1949, Zavenyagin reported to Beria in writing that during the flight of our only carrier of nuclear weapons at that time, the Tu-4 aircraft (similar to the Boeing-29), at an altitude of 10 kilometers, the temperature in an unpressurized bomb bay drops to minus 50 ° C. And such a temperature will cause the appearance of cracks in the structural elements of the RDS-1.

In fact, the heated Tu-4 bomb bay turned out to be a problem of strategic importance. Without it, the then Soviet atomic weapons turned out to be almost empty! And here is what Zavenyagin reported:

"... negotiations were held with TT. *Tupolev* and *Arkhangelsky* about the possibility of insulating the bomb bay ... But tt. *Tupolev* and *Arkhangelsky* during the last discussion of this issue in September of this year. declared that they were overburdened with works of particular importance (like this: "Don't come to us, don't come to us, otherwise we will refuse!" - S.K.) **and, in general, this work has** nothing to do with aircraft construction (emphasis mine. - S.K.)..."

Dear reader! The author's respect for Tupolev (precisely as a person!) has already been seriously tested while working on this book. But after reading the above arrogant answer, it became even more difficult for the author to maintain the same respect for Andrei Nikolayevich. This is necessary: work has nothing to do with aircraft construction! And what about ensuring security, **guaranteeing the very existence of the country ?** So, every day, spinning in a wild squirrel wheel, the "executioner" Beria should worry about them, and Academician Tupolev is a being of a higher order. He is "overloaded with works of particular importance", not like this sexy de maniac Beria, who is only concerned with the satisfaction of his hypertrophied

idleness of sexual needs at the expense of innocent tenth graders!

And how does this "monster", this "murderer" react to

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irresponsible, criminal, essentially anti-state refusal of Tupolev? That's how:

"Tov. Zavenyagin! Together with Comrade Khrunichev (Minister of the Aviation Industry. - S.K.) and Tupolev (this absence of "t." before the name Tupolev in scrupulous Beria is very eloquent! - S.K.) immediately take the necessary measures. Report the result. L. Beria. November 2, 1949".

For the first time, the issue of heating the Tu-4 bomb bay was raised by Zernov and Khariton in a letter addressed to Vannikov as early as October 7, 1949, which means that they asked Tupolev about it much earlier, because the "ties" of KB-11 with the Tupolev Design Bureau been going for a long time.

Given such details, Tupolev could easily and without any exaggeration be accused of sabotage. However, in 1949 it was possible to do otherwise: on November 5, 1949, Khrunichev held a meeting where his deputy P.V. Dementiev, Deputy Tupolev A.A. Arkhangelsk, and from PSU: A.S. Alexandrov, P.M. Zernov and N.L. Spirits. As a result, work on the insulation of the Tu-4 bomb bay was entrusted "to the chief designer of the aircraft, Comrade Tupolev A.N.", and the work plan had to be reported to Beria by November 15, 1949.

Work began no longer on the creation, but on the improvement of atomic weapons and their carriers. And this difference was, of course, qualitative, "significant".

YES, 1949, a turning point for the Soviet Atomic project, was coming to an end and soon ended. The main backbone of the nuclear industry was available.

And Beria...

No, he did not get the opportunity to devote himself at his leisure to the production of violins, like Marshal Tukhachevsky, or the search for rare stamps, like President Roosevelt, or even painting watercolors, like Prime Minister Churchill (although Beria was once fond of watercolors).

Lavrenty Pavlovich was only able to switch to a greater extent from defense work to national economic work. Not completely, I emphasize, but to a greater extent! Although defense work acquired a new quality.

But after all, the national economic problems all these years

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Beria was not bypassed! On September 6, 1945, the Politburo adopted a resolution on the formation of two operational bureaus of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. One, headed by Molotov (Voznesensky - deputy, members Mikoyan, Andreev, Bulganin and Shvernig), was in charge of "issues of the work of NGOs, the People's Commissariat of the Navy, agricultural and food commissariats, the People's Commissariats of Trade and Finance, as well as committees and departments under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR." The second, headed by Beria (Malenkov - deputy, members Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Kosygin), was in charge of "issues of the work of industrial people's commissariats and railway transport."

And this work only intensified as the economy developed! Moreover, on March 20, 1946, two operational bureaus of the Council of People's Commissars were brought together into a single bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, chaired by L.P. Beria (deputies - N.A. Voznesensky and A.N. Kosygin). The system of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers then underwent reorganization more than once, on February 8, 1947, eight branch bureaus were formed, of which Beria had the Bureau for Fuel and Power Plants with additional monitoring of the construction of multi-storey buildings in Moscow and the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the MGB was monitored separately, according to line of the Politburo, and it was led by the Secretary of the Central Committee A.A. Kuznetsov).

However, already on February 21, 1947 - three weeks later - Beria's bureau (for fuel and power plants) was merged with Kaganovich's bureau (for transport and communications) into one Bureau for fuel and transport, chaired by Lavrenty Pavlovich. But under any management structure, Beria's duties in the Council of Ministers have long been paramount.

So, on March 28, 1946, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 674 distributed duties between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Stalin and his deputies. Stalin watched only the Ministry of Armaments, and the ministries and departments were distributed among his deputies in different ways. And twelve ministries were assigned to Beria - more than anyone else! Even Voznesensky had a somewhat less significant and responsible "gentleman's set." Voroshilov had, it is true, seventeen positions, but only five "ministerial" ones, including

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Ministry of Cinematography. Kosygin also had twelve with ten "ministerial" ones, but Kosygin was a pure "business executive". Andreev oversaw agriculture, Mikoyan - mainly the food "block", Kaganovich - two major ministries and the Committee for Architecture ... Molotov was "listed" by the Ministry of Justice, the Committee for Higher Education, the Committee for Radio and Broadcasting and TASS.

On March 18, 1946, Beria finally became a full member of the Politburo - the Plenum of the Central Committee introduced him to the top party leadership at the same time as Malenkov (Bulganin and Kosygin then became candidates for members of the PB).

Since December 1945, Beria was also a member of the narrow commission on foreign affairs. affairs at the PB (Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Malenkov and Zhdanov).

There is an interesting document - "Extract from the minutes of the meeting No. 81

Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the distribution of working time L.P. Beria.

Here is its full text:

"March 15, 1951

Top secret

Decision of March 15, 1951.

1. Questions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

4. Tov. Beria to oblige half of his working time to give to the case No. 1, 2 and 3.

Secretary of the Central Committee.

"Cases No. 1, 2 and 3" are the duties of a member of the PB of the Central Committee of Beria for the 1st ("atomic"), 2nd (uranium mining) and 3rd (work on the missile defense of Moscow) main directorates under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

"Case No. 3" as a separate one has just taken shape (the resolution of the Council of Ministers on the formation of TSU is dated February 3, 1951), but Beria also supervised it earlier as part of work at PSU.

And we already know about all these "cases No. 1, 2 and 3". And these
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affairs were officially supposed to occupy only HALF of Beria's working time.

And only case No. 1 and case No. 2 had a capacity of ²/ 3 resolutions or orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR per day with a thirty-day working month. Plus - current papers and problems.

And the duties for all "cases" were not formal, but at the same time - considerable. It was necessary to decide concretely, moreover, in very heterogeneous scientific and technical fields. Famous rocket scientist B.E. Chertok in his book of memoirs calls Boris Vannikov the "marshal" of the atomic theme, and one can agree with this comparison, with clarification - the chairman of the Special Committee himself was still the commander-in-chief here.

On March 21, 1950, the Minister of the Navy, Admiral I.S. Yumashev specifically Beria writes about the feasibility of research and design work "to create an experimental power plant with a uranium boiler for submarines, and later for surface ships." But such work is already underway. And in a separate note, Makhnev notes on March 25 that *"an experimental ship is being developed."* However, much more is already being developed, which was only in the plans not so long ago. In the second half

In 1949, the world's first VVR was manufactured - a pressurized water reactor with a capacity of 10 thousand kilowatts, in which water serves as a moderator and coolant, and on February 11

In 1950, a decision was made to start construction at the Laboratory "B" at A.I. Leipunsky in Obninsk nuclear power plant. And in the same place, near Leipunsky, design work began to study the prospects for industrial fast neutron reactors.

On May 5, 1951, two resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR were adopted at once: No. 1464-733ss on work plans using drugs "R" (radioactive isotopes) "in the field of medicine, science and technology", and No. 1474-743ss / op on the work plan of PSU for 1951. The last resolution gave a powerful picture of the development of atomic science, technology and industry and for the first time set the task of obtaining a controlled thermonuclear reaction for energy purposes.

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Nuclear weapons work also developed... The second explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb was carried out on September 24, 1951, at 16:19 local time, at the Semipalatinsk test site.

As Beria Kurchatov, Khariton and Zel'dovich reported, the power of the bomb

turned out to be higher than it was foreseen by the calculation, and amounted to 38,000 tons of TNT equivalent against 27,000 tons of calculated. The report ended with:

"The test of 09/24/51 showed that the government's task to increase the power of the atomic bomb and lighten its weight has been completed. A bomb with a full TNT equivalent of 38,000 tons and a total weight of 3.1 tons was created "...

And on October 18, 1951, the commander of the crew, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Isaakovich Urzhuntsev, took off the Tu-4 with a new combat product. On the same day, a message addressed to Beria went to Moscow: "October 18, 1951. Comrade Beria L.P.

We report:

On October 18, at 09:54 Moscow time, an explosion was carried out an atomic bomb with a charge of plutonium and uranium-235.

The atomic bomb was dropped from a Tu-4 aircraft from a height of 10,000 meters and exploded at an altitude of 380 meters above the target.

Tests have shown that the detonated bomb has great power; its full TNT equivalent is about 40,000 tons.

During testing, it was found that TU-4 aircraft can be used for transporting and dropping atomic bombs.

The task of the government on the creation of an atomic bomb of increased power with using uranium-235 completed ...

Zavenyagin

Kurchatov

Khariton

Shchelkin.

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And reports to the same addressee on a wide range of "atomic" issues were common. And the last time a detailed note addressed to Beria left the gunsmiths the day before the arrest of Lavrenty Pavlovich - June 25, 1953. A.P. Zavenyagin, I.V. Kurchatov, A.S. Alexandrov and Yu.B. Khariton reported on the progress of work as if the curator of the Atomic Problem, a member of the Politburo, worked as the Chief Technologist. To make what has been said more objective, I will give a short fragment of it, characteristic of the style and content of the note:

"On June 23, a second pressing of a hemisphere of tritide-lithium-6 deuteride was performed, and the amount of material was reduced by 5%. During the second pressing, the part turned out to be close to the tolerance at the bottom, and 0.8 millimeters higher than the tolerance in height. Attempts to bring the part to the drawing dimensions by increasing the pressure to 3900 atmospheres did not give positive results. Cracks formed on the parts after pressing out.

The note dated June 25 dealt with the details for the first Soviet thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb RDS-6s.

And on June 26, 1953, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR L. Beria signed the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 8532-rs on the design assignment for the construction of the SU-3 plant (for uranium enrichment. - S.K.) at plant No. 813. Below the typewritten signature was the mailing: "tt. Zavenyagin A.P., Zverev A.G. (Ministry of Finance of the USSR, Makhnev V.A.)".

On the same day, June 26, Beria was arrested, and soon, at the July Plenum of the Central Committee of 1953, he was expelled from the life of the country. And from July 10, 1953, the topic of the significance of Beria's activities for the development of the country was banned. Moreover, the injustice in relation to the "atomic" role of Beria immediately manifested itself in the form of a tragicomic one.

The first test of a Soviet thermonuclear weapon, the RDS-BS "hydrogen" bomb, took place on August 12, 1953. A week before this day - August 5, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Malenkov at an extraordinary session

of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR proudly declared: "The American

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the perialists frighten us with a superweapon—the hydrogen bomb. But we should not be scared, we not only know the secret of the hydrogen bomb, but also created it. A month before that, on July 2, at the plenum of the Central Committee, the same Malenkov, as an example of "criminal anti-state actions", cited the decision of Beria (member of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR) "without the knowledge of the Central Committee and the government ... to organize an explosion hydrogen bomb."

Later I will talk about this in more detail, but I cannot fail to notice right away that the brilliant manager Beria was always disgusted by the lack of professionalism (including purely managerial) of the leading figures of the "Central Committee and Government". He really did not favor partocratic idle talk.

On the other hand, Malenkov blamed Beria for his actions, which had only to be approved! After all, if there weren't these actions, there wouldn't be RDS-6s tests in such a quick time, which means there would be nothing to boast about on August 5!

In addition, the test of the RDS-1 was also not formally authorized by the document (Stalin did not sign the draft resolution on the test). And what would the sanction of the Central Committee and the government "organize the explosion of a hydrogen bomb" give? By 1953, in fact, only Stalin and Beria were fully aware of the current state of atomic work. So Beria's neglect of the bureaucratic side of the matter was fully justified.

As for the sincerity of the general atmosphere of the Plenum "according to Beria", which did not even cross it out, but blackened it out of the creative history of Russia with solid black paint, one can judge about it (about sincerity) by the following episode ...

On June 26, a DECISIVE day for the future fate of Russia, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee (during which Beria was arrested), it was decided, instead of the Special Committee, to form the Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR as part of the 1st and 3rd GUs (the 2nd GU had been included even earlier at PGU).

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And now the freshly minted "atomic" minister Malyshev, speaking at the plenum, declares:

"I ... worked under the guidance ... of both Comrade Molotov, and Kaganovich, and Beria. I must say that every time you go to report on some question to your comrades, you go with a different feeling. With one feeling you go to Comrade Molotov, about whom we know that he is a strict leader, demanding, but always, when you go to him, you know that there will never be hasty decisions, adventurous decisions ... you will not be under attack ... Other the case is Beria. We, the ministers, knew that you were going to the office as a minister, but you don't know how you will go back ... maybe you will end up in prison ... Roughly speaking, Beria's leadership style is dictatorial, rude, non-party."

In fact, both during Beria's membership in the State Defense Committee and during his tenure at the head of "atomic" affairs from the summer of 1945 to June 1953 (including work in the Council of Ministers), not one of the leaders of any link who was in Beria's field of vision did not go to jail. Yes, and it was not he who removed and appointed people's commissars and ministers ... And since 1946, Beria has not led the "power" ministries. Suffice it to recall that he did not even have the sole right to order Abakumov and Kruglov to take the PGU building under protection - the decision had to be made through the Council of Ministers!

But the most interesting thing here is the legitimacy of the Molotov-Beria parallel set by Vyacheslav Malyshev... In Yu.B. Khariton and Yu.N.

Smirnov "Myths and Reality of the Soviet Atomic Project" (VNIIEF, Arzamas-16, 1994) says:

"The ground for various conjectures also appears when the truth is hushed up due to political attitudes ... as ... in the case of L.P. Beria. If there is no truth today, then there will be myths tomorrow... It is known that at first the general management of the Soviet atomic project was carried out by V.M. Molotov. His leadership style and, accordingly, the results were not particularly effective. I.V. Kurchatov made no secret of his dissatisfaction.

With the transition of the nuclear project into the hands of Beria, the situation
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changed dramatically ... Beria quickly gave all the work on the project the necessary scope and dynamism. This man ... possessed ... great energy and efficiency. Our specialists, coming into contact with him, could not fail to note his mind, will and purposefulness. We made sure that he is a first-class organizer who knows how to bring things to the end. It may seem paradoxical, but Beria ... knew how, according to the circumstances, to be polite, tactful and just a normal person. It is no coincidence that one of the German specialists N. Riehl, who worked in the USSR, had a very good impression from meetings with Beria.

The meetings he held were business-like, always productive and never dragged on. He was a master of unexpected and non-standard solutions... Beria was quick to work, did not neglect site visits and personal acquaintance with the results of the work..."

Summing up, Yu.B. Khariton wrote:

"According to the impression of many veterans of the nuclear industry, if the nuclear project had remained under the leadership of Molotov, it would be difficult to count on quick success in carrying out such a grand scale of work." Do I need to comment on these lines in detail?

BETTER, I will once again touch on the topic of Beria's resolutions on the documents of the Atomic Project. Yu.B. Khariton could L.P. Beria is to be praised, someone could denigrate him, and the documents are impartial and accurate - if they are preserved and if they are not falsified. But who, after June 26, 1953, would falsify documents testifying in favor of Beria? And among the documents of the Atomic Project there is not a single one that represents Lavrenty Pavlovich from an unattractive side. But there are plenty of examples to the contrary!

Here is such a detail. November 1949... Two months have passed since the successful explosion of RDS-1. Production of at least single new atomic bombs - a question of vital importance for the USSR. And the protocol of the meeting of the Special Committee No. 88a, signed personally by Beria, states:

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"1. It should be noted that the storage of RDS-1 parts from amethyl (the code name of plutonium. - *Approx. SB.*) at the plant No. 817 is unsatisfactory. Details of the RDS-1 were placed in damp underground rooms that did not protect their surface from oxidation.

It would seem that comments are unnecessary - the management of the plant can easily (and, alas, not without reason) be accused of almost a state crime! After all, plutonium at that time was the main factor that was more expensive than any gold! However, in the "organizational conclusions" of Beria, there is not even close to the "execution" shade:

"2. To point out to the head of plant No. 817, comrade Muzrukov, and the chief engineer, comrade Slavsky, the inadmissibility of such an attitude towards the storage of products from amethyl.

3. To the deputy chief of combine No. 817 for the regime, comrade Ryzhov, who was responsible for the storage of amethyl and gave the wrong order to

laying RDS-1 parts in a damp room, reprimand.

4. To oblige the head of plant No. 817, Comrade Muzrukov, to establish uninterrupted ventilation of the storage facility within 3 days, ensure its thorough drying and equip it with devices to control humidity and temperature.

T. Muzrukov personally systematically check the state of the storage ...

5. Instruct ... t. Meshik to check the execution on site of this decision."

Another, earlier example. June 1947 ... Slavsky, who had just been appointed to the plant No. 817 under construction, reports outrageous things in an extensive memorandum addressed to Beria. Let's say:

"The pace of work ... is extremely weak ...

... the most complex object ... it was entrusted to build a road construction regiment, which does not include a single specialist in the construction of industrial facilities ...

Housing construction is a complete failure ...

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... Workers sit for a very long time and no one forces them to work ...

Out of 41,000 workers ... only 5,700 people work at industrial facilities, and the rest are dispersed in various subsidiary enterprises and auxiliary work, "etc. and so on.

Beria's resolution:

"T. Kruglov, comrade Vannikov and comrade. Zavenyagin. 1. We urgently need to strengthen the leadership... Release T. Rapoport for health reasons. Nominate the building of Tsarevsky as a researcher. 2. Consider the memorandums of comrade Slavsky and comrade Tkachenko and take action on them. Report on the measures taken. 3. T. Chernysheva is sent on a business trip for 2-3 months to take all necessary measures on site to ensure the completion of construction and installation work in the installation. government deadlines. 4. Urgently contact Comrade Khrulev on the issue of providing assistance to the building of engineering and technical. works. L. Beria.

We go down the time scale even lower. October 2, 1946 ... Pervukhin, Malyshev, Zavenyagin, Antropov and Kurchatov tell Beria:

"Until now, no definite decisions have been made regarding where to organize the production of pure metallic plutonium in the amount of 100 grams per day from the precipitate obtained at plant No. 817, and pure metallic uranium-235 in the amount of 140 grams per day from uranium hexafluoride -235 at factory 813..."

Of the five authors of the letter, four are the largest organizers of industry with vast experience, and one of them, Antropov, from 1941 to 1945 was an assistant to a member of the GKO Beria. The fifth is a prominent scientist who is obliged to give the first four recommendations on optimizing the layout of at least plant No. 817, where he is the scientific director. However, they turn to Beria, who writes on October 5, 1946:

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"TT. Pervukhin, Kurchatov, Zavenyagin. Provide more specific suggestions - where to place these workshops? A. Beria.

But something is not going well with Kurchatov and the "leading guys", and on April 10, 1947 (!) Beria writes on the same document:

"TT. Pervukhin, Zavenyagin, Kurchatov. Why are you postponing the choice of a place and the construction of a workshop. This matter cannot be dragged on any further. Address this issue urgently and submit specific proposals within a week. A. Beria.

However, even after that, things were moving slowly, all the ups and downs of the story with the plant No. 817 begin, which the reader already knows, and Beria

I have to go to the construction site myself. But even there he didn't erase anyone into the "camp dust". And he didn't even threaten to erase it - he didn't even have such an expression in his lexicon.

We continue to move to the origins of nuclear work. November 12, 1945 P.Ya. Antropov reports to Beria on the results of his business trip to the Tajik SSR, to plant No. 6 (7 mines and 5 plants for the extraction and processing of uranium raw materials). The situation is bleak ... And two narrow (1 / 6 A4 format) strips of paper with resolutions are pinned to Antropov's report:

"Tov. Chernyshev, comrade. Zavenyagin. Understand and report why the funds allocated for plant No. 6 were used for other purposes. The guilty must be punished. November 15, 1945".

"Tov. Vannikov B.L., comrade. Borisov N.A. 1. Urgently develop measures to ensure a sharp increase in the extraction and processing of ore at the plant. 2. Take the necessary measures to restore order immediately. Report the results. November 15, 1945".

And here the tone is exclusively businesslike. And this approach is not an accidental "whim", but a style! This is proved not by anyone's memories, but by documents! Although the memories - too! For example, the memoirs of the same Slavsky (three times Ge 561

a swarm of Socialist Labor, ten Orders of Lenin!), not very loyal to Beria (but what about - he "filmed" Yefim Pavlovich, after all).

But this is what Slavsky recalled in 1998 (!) ... For the first uranium-graphite reactor, graphite was needed with practically no impurities. The people's commissar for non-ferrous metallurgy Lomako and his deputy Slavsky were responsible for this. Alas, the graphite, which they supplied to PSU and considered conditioned, turned out to be a marriage. Lomako and Slavsky were summoned to the Special Committee:

"Lomako and I are standing in the waiting room, waiting to be called, and thinking: "Well, that's the end of everything ... What will happen to us?"

We enter. Chairman Beria turns to Malenkov ... and says: "George! So Lomako and Slavsky reported and promised that they... would do everything right. Do you think we will agree?" He, and behind him the others, nodded: "Let's agree." And we left the meeting with the feeling that we were born again: as if we were standing on a chair with a noose around our neck ... And then ... the noose was removed, and we went to work.

And the noose was removed by Beria. And, excuse me, it doesn't happen that today a person in relation to his subordinates is a boor and a jerk, and tomorrow he is polite and correct in his behavioral reactions. Scream - yes! After all, with a huge personal responsibility, with overloads, you can sometimes break loose. But without unfair "consequences".

I will give one more resolution of Beria on the memorandum of the head of KB-11, General A.S. Alexandrov dated May 12, 1952, beginning with a very dramatic statement:

"I report to you that if urgent measures are not taken, then we are on the eve of a breakdown preparation of RDS-4 and RDS-5 products for testing at test sites No. 71 and No. 2.

The reasons were exclusively bureaucratic red tape and indiscipline of the PGU apparatus. On December 4, 1951, KB-11 issued information about its needs to the main headquarters, but at the beginning of January 1952, it discovered that positions for 33 items of parts and assemblies of two new products, the tests of which were planned for

autumn of this year.

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On March 10, Aleksandrov drew Zavenyagin's attention to this. Nevertheless, even in May, KB-11 had to "literally beg for 2-3 knots" for

manufacturing plants. And on May 15, Beria addresses a note from Alexandrov to Zavenyagin and N.I. Pavlov (First Deputy Head of PGU):

"1. Understand and provide an explanation of who is to blame for the fact that the components and parts required for KB-11 were not provided in advance.

2. As you can see, the department headed by Comrade Zernov does not work well, because. failed in the presence of 46 employees to provide within six months of the preparation of proposals to ensure the experimental work of the design bureau.

Restore order in this department and report on the measures taken.

"T. Zernov" is the former head of KB-11 P.M. Zernov, who was transferred in 1951 as the head of a department to PSU for health reasons. That's when Beria could remember Zernov - if the "incident with the candelabra" really took place - the failed "terrorist act" with the help of the "candelabra paperweight", prevented by Beria with the help of "browning with a golden molded handle." After all, RDS-4 is a prototype of the first serial aviation bomb, which was supposed to go directly to the troops! And the disruption of the planned test dates turned out to be no joke.

However, punishments followed in the form of reprimands and the like.

Moreover! After all, Slavsky about the "noose around the neck" simply spun! And he spun maliciously, portraying Beria, in fact, all the same "villain" who, supposedly, could put Yefim Pavlovich in a noose, but now he did not put it, by his master's permission. But it wasn't like that! I deliberately did not immediately illustrate Slavsky's "memoirs" with documents. But now I present them to the reader! Moreover, here we are dealing with a significant "clouding of memory"!

On April 17, 1946, Kurchatov sent one of Makhnev's assistants - N.I. Korobkov - a letter about the short supply of graphite blocks "to ensure the construction

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installation "F-1". The F-1 plant is precisely our first uranium graphite reactor, which Slavsky spoke about, which was built on the territory of laboratory No. 2 and was launched on December 25, 1946.

By August 1, 1946, the Moscow Electrode Plant was supposed to supply Kurchatov with 1,000 tons of graphite, of which 340 tons by March 31, 1946. And he delivered only 107.9 tons. Kurchatov sounded the alarm, Korobkov reported to Makhnev, who, on April 18, to Beria, reported at the same time:

"The reasons for this situation are: firstly, the lack of control by the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy over the work of the Moscow Electrode Plant, as a result of which the employees of the plant and the Soyuzelektrod trust supplied fraudulent information about the implementation of the plan to the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy for a long time, counting it into finished products semi-finished products;

secondly, the failure by the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy and the Ministry for the Construction of Fuel Enterprises of the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of September 14, 1945 on the commissioning of the first stage of the electrode plant No. 523 (this is how the plant for the production of graphite reactor blocks was coded. - S.K.) to March 1, 1946". On the same day, Beria gives the order:

"TT. Pervukhin (convocation), Vannikov, Lomako, Zademidko (Minister for the Construction of Fuel Enterprises of the USSR. - S.K.), Slavsky. 1. Urgently understand this issue, take the necessary measures to ensure the timely delivery of graphite blocks and the speedy commissioning of Plant No. 523. 2. Tt. Lomako and Zademidko submit reports on the supply of blocks and the construction of plant No. 523 within 5 days. 3. Those responsible for disrupting the supply and delaying construction must be held accountable. L. Beria. April 18, 1946".

As you can see, Beria orders Lomako and Slavsky himself to bring the perpetrators to justice. So, one wonders, did he order them to flog *themselves*? So hardly

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After that, Slavsky trembled until May 7, 1946, when the 20th meeting of the Special Committee was held in the Kremlin with the participation of Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky and others, where the sixth item on the agenda was Lomako's report on the progress in the supply of graphite blocks and the construction of the first stage of the plant No. 523, and paragraph VII - the question of measures for the construction of the second stage.

On point VI, the minutes of the meeting stated:

"1. Take note of Comrade Lomako's message that they:

a) those responsible for disrupting the plan for the production of graphite blocks for Laboratory No. 2 were brought to justice;

b) measures have been taken to ensure delivery by August 20 of this year. 600 tons of high-quality graphite blocks for Laboratory No. 2;

2. Take note also of the message of TT. Zademidko and Lomako that they have taken measures to ensure the commissioning of the first stage of plant No. 523 at the end

May this year

3. Oblige comrade Lomako to establish control...", etc.

According to paragraph VII, it was decided to "instruct Borisov (convocation), Lomako and Slavsky to finalize the draft Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR within 5 days ...", etc.

Well, where is the "loop" and so on? According to Slavsky, it turns out that he and Lomako entered the meeting of the Special Committee and **almost immediately** left - with the noose removed ... In reality, there was a completely business-like approach of the state leaders to a serious, but correctable failure with **hearing** the statesmen responsible for the correction.

Engineer Tremasov, physicist Golovin, manager Slavsky, the unnamed "commander of a missile base near Moscow" and other "memoirists" in their "memoirs" sometimes depict the era and behavior of Beria as if everything happened almost in a gang. But pardon me, we are talking about the state work of serious statesmen! And in the memoirs of the same Slavsky Beria, **at a meeting of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR**, he leads

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himself as the chairman of a seedy collective farm, sorting out the sins of a spree foreman: they say, how, Georgy, will we forgive the guys? ..

But why did Slavsky even half a century after those events need to exaggerate in such a way as to stain Beria in "graphite dust" and create the impression that Beria "could deal with us" at any moment? That's it, dear reader! All, all the then elite after 1957 was tied up with **a triple state crime ...**

In 1953, she betrayed Beria to Nikita Khrushchev with her head.

In 1956, she allowed him to throw mud at Stalin.

And in 1957, the same elite betrayed Malenkov with his head to Khrushchev, Molotov and Kaganovich, who suddenly realized: "What are we doing? »

And now, for the rest of their lives, the elite had only one thing left to do: *keep quiet* and receive compensation in the form of chairs, dachas, Stars and other things. Assenting (at least with his silence) to the slanderer Khrushchev in his insinuations about the "tyrant" Stalin and the "executioner" Beria. However, they themselves willingly slandered Beria.

But those who are engaged in the documentary history of PSU do not note a single fact of the reprisal of Lavrenty Pavlovich with any of the guilty ... But there are many documents with his instructions in every possible way

encourage those who work hard. Including Slavsky himself.

But he himself, at least morally, was not very encouraged. And even after decades, they were not appreciated according to their merits. For example, when asked about the role of Beria, Slavsky answered condescendingly in the completely "democratic" year of 1998:

"Beria did not interfere with us. He did not understand scientific, engineering issues, therefore he always listened to the opinion of specialists (remember how Malyshev argued the opposite. - S.K.). As for organizational problems, mobilization of people and resources, then ... he helped to carry out all the necessary decisions."

Here it is impossible not to notice this ... An analysis of Beria's style of work with heterogeneous documents of the PSU convinces that he was surprisingly not versed in special issues

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bad - in the part that concerns the right management decisions. What else was required of him?

Slavsky claims that Beria, they say, "*helped* to carry out all the necessary decisions." However, it would be perhaps more correct to assume that, *on the contrary*, such specialists as Malyshev, Kurchatov, Slavsky, Khariton, Kikoin, Muzrukov, Zernov, Tsarevsky, Komarovskiy and dozens of others helped Beria create and strengthen the nuclear industry!

And he - yes, he helped them in turn!

And not only them. In one way or another, he oversaw many sectors of the economy - even taking part in determining the directions for the development of the Navy as a whole (not only its emerging nuclear submarine component). But how inadequately some treated him even then!

AMONG the documents now declassified, there are two letters from P.L. Kapitsa to Stalin and one to Beria. The first letter to Stalin dated November 25, 1945, Kapitsa wrote about the organization of work on the problem of the atomic bomb, as he saw it, and about his release (more precisely, self-elimination. - S.K.) *from* work in the Special Committee and the Technical Council of the Special Committee.

The general tone of the letter (to Stalin!) is rather arrogant, **with** teachings and reasoning. For example, in the letter there are in principle true, but in the context of the letter inappropriate maxims about the role of atomic energy in world culture, etc.

Kapitsa saw a "general plan of action" in the development of a two-year plan for the preparation of industry, in parallel scientific research, in the rise of higher education, and in "the rise in the well-being of our scientific workers." And completely ignored the simple fact that the bomb must be made **quickly**. And before you do it, you need to "make" a new industry that can make a bomb even faster.

Kapitsa wrote that

"the correct organization of all issues is possible only under one condition, which does not exist, but without creating it, we will not solve the problems of A.B. quickly... This condition is

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more trust is needed between scientists and statesmen"...

Pyotr Leonidovich was right here too, but, as life itself showed (the bomb was made quickly), however, there was trust in those scientists who not only reasoned, but also acted! And they acted quickly. Like, say, Kurchatov.

In the first letter to Stalin there are also curious assessments by Kapitsa of Beria (and not only him):

"Comrade Vannikov and others from the Technical Council remind me of that citizen from the joke who, not believing the doctors, drank everything in Essentuki

mineral waters in a row in the hope that one of them will help.

Comrades Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky behave in the Special Committee like supermen. In particular Comrade. Beria. True, he has a conductor's baton in his hands. This is not bad, but after him the first violin should still be played by a scientist. After all, the violin sets the tone for the entire orchestra (a direct hint that it should be the great Kapitsa, whom everyone should obey - the conductor himself does not play. - S.K.). Comrade Beria's main weakness is that the conductor must not only wave his baton, but also understand the score. With this, Beria is weak.

Weakly or not weakly, Comrade Beria's understanding of the "score" was soon shown by life. And the same life proved: Beria behaved not like a "superman", but like a reasonably self-confident person. But comrades Malenkov and Voznesensky behaved "like superhumans" in vain. Their bossy ambitions did not really correspond to their business potential (later, regarding Voznesensky, I will cite some **amazing fact**, almost improbable, but which took place). Kapitsa also wrote:

"I personally think that Com. Beria would have coped with his task if he had given more time and effort. He is very energetic, orients himself perfectly and quickly, distinguishes the secondary from the main well, so he does not waste time in vain, he certainly has a taste for scientific

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questions, he grasps them well (that's even how! - S.K.), precisely formulates his decisions.

But he has one drawback - excessive self-confidence, and the reason for this, apparently, is ignorance of the score. I tell him directly: "You don't understand physics, let us scientists judge these questions," to which he objects to me that I don't understand anything about people. In general, our dialogues are not particularly kind. I offered him to teach him physics, to come to my institute..." What can I say? If Beria had "studied", then perhaps he would have become a doctor of sciences, but what about the uranium problem then?

And Pyotr Leonidovich's arrogance is growing and is already able to amuse ... And his "recommendations" cross every line, causing a polite smile and at the same time a desire to resort to profanity. Thus, he writes further:

"Our ingenious merchants-patrons of the Tretyakovs, Shchukin and others, because they were well versed in paintings and saw great artists before others; they were not artists, but studied art. Beria, if he weren't so lazy (yes. - S.K.), then, having worked with his abilities and "knowledge of people", undoubtedly, he could then understand the creative processes of people of science and technology in order to become first-class orchestra conductor A.B. For example, he should have..."

And here I will interrupt the quotation and emphasize that the following are the lines of Pyotr Leonidovich himself:

"... one should get acquainted from primary sources (and not in a popular presentation), how the transatlantic cable was laid, how the steam turbine developed, etc.

He would have seen the general regularity of these processes and would have used this experience in order to understand what is important and necessary in the development of works on A.B. ... "To offer such "technical education" to a person who, together with Stalin, pulled the main strap of the organizational efforts of the Great War, could only be extremely narcissistic and blinded by narcissism (and therefore, in the end

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account, and limited) man! Which, alas, Kapitsa was.

And he serenely offered this:

"It should be that all leading comrades like Beria let their subordinates feel (I wonder what methods of persuasion did Academician Kapitsa mean? - S.K.) that scientists are the leading, and not an auxiliary force in this matter "...

How the academician saw the organization of work at the same time can be seen from his letter dated December 1, 1945, already directly to Beria:

"I propose the following. Establish ... a number of technical committees for each of the important technical tasks ... Create a body that could be called the Council of Chairmen of Technical Committees ... The task ... is to observe, approve, coordinate the work of various committees and select the staff of their employees (there are cadres not of workers in the new industry, but cadres of workers of committees, that is, officials.— S.K.). If the question is framed in this way, the Council of Presidents ... will grow as new tasks appear, when, in accordance with the instructions of the Special Committee, the number of

committees."

So, as Mayakovsky wrote about those who were "sitting": "Oh, at least one more meeting regarding the eradication of all meetings! »

At the same time, the priorities of "certain problematic issues" of nuclear energy Kapitsa (December 1, 1945!) lined up no more responsibly:

- "a) the use of A.E. for peaceful purposes of cultural development;
- b) the destructive power of A.B. ..." etc.

Not only that, in 1945, it was not a patriot, but a cosmopolitan in the exact sense of the word, who could prioritize in this way ... Kapitsa did not even think about the potentially peaceful, *restraining* role of the "destructive force of A.B."! And Beria, it seems, was thinking. In any case, by 1953, already being sure that Russia would soon receive a thermal

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nuclear "superbomb", he was thinking not about the unrestrained development of nuclear arsenals, but about a reasonable reduction (more precisely, optimization) of society's spending on nuclear weapons! He stood in positions, so to speak, of defensive sufficiency. And he will still be blamed for this at that plenum, where they will defame him in absentia!

Alas, on the topic "Beria and scientists", citing facts that are not very advantageous for the reputation of a number of scientists, one can talk a lot (one story about how Professor Fock publicly defended his scientific views with references to Beria's authority is worth something!).

But I will only speak about academician Sergei Arkadyevich Vekshinsky. A Pskovite, born in 1896, he studied at the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute from 1914 to 1916, and in 1916 he was sent by the Main Artillery Directorate to the United States. And having returned (returned!) in the years of hard times to that Russia, to which Kapitsa was hardly able to get out of Cambridge already in relatively prosperous years, he enters the Chemistry Department of the Don Polytechnic University, and from 1922 begins to work at the Leningrad plant "Svetlana".

On December 15, 1945, Vekshinsky, already a recognized scientist, addressed a letter to Malenkov. As far as Kapitsa's letters are mediocre in practical terms, just as practically valuable are the ideas of Vekshinsky's letter, which Malenkov sent to Beria with the resolution: "*Personally, Comrade L.P. Beria, I ask you to read this letter. I know Vekshinsky as a serious worker.* 27/XII".

Here is the letter:

"Dear George Maximilianovich!

I have been informed by Comrade Makhnev that my laboratory

attracted to participate in the work on the creation of electromagnetic masses of separators.

If it is necessary, it is necessary, and I am ready to make every effort to facilitate this task. I understand its meaning.

Two meetings of Comrade Vannikov's Technical Council, to which I was invited, convinced me, however, that there is such a logical and orphan in the formulation of the problem.

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Organizational confusion that it is impossible to count on success. The fact is that in order to create practically working mass separators, it is necessary to solve 95% of engineering and technical problems and 5% of fundamentally physical ones.

Now physicists are gathered around this matter, and only the organization of physical research takes attention. <...> It is assumed that later (when?) the factories will do everything. This is fundamentally wrong, and the golden eggs laid by the cuckoo in empty nests will go rotten sooner than even one chick hatches from them.

To physicists, all this seems to be a trifle, long known and achieved. It seems to me that physicists (although I myself am a physicist, but "spoiled", "factory") - these are people who know too much to be able to do anything well. Unfortunately, our engineers do too much to know well what is new in physics. <...> This means that such an organization should be created, where masters, physicists, and engineers would be merged into one team.

As a temporary measure, it is necessary to take the organization of research work in different places, but we must immediately begin to create and equip such a scientific and technical center, where in 8-10 months it would be possible to carry out real work. Academician Kurchatov's proposal for the urgent construction of an institute with a strong technical focus, in my opinion, is not only justified, but absolutely necessary.

With communist greetings, sincerely yours, Vekshinsky.

On December 31, 1945, Beria addressed a letter from Vekshinsky to Vannikov and Pervukhin and wrote: *"I ask, with the participation of Comrade Vekshinsky, to develop and submit proposals for the laboratory of Comrade Vekshinsky for approval by the Special Committee."*

Thus was laid the ideological foundation of the Central Vaku

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smart laboratory of Narkomelektroprom, in 1947 transformed into the Scientific Research Vacuum Institute. But at the same time, these same ideas finally prompted the decision to form KB-11 in Arzamas-16, which grew up in the USSR into the largest multi-profile scientific and engineering "combine", mediocre and ingloriously dying in the current "Rossiyanin".

Kapitsa, in terms of his selfish nature, was closer to the bureaucratic partocracy, which is why he did not get along with Beria in character. But Vekshinsky was a man of deeds and honor. And therefore, his ideas were immediately accepted by Beria and accepted by him for immediate implementation.

In the LITERATURE, one has to come across statements that Beria was sometimes called the "father of the Soviet atomic bomb." In any sense, it is not. But not only can he be called the father of the Soviet nuclear industry, but he must rightly be called if we want to stand on the basis of historical truth. In the "era of Beria", in fact, the entire material "atomic" infrastructure was created, which after Beria only developed.

But he never emphasized this role in any way, and before advertising (there is no talk about self-promotion at all!) He was not eager. After his arrest, the manager of the USSR Council of Ministers, Pomaznev, wrote in a note to the Central Committee dated July 2, 1953:

"Beria considered high-rise buildings to be his brainchild (and had everything

grounds. - S.K.) Once I heard him say that others would have been photographed ten times against the background of these buildings, but here we are building, and nothing. So, even the disloyal Pomaznev involuntarily noted Beria's personal modesty. But this is also confirmed by such, say, a document as "Materials for a collection on the history of mastering atomic energy in the USSR", which was being prepared since September 1952 in the secretariat of the Special Committee! All of its chapters were personally reviewed by Beria, and it seems that he wanted to publish an open Soviet analogue of the American government report on the development of the atomic bomb in the United States. The collection never saw the light of the day, because with the arrest of Beria the idea was buried, and the country in real time

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she never learned what a great deed she had done, nor the names of the heroes of the atomic epic. We are disentangling the consequences of this stupid super-closedness to this day. After all, the country did not understand: what is the value of its gunsmiths and what their feat meant for Russia ... And they did not understand, not least because they did not know about this feat in real time.

So, in the voluminous (pages 806-912 in the book of the 5th volume II of the "Documents and Materials of the Soviet Atomic Project") draft "Materials" Beria's name is mentioned only three times in purely official phrases.

Here they are:

1) "Based on the special nature of the task assigned to the country, Comrade Stalin (by the way, the name of Stalin is also very rare and out of place there. - S.K.) entrusted the leadership of all work on the atomic problem to *his* faithful and closest colleague Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria. Comrade Beria L.P. was appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

2) "From the very first days of its activity, the Special Committee under the leadership of Comrade L.P. Beria led work on the organization and construction of new scientific institutions, design bureaus and pilot plants and the expansion of the work of organizations previously involved in solving the atomic problem on a broad front.

3) "On the progress of construction (of the first reactor. - S.K.) to Comrade L.P. Beria reported daily, measures of assistance were taken immediately.

This is all!

ALL!!!

But in the "Materials" very complimentary assessments are given to others: "the closest associate of Comrade Stalin, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov", "the country's largest scientist in the field of nuclear physics, Academician I.V. Kurchatov", "experienced business managers and talented engineers B.L. Vannikov, A.P. Zavenyagin, M.G. Pervukhin, V.A. Makhnev", "an experienced engineer and a wonderful organizer... E.P. Slavsky", "energetic, knowledgeable engineer and good organizer A.S. Elyan", etc.

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Dozens of names were mentioned in the "Materials ...", including the names of the Germans Hertz, Barvikh, Steinbeck, Volmer, Schutze, Thyssen, Ardenne, Riehl, Wirtz ... A separate section was devoted to training personnel, and Stalin's thought organically entered the text :

"Russian revolutionary scope is that life-giving force that awakens thought, moves forward, breaks the past, gives perspective. Without it, no progress is possible."

Yes, it was a collective documentary portrait of the Problem and the Epoch, but by no means a portrait of one of the main figures of the Problem - Lavrenty Beria. And what a temptation it was!

Although ... If there was a temptation, then the "Materials" would have been written differently - "under Beria". And they are written "under the collective."

So these pages, which were not taken into account by Beria's biographers, perhaps most weightily prove that Lavrenty Pavlovich not only did not suffer from anything resembling megalomania, but, on the contrary, was sincerely, organically modest.

How much during the work on this book I had to read "memoirs", "memoirs", "testimonies" and transcripts of speeches, where Beria's assessments were given as if by a stencil: "chameleon", "irrepressible careerist", "despot, blinded by the thirst for personal exaltation", etc.

But here is the DOCUMENT. It was written and worked out under **the personal** editorship of Beria. And where is the "thirst for personal exaltation" here?

But this is a litmus test for the essence of personality. Khrushchev, having seized power, immediately hung the Star of the Hero of Socialist Labor for himself in 1954, by 1961 having already become a "Hero" three times. By his seventieth birthday, truly, the thirst for personal exaltation had become so acute that he blasphemously hung the Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union on himself.

And Beria was content with lighting - like stars - the fires of new construction projects of the state.

He really was not hungry for awards, and for all "atom

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efforts", as I already reported, was awarded once. But from the especially important and top secret documents of that time, an attractive image of an outstanding statesman emerges: a clever woman, an organizer with an excellent reaction, able to quickly become aware of hitherto unknown problems and adequately solve them, a person cadres, and not repression, and, moreover, extremely attentive to the needs of the working masses.

Speaking figuratively, he guided the method not of an ax, but of a precise directive, but sometimes, yes, and a strong fist.

But wasn't this method in relation to the negligent or sluggish at that time the only justified one? And shouldn't it be used at all times in the sphere of the highest state leadership? After all, kindness to thieves, slob and corrupt officials turns into evil towards the people.

BERIA was removed from the active life of the country on June 26, 1953, but the gunsmiths still lived in the rhythm they had previously set. The weeks of July and August flew by in preparations for testing the first RDS-6s hydrogen bomb. Finally the day came on August 12, 1953...

On the Experimental Field, the center of which was a 40-meter tower with a charge, 308 structures rose (or, on the contrary, were buried in the ground): buildings, bridges, dugouts ...

1300 measuring, photographic and filming instruments, 1700 indicators — everything, as before. And all for the first time, because the political price of the success or failure of the "hydrogen" explosion in 1953 was almost the same as the "atomic" explosion in the year 1949.

The State Commission for the test was headed by the Minister of Medium Machine Building of the USSR Malyshev, and for this unprecedented event - the expected power of the explosion was to have a TNT equivalent of 400 thousand tons of trinitrotoluene! - a lot of big figures gathered. It is enough to cite a number of names from the list approved by Kurchatov of persons "representing personal observations" about the explosion ... There were three academicians - M.V. Keldysh,

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M.A. Lavrentiev and A.D. Sakharov, future academician M.A. Sadovsky and future "correspondent members" D.I. Blokhintsev and L.A. Galin, V.P. Dzheleпов, B.S. Dzheleпов, Lieutenant General I.F. Chukhнов, S. Roginsky, I.S. Glebov, Rozhdestvensky, major generals M.N. Kochergin and Voskresensky...

Hour "H" came at 7:30 local time (at 4:30 Moscow time). The temperature of the luminous zone, determined by the "fireball" method, significantly exceeded the solar one, that is, the test command post from a distance of several kilometers was scorched by a small man-made star for some time!

A huge glow of red-orange color was visible from a distance of 170 kilometers. The full TNT equivalent was estimated at 400 + - 50 kilotons. It was a success! And what a success! On August 20, Pravda published a "Government Report on H-Bomb Tests in the Soviet Union."

But all this was already without the one whom only two months ago the nuclear scientists and rocket scientists called among themselves simply LP. As I understand it, by this time he was no longer alive, although officially there was only an "investigation" in his "case".

However, my story about the "atomic" life of Beria is not over yet...

Chapter 21

LAVRENTIY FOR LAVRENTIEV

MARCH 11, 1946 Director of the 2nd Research Physics Institute of Moscow State University Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences D.V. Skobeltsin turned to "highly respected Lavrenty Pavlovich" with a request *"to give instructions on the need to demobilize from the army and expedite the return to Moscow State University for the retraining of physicists who had previously graduated from Moscow State University and former senior students according to the attached list."*

The motivation was as follows: *"delay in carrying out the order I requested will lead to the disruption of everything*

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assignments regarding the graduation of specialists in nuclear physics in 1946".

Skobeltsin's anxiety was understandable and understood: on March 12, Beria addressed him a letter to the Minister of the Armed Forces Bulganin, who on March 18 said:

"Comrade Beria.

In pursuance of your order of 12.3.46 on the issue of dismissal of military personnel from the Red Army for the training of specialists in nuclear physics, I issued the attached order.

The order was given to the head of the Main Directorate of Personnel, Colonel General F.I. Golikov, and he fulfilled it, but on April 18, 1946, he turned to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. Malenkov G.M. with a memorandum: "I report:

In order to meet the needs of scientific research institutions working on the problems of atomic energy, the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Armed Forces is returning from the army a significant number of former students of the physics departments of universities.

At the same time, one cannot help but pay attention to the fact that ... the selection of those recalled from armies of physics students are produced too one-sidedly.

So, from a list of 20 people on April 13 this year. professor D.V. Skobeltsin asks fire 16 people Jews.

Earlier, on March 11, out of 10 people, Professor Skobeltsin, half of the people (5 people)

selected the same nationality.

On April 20, Malenkov addressed this report to Beria, and on the same day Makhnev, in turn, gave Beria a certificate: "The clarification showed that Comrade Skobeltsin, when compiling the list, used the oral recommendations of acquaintances of teachers, physicists and students, since there was no accounting at Moscow State University senior students drafted into the army.

Judging by the efficiency of Makhnev, the question seemed interesting to Beria, but how it was already there, keep silent about the documents

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wow. However, the above "information for thought" will serve as an appropriate introduction to the further story.

FULLY the reader can get acquainted with this story in Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the Bulletin on Atomic Energy, but it is unlikely that the departmental edition of TsNIIAtominform can be found in many public libraries.

I immediately warn you that although everything below is presented mainly in the third person, in fact I am very succinctly retelling what I wrote *in the first person* in this Bulletin ... about myself, about physics and about physicists of the early 50s Mathematical Sciences Oleg Alexandrovich Lavrentiev, whose fate was connected with the fate of Beria, is also symbolic. And so it is impossible not to talk about it.

For more than half a century, Oleg Alexandrovich has been living in Kharkov, being an employee of the famous UFTI - the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology of the Academy of Sciences. While working on this book, I got through to him, and after my introduction, we had a phone conversation that went something like this...

- Oleg Alexandrovich, as far as I know, you met with Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

- Yes, I had one meeting with him ... By the way, I was with Sakharov.

— When was that?

— In 1951...

- Well, what are your impressions of him?

- Good impressions ... Firstly, he was an excellent organizer ...

- I know this, but he interests me as a person ... What can you say about this say? Whatever you want, then say ... What impression did he make?

- A good impression ... Firstly, he left the table, he had a large table ... He came up, shook hands, "said: "Hello ", invited me to sit down ...

Lavrentiev's voice is a muffled bass, and the manner of speaking

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vora - unhurried and thorough ... He pauses and continues:

- And his very first question stunned me ... He asked: "Do you have a toothache?" ... I was surprised - why? Nothing hurts! And he asks: "Why is the cheek swollen?" - "And they are always plump for me ..."

Anyone who sees a photo of young Lavrentiev will not be surprised at Lavrenty Pavlovich's question - Oleg Alexandrovich's cheeks were then really like hamster...

And one more thing ... Both in his published memoirs and in a telephone conversation with me, Oleg Alexandrovich recalled that Beria addressed him as "you." But how often in the memoirs of others (at least - KGB General Sinitsyn) Beria boorishly "pokes" the interlocutor ... So, let me not believe it! To those who had already firmly entered his circle, he could, of course, in a comradely way address "you" ("empty "you" with a heartfelt "you", she, without saying a word, replaced) ... But "you" as the norm ? No and no again!

And that's why I am so categorical ... In 1951, in front of **the Marshal of the Soviet**

Union, a member of the Politburo, a mature man, after all, was a twenty-six-year-old sergeant Lavrentiev!

It's the sergeant...

How he got into Beria's office, the reader will soon find out. But now it is significant that Lavrenty Pavlovich came out from behind the table to shake his hand and seat him in an armchair! And then he immediately carefully asked about his swollen cheek ... Yes, this one detail refutes all the vile things piled up over the memory of Beria over the past half century or more!

- Well, then what? I asked my telephone interlocutor.

"Then I started asking about my parents. My father is in jail then.

sitting...

- And then?

- Well, then he wrote a good note to Vannikov, Zavenyagin and Kurchatov.

- And then?

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- Then everything was fine too ... They gave me a room in Moscow ... They gave me money ... I received a Stalin scholarship - as an excellent student ... They accepted me to work for Kurchatov ... We prepared the program ...

Silence on the phone... Pause...

- And then? I can't stand it.

- Then Beria died, and all the bumps fell on me ... Although I am alone

I only met him once.

Another pause, and then I hear:

- Yes, all this is published ... - Where?

- In the Atomic Energy Bulletin, I think in the summer issues of 2001

year...

The MEMORY of the old physicist did not disappoint, and further on I state everything as I warned the reader about it at the beginning ...

In 1941, Oleg Lavrentiev, a seventh-grader, read the book "Introduction to Nuclear Physics", which had just been published, the author of which he later forgot. And he had a blue dream - to work in the field of nuclear energy.

The war began, at the age of 18 Lavrentiev volunteered for the front, fought in the Baltic states, and after the end of the war he was transferred to the Sakhalin military district, to the 221st anti-aircraft artillery division. There he became a radiotelegraph operator and a sergeant, and for sergeant's rubles he was able to subscribe books on physics from Moscow through Posyl-bargaining and subscribe to the journal Uspekhi fizicheskikh nauk. In addition, the unit had a good library.

And a systematic and serious self-education began, especially since the command of the unit encouraged this. Surprisingly, it is a fact that even without formally having a secondary education, Lavrentiev already then thought like a serious physicist, already in 1948 independently coming up with the ideas of thermonuclear fusion and a hydrogen bomb based on lithium deuteride. Thinking about the use of thermonuclear reactions for industrial purposes, he formed the idea of electrostatic traps for plasma ... In fact, Sergeant Lavrentiev was a potential physical genius,

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for genius is not only ability, but also labor. And life taught him to work.

In September 1948, Oleg entered an evening school, despite the ban on military personnel attending it. However, political officer A. Shcherbakov convinced the division commander, Lieutenant Colonel I. Plotnikov, that an exception should be made here. In May 1949, having passed three classes in a year, Lavrentiev received a matriculation certificate.

The newspapers were full of reports that President Truman was setting out to build a hydrogen bomb. And Sergeant Lavrentiev knew how to make it! And he wrote a short letter to Stalin, and a few months later - to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Soon, lieutenant colonel of the engineering service Yurganov arrived from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk to look at Oleg, and at the same time to find out if everything was fine with his psyche.

A few days later, the command of the unit received an order to create working conditions for Sergeant Lavrentiev, and in a guarded room at the headquarters of the unit, he began to write his first work on thermonuclear fusion.

In July 1950!

Professor Skobeltsin's protege at that time was happily nibbling on the "granite of science" at Moscow State University, periodically interspersing this "menu" with products from Moscow restaurants.

But even Lavrentiev had Moscow ahead of him ... Documents had already been sent to the admission committee of Moscow State University, and on July 21 - without any professorial petitions - honest Soviet people carried out early demobilization of a talented Soviet guy. He finished his work on fusion, and on July 22, 1950, she went by secret mail to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, to the head of the department of heavy engineering I.D. Serbin. Oleg himself went to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

And there...

And there it turned out that near Vladivostok, the rains washed away the path, it was pointless to board a steamer in Korsakov - you would still get stuck on the mainland. In what was then Russia - according to Stanislav Pestov and Antonov-Ovseenka -

"totalitarian" times were in full swing, when everyone was "spying on each other" in order to push their neighbor into "GULAG slaves", and when "people were not considered people", calling them "cogs". But what is surprising - in this "that

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to the literary power, Lavrentiev did not come up with anything smarter than to go to the regional party committee. And there...

And there the secretaries for science and industry, already familiar (!) with the work of a sergeant (!), helped him buy a plane ticket to Khabarovsk and introduced him to G. Smith's book on the US Manhattan Project. He devoured the book, and it gave him a new impetus for ideas on the hydrogen bomb.

Having arrived in the capital on August 8, Oleg was included in the group of latecomers and, after successfully passing the entrance exams, became a student at the Faculty of Physics. In September, he met with Serbin, who offered to keep in touch (the head of the Central Committee department and a student!) and report on all new ideas. Oleg wrote another work, sent it to Serbin through the expedition of the Central Committee, but there was no answer...

And suddenly, on January 3, 1951, in a hostel on Stromynka, Oleg was informed that he was wanted and asked to call such and such a phone. He called. The subscriber on the other end of the wire introduced himself as Makhnev and, despite the late hour, offered to come to the Kremlin.

Student sergeant!

There was only one person at the window in the pass office at the Spassky Gate, and when he heard the name "Lavrentiev", he peered carefully and followed. It turned out that they were going to the same place, and when the fellow travelers reached Makhnev, he introduced them to each other: "Oleg Alexandrovich Lavrentiev" and "Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov."

On Makhnev's desk lay Lavrentiev's beautifully designed second work, and the secretary of the Special Committee asked Sakharov if he was familiar with it. Sakharov replied that he did not, but that he had read Lavrentiev's first work and that it made a strong impression on him. Makhnev recommended reading the second work. I remind you: Lavrentiev was then a first-year student.

A few days later, also late in the evening, Lavrentiev was again at Makhnev's, as was Sakharov. Makhnev said that they would be received by the chairman of the Special Committee, but that they would have to wait - he had a meeting now. After a rather long wait, we went to the neighboring building of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and after multiple checks of documents, all three ended up in the "dressing room" of Beria's office.

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At first, Sakharov was summoned to Beria. After 10 minutes, Oleg was also invited to him. And the conversation that I described above took place ...

VERY soon the circle of high acquaintances of the student expanded. And at whose expense! Vannikov, General Pavlov, Kurchatov! But most often Oleg dealt with Pavlov ...

"Running through" my ideas," writes Lavrentiev, "he arranged meetings for me with scientists, followed with interest our discussions, which were sometimes quite stormy. Then for me there was only one authority - science, and if I was sure of something, then I defended my point of view, regardless of how..."

Once Pavlov said that the "master" called him and was interested in the affairs of Lavrentiev. Today, the "leaders" of "Rossiyanin" do not find time for academicians, and Beria was interested in a talented student! Yes, in fact, he is no longer a student, but a promising young scientist!

The circle of acquaintances expanded: physicists Blokhintsev (Oleg knew him only in absentia from a textbook of quantum mechanics), Golovin (the future anti-Beria "narrator"), mathematician Samarsky ... Kurchatov offered to graduate from the university in four years, and Oleg quickly jumped from first year to the third, and soon he was invited to work in laboratory No. 2 (the future Institute of Atomic Energy named after Kurchatov).

Everything was fine, but... But suddenly, with surprise, Lavrentiev learns that Sakharov and Tamm are also involved in plasma confinement - due to the magnetic field, which Sakharov did not tell Oleg about. And there was a reason for this - as Lavrentiev found out only in 1968, his first Sakhalin work was reviewed by Sakharov, a recent graduate student of Tamm, and Lavrentiev's ideas, apparently, launched a "chain reaction" of Sakharov's thoughts ...

In mid-May 1951, Oleg received a permanent pass to laboratory No. 2, also called LIPAN - the Laboratory of Measuring Instruments of the Academy of Sciences. They worked a lot, Beria was expected to arrive, who himself wanted to look at the experiments ... Lavrentiev met Lev Artsimovich, the head of the experimental program for

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controlled thermonuclear fusion, the largest value. It turns out that Artsimovich also read his first work and appreciates it highly. And then Oleg meets Budker, the future director of the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Budker also read the "sergeant's" work of a graduate of the evening school for working youth and treated its author very kindly.

At that time, Oleg was already living on the Maxim Gorky embankment (several impressive residential buildings were built there for PGU employees). And everything seemed to work out just fine! At the end of June 1951, Zavenyagin received him in his office at PSU on Novo-Ryazanskaya Street, asked him about life, plans for the future, and offered him a ticket. Meetings with Pavlov and Makhnev are not uncommon - Oleg wanted to implement a modest own experimental program (Makhnev called it "penny" due to the insignificance of the required funds) ...

But something got stuck.

In October 1951, a detailed discussion of Oleg's idea of an electromagnetic trap took place in LIPAN.

"At the discussion," writes Lavrentiev, "another person was present. He sat quietly in the corner, listened attentively to my explanations, but did not ask questions and did not interfere in our conversations. When the discussion was coming to an end, he quietly got up and left the audience.

Only later did Oleg realize that it was Tamm. Half a century later, Lavrentiev will write: "The reasons that prompted him to attend our meeting incognito are incomprehensible to me."

Although the reader may already begin to understand something ...

By JUNE 1952, Lavrentiev released a report with calculations of his trap and the parameters of the plasma contained in it. The report was sent for review to Academician M.A. Leontovich, and on June 16, the first meeting of another major figure in physical science and a plump-cheeked stubborn man who recognizes the authority of only scientific truth took place.

Leontovich began with compliments, but then became convinced

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give the author of the report the unfeasibility of both his idea of traps and the second idea of a jet plasma engine for use in outer space (later such engines will be used in practice, but ...).

Lavrentiev did not give in, but politely said that he would think about it. And then Leontovich, in front of him, called someone on the phone and said: "Everything is in order" ... Even the naive Oleg was jarred by these words, and he mentally added to them: "Your task has been completed."

I would like to know - whose?

Leontovich "cut down" Lavrentiev's report, but their meetings continued, and Leontovich even wanted to take him to graduate school, but ... But here are the words of Lavrentiev:

"Conclusion of M.A. Leontovich delayed the start of experimental research on electromagnetic traps by almost five years. It was a great loss not only for me, but for our entire controlled fusion program."

And what is there a young Russian guy with the makings of a genius, but without ambition and without the appearance of a genius, unlike the "brilliant" Landau or Leontovich with his very expressive face! Schemers from science brought down bigger figures! For example, in 1946, an article by V.L. Ginzburg, L.D. Landau, M.A. Leontovich and V.A. Foka, which began like this:

"Recently (in 1944-1945) a number of works by A.A. Vlasov... Consideration of these works by A.A. Vlasov led us, however, to the conviction of their inconsistency and the absence of any results of scientific value ... "

Anatoly Alexandrovich Vlasov was a professor at the Faculty of Physics of Moscow State University ... In 1988, in France, in Corsica, an international conference was held, named at the suggestion of a number of US scientists "Vlasov's Plasma" ... But Vlasov himself was not alive for a long time - he went crazy and died.

Oleg, on the other hand, was a guy with strong nerves, and although he was surprised why Sakharov, in conversations, evaded the topic of that part of Lavrentiev's "Sakhalin" note, where it was proposed

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a "real" hydrogen bomb, but Sakharov's silence did not unsettle the former artillery reconnaissance observer. And it was quite understandable ... For example, the idea of using lithium deuteride in a thermonuclear charge is dated in the USSR in 1948 - there are **seemingly** indisputable

documents in Arzamas-16. But its authorship was disputed by the "luminaries" themselves. And suddenly admit that this boy, devoid of intellectual grace, and even promoted by "this" Beria, found all this on his own, wearing sergeant's shoulder straps ...

No, it was unbearable for the "luminaries" ... But they had to endure, hiding their irritation ... Moreover, on the one hand, the obstinate could throw up interesting ideas, and on the other hand, he needed an eye and an eye .. You leave him unattended, and you see, he can do for pennies what the academicians did not do for millions. And how then to explain to the "luminaries" with L.P. Beria?

But Academician Leontovich, on his 50th birthday, which is coming on March 7, 1953, received the most wonderful - as he himself declared to "his" - gift: Stalin's death... How is it necessary to hate the country in which one was born in order to treat someone who, according to Churchill, accepted Russia with a plow and left it with an atomic bomb?

On June 26, 1953, all the all-Union bastard receives another gift - Beria's arrest.

And it started!

Lavrentyev is deprived of both his pass to LIPAN and his work permit. And his diploma practice begins and he needs to write a diploma. They also deprive him of an increased scholarship (absolutely illegal, in violation of a government decree) and turn out the tuition fee for the whole year. Oleg finds himself without a livelihood, and when he makes his way into the office of the new dean of the Faculty of Physics, Fursov, he hears: "Your benefactor is dead, what do you want?"

HOW did the young physicist believe in Soviet power, if immediately after that he writes a letter to Khrushchev. And a few days later Oleg was called to Staraya Square by Khrushchev's scientific assistant Panasenkov. The physicist himself, Panasenkov all

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quickly grasped, and - as it turned out - Artsimovich at the highest level confirmed the importance and value of Lavrentiev's ideas.

In short, the scholarship was returned, but there were many obstacles on the way to the defense, and only in May 1955 did the defense take place. And it took another six months (!) for the talented physicist Lavrentiev to receive a diploma and a qualification as a physicist.

A year ago, everything was clear: they were waiting for him in LIPAN. But now they give him a turn from the gate - including the same Golovin.

Academician Artsimovich rather coldly reports that this issue is not within his competence ... As a result, Lavrentiev ended up in Kharkov, where he remained for the rest of his life. But even before his arrival, the director of the UFTI, Sinelnikov, received a call from someone from LIPAN and informed him that a "scandalist and author of confused ideas" was coming to visit him...

Moscow ordeals have been replaced by Kharkov ones, but talent cannot fail to have success at all. The first installations were assembled, the first results were obtained. Work began for many years ... However, even the publication of articles in Moscow for Lavrentiev turns out to be impossible. He is published in the "Ukrainian Physical Journal" - in Ukrainian, and his articles are beginning to be read ... in the West. And they immediately make a "stand" on them.

In 1968, at the Novosibirsk conference on physics of the plasma, foreign scientists got to know Lavrentiev personally... Lavrentiev is quoted, referred to... However, Moscow does not send him abroad, ignoring even direct invitations sent to Oleg Aleksandrovich. Even those expressing a willingness to pay the costs at the expense of the inviting party. Only in 1974 did he go abroad for the first time - to the GDR for a conference on low-temperature plasma (in 1975 he was "mercifully" released also in

Lausanne). But more often, Lavrentiev was denied travel, not like his classmate and former dormitory neighbor on Stromynka Roald Sagdeev, who made a brilliant career in the Brezhnev USSR and then "crowned" it with relocation to the "stronghold of freedom" across the ocean.

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In 1968, in Novosibirsk, Budker said to Oleg Alexandrovich: "They killed a good guy." Recalling this, Lavrentiev wrote: "After these words, my vague guesses took on real shape. They simply "ruined" me, and when they "ruined", it turned out that I did not enjoy high patronage, did no harm to anyone or anything ... "

And here he was wrong.

LIKE BERIA at his level as a statesman, Lavrentiev at his level as a physicist caused "harm" to so many by the very fact of his existence! He wanted to live in a *family* of physicists, and there were only *clans* - if we mean those who made up the Olympus.

Beria was to blame for the fact that many people just wanted to "eat", and he forced them to work the way he worked himself, at the limit of his strength. So after all, Lavrentiev was to blame - at his level - IN THE SAME! He wanted to work, not shine.

Beria loved the Motherland in himself. His ideological antipodes, and above all Khrushchev, loved themselves in the leading chair.

Lavrentiev loved physics in himself. And all these Leontovichs and Landau with Artsimovich, and Sakharov, and Tamm, and Kapitsa, loved themselves, their exclusivity, their "chosenness". And therefore, not only to love - to endure next to them the one who did not pose as the chosen one, but was him, they could not.

How much Sakharov in his memoirs did not spare black paint for Beria. Why is there a "monster" Beria, who at one time treated with attention and interest not only Lavrentiev, but also Sakharov himself! "The Conscience of Democracy", Sakharov, even the modest Vasily Alekseevich Makhnev, who has not served in the "organs" for a single day, is promoted to the head of the "camp in Kolyma" - in his article about Leontovich, published in the 2003 collection "Academician M.A. Leontovich. Scientist. Teacher. Citizen"...

It's in people...

But when, on April 5, 1989, Lavrentiev came to Sakharov at his Moscow apartment and the owner, "lowering his head", led the guest past the homegrown people who were noisy around the house.

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other "democrats" and foreign mentors to the kitchen, then in the first minutes he remembered not something there, but a *meeting with Beria*.

She sunk, it means, into the academician's soul and memory, but not with the atmosphere of "fear" - she was not even close in that meeting. But there was a keen interest in him from an outstanding statesman. After all, Sakharov was older than Lavrentiev by only five years, an older peer, in fact. And in 1951, he also got to the LP for the first time, although, unlike Oleg Alexandrovich, and not for the last time. So it was *the bride for the ADF* ...

"We drank tea," Lavrentyev testifies, "with a pie and recalled the past. He was still under the impression of our meeting with L.P. Beria, and his first words were about her ... "

What were these words that Sakharov recalled? I don't know, but Oleg Aleksandrovich doesn't remember - at least he said so in answer to my question. But what, by the way, could Sakharov say then, having *bowed his head*, he passed into the kitchen through the line of jubilant destroyers of Russia? After all, it seems that then he began to understand that Russia, not without his assistance, was being led to the slaughter ...

It was 1989 - the year of the bacchanalia of the Gorbachev congress of "people's

deputies", who buried the state. And then, in the era of Beria and the late Stalin, the state found itself at a crossroads. There were two paths: either to new glory, or to infamy.

Or - to indestructible power, or - to decrepitude.

Or - to the flowering of genuine, that is, Soviet, democracy, or - at first to partocratic, and then to oligarchic totalitarianism.

Or - to natural world leadership in a world of increasing justice and freedom, or - to unnatural death in a world of increasing inequality and global suppression of freedoms ...

There was a choice.

And the country was at a crossroads.

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Chapter 22

THE END OF THE 40'S - THE BEGINNING OF THE 50'S... A COUNTRY AT THE CROSSROADS

In 1946 or 1947, Einstein published an article in one of the American magazines with the title, characteristic of those years, "Why is socialism needed?". I will emphasize - not "Is socialism necessary?", But "Why is socialism necessary?".

The diplomatic figure of the Khrushchev-Brezhnev-Gorbachev era, Georgy Kornienko, recalled it in his book Cold War. Testimony of its participant. The path of the author, who graduated from the Higher School of the NKGB shortly after the war, and by the era of the "catastrophe" had reached the highest posts in the Foreign Ministry, is quite typical for a representative of the elite that betrayed the state. Specifically, Kornienko, in the words "remained faithful to socialism", but what do we care about his words now!

In their youth, people like him did not read Lenin very carefully, and even more so Stalin, but they imagined themselves to be a thinking public. Then they quickly rose to the top, thinking that their participation in big politics was due to their talents, while it was ensured by the successes of Russia during the Stalin and Beria times.

They occupied ever higher positions in an ever more powerful state and were sure that the power of the state was growing thanks to them, while this power was growing on the basis that had been laid by the labors of the era of Stalin and Beria.

The time has come, and this elite, having believed in its chosenness (and in fact, just petrified as some kind of specific substance), fearlessly and without any internal struggle, which, however, it was not capable of even in its early years, surrendered the state to the mediocre and a near-minded rogue with the seal of Cain on his forehead. And he was gradually raised to the pinnacle of power by the darkest and most sinister forces.

Why did this happen?

Why?

There is an answer, and I will try to give it.

In my time...

Kornienko admits that Einstein's judgments influenced

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whether his worldview (it turns out that he, who lied to Gorbachev (!), had it) is greater than Stalin's Questions of Leninism, which he studied at the same time. And this is also revealing.

Let us return, however, to Einstein. In the article mentioned above, he came to the conclusion about the preference and greater justice of socialism - not just its Soviet model, but socialism as a social system. The most famous physicist of the 20th century wrote:

The economic anarchy of the capitalist system, in my opinion, is

the real root of evil... Production is not for the benefit of the people, but for profit... Capital is concentrated in a few hands, and the result is capitalist oligarchies, whose gigantic power even a democratically organized state is not able to control... I am convinced that there is only one way to fight this grave evil - **the introduction of a socialist economy, together with an education system** (emphasis mine. - S.K.), aimed at the benefit of society "...

For the world of private property, this was a kind of ideological knockout. However, in a huge (with a page portrait-insert) article about Einstein in the 48th volume of the second edition of the TSB, this seemingly important and advantageous work for the USSR was not even mentioned by Einstein, although his philosophical views were mentioned. I think it was not a review of the editorial board, but an exact calculation - the 20th Congress had already passed, and some people had already begun work on the future dismantling of socialism, so there was no need for these forces to take the famous physicist as his defender.

One way or another, but ten years before the publication of the 48th volume of the TSB, Einstein compared the two systems, their advantages and disadvantages, and pronounced a historical verdict on capitalism as a scientist, as a result of *scientific* analysis.

He, by the way, spoke about the depletion of natural resources provoked by capitalism, noted that the United States, with a population of 5% of the world, consumes 30% of the world's energy resources, often simply throwing them away.

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wind. And the USSR consumed a little more, but had a huge development potential and huge reserves of natural resources.

The United States increasingly robbed the outside world, and in the future the USSR could share its wealth with it on a mutually beneficial basis. But after the war, new problems arose, and the future of real socialism, and therefore, in accordance with Einstein's conclusions, the future of the planet depended on whether they were solved.

TO BE more convincing, I will refer to one more evidence from the New World. The original American artist Rockwell Kent was also an interesting writer, and his autobiographical book *It's Me, Lord!* is best known. And this is what we find in it:

"Arriving in Paris (in 1950 for one of the international events of Western peace advocates. - S.K.), I barely had time to wash in the hotel: I had to go to the Chamber of Deputies. ...Following this speech, I was invited to go to Moscow as part of a delegation. Moscow! This fabulous capital of a forbidden country!.. And if we want peace, where else can we defend it, if not in the main citadel of its enemies, which this city supposedly is? So we fly to Moscow...

Moscow appeared before me as a great city, full of people, people well-dressed and actively participating in the nationwide struggle for peace. I saw the cleanest city in the world, even cleaner than Stockholm and Copenhagen....

Every evening we were taken to the opera, ballet, theater or cinema. The halls were crowded. No one from the public stood out so that he could be called rich or poor ... "

"Stalin-Beria's Potemkin village," the "democrat" will grin at these lines. And he will be as mistaken as only "democrats" can be wrong. For what follows is this:

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"...One night, returning home, I got lost. In search of a policeman who would show me the way, I went through countless

Moscow quarters. And not having met a single policeman, I had to turn to a passerby, who turned out to be very friendly ... "

This is how it was in the supposedly "totalitarian" Moscow of the 1950s. How the state of affairs now in "democratic" Moscow is hardly worth saying...

Yes, by the beginning of the 1950s, it had already become clear to all honest people in the world that Russia was turning into a mighty, but at the same time a peace-loving power. In the forties, half the country lay in ruins. Many lived hard, but the prospects gave quite reasonable hope. Nevertheless, there were grounds for concern.

What happened in the USSR had no precedent in world history. For the first time, such an economic and state colossus was so centralized, and its life was so comprehensively planned. And it successfully functioned and developed.

But thanks to what?

In such a huge country *with such a history*, such success could have only two components: 1) the efforts of the people and 2) adequate and competent management.

The management of the Soviet Union had a twofold character: party and state. The party and its highest body, that is, the Politburo of the Central Committee, in principle, were supposed to provide moral, spiritual guidance to society.

The state and its highest executive body, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, were supposed to provide economic, economic leadership.

At the same time, the party had to understand the economic problems of socialism, and the government had to solve them. But who was to be in charge? This question arose objectively. And even if it were brushed aside, it would not disappear, but only escalate.

Stalin understood that now that socialism had survived the war, party organs should not convince people of the advantages of Soviet power - they were obvious, but

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to practically develop and strengthen these advantages. But if, say, at some plant a particular member of the party is better than others able to direct the work of the plant and its development, then who should he be appointed - the party organizer of the plant or the director?

And if in some city a particular member of the party is better than others able to solve the problems of the development of the city, what should he lead - the city committee of the party or the executive committee of the city council? The answer in both the first and second cases, it would seem, was clear.

But if the most competent people in the field of administration had to be sent to the bodies of Soviet and economic management of the city, then they should have the right of a decisive vote in the city. Is not it?

Like so.

And in the region?

And in the republic?

And in the Soviet Union?

That's what it is...

There was another poignant moment in all this.

In order to tell the director of a metallurgical plant how best to cook steel, a member of the party, who is part of the leadership of the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, had to go through many stages of professional growth. But a party member, yesterday's director of a school, if he was elected secretary of the city committee in the city where the metallurgical plant worked, acquired the right to give instructions to the director of this plant, and the director of the dairy plant, and the rector of the university.

Socialism is a directive system, and in principle there is nothing vicious in that. It is not a directive in itself that is bad, but an incompetent directive. But who and how was to develop and issue competent directives?

As socialism developed, everyone thought about how and to whom to organize its development. Even such a little thinking person as Khrushchev ... Already after he had dealt with both Beria and the "anti-party group of Malenkov-Kaganovich-Molotov", speaking on November 1, 1957 at a meeting of the activists of the Moscow Regional Organization, Khrushchev blurted out (he got loose there) interesting

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things! I will quote his words from an uncorrected transcript published in the collection of the Democracy Foundation "Georgy Zhukov. Documentation":

"... take Beria. Beria, after the death of Stalin, in what direction did he act? He began to strengthen the Ministry of Internal Affairs and weaken the party (Khrushchev twitched, because Beria began to strengthen, first of all, the Council of Ministers, but he really began to ignore party talkers. - S.K.) ... This means cutting the party ... This, comrades, was a campaign against party, to crush the party and to strengthen the personal role, this would lead to the restoration of capitalism. This is only enemies can.

Now look, if you take Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Shepilov, then what a dispute there was again with Molotov. Well, Beria and Molotov are, of course, different people, completely different. But Molotov and I had a big argument as soon as Stalin died. He said that the role of the Soviet organs should be strengthened. We (who is "we"? - S.K.) said: no, we need to strengthen the role of party organs ...

Who is able to crush the enemy in the party? The consignment. Therefore, the question of the role of the party is the main thing. If the party could not cope with Beria, where would we go then?

And really, where?

Where we went with Khrushchev, we know.

And where would we go with Beria?

And where did we go after the war with Stalin?

In 1945, the future Chief Designer of the Nuclear Weapons Center in the Urals, and later the Deputy Head of the Weapons Directorate of Minsredmash, Major General Leonid Fedorovich Klopov, turned twenty-seven years old, and he had just been enrolled as a student of the N.E. Zhukovsky. On June 24, as part of the Consolidated Regiment of the Academy, he stood on Red Square - almost directly in front of the Mausoleum, waiting for the start of the Victory Parade. And I saw well how the members of the Politburo headed by Stalin were going up to the podium of the Mausoleum.

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"I saw Stalin up close," L.F. wrote in his memoirs. Klopov, - during the funeral of M.I. Kalinin on Red Square in 1946. I was then in the calculation of the cordon of the place of movement of the hearse with the coffin of M.I. Kalinin. I.V. Stalin walked directly behind the hearse alone, and the members of the Politburo walked three or four steps behind. The sallowness, sparse gray hair, and not quite confident step showed his fatigue and old age. Even after his death in 1953 in the Mausoleum, Stalin seemed younger to me than seven years ago at the funeral."

I don't know about the reader, but I appreciate such small details as much as I do documents. The fact that Stalin was aging and tired by the end of the forties can be read on hundreds of pages from dozens of venerable memoirists. But the impressions of the young officer, which undoubtedly forever engraved in his memory, are valuable as an old photographic film, where signs of the era are documented in an instant.

Yes, Stalin was aging, although in 1946 he was only sixty-seven years old.

But what years! In addition, 1946 is the year when the US became increasingly aggressive, and the rest of the world hesitated. Stalin, Molotov and Beria did not know the mood of the Western leadership from newspapers - the Soviet intelligence services, consolidated into a single Committee of Information (CI) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, laid on their tables such first-class and accurate data about the plans of the West that Stalin, unlike Western leaders, saw the true picture of world politics.

And she worried...

Here is a fragment of a typical KI station report in April 1948:

"For the past two weeks there have been secret Anglo-American talks in Washington. The first stage of the negotiations ended on April 1 of this year .

Anglo-American-Canadian staff talks will be held over the next few weeks,

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which may be of even greater interest than the talks just concluded in Washington.

The military staff talks will be aimed at working out joint

plans:

- a) In an unknown uncertain event, namely in the event of war within the next few weeks or months;
- c) In case of war in 1955-1956.

The Anglo-Americans believe that by that date the Soviet Union will have a sufficient number of atomic bombs and can consciously risk war ... "

Moreover, both in 1940 and in 1948, not even Moscow, but Baku and the surrounding oil regions were supposed to be the primary object of an atomic attack. Oil has increasingly become the nerve of Western politics. But in April 1948, we still did not have a single atomic bomb, while the United States was rapidly building up its nuclear arsenal, moving from double-digit numbers to three-digit ones.

There was reason to have a "not quite confident step" for Stalin in 1946. But after a successful test of the RDS-1, the tension subsided somewhat. On October 29, 1949, Stalin signed Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 5060-1943 "On the development of the nuclear industry in 1950-1954." The first item approved the plan for "manufacturing finished products from plutonium" in the amount of 153 products, including: in 1949 - 2 units; in 1950 - 7 units; in 1951 - 18 units; in 1952 - 30 units; in 1953 - 42 units; 1954 - 54 units. So everything worked out? All but not all...

On January 3, 1947, Abakumov sent the following report to Stalin:

"At the same time, I present a certificate of Gordov's conversation with his wife (Tatyana Vladimirovna. - S.K.) recorded by operational equipment on December 31, 1946, and a certificate of Gordov's conversation with Rybalchenko on December 28.

From these materials it is clear that Gordov and Rybalchenko are clear enemies of the Soviet regime. I considered it necessary to once again ask for your permission to arrest Gordov and Rybalchenko.

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Colonel-General Vasily Gordov, born in 1896, a native of the village of Matveevka in the Menzelinsky district of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, was then a typical - according to his biography - general of the Soviet Army. Called up in 1915, fought as a senior non-commissioned officer of the old Russian army, in the Civil Army - commander of a platoon, company, battalion, regiment ... Then - courses "Shot", Frunze Academy, in 1940

year - Chief of Staff of the Volga Military District ...

During the war, Gordov first rose to the post of commander of the Stalingrad Front, and here in the summer of 1942 he failed mediocly, and as a result, the Germans broke through the outer defensive bypass of Stalingrad. His failures were corrected by Vasily Chuikov, who returned from China, who later noted Gordov's aplomb and arrogance.

Demoted to the position of army commander, Gordov fought better, in 1945 he became a Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, he was appointed commander of the Volga Military District, and General Rybalchenko became his chief of staff (they served in such a "bundle" during the war).

So, Gordov's real level of incompetence was the position of army commander. However, this former peasant son, raised by the Soviet government to the "golden" starry heights, was "offended", which was recorded by Abakumov's technique.

I quote Gordov's conversation with his wife in part, but - for the convenience of the reader - without marking the published text with dots.

Gordov. You keep saying - go to Stalin. So, go to him and say: "I'm sorry, I made a mistake, I will honestly serve you, faithfully." To whom? I will serve meanness, savagery? The Inquisition is solid, people are just dying! (Just these days, it was the anniversary of the day when Generals Muzychenko, Potapov, Lukin left the Lubyanka after a special check. - S.K.).

T.V. They broke such a spirit as Zhukov ...

Gordov. He still won't get fired. Now they are only clearing away those who were more or less trusted by Zhukov ... And they will hold Zhukov for a year or two, and then also - in a mug, and that's it! I missed out on a lot. What did I break my head on? On

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volume. what broke such people - Uborevich, Tukhachevsky ... (taking into account the fact that in 1933 Gordov was the chief of staff of the Moscow military infantry school, these words are very interesting. - S.K.).

T.V. When Zhukov was removed, you immediately told me: everything was dead.

Gordov. So I had to tremble, slavishly tremble... I can't! What ruined me was that I was elected a deputy. This is where my death lies. I went around the districts, and when I saw everything, all this terrible, - then I was completely reborn And it went like a platform. I'm saying now, I have such convictions that if collective farms are removed today, then tomorrow there will be order, there will be a market, there will be everything ... Let people live, they have the right to life, they won life for themselves, they defended it!

T.V. Now no one aspires to live for society.

Gordov. There is no society.

T.V. Even if there is - a handful, but it is not interesting for her to live.

Gordov. And it's a pity to die too.

T.V. I want to see life. Whatever they get to.

Gordov. This scum?

Madam Gordova, with her disappointment in life in the atmosphere of a Moscow (except for Kuibyshev) general's apartment, reminded me very much of a classic provincial fool with pretensions to high demands that all sorts of Stalins and Berias "do not want" to understand ...

General Gordov, who undertook to judge problems above the general's boot, is no more attractive to me. Behind all these conversations "let live" was simply the mug of a petty bourgeois, unsatisfied in his conceit ... But this petty bourgeois had general epaulettes, like another "guardian for the people", General Rybalchenko, who talked with Gordov in his apartment passing from Sochi to Kuibyshev.

And here's what the conversation was about:

"Rybalchenko. There are no essentials. They literally became beggars. lives

only the government, and the broad masses

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begging. I'm wondering, does Stalin really not see how people live?

Gordov. He sees everything, knows everything.

Rybalchenko. Or is he so confused that he doesn't know how to get out? Completed

The 1st year of the five-year plan - why throw dust in your eyes? ..

Gordov. They eat cats, dogs, rats.

Rybalchenko. We used to get help from abroad.

Gordov. Lived up, now they give nothing. And we have nothing.

Rybalchenko. And no prospects, complete isolation."

These conversations were recorded. First they arrested Rybalchenko, then Gordov (in 1950 they were shot, but in 1956 - which is significant - rehabilitated). However, not everything was recorded! And figs in the pocket of the power that gave birth to it, part of the Soviet elite showed more and more often - even after the country moved towards prosperity. And the reason was not some "platforms" with which Gordov tried to cover up his grumbling. What there "platforms"! It all boiled down to the fact that they wanted to live and eat *now*, but the country could not immediately give them the opportunity to do so.

The former peasant boy lordly denied us the right to society, and his "madame", justifying her own worthlessness, declared that no one even aspires to live for him. Actually, it was repeated - adjusted for the era -

the situation that arose after the revolution and the Civil War, when one of the fighters rolled up their sleeves for peaceful work, and someone ... "For all the battles, for everything adversity..."

Well, further to the reader, I hope it is clear ... Especially since I have previously discussed this topic in already stated in the book.

AND OUTSIDE the emerging circle of the new Soviet elite, elevated by the war to worldly (life-I can't write) heights, lived a huge country. She lived a difficult life, but with hope and work. Factories were restored, cities were rebuilt, new discoveries were made, new varieties of winter and spring crops were bred,

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domestic electron microscopes and walking excavators launched air defense missiles towards the targets ...

On Sakhalin (on Sakhalin!) Sergeant Lavrentiev pondered pioneering physical ideas, subscribed to scientific journals for sergeant's rubles... And ahead of him was a meeting with Marshal Beria.

And I think - what if, with his ideas, the sergeant turned not to Marshal Beria, but to General Gordov? Yes, this brave "supporter of the market" would have wiped him into dust! Not in the camp, but on the parade ground ... I would drive the sergeant into the ground with one obscene language.

The marshal-general, confident that he had surpassed everything - this was one threat to developing socialism. The second, and not eliminated, threat was partocracy. If the generals were sure that a general could not be a fool, then the party bureaucrats were sure that a secretary of the Central Committee could not be a fool. The third threat was the "elite" intelligentsia. First of all -

service and "creative", but to some extent - and scientific, especially at the professorial and academic level.

Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky classified the intelligentsia as follows:

"1) People with a patchwork worldview sewn from scraps of newspapers and magazines. 2) Sectarians with hardened commandments, but without a way of thinking and even without the ability to think. 3) Slivers floating downstream, with some

words and appetites.

Klyuchevsky traced the problem from the time before Peter the Great and concluded with surprisingly topical words to this day:

"... the proud Russian intellectual found himself in an awkward position: what he knew turned out to be unnecessary, but what he needed he did not know. He knew the sublime legend about the moral decline of the world and about the transformation of Moscow into the Third Rome, but he needed artillery, fortification, mining, medical knowledge in order to save the Third Rome from the fallen world An educated Russian man knew Russian reality as it is, but I had no idea what she needed and what he should do "...

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Many years have passed since these bitter words were written, and a whole social stratum of educated Russian people appeared in Russia, who knew Russian reality very well - as it is, and knew what it needed and what they should *do* ...

Do!

They were confident in their state and in themselves, because they had knowledge of artillery, fortification, mining, and medical, and they knew how to use them when doing business! They were people of action, they wanted and loved to do it! And the era of Stalin and Beria provided them with every opportunity for this ... However, why the hell were these opportunities for the partocracy necessary? Or - to the nascent regulars of "kitchen" discussions about the "lack of creative freedom"?

The partocracy and the "creative" intelligentsia were related by the inability to do business and a tendency to idle chatter. The partyocracy and the generals had in common an exaggerated self-confidence that they already knew how to govern the country.

And it was deadly.

Of course, in the country of Stalin and Beria there were then many excellent party and Soviet workers - one twice Heroes of the Soviet Union Alexei Fedorovich Fedorov-Chernigovskiy and Sidor Artemovich Kovpak were worth something! I'm not talking about the cohort of brilliant economic leaders formed by the war, of which Beria was the natural leader. And there were excellent, honest, generals and even marshals busy building a new army - one Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky was so good! And there were scientists devoted to the truth... And creators of artistic values devoted to art...

It was thanks to them that things went well, and year by year everything got better. prospects brilliant ones were outlined, and by 1952 a lot had been done.

Generals Gordov and Rybalchenko chose their own fate and failed to see the country of 1952. And by 1952 it had a qualitatively different look. This year we produced 34.4 million tons of steel against 12.3 million tons in 1945; coal - 300 million tons against 149 million

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new tons; electricity - 119 billion kilowatt-hours against 43.3 billion.

By 1950, infant mortality had already decreased compared to 1940. doubled, the number of doctors grew from 155,000 in 1940 to 265,000 in 1950.

In 1945, the country produced 292,000 tons of vegetable oil and 117,000 tons of animal oil. And in 1950 (when Gordov and Rybalchenko were shot) - 819 thousand and 336 thousand. Sahara - 2 million 523 thousand tons against 465

thousand tons.

That, dear reader, was a feat!

But they did something not for Uncle Sam, not for the oligarchs, but for themselves! That's why it was so powerful!

But all this had to be organized.

Stalin's party and organized.

The party of partocrats used it.

And the country?

The country has been on the rise so far...

ONE of the anti-Stalinist (and therefore anti-Beria) myths is this: we are lagging behind in the field of electronic computers because cybernetics has been declared a pseudoscience. But such a student of the history of Soviet science as Lauren Graham admitted that "Soviet hostility to cybernetics was exaggerated outside the USSR."

Still would! The reader is already familiar with the note by Minister Parshin Beria on the work on computers. And here is an illustration to it from the "other" side ... In his book "I - mathematician" Norbert Wiener, "the father of cybernetics", wrote:

"My research ... was in close contact with the work of several Russian mathematicians ... Khinchin and Kolmogorov, two of the most prominent Russian specialists ... worked in the same field as me. For more than twenty years we have stepped on each other's heels ...

And I have no confidence that Kolmogorov did not find on his own ... the possibilities of applying these methods known to me ... he probably simply did not manage to publish his work in the open press ...

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When I started working for the US War Department... the question arose whether anyone abroad was interested in the same problems as me. I said then that ... if anyone in the world is now doing the same thing as me, then most likely it is Kolmogorov in Russia "... Luzin's student, Andrei Kolmogorov, at the age of 36, in 1939, became academician, in 1941 - the winner of the Stalin Prize, during the life of Stalin received two Orders of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. Alexander Khinchin became a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the same year as Kolmogorov, but at the age of 45. In 1941, Khinchin became a laureate of the Stalin Prize, and by 1953, he was also a holder of the Order of Lenin.

Sergei Alexandrovich Lebedev, the creator of our first high-speed calculating electronic machine BESM and its modifications, in 1934, thirty-two years old, already published the 2nd (!) Edition of his book "The Stability of Parallel Operation of Electrical Systems", in 1946— In 1951 he headed the Institute of Electrical Engineering of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, and since 1953 he became the Director of the Institute of Fine Mechanics and Computer Engineering, where BESM-1, BESM-4, BESM-6 and other pioneer computers were developed.

In the 4th volume of the 3rd edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia about machines of the BESM family, there is an article written by Lebedev himself. This is 1971. But in the 4th volume of the Great Russian Encyclopedia, published in 2006, there is not a word about BESM. Still, and suddenly someone will pay attention to the fact that the first BESM worked already in 1953, and doubt that the "tyrant" Stalin was the persecutor of modern trends in scientific and technological progress.

However, our computer technology already in the 40s had its own ideologists and their own creators. Sergo Beria wrote about this well:

"I once told my current colleagues that at that time I had more computers at the institute than today! Eleven! Yes, large in volume, still the first generation, but - there were! Domestic, by the way, technology ... It is strange that all this is forgotten. But the main developers were in Kyiv and Kharkov ...

Professor Lebedev, a number of other scientists created these machines...

Although it was then that the party crushed pseudoscience cybernetics ... Its Central Committee, the apparatus, as always, were far from real things ...

Their chatter did not interfere with us, because party workers were not allowed to come close to such serious things as nuclear and missile projects. In other sectors where they had the opportunity to intervene, they, of course, interfered greatly ... But Stalin was interested in the matter. Believe me, he knew the value of the Central Committee apparatus... He needed it for control..."

I will immediately invite the reader to compare this assessment with another one given by the newly appointed Minister of Medium Machine Building Vyacheslav Malyshev at the Anti-Beria plenum of the Central Committee:

"Beria's leadership style is dictatorial, rude, non-partisan.

By the way, about partisanship. I worked during the war, supervised tank affairs ... he never had a party affiliation. He somehow set up or pushed not directly, but indirectly, that the party organization should provide services (to whom - Beria or the country? - S.K.) ... you do one thing, do another.

There was no provision for him to teach us, he asked the party organization for help in organizing party work, and so on. He considered the secretaries of the regional committees of the party dispatchers ... "

And who else could the secretaries of the regional committees in the regions that produce weapons be during the war, if not dispatchers of the State Defense Committee? Turner Anya Lopatinskaya from Uralmash gave 300 (three hundred!) percent of the norm ... When she was asked how she did it, she replied: "I'm standing on tiptoe." In order to get the control levers of a large machine, Anya, who was not tall enough, "stood on tiptoe" for an eleven-hour shift!

So, in front of such people, the secretaries of the regional committees should have been "party leaders" to portray themselves, "agiti

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to "manage" them, and not to coordinate their production activities in a businesslike way - like dispatchers?

Yes, in front of this fifteen-year-old girl, "standing on tiptoe" in the name of Victory, it was not a sin for them to kneel down!

Malyshev was an engineer. And in the same 1941 at Uralmash, he very harshly demanded that the plant management reduce, for example, the installation time of the tank underframe from forty-eight hours to three to five ... That is, ten times ! Leadership tyranny? Illiterate arbitrariness? No! The rigidity of Malyshev did not intimidate the Uralmashites, but showed in all its nakedness: HOW the front needed tanks. And after some time, the tanks went on stream.

Beria behaved just as harshly when the situation required it. As a result, the front received from the rear what ensured the Victory. This was the partisanship of Lavrenty Beria and Anya Lopatinskaya, because they were members of Stalin's party.

And generals Gordov and Rybalchenko, despite their lamentations about the starving people, were members of the Party of Partocrats, and people like Vyacheslav Malyshev were now joining this party, Khrushchev's party.

Alas...

Here is another accusation of allegedly "non-partisanship", expressed in writing to Lavrenty Pavlovich by M.T. Pomaznev after the arrest of Beria. Pomaznev explained to Malenkov and Khrushchev that, since he "failed to get the floor at the Plenum of the Central Committee," he would like to supplement the characterization of Beria's "hardened intriguer, treacherous and provocateur" with a number of facts and wrote:

"...7. Beria was intolerant of party and public bodies,

employees and activities. He cultivated disrespect for the apparatus of the Central Committee. Participation in public events was considered idleness. When I had to be present at a party committee, at a meeting or meeting, and at that time there was a call from Beria, there was always a scandal. He said many times that only idlers can allow this.

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Well, one can only admire such behavior of Beria and such assessments of him. During the war for socialism it was necessary not to agitate, it had to be defended. After the war, there was no longer any need for empty "agitation". There was no need to agitate for socialism, it had to be built and strengthened! And the country by 1952 knew how and could do a lot ...

Oh, how much we could already then! And how much of what we could, we owe to the organizational and managerial talent of Beria, who knew how to talentedly use the "human factor" in its best manifestations. Now sometimes they write about the tandem de "technocrats" Malenkov and Beria. But there was no real "tandem", and if Malenkov, who was prone to partocratic methods, and the clever Beria often sat on the same "bicycle", then Beria turned the "pedals" with might and main, and Malenkov, at best, did not slow down the movement.

And HERE I will say once again about the untenable statement of various political scientists, about the widely promoted thesis regarding the allegedly constant intrigues in the top leadership of the Stalinist USSR.

I do not want to say that there were no intrigues at all. But I want to say, firstly, that they were not the same as they are described, secondly, they were not so personified and, thirdly, that Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria did not deal with them. Alexei Toptygin, whom I mentioned more than once, who often wrote cleverly and accurately about Beria, unfortunately did not understand much of him. Nevertheless, Toptygin wrote, for example, as follows:

"Beria, who had previously dealt with national economic issues quite closely, is becoming a "pure" business executive, but not only ... He is being promoted to the forefront of the leaders of the military-industrial complex. Stalin did not let go of the reins of the military-industrial complex until the end of his life. Beria in this system is the second most important figure ...

... But at the same time, he does not play an active role in those political battles that are played out around the figures of Voznesensky, Kuznetsov - everything that is half 608

the name of the "Leningrad case" was chilo ... But Lavrenty Pavlovich is more than energetically trying to catch on the so-called. Mingrelian case - in essence, it is directed against him ... "

I note that the "Mingrelian case" mentioned by Toptygin - despite the fact that Beria was a Mingrelian, despite the fact that after Stalin's death Beria participated in the closing of this case - is an ambiguous fact in the history of the late Stalinist USSR. Suffice it to say that this allegedly exclusively anti-Beria "case" was spoken of as a falsification at the Anti-Beria plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953, after Beria's arrest. Although it would seem that it made sense to strengthen the accusations against Beria with this "case". Therefore, I warn the reader in advance that I do not intend to analyze this "case" when my story reaches 1953. It is too important to be limited to a brief discussion of it.

Let's return, however, to the topic of "intrigue" ... In 1996, the Gaia publishing house published Pavel Sudoplatov's memoirs for the first time (it is significant that Gaia in a printed form disclaimed responsibility for the accuracy of the information presented in

them facts). And there Sudoplatov reported that at the end of the 40s he met Anna Tsukanova, deputy head of the Department of Leading Party Organs of the Central Committee, in fact, Deputy Malenkov. And Tsukanova allegedly opened Sudoplatov's eyes to the fact that Stalin's policy is a chain of intrigues... Like, in a small group of his closest associates (Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Beria), Stalin in every possible way "contributes to inciting rivalry"... He constantly de moves high-ranking party leaders and state security officials, not allowing them to stay in the same place for more than three years in a row, etc. and so on.

What can be said here?

The very admission of one of the leaders of the special services that his eyes were allegedly opened to the situation in the late 1940s raises doubts that intrigues took place. Here is a systematically similar case... In the collection of the fund "De

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mocratia" "Georgy Zhukov. Documents" contains a recording of the alleged memoirs of the marshal, allegedly made in 1963-1964 and transferred to the Russian State Military Archive in 1995 (!) The authenticity of these "memories", which also refers to the arrest of Beria, is more than doubtful for me. But there is a phrase there, in any case curious: "Then they did not yet know about the extent of the evil that Stalin inflicted on the Soviet people in 1937-1938" ...

How is this to be understood? If someone inflicts, say, a wound on me, then I will know about it right away. And what is this terrible evil inflicted on the Soviet people by Stalin in 1937, if the people learned about it only in 1956 from Khrushchev's messages and the writings of Khrushchev's hacks? So, perhaps, in 1937, Stalin did harm not to the people, but to the enemies of the people - as it was immediately announced? The people did not notice this evil, but the enemies of the people remembered him and could not forget him, just as they could not forgive Stalin ...

Just as strange is Sudoplatov's statement that he, already an experienced person in Moscow life, discovered only at the end of the 40s that the life of the Kremlin was full of intrigues. So, maybe they were not so extensive and ubiquitous, as Tsukanova told Sudoplatov? Moreover, she, perhaps, did not tell Sudoplatov anything like that ...

Let's look, however, at the statement about Stalin's constant shuffling of the leadership of the secret services of the USSR. Did it really take place? The same Viktor Abakumov was actually in one place from 1943 to 1951. Sergey Kruglov was actually in one place from 1943 to 1953. Ivan Maslennikov was Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR from 1948 to 1954. Vasily Ryzanov was Deputy People's Commissar and Deputy Minister of the Interior from 1946 to 1953. Ivan Serov was the first deputy minister of internal affairs of the USSR from 1947 to 1954. Nikolai Stakhanov was the head of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops from 1942 to 1952. Lavrenty Tsanava was People's Commissar Minister of the State Security of the Byelorussian SSR from 1943 to 1951. Vasily Chernyshev was Deputy People's Commissar of the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR from 1937 to 1952 (he died in 1952).

As you can see, at least in relation to their information

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whether Tsukanova, or Sudoplatov, or the political correctors of his memoirs was not entirely accurate. Or rather, not at all accurate.

But does this mean that there were no intrigues at all in the Soviet post-war leadership? For a correct answer to this question, one must have a correct idea of the collective appearance of this leadership, and first of all, look at who has been a part of it since 1945.

July 7, 1945 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V.

Stalin gives a dinner in the Kremlin "in honor of the Prime Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic, Marshal Choibalsan." From the Soviet side were present: V.M. Molotov, L.M. Kaganovich, L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, N.A. Voznesensky, N.A. Bulganin, and further: V.N. Merkulov, A.Ya. Vyshinsky, Lozovsky and others...

On July 13, 1945, Stalin gives a dinner "in honor of the Chairman of the Executive Yuan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Mr. Song Ziwen."

From the Soviet side were present: V.M. Molotov, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, N.A. Voznesensky, N.A. Bulganin, A.N. Kosygin and further: V.N. Merkulov, V.G. Dekanozov, Lozovsky and others...

On August 13, 1945, Stalin gives a dinner "in honor of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower."

From the Soviet side were present: V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, L.P. Beria, G.M. Malenkov, N.A. Voznesensky, Marshal G.K. Zhukov, Marshal S.M. Budyonny, N.A. Bulganin and further: A.Ya. Vyshinsky, B.L. Vannikov, A.I. Shakhurin, D.F. Ustinov, other marshals and generals...

It is already clear from here that the main post-war "clip" looked like this: Molotov (born 1890, in the party since 1906), Kaganovich (born 1893, in the party since 1906), Mikoyan (born 1895) b., in the party since 1915), Beria (b. 1899, in the party since 1917), Malenkov (b. 1901, in the party since 1920), Voznesensky (b. 1903) , in the party since 1919), Bulganin (born 1895, in the party since 1917) ...

Khrushchev (born 1894, in the party since 1918), absent from the "lunch clip" as and Zhdanov (born 1896, in the party since 1915).

But Khrushchev is in Kyiv, Zhdanov is in Leningrad, although both

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are full members of the Politburo (Beria and Malenkov will be approved as members of the PB only on March 18, 1946).

What united these people? And above all, Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, and even Mikoyan? The last group was united primarily by pre-revolutionary party experience. Their very young years, when the personality is formed, passed under the sign of a pure idea. When they joined the party, it did not mean privileges, but dangers, exiles, prisons, underground... Under such conditions, not intriguers, but professional revolutionaries grow up.

Beria, Malenkov, Zhdanov, Bulganin, Voznesensky came to the party also not in the "creamy" times, fertile for intrigues. However, Voznesensky and Malenkov (especially the latter) immediately "walked" along the apparatus line, having little to do with live management. And it was easier for them to acquire the skills of certain "games" in the apparatus than in the people's commissariat. I have already said that in Stalin's USSR a higher level of power meant, first of all, a higher responsibility and a greater workload. But above all, this is true for those who were engaged in such activities, the result of which was material. And here are the hardware...

The reader has probably already noticed that I did not say anything about Khrushchev, but he turned out to be a unique, completely special figure in the top leadership of the Stalinist USSR. Only he was a born intriguer and hypocrite, and therefore only he, of all his other colleagues at that time, can be defined as the systemic undertaker of Soviet power.

But in the 1940s, that was far from it. The country developed, won the war and entered the first rank of world powers. And the situation in all spheres began to change. Power increasingly became synonymous with goods and pleasures. Not exactly synonymous, but still...

In addition, after the war, the nature of the life of the closest Stalinist environment changed. No, the tension and the heavy load from this being did not disappear, but acquired a more calm, planned, so to speak, character. In addition, Stalin began to age.

When the work is over the top, there is no time for intrigue. The less work, the higher the likelihood of their occurrence. And therefore

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even in the immediate Stalinist environment, from the beginning of the 50s, *the germs* of intrigues began to appear, which developed after Stalin's death.

The first powerful reception for foreigners was arranged by Molotov at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of the Red Army on February 23, 1944. Beria, and most of Stalin's other associates, as well as Stalin himself, were then not in the mood for receptions. Beria - unlike the rest of the "lunch club" - was not even at a dinner given by Stalin on March 28, 1945 in honor of the President of Czechoslovakia Benes, first appearing at such an event only on April 11, 1945 - at a dinner in honor of Broz Tito. However, Beria was not a hunter before such actions; he kept in the background both in Yalta and in Potsdam.

And what about the rest of his colleagues in government? Back in 1944, it was hardly possible for all of them, who then wore military or paramilitary uniforms, to imagine an almost continuous series of ceremonial, official dinners in which they would participate. Dinners glittering with gold, crystal, drinks, delicacies, flowers, expensive suits, shoulder straps...

And now...

Now the position of not only the state was changing, but also those who led it. And also - **and the position** of those who **surrounded the leadership of the state!** This position became less and less responsible and more and more comfortable - especially for those who ensured the transmission of instructions, and not their execution.

The entourage plays the king... And who "played" now the Great Soviet Power? Is it not the same environment that in official reports of visits and receptions was called "... and the persons accompanying them"; "... as well as scientists, writers, artists, representatives of the Soviet press"; "...responsible employees of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of Defense"; "...and others"? Not to mention "and other responsible employees" of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks - the CPSU and the Council of People's Commissars - the Council of Ministers of the USSR ...

But there were also national Central Committees and Councils of People's Commissars,

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ministries and their apparatuses, mutually connected with the central apparatuses!

This environment, even in modest pre-war times, dressed in khaki paramilitary tunics, had in its ranks those who - neglecting the danger of any repression - managed to intrigue and "spin" in order to "live". After all, the psychology of the embezzler is tenacious at all times, and Louis XV, one of the highest-ranking embezzlers of all times and all peoples, accurately formulated it: "After us, even a flood!"

Isn't it in this environment, especially since the second half of the 1940s, that intrigues really began to become a feature of its existence and a guarantee of its survival?

And this environment began to have an additional corrupting, demoralizing effect on its higher "bosses". And the less the "responsible employee" was responsible for a specific work, the more he developed the desire to hide behind the "party spirit".

imitate

activity,

Not without reason, on March 28, 1947, at the initiative of Stalin, the Politburo approved the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On courts of honor in the ministries of the USSR and central departments." The courts of honor were entrusted with: "consideration of anti-patriotic, anti-state and anti-social acts and actions committed by leading, operation

employees of ministries of the USSR and central departments, if these acts and actions are not subject to criminal punishment ... "

From April to October 1947, courts of honor were formed in 82 ministries and central departments. In September 1947, a court of honor was created in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and in April 1948 - in the apparatus of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. These courts could issue a public censure, a public reprimand, or refer the case to the investigating authorities for referral to a criminal court.

But Stalin's plan was "quietly" "lowered on the brakes" everywhere, although several trials under Stalin's control did take place. Did the courts of honor need those who either never had it, or were preparing to exchange it profitably for a satisfying life with high authorities, etc.? Not without reason in the lane

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the first years of Khrushchev's "leadership" forgot about these ships firmly and forever.

In all its vile power, another factor arose. Diplomat, intelligence officer and political scientist George Kennan, a man who understood far from everything in Soviet Russia, but understood something by the 70s of the XX century, then suddenly became worried about the fate of the USSR, without which Kennan prophetically could not imagine a stable world. And he considered one of the factors of decay "lack of purpose in life in children elite."

I have already written about the son of Commissar Shakhurin. And now I will give another illustration of how dubious fathers gave birth to absolutely worthless sons. In Soviet history, the names of two Troyanovskys are known - father Alexander and son Oleg. Father, born in the family of an officer in 1882 and an officer himself, joined the RSDLP (b) in 1904, was exiled to Siberia in 1909, fled, since 1914 was a Menshevik-defensist, returned to Russia in 1917, in 1923 In the year he joined the RCP (b) and, being in various, mainly diplomatic, positions, he lived until 1955, having died at the age of 73.

His son was born in 1919, became a well-known diplomat, and in 1997 published a memoir, very accurately titled "The Story of a Family." For the "diplomat" Oleg Troyanovsky, the son of the "less" - "Bolshevik" Alexander Troyanovsky, nothing has changed after 1991, or rather, people like Troyanovsky-son *pretend* that nothing has changed. Well, just think, there was a "tyrant" Stalin, then there was a "voluntarist" Khrushchev, a "stagnant" Brezhnev, there were incomprehensible Andropov, Chernenko ... Well, then, after Gorbachev, everything got a little confused, here came Yeltsin ... Not very, of course, everything is fine, but Moscow is still in place, and as before, it is the capital of their homeland (with a small letter) ...

And in place of their capital apartments, and "Russian diplomacy" functions, and even memoirs are published - like all decent ones.

Personally, this kind of audience disgusts me. They lived their lives in the country, not serving it, but being only highly (and not talented!) Paid employees. The concept of an idea has not existed for them since their youth. Not without reason in the famous IFLI (Moscow Institute

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philosophy, literature and history), of which Troyanovsky-son became a student, it was customary on the way to the pre-war May Day demonstrations in a certain place to shout: "Long live Boris Leonidovich Pasternak!"

Not Aristotle and Democritus or Hegel - among philosophers ... Not Pushkin and Mayakovsky or Heine - among poets ... Not Karamzin and Klyuchevsky, or at least Academician Tarle - among historians, but a poet of chaotic talent who has lived on the sidelines of history all his life. .. A cheap front in the center of the emerging great power from its future supposedly intellectual supposedly elite ... This is after all

indicative, my dear reader!

Just as it is significant that, talking about Stalin, the buttons from whose shabby tunic are not worth the father and son of Troyan, taken together, the son did not find anything better than to say that for him, de Stalin is not a devil and not an angel, but simply a politician from among those standing at the very top of the political pyramid, and to quote (Troyanovsky-son thought that it was in place) Harry Truman's letter to his daughter, where this ordinary US politician arrogantly ranted: "To be a good president, you need to combine the qualities Machiavelli, the French king Louis XI, Caesar Borgia and Talleyrand, to be a liar, a traitor, a crafty churchman (Richelieu), a hero and

still unknown by whom.

If Oleg Troyanovsky, in response to such a statement, heard that Stalin was a Bolshevik-Leninist, who lived all his life with the idea of a great and powerful Russia for free, developed and educated (and therefore free) people, then the father's "diplomat" son would be "diplomat" would shrug his shoulders. After all, if not for dad, then for the son - for sure, it was, after all, an empty sound. They lived, as befits "civilized people", ultimately as a family.

These "fathers and sons" arose in the country not as a result of Stalin's power, but contrary to it and its spirit, for it was the spirit of creativity and creation, and they lived in the spirit of consumption and serving for a tasty morsel.

According to the Foreign Ministry of the forties, there was a legend about how a certain "serving" there (these always do not work, but "serve

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zhat"), the head of the economic department, who had four or five children, in response to the irritated remark of the First Deputy Minister Vyshinsky: "You don't know how to do anything except children," he "boldly" answered: "But you don't do it the best So, Andrey Yanuarievich, that's why you're angry.

The "dared man" was the father of the future president of the Central Bank of the Yeltsin "Russian" Gerashchenko ... As you can see, Gerashchenko's dad did not manage to make good children either.

But they knew how to get settled. The reader should remember how they knew how to get along, according to the description of the apartment of Professor Vinogradov - one of the "pestologists". And they really were pests! As well as intriguers...

IF you get acquainted with the history of the USSR at the turn of the 40-50s according to the works of many current "researchers", then the key words for this period will not be "restored Dneproges, Stalingrad, Sevastopol", "Berkut system", "BESM", "RDS -1" and "RDS-6s", and "doctors' case", "Leningrad case", "Mikhoels case", etc.

I will not go into the study of this second series - Beria had nothing to do with these "cases", giving half of his time to the well-known reader "cases Nos. 1, 2 and 3", and the second half to the management of the national economy. But I will cite one curious fact, when the activities of the curator of the Atomic Project L.P. Beria intersected with the "activities" of one of the future "heroes" of the "doctors' case" Professor Yegorov.

At the end of 1947, Makhnev wrote to Beria:

"The head of the Lechsanupra of the Kremlin, comrade Egorov, said that, by decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the contingent served by the Kremlin polyclinic is being reduced.

At your request, several scientists were attached to the Kremlin polyclinic, for whom, due to the specifics of their working conditions, more qualified medical care was required.

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As Comrade Yegorov said, these scientists are subject to detachment from the Kremlin polyclinics.

Academician Sobolev L.S. already received notice of withdrawal.

Scientists ask that they and their families retain the right to use Kremlin clinic.

The list of scientists is attached.

December 26, 1947 V. Makhnev.

Judging by the decision of the Central Committee, Yegorov "specially served" so many bureaucratic riffraff that they had to reduce their number. And on whom did the head of the Kremlin Medical and Sanitary Administration decide to save money?

Here is the list attached by Makhnev to the letter:

1. Kurchatov I.V., Academician
2. Sobolev S.L. - "-
3. Alikhanov A.I. - "-
4. Semenov N.N. - "-
5. Khlopin V.G. - "-
6. Kikoin I.K. member -kor. USSR Academy of Sciences
7. Khariton Yu.B. - "-
8. Artsimovich L.A. - "-
9. Aleksandrov A.P. - "-

This was the scientific "head" of the Atomic Project, the significance of which lay not only in its purely intellectual potential, but also in the fact that these people carried out interaction, knew the connections between individual parts of the work, etc. Their health, their strength at that moment no longer belonged to them - their health was a national value of particular importance.

Scientists were attached to the "Kremlin" at the request of Beria. This was, by the way, a characteristic manifestation of the LP's concern for those who, according to the slanderers, "needed it", but in fact - about those who were needed by the country. But Egorov unfastened them, and this, taking into account the time and the fact that Egorov was aware of the significance of the work of scientists, can be regarded as real sabotage. And already in the light of the above document, the accusations against doctors like Egorov and Vinogradov look very convincing.

Beria reacted on the same day, attaching to the letter

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Makhnev, a typewritten note to Stalin's secretary Poskrebyshchev:

"Tov. Poskrebyshchev A.N. I ask that the scientists listed on the list retain the right to use the Kremlin polyclinic. A. Beria. December 26, 1947 G."

Here everything was safely settled in real time, but something else happened.

How Zhdanov was "treated" the reader knows. And here is how Kalinin was "treated"... Kalinin's attending physician from January 1940 to June 1942, S.E. Karpay. With fright, not because her teeth were knocked out in the MGB, but because the charge of killing Kalinin was first brought against her, and she, "washing herself", reported amusing facts.

In June 1942, Karpay proposed a thorough examination of Kalinin, who complained of pain in the intestines. And then the chief therapist of Lechsanupra Professor Vinogradov: 1) limited himself to the appointment of an enema, diet and drug treatment; 2) *replaced Kalinin as the attending physician.*

Only on June 10, 1944, Professor A.D. Ochkin performed an operation on Kalinin, which revealed stomach cancer in a very advanced state. Ochkin tried his best, but only delayed the inevitable - in June 1946, Kalinin died.

After the arrests, the leadership of Lechsanupra was also accused of "healing" the 44-year-old secretary of the Central Committee, Alexander Shcherbakov. And this is very similar to the truth. Especially when you consider how Khrushchev already denigrated Shcherbakov in his "memoirs", also dragging Beria here, they say, "Beria ... said that Shcherbakov died because he drank terribly" ... No, perhaps Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov died because he interfered with the realization of the desires of the partocracy and the elite to ensure their comfortable existence. And further confirmation of this - "Leningrad business".

THIS concept combines several trials of 1950 on the cases of the former first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee A.A. Kuznetsova, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR N.A. Voznesensky, former

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Chairman of the Leningrad City Council and First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee P.S. Popkov, the former Presovmin of the RSFSR M.I. Rodionov and others. In total, up to one and a half thousand party, Soviet, trade union and Komsomol workers of Leningrad and the region fell into the orbit of these "cases".

"Democratic" sources indicate a figure even up to 2 thousand, but the real figures available in the note of the Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov and his deputy Serov addressed to Khrushchev dated December 10, 1953, are as follows: 23 people were sentenced to death by the Military Collegium, 85 people to death. terms from 5 to 25 years, and 105 people were deported for a period of 5 to 8 years. Of the total number of convicts, 36 people worked in the Leningrad regional committee and city committee, as well as in the regional executive committee and the Leningrad City Council, 11 people worked in other regional committees and regional executive committees, and 9 people worked in the district committees and district executive committees of the Leningrad Region.

Basically, the "repressions" were limited to release from work.

Beria had nothing to do with these cases, even though at the 20th Congress Khrushchev accused him of organizing these cases, although Beria could not influence the MGB, led by Abakumov, in this regard. But in 1956 it was possible to put into circulation any anti-Beria "fools" at the highest level than Khrushchev

and was doing.

Nevertheless, it is impossible not to say about the "Leningrad case" ... Kuznetsov, Voznesensky, Popkov, Rodionov were charged, among other things, with the intention to separate the RSFSR from the USSR, making Leningrad the capital of the new state. Without going into an analysis, I will simply say that, according to my ideas, formal accusations and actual guilt here did not always coincide in content, but in no way - not in severity, because Stalin and Stalin's cause, that is, the cause of Soviet power, and therefore The Soviet Union, convicted in the "Leningrad case" was changed.

They changed it by the fact that they gradually moved from Stalin's party to the party of partocrats. No wonder the "Leningraders" did not appear in the first rehabilitation "cage" after Stalin's death, and the question of their "rehabilitation" arose later, when Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites strengthened themselves.

Born in 1905, Kuznetsov was already completely

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formed in Soviet times, when at the age of 19 he went along the Komsomol-party apparatus path. That's who was the pure "apparatchik", so this is Kuznetsov. Malenkov almost graduated from the Moscow Higher Technical School, in the Civil Army he was the commissar of a squadron, a regiment ... Zhdanov served in the old army, fought in the Civil Army, was the commissar of agriculture of the county Council, editor of the regional newspaper. And Kuznetsov, as he became secretary of the Orekhov Volost Committee of the Komsomol in 1924, he "secretary" until his arrest as secretary of the Central Committee.

He, like Nikolai Voznesensky, is portrayed as the largest and most innocent victim of the "late Stalinist terror", but both of them had a dark nature and a dark fate of people who greatly overestimate themselves. Psychologically, I would have brought them closer to General Gordov - they were also sure that they would have done everything better than Stalin. And at the same time, they thought not about how they would serve the country after Stalin left, but about how they would *rule it*. Not to serve her interests, but to rule, satisfying her ambitions.

Here is Voznesensky's assessment given by one of his colleagues: "Voznesensky was not respected by many members of the Politburo because he was boastful, rude, treated subordinate people in a boorish way ... "

This is from a transcript of a speech by Nikita Khrushchev at a meeting of the activists of the Leningrad party organization on May 7, 1957. Khrushchev, however, made a reservation that he was convinced that in spite of everything "Voznesensky was an honest and intelligent, but wayward man ..." If Khrushchev could not make a reservation - after all, he made a report just about the "Leningrad case", exposing it as the result of the activities of the "Beria gang", although Beria had nothing to do with this case. But the fact that even in such a situation even Khrushchev could not restrain himself, speaking of the "unfortunate" Voznesensky, shows the appearance of the latter quite definitely.

Without dwelling on the "Leningrad case" in detail, I will give a few interesting, in my opinion, details. And I will do this because Beria is credited with the initiative to revise, after Stalin's death, both the "case of doctors" and the "Leningrad case", which I doubt.

So, the promised details...

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In 1946, a commission of the Central Committee, chaired by **Alexei Kuznetsov**, examined the activities of the USSR Ministry of State Security and Minister Merkulov, ridiculously accusing him of having stopped the persecution of Trotskyists during the war. Merkulov was removed from his post, and he was perhaps a more suitable figure for the MGB than Abakumov, who replaced him.

More... Until the spring of 1947, Professor Egorov was the chief physician of **the Leningrad** Military District, and became the chief physician of the Kremlin Medical and Sanitary Administration on the recommendation of **Alexei Kuznetsov**.

In the summer of 1947, director and founder of the Foreign Literature Publishing House B.L. Suchkov. In 1955, Suchkov was released, but I am inclined to believe that he was not tried in an empty place. Suchkov was well acquainted with many physicists, in particular, with M. Leontovich, who could well blurt something out to Suchkov, but he, due to the inability of the intelligentsia to keep his mouth shut, could blurt something out to acquaintances from among the Americans.

A certain supposedly illegitimate "son of Stalin" (or maybe, at the same time, the son of Lieutenant Schmidt) K.S. Kuzakov, in Argumenty i Fakty, No. 39 of September 1995, argued that the real reason for Suchkov's arrest was the "fight under the rug" between Beria and Zhdanov, but there was nothing for LP to do then, except to intrigue some Suchkov to build. However, the arrest of Suchkov, who was patronized by Zhdanov, is interesting in that it caused the activity of **Alexei Kuznetsov**. On September 23, 1947, the Politburo decided to create a "court of honor" in the Central Committee, and on September 23 On September 24, at the suggestion of **Aleksey Kuznetsov**, the former deputy head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee appeared before this court ... K.S. Kuzakov and ... head of the personnel department of the press of the personnel department of the Central Committee ... M.I. Shcherbakov. They were given a "public reprimand" and both were expelled from the party. It was a blow to both Zhdanov and Malenkov. A blow from the side, including **Alexei Kuznetsov**.

Yes, intrigues in the top leadership began in the late 40s, but without

Beria's involvement. And while he was dealing with atomic, missile and general economic problems, in

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the top leadership was really forming an apparatus intrigue, the formal first figures of which were then, most likely, apparatchiks Zhdanov, Malenkov and Kuznetsov, as well as the "business executive" Voznesensky.

And now, from general discussions, I will move on to that most amazing fact about Voznesensky, chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, which I promised the reader to tell the reader a long time ago.

First, however, a little chronology ...

On March 1, 1949, the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed by Beria, Malenkov, Voznesensky (he had to sign willy-nilly), Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Saburov, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kosygin and Malyshev, sent Stalin a report on the results of consideration of a note by the USSR Gosplan on the plan for the production of industrial products for the first quarter of 1949. The author of the note was M.T. Pomaznev, then - First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Gosplan Kaganovich. Both Pomaznev's note and the report of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers thoroughly and substantively (with numerical analysis) proved that the State Planning Committee of the USSR was working, to put it mildly, weakly and incompetently.

As a result, on March 5, 1949, the Politburo adopted a resolution approving the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers "On the State Planning Committee of the USSR." The main personnel moment was the release of Voznesensky from the duties of chairman of the State Planning Commission and the appointment of Saburov in his place.

On March 7, the Politburo "satisfied" Voznesensky's request "to grant him a month's leave for treatment in Barvikha." But the "vacation" dragged on... On July 4, the secretary of the Central Committee, Suslov, devotes a third of the report on the errors of the editorial board of the Bolshevik magazine (the main theoretical organ of the Central Committee) to criticizing the laudatory reviews of Voznesensky's book "The Military Economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War", and on August 17, Voznesensky appeals to Stalin "with a great request" - "to give ... work that you find possible" ... "It is very difficult to be away from the work of the party and comrades," complained the former deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

However, on August 22, 1949, the authorized Central Committee for personnel in the State Planning Committee of the USSR E.E. Andreev sends a note to the Secretary of the Central Committee Ponomarenko. And this is where the chronology ends.

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etsya, and almost almost fantastic, but documented crime begins. Andreev reported:

"The Gosplan of the USSR concentrates a large number of documents containing secret and top secret information of national importance, but the safety of documents is provided unsatisfactorily ...

The lack of proper order in handling documents led to the fact that 55 secret and top secret documents disappeared from the USSR State Planning Committee in 1944, 76 in 1945, 61 in 1946, 23 in 1947 and in 1948 - 21, and in just 5 years, 236 secret and top secret documents are missing ... "etc. — on seven sheets of typewritten text.

I will give the names of only some of the documents mentioned by Andreev and "lost" by Voznesensky's subordinates:

State plan for the restoration and development of the national economy for 1945, on 209 sheets;

about the purchase in the USA for cash of equipment not supplied by the Americans, on 15 pages;

on the organization of production of radar stations, on 6 sheets;

certificate of demand for Donetsk, Kuznetsk and Chelyabinsk coal for individual grades and grades for 1947 according to Minaviaprom, on 1 sheet;
certificate of fuel oil reserves in the state reserve, on 1 sheet, etc.

And where these "lost" documents went, no one in the State Planning Committee could say. The fact, I repeat, is amazing, for anyone who knows firsthand what work "with secrets" is, implausible, but ...

But it's a fact!

And these data are absolutely reliable, because they are taken from the collection of documents "The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 1945-1953", published by the publishing house "ROSSPEN"

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with a circulation of one and a half thousand copies in 2002, founded by Franko Venturi series "Documents of Soviet History" (Chairman of the Scientific Series Michael Confino, managing editors Andrea Graziosi and O.V. Khlevnyuk). Wouldn't such a representative group of anti-Sovietists falsify the documents of Soviet history in order to confirm the accusations against the "victims" of Stalin, would they?

Voznesensky's wordy excuses, which he sent to Stalin on September 1, 1949, make a pitiful impression and by no means paint us the figure of an outstanding statesman.

Returning to the chronology, I will inform you that September 11

In 1949, the Politburo approved the proposals of the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the issue "On the numerous facts of the disappearance of secret documents in the State Planning Committee of the USSR."

The CPC recommended:

"1. For violation of Soviet laws on the protection of state secrets and the creation of a corrupting environment in the apparatus of the State Planning Committee of the USSR of connivance to the perpetrators of the loss of secret documents Voznesensky N.A. to exclude from the composition of the members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).
2. In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 9, 1947, and in view of the particular seriousness of violations of the law in the State Planning Committee of the USSR, to bring Voznesensky to trial as the main culprit of these violations, and also ... "
and then the names of a number of high-ranking "Gosplanovites" Panov, Kuptsov, Oreshkin and Belous were listed ...

This is what Voznesensky and his former friends were arrested for in October 1949. employees, and already shot in October

In 1950 he was, as I understand it, not only for this. For a year of investigation there was much more to discover...

For those who doubt my last assumption, I can recommend reading in the above-mentioned collection of ROSSPEN a detailed note by E.E. Andreev on the verification and replacement of personnel in the USSR State Planning Committee (pp. 301-305). This is not only honest

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ny, but also a smart document, issued from the pen of an unconditionally competent worker. And the picture of the situation in the State Planning Commission of the Voznesensky model is given there not only gloomy in business terms, but also politically very dubious.

Now I will sum up some results, stating - as "information for reflection" - a version of the events of 1945-1950, for a complete study of which separate efforts must be made.

Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov was a Russian man and, despite his "apparatus" origin and position in the apparatus, was not an apparatchik. He had an excellent memory, but at the same time he was able to analyze and then **make decisions**, which was the danger of partocracy. In 1925-1930

Shcherbakov worked under the leadership of Zhdanov in the Nizhny Novgorod regional committee, then at one time - the second secretary of the Leningrad regional committee. They used to consider him a "young" frame, but this is an erroneous impression - he was simply *killed young*, and so he was only two years younger than Beria.

Zhdanov was married to Shcherbakov's sister, so they were their own people in every way. Various "researchers" write about the confrontation between A. Shcherbakov and A. Zhdanov, but this looks like overexposure, designed to play the role of a smoke screen. It looks like this to me...

Alexander Shcherbakov - as the most consistent representative of Stalin's party in the field of ideology and culture - was removed by some growing dark forces in 1945. Andrei Zhdanov interfered with the same forces and was removed by them in 1948.

In the future, the reborn elite relied on the Kuznetsov tandem—Voznesensky, however, Abakumov and through him Stalin became aware of the fuss around this plan, the result of which was the "Leningrad case".

When the calculation on Kuznetsov and Voznesensky turned out to be beaten, the search for a new option began. Actually, one could count on a narrow circle: Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Khrushchev (since December 1949 secretary of the Central Committee and first secretary of the Moscow city committee) ...

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All of them could be in one way or another, in one way or another use "in the dark".

Beria was excluded immediately - he was a quick and sharp mind, and he would have considered the goals of the "well-wishers" at once, with all the ensuing consequences for them consequences.

Kaganovich was an emotional and rather open person, he was not suitable for the role of the main figure of intrigue, like Molotov. In addition, both of them were completely devoted to the cause of Soviet power and therefore had no inclination to dark intrigues.

Mikoyan was so cautious that he could only be counted on as to support the winner.

The figure of Bulganin could not seduce anyone either. There were Malenkov and Khrushchev. The first was not stupid, not without ambition, but inert. The second was not far off, but cunning and vile.

Here on Khrushchev, I think everything came together. He was a convenient figure for the manipulation of both the intra-union and the world "behind the scenes". It was suitable both for all those who by the beginning of the 1950s formed a "party" of partocrats, and for the external enemies of Russia, who had already introduced point (so far) agents of influence into the apparatus and into the capital's elite. It was decided to bet on him - in the future!

Moreover, in the future - after Stalin's death, one way or another, it was necessary to quickly remove Beria, too, because after the removal of Stalin, he turned out to be the main personal guarantor of the further development and strengthening of the USSR.

That is, already a year in 1950, the future confrontation between Khrushchev and Beria was objectively outlined. But even in 1951, in 1952, 1953 and subsequent years, Khrushchev, as I imagine it, had no idea about such a choice "behind the scenes". I think he went down into the coffin, not realizing that *he* was rammed into the fate of his homeland.

I will return to the TOPIC of intrigues, but now I will remind the reader that, in addition to dark intrigues, creative processes were developing in the country at that time, new generations were growing up. And at

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the right line in the life of society in this generation of post-war enthusiasts

there were great prospects!

Much, much effort was made "to present Stalin's socialism as fundamentally barracks, as a System that was allegedly held together by Terror and Fear. But the harshness was determined by the situation. And it was Stalin who was always the main ideologist and practitioner of democratization in the country.

Here is a shabby book in front of me ... "V.A. Karpinsky. The Constitution of the USSR. Textbook for the 7th grade of high school. Fourth edition, revised. Moscow, Uchpedgiz. Signed for publication on June 3, 1953, with a circulation of 2,000,000 copies, that is, two million. Let's turn to page 156 and read:

"The Constitution provided Soviet citizens with the inviolability of the person and home. Secrecy of correspondence (Articles 127, 128). No one in the Soviet Union can be arrested without a court order or a prosecutor's permission. Representatives of state power may enter a citizen's dwelling without his consent only in cases specified in the law..."

Will a political system oriented towards arbitrariness and lawlessness take care that in a normative way, teaching this **as a subject in a public school**, instill such thoughts in young minds?

Is it really possible for someone to answer this question with a "yes"?

But I know in advance - it will turn. A "democratized" "intellectual" even if he has a stake on his head, he will be convinced that he "was a slave for seventy years", even if he is no more than sixty years old.

Well, here's another quote...

"It is necessary ... to achieve such a cultural growth of society that would ensure to all members of society the comprehensive development of their physical and mental abilities, so that members of society have the opportunity to receive an education sufficient to become active agents of social development, so that they can freely choose profession, and

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not be chained for life, by virtue of the existing division of labor, to any one profession.

What is required for this?

It would be wrong to think that such a serious cultural growth of the members of society can be achieved without serious changes in the present state of work. To do this, it is necessary first of all to reduce the working day to at least 6, and then to 5 hours. This is to ensure that members of the society have enough free time to receive a comprehensive education. To this end, it is necessary, further, to introduce compulsory polytechnic education... To this end, it is necessary, further, to radically improve housing conditions and raise the real wages of workers and employees at least twice, if not more, both through a direct increase in money wages, and, especially, by further systematic reduction in prices for consumer goods.

These are the basic conditions for preparing the transition to communism..."

Will the tyrant strive to ensure that the masses are fully educated? Educated in such a way that the very concept of the elite disappears, because each member of society is comprehensively developed and, having united with other comprehensively developed individuals, will no longer allow anyone to pose as "quintessence", "cream of society", "servants of the people", "salt of the earth" and so on.

But this is Stalin - "The Economic Problems of Socialism" ...

1952

This is what Stalin came with this year to that 19th party congress, which became its first post-war congress and the last congress that the party convened.

Bolsheviks. Moreover, in such a vision of the promising social development of Russia and mankind, the politician Stalin was one with the physicist Einstein. I

Let me remind the reader of the conclusion of the latter:

"The economic anarchy of the capitalist system is the true root of evil ... I am convinced that there is only one way to combat this grave evil -

social introduction
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list economy **together with the education system**

(highlighted by me. - S.K.), aimed at the benefit of society ... "

XIX CONGRESS OF THE AUCP(b) was held in Moscow from 5 to 14 October 1952. Malenkov made a report. According to the report of the chairman of the State Planning Commission, Saburov, the congress adopted directives on the fifth five-year plan for the development of the USSR for 1951-1955. Khrushchev made a report on changes in the Charter of the CPSU(b). Beria also spoke at the congress.

Stalin delivered his closing remarks on 14 October.

At the congress, a commission was formed to revise the party program, consisting of: I.V. Stalin - Chairman, L.P. Beria, L.M. Kaganovich, O.V. Kuusinen, G.M. Malenkov, V.M. Molotov, P.N. Pospelov, A.M. Rumyantsev, M.Z. Saburov, D.I. Chesnokov, P.F. Yudin.

The presence of Beria in the commission and the absence of Khrushchev in it is suggestive in itself, as is the presence of Molotov in the absence of Mikoyan. But the most important were the personnel results of the congress, which began as the Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and ended as the Congress of the CPSU. Then they thought that the party was only renamed, but it turned out that it was actually buried at this congress. The next, the 20th congress, was no longer a congress of communists of the Leninist-Stalinist formation, but the first congress of the triumphant partocracy.

On October 16, 1952, the Plenum of the Central Committee elected instead of the Politburo the Presidium of the Central Committee in such an unprecedentedly large composition: V.M. Andrianov, A.B. Aristov, L.P. Beria, N.A. Bulganin, K.E. Voroshilov, S.D. Ignatiev, L.M. Kaganovich, D.S. Korotchenko, V.V. Kuznetsov, O.V. Kuusinen, G.M. Malenkov, V.A. Malyshev, L.G. Melnikov, A.I. Mikoyan, N.A. Mikhailov, V.M. Molotov, M.G. Pervukhin, P.K. Ponomarenko, M.Z. Saburov, I.V. Stalin, M.A. Suslov, N.S. Khrushchev, D.I. Chesnokov, N.M. Shvernik, M.F. Shkiryatov.

Candidates for members of the Presidium were: L.I. Brezhnev, A.Ya. Vyshinsky, A.G. Zverev, N.G. Ignatov, I.G. Kabanov, A.N. Kosygin, N.S. Patolichev, N.M. Pegov, A.M. Puzanov, I.T. Tevosyan, P.F. Yudin.

Together with the candidate members, **the Presidium of the Central Committee was expanded**

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ren up to 36 people, and Stalin proposed such a composition, and there were many young cadres in it (say, D.I. Chesnokov). At the same time, at the suggestion of Stalin, an extra-statutory Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU was created to quickly resolve issues: Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Stalin and Khrushchev.

A study of the composition of the Bureau shows that such major figures as Molotov and Mikoyan were absent from it. Stalin seriously criticized them at the October 16 plenum, and criticized them for their deeds (which, however, by no means meant for them - as the "democratic" "researchers" falsely claim - some kind of complete fall and repression).

What mattered most for the future was that the plenum also formed a "leading five": Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov, Stalin, Khrushchev. Beria was in first place here, Khrushchev in last. But this was explained only by the order of the letters of the alphabet with which their names began.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee looked like this: Aristov, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Malenkov,

Mikhailov, Pegov, Ponomarenko, Stalin, Suslov, Khrushchev.

The General Secretary was not elected. Moreover, Stalin expressed a desire to leave the secretaries of the Central Committee, but no one agreed to this. Such a move by Stalin is presented by "researchers" as a Jesuit "test of loyalty" of his comrades-in-arms on his part, but Stalin could not help but understand in advance that no one would support him in such a desire. After all, at that moment no one objectively could be a full-fledged alternative replacement for Stalin. Even Beria!

Rather, Stalin, by such a statement, intended to increase the chances of accepting another of his proposals, which printed sources do not report - on the resignation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Yes, there is evidence that Stalin wanted to resign from the duties of the Presovmin, and even a certain vote was held, but Beria's candidacy was not considered, but the very unexpected candidacy of Ponomarenko was considered. But, one way or another, Stalin remained the head of the Council of Ministers. And he had a little more than four months to live.

Dear reader! My book is voluminous, but the era

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described in it is immeasurably more voluminous. But how scantily it has been studied, and how rarely it is examined in good faith... Here Nikolai Zenkovich "analyzes" the last months of 1952 and the first months of 1953 and declares that many still call Beria the murderer of Stalin. And then he doesn't refer to anyone: to Avtorkhanov, to Svetlana Alliluyeva, to the "arguments" of V.F. Alliluyev, with a nod in the direction of Beria, who claims that it was worth de Stalin to praise someone, and that de "somewhere" disappeared, because Beria allegedly did not tolerate "competitors".

Not Moscow, but some kind of Sicily!

At the same time, the "accuser" asks: where are Voznesensky, Kosarev, Kuznetsov, what about Zhdanov, Ordzhonikidze?

What, Zenkovich doesn't know that Beria has nothing to do with it? Zenkovich is already in another place, he directly reports that Khrushchev killed Stalin, but this is in another place. As for the rest allegedly killed by Beria ...

Ordzhonikidze committed suicide (he was seriously confused and confusing a lot) February 18, 1937 ... Beria was still in Tbilisi.

Kosarev was arrested on November 29, 1938. Beria was not yet a people's commissar, although Yezhov had already been removed from leadership. But how could the main Komsomol member of the USSR interfere with Beria? Kosarev was shot in February 1939 by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. He was rehabilitated "in party order" by the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU on April 27, 1989, that is, he was not actually rehabilitated.

Zhdanov was killed by the doctors of the "Kremlevka" when Beria did not led the intelligence agencies.

Voznesensky and Kuznetsov?

Well, here is a direct quote from Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 2 for 1989:

"Inflating the case about the illegality of holding the All-Russian Wholesale Fair (which was nevertheless held illegally. - S.K.), G.M. Malenkov also used other pretexts to discredit the Leningrad leaders <...>

February 21, 1949 Malenkov with a group of workers went to Leningrad to holding a bureau and a joint

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plenum of the regional and city committees of the party... at which... declared that there was an anti-party group in Leningrad <...>.

March 13, 1949 in Moscow, in the office of G.M. Malenkov... were arrested A.A. Kuznetsov, P.S. Popkov, M.I. Rodionov, P.G. Lazutin, N.V. Solovyov.

At the same time, preparations began ... in relation to N.A. Voznesensky. For these purposes, a note was used by the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Gosplan M.T. Pomaznev about the underestimation of the industrial production plan by the State Planning Committee by I quarter of 1949 <...>

In order to obtain ... testimony ... Malenkov personally supervised the course of the investigation and took direct part in the interrogations ... "

Why is Beria here?

But on such "accusations" the whole image of the "monster" of Beria is built. Built from the time of Musavatist Baku to the day of the arrest of Lavrenty Pavlovich.

And the image of the "tyrant" of Stalin is built just as falsely, in the creation of which, alas, Sergo Beria, and possibly the political correctors of his "memories", contributed. Sergo Lavrentievich claimed that Stalin intended to replace all old comrades-in-arms with new people, removing Molotov, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Beria in order to go down in history as a pure man who won the war and created a state.

I cite this opinion only because it echoes the statement of K. Zalesky that if, they say, Stalin had managed to complete the "shake-up" of the nomenklatura, then the "Khrushchev era" would not have existed at all, and in this case people would have come to power "Brezhnev era", which received power in October 1964. I cannot dismiss this thesis as completely untenable, in the sense that renewal was possible, albeit without the "bloodbaths". Stalin, at the plenum of the Central Committee in October 1952, spoke directly about the need to nominate young people, especially to the posts of deputy chairman of the council of ministers and ministers. He remarked that the work of a minister is "a peasant's work," and one must have good health for it. He expressed such thoughts on October 20, 1952 at a meeting in his Kremlin office.

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If Stalin - let's imagine this for a moment - had planned some kind of "bloodletting", he would not have said so in the presence of the "old guard". But if he himself spoke of something like resignation, meaning himself, then the reshuffle was clearly planned. Moreover, Stalin, in full accordance with his vision of the development of Soviet society, intended to concentrate the entire "Areopagus" in the leadership of the CPSU for ideological influence on society, and transfer economic management to the young forces. But - under the guidance of experienced business executives.

One bad thing - Stalin, apparently, did not see Beria as an experienced leader of young economic cadres. And they could only be Beria. And if this option were realized, the further development of the country would follow the path of the all-round development of socialism and socialist democracy.

After that, one should not be surprised that Stalin had less than eight weeks.

IN THE MEAN, "atomic" affairs went on as usual. Only in the period from January 8 to 12, 1953, five extensive resolutions and orders of the Council of Ministers were adopted on various issues: on the separation of the LIPAN Hydrotechnical Laboratory into a separate laboratory; on the organization in 1953 of revision and search work for uranium in the Hungarian People's Republic, etc.

These documents are published in the "Materials of the Atomic Project of the USSR" according to copies certified by the protocol part of the Administrative Department of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Stalin's signature entered in all documents is missing, although this does not mean that he did not sign the first copies.

On February 15, 1953, Mekhlis was buried, who had been seriously ill for a long time and died on February 13. The urn with the ashes was embedded in the Kremlin wall. Stalin was not at the ceremony, just as Beria and Malenkov were not. However, February 17

Stalin received the Indian ambassador K. Menon and had a long talk with him. According to Menon, Stalin, despite being seventy-three years old, looked perfectly healthy. man.

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However, alas, he was no longer such - if on February 6, 1953, under the quite ordinary order of the Council of Ministers on the operation mode of plant No. 4 of plant No. work on the "MP" facility (RFT research reactor) was signed on February 14, 1953 by L. Beria, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

And here we come to another reliable, but extremely mysterious - if you do not make certain assumptions - a fact! As follows from the book of the 5th volume II of the "Documents of the Atomic Project of the USSR" (text - p. 505, facsimile - 506), on January 28, 1953, a document of surprising and unusual content was printed on the letterhead of the Central Committee of the CPSU of the strictest (nowhere above!)

exactly:

"No. BP7/217

Tt. Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin
28.1.1953

Extract from the protocol No. 7 of the meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of January 26, 1953

G.

214 – The question of monitoring special work.

Instruct the troika as part of TT. Beria (chairman), Malenkova, Bulganina management of the work of special bodies on special cases.

BUREAU OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CC CPSU.

How to understand this document, I can only guess. But I can guess!

All defense work went according to plan, and to strengthen their leadership (and even by whom - Malenkov and Bulganin!) There was no need.

However, I draw the reader's attention to the fact that this special "Troika" was a variant of the "leading five" (Beria, Bulganin, Malenkov, Stalin, Khrushchev), truncated to Khrushchev. **Stalin, of course, does not count, he was implied. In any case, he would be a "coachman" for this "Troika", and she would "ride" where the "coachman" ruled.**

But what is the work of what special bodies and

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what special cases was this incomprehensible "Troika" supposed to lead? It seems that four minutes of the meetings (February 2, 9, 16 and 23) of the Troika are given to this question, starting with the first, held on February 2, 1953, and which determined the day and hour of the Troika meetings (so in the documents, with a capital letter) Monday, 2 p.m.

On February 9, at a meeting of the Troika, decisions were made on special work on

- the first (atomic) section (comrades Vannikov, Klochkov, Malenkov, Beria);
- the second (uranium mining) section (comrades Antropov, Klochkov, Malenkov, Beria);

- joint-stock company Wismuth (uranium mining in Germany) (vol. Sergeev, Malenkov, Beria);

- the Soviet-Romanian mining society "Quartzite" (comrades Sergeev, Beria);
- section "B" ("Berkut" and "Comet") (comrades Ryabikov, Vladimirsky, Beria);

- the manufacture of an experimental batch of products 32-B (comrades Beria S.L., Vladimirsky, Malenkov, Beria L.P.);

- experimental design and research work on products "R" (rocketry) (comrades Ustinov, Korolev, Nedelin, Vasilevsky,

Bulganin, Malenkov, Beria).

Everything seemed to be going on here in a long-established way, but why all of a sudden "Troika"? Why introduce Bulganin into such a narrow composition - the issues of the Armed Forces were the fourth on the agenda of the Troika meetings plan.

I think it is impossible to give answers to these questions on a documentary basis - after the assassination of Stalin and Beria, the archives, presumably, were cleaned up in earnest. And could some important ideas of Stalin be documented in writing, if he had them?

And they seem to have it!

In any case, the real purpose of creating the Troika could not be exclusively defense work, and here's why ... After Stalin's death, on March 16, 1953, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers, already signed by Malenkov, was adopted

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No. 687-355cc / on "On the management of special work", which formed the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR consisting of: L.P. Beria (chairman); B.L. Vannikov (First Deputy Chairman), Vice-Chairmen I.M. Klochkov, S.M. Vladimirovsky, members N.A. Bulganin, A.P. Zavenyagin, V.M. Ryabikov, V.A. Makhnev.

The Special Committee was entrusted with the "management of all special work (on the nuclear industry, the Berkut and Kometa systems, long-range missiles <...>"

The management of "all **special work**", provided for by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 687-355ss / op, and the "**management of the work of special bodies on special cases**", provided for in paragraph 214 of the protocol No. 7 of the meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, were clearly different things. The two formulations are very different both in form and in meaning.

So how can all this be explained?

I will make a reservation that there may be "holes" in my version of events ... When we discussed it with such an authoritative expert as Richard Ivanovich Kosolapov (a well-known social scientist, former editor-in-chief of the CPSU Central Committee magazine Kommunist, member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy Supreme Soviet of the USSR), he noted that in order to fully substantiate such a version, it is necessary to carefully trace the chain of a number of destinies, compare the facts, the chronology of events, etc.

And indeed it is. Moreover, the role of, say, Malenkov in the events of the last weeks of Stalin's life may turn out to be both neutral and negative in the end. However, I will try to build my reconstruction on the data that I have.

So...

On January 9, 1953, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee approved the draft TASS report on the case of doctors, and on January 13 it was made public. Many are in a panic, and rumors (and even information) about the formation of the 13th department in the GRU only increase the panic.

Events are developing.

Minister of State Security Ignatiev, an undoubted creature of Khrushchev (and possibly Malenkov), is also alarmed. He is cut off from events, and he has a stigma in a cannon. At the same time, the Security Department (protection of the leaders of the party and government

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va), that is, Stalin's security, as well as the selection of personnel for it, is led in the MGB by a person whom Semyon Ignatiev can trust as himself. Who it was specifically, I will tell later, while limiting myself to reporting that by the beginning of 1953, the guards loyal to Stalin, General Vlasik and Kuzmichev, were removed from Stalin.

On January 26, at a meeting of the Bureau - obviously with the participation of Stalin - a mysterious "Troika" is formed.

Formally, this is the same Special Committee with purely "technocratic" goals, but in fact, **the Troika immediately looks like some kind of political superorgan capable of instantly becoming a leading triumvirate under the supreme rule of Stalin.**

Beria - the Ministry of Internal Affairs - the Ministry of State Security and the national economy.

Malenkov - party apparatus and propaganda.

Bulganin - Armed Forces.

In fact, this "Troika" replaces the leading "five", throwing Khrushchev out of his trusted leadership. Moreover, the chairman of the Troika is Beria. And he is not just formally the first, he is one of three -

the only person of business and action with a quick response. And all this promises some cardinal changes not in the course of work on defense projects.

Now Khrushchev is also in a panic. And he does everything to restore Stalin's confidence in himself, fawning and fawning with might and main ...

Ignatiev has been "engaged" for a long time, and Stalin's guards have been selected by him so that Stalin can be quickly eliminated. At the same time, the panicking Khrushchev is still "blindly" incited by the environment from the "fifth column".

Molotov and Mikoyan are in disgrace, and Khrushchev can count on them - no, not support in eliminating Stalin, God forbid, but support *after* (oh, what a grief!) Comrade Stalin's death.

February 1953 is the preparation for the elimination of Stalin (there is evidence that there were cups of mercury in the attic of Stalin's dacha).

The patron is Khrushchev.

Responsible executor - Ignatiev.

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The direct executors are employees of the Security Department of the MGB, led by ...

No, who led it, I will tell you a little later.

And events are accelerating ... On Monday, March 2, 1953 - here I rely on the statement of Yuri Mukhin - Stalin appointed a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee (and this is 36 people!) To consider the issue of merging the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the MGB into one ministry with the appointment of Beria as Minister.

If Y. Mukhin's information about just such an agenda is correct, then the picture of the future is clear in *principle* : between February 28 and March 2, 1953, Stalin began to be killed. This inevitably follows from the above reconstruction of the situation.

How exactly it was eliminated, I leave it to others to investigate. The important thing is that it was eliminated. And he was eliminated because he lost his true personnel instinct and did not constitute Beria as his direct successor -

right at the plenum of the Central Committee on October 16, 1952, insisting on his appointment as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The appointment of Beria as chairman of a special "Troika" can be regarded as the beginning of Stalin's insight. But Khrushchev was quicker.

YES, PLEASE, by the beginning of 1953, Stalin had reached, to use the concepts of the Peter principle, which I will talk about later, the level of his incompetence. During his life, he made two major mistakes, each of which cost Russia and humanity a golden age.

The first was the underestimation of the prospects and possibility of a strategic partnership with Germany against the Anglo-Saxons after the conclusion of the 1939 Pact.

The second was the underestimation of the capabilities and potential of Lavrenty Beria as the only one adequate to the requirements of the era of its successor.

Stalin was exactly twenty years older than Beria. He was formed as a professional Marxist revolutionary, driven by the slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" and, together with Lenin, believed in the European and world revolution. Of all the leaders of the revolution - like sa

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one of them sober, he understood earlier than others that Russia can hardly count on "brothers in the class" in developed countries. But he also understood that Russia is completely self-sufficient in order to grow into a mighty power, in which there is no place for private property and selfish interests, and in which the free development of everyone will become a condition for the development of society.

And now it, having passed the test of war, has become such a power.

And Stalin...

Well, it's hard to say what played a fatal role - whether it was gradual aging, the pressures of wars, or the habit of taking everything upon yourself for three decades and being, ultimately, the last resort (it's not for nothing that this allegory was instilled in the apparatus in relation to it - "Instance"), weakening of the protective reaction to

doxology...

But it can be said with confidence that Stalin, as a *comprehensive* head of state, had exhausted his resource by the end of 1952, and Beria, on the contrary, had accumulated such life and managerial state experience that he could fully use it only when he was at the head of state.

Beria, although he came to the revolution as a young man, almost immediately turned from a revolutionary and underground worker into a state manager, into an organizer. The ideas of the world revolution did not fascinate him. On the other hand, the idea of an active restructuring of life in Russia on a collectivist basis captivated me for the rest of my life.

In the course of his career growth, he received more and more managerial opportunities and now he was already ready for the leadership of Russia by the socialist (I emphasize this!) "technocrats." The building of communism was for him not an ideal, not a slogan, but a concrete, complex, but solvable task.

From the mid-1930s, Stalin sought to reverse the role of the Party and the Soviets. And in 1952, a completely favorable moment came for this ... Quite a few young cadres were introduced into the leadership, the reorientation of the tasks of the party from economic management to ideological management began, which was already evident from a comparison of the Charter of the CPSU (b), adopted

XVIII Congress in March 1939, and the Charter of the CPSU, adopted

XIX congress.

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Charter of 1939:

"The Party is the guiding core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state, and ensures the successful building of a communist society."

Charter of 1952:

"Now the main tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are to build a communist society ... to continuously raise the material and cultural level of society, to educate the members of society ..."

Moreover, if earlier the Politburo of the Central Committee was called upon to organize "political work", and the Party Control Commission controlled "the implementation of the decisions of the Party and the Central Committee ... by party organizations and Soviet economic bodies", now the Presidium of the Central Committee had to organize the current work of the Central Committee, and the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee, the functions of controlling purely internal party affairs were given.

And if, immediately after the 19th Congress, Stalin, having retained the post of General Secretary of the CPSU, had transferred his powers of the Chairman of the Council

ministers of the USSR Beria, then by doing this he would have saved both his life and indestructible posthumous glory.

Most clearly, in my opinion, the incompetence of Stalin, which first arose, manifested itself in a number of those "grand" construction projects, on the abolition of which Beria began to insist immediately after Stalin's death. I will say more about them.

Alas, Stalin did not dare to give the future of the country into the hands of Beria, which meant that after Stalin's death, the question of a successor, a leader, would inevitably arise. And the future fate of a vast country depended on who would become a member of Stalin's party or a member of the Party of Partocrats.

Yes, and peace.

SO by the end of 1952 and the beginning of 1953, the country had two fundamentally different paths. One path led to

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the rapid degradation of the country, the second - to its no less inevitable flourishing.

The symbol of one was a functionary - narrow-minded, ignorant, ambitious, not only unable, but also not striving to optimize the social life of the country, personally lazy and incompetent and therefore generating laziness and incompetence both next to him and at lower levels of power.

The symbol of the other was a manager - far-sighted, educated, energetic, respectful of those who deserve respect, striving by the very essence of nature to make the life of society better. A manager who loves and knows how to work, is competent and therefore in every possible way encourages and brings good, competent employees closer to him.

The functionary did not know the matter, but he had the audacity to teach everyone without learning anything, because he believed that he knew everything in advance *and so*, because he is the secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Politburo.

A manager, if he did not know something and was faced with a new business for himself, studied, understood things that were new to him and then could make meaningful decisions.

The functionary in the future gave the USSR into the hands of the same functionaries as he, only with a lower rank. And they were capable of one thing - to bring the country "to the handle."

The manager in the future gave all the rights in the USSR to professionals, specialists in management, science, production, education and culture, who would certainly bring the country to a genuine, unshakable by nothing and no one greatness.

The functionary in the future reduced the masses to the level of cattle - unreasoning, accustomed to a primitive semi-vegetative existence.

The manager in the future provided the masses with a comprehensive development, allowing everyone to reveal all their abilities and live cheerfully, smartly and for a long time.

The functionary loved himself in the power, and not the power in itself, because the great power, belonging to the people, simply did not need him.

The manager could not help but love the power in himself and lived for the power already because that only in a great power could he be most fully realized as a person.

The logical outcome of the "activities" of the functionary became

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the death of the Soviet Union and the subsequent degradation of all mankind.

The logical result of the manager's activity was such a Soviet Union, which could, by right, not only strong, but also just, stand at the head of all the healthy forces of the planet.

And in the top leadership of the country by 1952 there was both a bright (if we can talk about the brightness of an ordinary person) pronounced, complete functionary - Nikita Khrushchev, and a pronounced, outstanding manager - Lavrenty Beria.

Stalin did not throw his enormous authority onto the scales of Beria. And this meant that the scales would fluctuate and everything could be decided by chance.

The confrontation between Beria and Khrushchev was inevitable, and he could have won only one.

Khrushchev, as an intriguer and an egoist, understood this, prepared in advance for a fight and calculated how to awaken base passions in his colleagues in power and win them over to his side.

Beria, as a "hard worker" and a collectivist, was deeply and innocently sure that his obvious business superiority would automatically provide him with leadership. And although he understood Khrushchev's worthlessness, he could not even imagine that for the sake of personal well-being he could arrange reprisals against a comrade and colleague.

Beria measured by himself.

But Khrushchev also measured by himself.

It's just that their measurements were different.

Chapter 23

"STRANGE" DEATH OF STALIN

The official date of Stalin's death is March 5, 1953. And the official diagnosis of a whole synclite from the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Health and elite doctors is quite respectable, without a hint of any medical incomprehensibility.

By the way, about the synclite ... On March 4, the first government report about Stalin's illness appeared in the press, which said that on the night of March 2 he had a blood 643

an effusion in the brain and that "the best medical forces are involved in the treatment of Comrade Stalin." What were these forces? The most detailed bulletin on the state of Stalin's health, published in Pravda on March 5, 1953, was signed by: USSR Minister of Health A.F. Tretyakov, head of the Medical and Sanitary Department I.I. Kuperin, Chief Therapist of the Ministry of Health, Professor P.E. Lukomsky, a member of the Academy of Medical Sciences N.V. Konovalov, member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, Professor A.L. Myasnikov, Professor E.M. Tareev, corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences I.N. Filimonov, Professor I.S. Glazunov, Professor R.A. Tkachev and associate professor V.I. Ivanov Neznamov.

"Lights", as we see, was enough. But the story of Stalin's death is dark, like an abandoned underground dungeon. After all, Stalin was clearly killed. And obviously with the sanction of Khrushchev, and even with the personal participation of Khrushchev in the final act of poisoning. Actually, according to the "historian" Nikolai Zenkovich, Khrushchev himself let slip at the end of his reign that he eliminated Stalin.

However, Zenkovich is an unreliable source. For the former "internal chronicler of the Central Committee of the CPSU", as his annotations to his books present, he too often collects gossip instead of analysis. But what gossip! What is worth, for example, his retelling of the story of Ilya Ehrenburg, given in Zenkovich's book of the 2005 edition of "Perjury, falsification, compromising evidence"!

Ehrenburg, allegedly with the sanction of the Khrushchev Kremlin, allegedly told French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre that it was like this...

The meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee took place on March 1, 1953, and at it

Kaganovich, with the support of all members of the old Politburo (except Beria), demanded from Stalin the creation of an objective commission to investigate the case of doctors and the cancellation of the order given by Stalin to deport all Jews to a remote zone of the USSR.

Stalin allegedly burst into public abuse, but Mikoyan allegedly declared that if they (in fact, the conspirators) did not leave this building free in half an hour, then the army would occupy the Kremlin. After that, Beria also left Stalin,

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and Kaganovich tore to shreds his ticket as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and threw it in Stalin's face. After that, Stalin was struck by a stroke, he fell unconscious, and at 6 o'clock in the morning on March 2, doctors were called to him, already dying.

Dear reader! This nonsense is not nonsense, but a presentation of the contents of pages 180-181 of the said book by N. Zenkovich. True, here he directly quotes another "chronicler" - Avtorkhanov, but he quotes seriously, and not as an example of historical paranoia (which Avtorkhanov attributes to Stalin) ...

Kaganovich himself wrote in his memoirs that Stalin died "unexpectedly". However, according to the testimony of Felix Chuev, to which Russian "historians" are so fond of referring, Kaganovich, after more than thirty years, responded to Felix Chuev's remark: "It seems to me that Stalin was killed," answered: "I don't know" ...

Then Chuev objected: "Molotov was inclined to this," and then continued: "Do you know what he told me?" "What?" Kaganovich replied. "At the Mausoleum on May 1, 1953, the last time Beria was, he told Molotov: "I removed him."

Chuev, however, immediately made a reservation that, according to Molotov, Beria "could deliberately slander yourself in order to give yourself weight" ...

It is unlikely that Beria could thus try to increase his value - it was already almost nowhere higher. But Lavrenty Pavlovich could provoke Molotov. Beria certainly knew that Stalin was killed, and the circle of his potential killers was extremely limited. And for an experienced investigator, such a sounding - how Molotov will react - would be quite natural. And it is characteristic that he did not say to Kaganovich: "I saved you all," although Stalin's attitude towards Kaganovich was not very warm lately either.

However, it is not yet a fact that Beria said this to Molotov as well. No, I more or less believe Chuev, but Molotov could, to put it mildly, "riveted" to Beria. Let us recall how he "carefully" transferred his correspondence with Stalin to Istpart, carefully removing - apparently - from it those letters where Beria was mentioned. After all, Beria could be mentioned there only in a positive sense.

It is possible, tiring and so, I'm afraid, a weary reader,

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to bring, following Zenkovich and other "narrators", a number of "versions" similar to Avtorkhanov's. So, quite seriously they say that when Stalin fell unconscious, Beria allegedly shouted in delight: "The tyrant is dead, we - free." But then Stalin opened his eyes, and Beria on his knees began to ask his forgiveness.

Well, just Shakespeare, arranged by Mikhail Zhvanetsky, and nothing more!

WHAT IS interesting in ALL this nonsense is either real or mythical plans for the deportation of Jews as the reason for the elimination of Stalin, in the first place.

Secondly, the recognition of the fact not of the natural death of Stalin, but of the fact that or otherwise remove it.

Thirdly, the fact that even in the delusional versions of Beria is somehow separated from the rest as a person who was not directly involved in the conspiracy against Stalin.

In the light of the "fairy tales" of Avtorkhanov-Zenkovich and Co. (and a fairy tale is a lie, but in

hint) my version of Stalin's death, which largely coincides with the version, for example, of Yuri Mukhin, looks more and more reliable. By the way, both Ehrenburg, and Avtorkhanov, and Zenkovich were too lazy to look into the old calendars and "appointed" a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee for **Sunday**, because March 1, 1953 was exactly Sunday. But Y. Mukhin's information that an acute meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee was scheduled for Monday, March 2, indirectly confirms his correctness in general.

By the way, even on March 1, the Presidium of the Central Committee could not proceed as it is described by Avtorkhanov-Zenkovich, simply because the large and younger part of the *then* numerous Presidium would not allow anything like that described in any case! Not without reason, immediately after Stalin's death, on March 6, 1953, the Presidium instantly "shrank" to the size of the Bureau, quantitatively from 36 people to 10 people. Almost all of its young members, elected at the October 1952 plenum of the Central Committee, were taken out of the Presidium, like kids from the table. And this, of course, was not done on the initiative of Beria.

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But the new Presidium included Molotov and Mikoyan (in fact, it was precedent for the establishment of a party gerontocracy).

BUT MORE! As I already said, Zenkovich, sorting through the "versions", on page 193 directly thumped that the mystery of Stalin's death is not whether he was killed, but how it happened.

Zenkovich reports that on July 19, 1964, at a rally in honor of the Hungarian party and government delegation, Khrushchev openly admitted to the violent death of Stalin and stated that there were many cruel tyrants in the history of mankind, but they all died in the same way from the ax, as they themselves supported their power with an ax...

Like this!

However, Zenkovich smears the entire Politburo with Stalin's blood at once, including Beria, arguing that faced with an alternative: who to die, the "tyrant" or the "old guard", the "comrades-in-arms" chose the death of Stalin. And if we recall the title of Zenkovich's book mentioned above, we can say that his "collective compromising evidence" should be classified as perjury and falsification.

No, not all of Stalin's comrades-in-arms have his blood, but only Khrushchev. But the dirt that soon stuck around Stalin is in the hands of all of them, except for Lavrenty Beria. Elena Prudnikova called him "the last knight of Stalin", and I can only congratulate her on such an accurate definition.

How exactly Joseph Vissarionovich was killed, I now little interest. It doesn't even matter who authorized his death.

It is important - for what reasons was destroyed so carefully, it would seem, the guarded Stalin?

I think that in part we already have answers to these questions, but there is more to say ... I promised the reader to tell who in the MGB, under Minister Ignatiev, was in charge of the Security Directorate in 1953 (protection of the leaders of the party and government) ... So here, he was led by himself ... Semyon Ignatiev.

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Back in 1952, the Main Security Directorate was headed by Lieutenant General Nikolai Vlasik, who founded it in 1946. However, on May 23, 1952, the GUO was transformed into simply the Security Directorate (UO), Vlasik was removed and transferred as deputy head of the forced labor camp in the city of Asbest, Sverdlovsk Region (it is interesting that he was exiled there as the manager of the Soyuzasbest trust after the June plenum of the Central Committee 1957 Kaganovich).

And instead of Vlasik, he began to direct the guards of Stalin directly

Ignatiev. In the light of what follows, I am sure that Vlasik was simply "set up" before Stalin (the general had sins, but a shake-up would have been enough to bring him back to normal, and he was faithful to Stalin).

On December 16, 1952, Vlasik was arrested and, after a strangely long investigation, in 1955 he was sentenced to 5 years of exile. But already in 1956, his criminal record was expunged. I am sure that Vlasik was temporarily eliminated by the forces behind Ignatiev, and then he simply conspired with the Khrushchevites, also agreeing to cast a shadow on Beria.

But the story with Vlasik is more or less well known. But the name of Major General Sergei Fedorovich Kuzmichev (1908-1989) is practically unknown. But in vain ... In 1946, during the formation of the GUO, the 1st department of the GUO (Stalin's guard) was headed by Kuzmichev. In 1948-1949, he was authorized by the USSR Council of Ministers for the resorts of Sochi-Matsesta (Stalin's resting place). In 1949-1950, Kuzmichev was again directly in the GUO in the same position, but in 1950 he was transferred to the deputy. head of the UMGB of the Bryansk region. In 1952, they were further demoted to deputy. head of the Dubravny camp of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, generally withdrawing from the MGB system.

Around the same time, Vlasik was also taken out of the MGB. And in January 1953, Kuzmichev, like Vlasik, was arrested, finally taking him out of the rapidly developing situation around Stalin.

It is significant that in March 1953, having come to the Ministry of Internal Affairs-MGB, Beria immediately released Kuzmichev and appointed him head of the Main Directorate of Security of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, entrusting him with the protection of the government (later Beria would be blamed for this at the "anti-Beria" plenum). It is also significant that

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the very next day after the arrest of Beria, Kuzmichev was also arrested. He was released in February 1954, and since then this full of energy, who lived to be 81 years old, has dropped out of active life. It seems that this is how the party of partocrats paid him for his silence. And it's hard for me to judge him. He already knew that after the fall of Beria and as a result of the fall of Beria, the fall of the USSR was only a matter of time.

Having told about this, I will note again: **it is simply amazing how many "researchers" "lose sight" of the obvious fact that from January 1946 until Stalin's death, it was not Beria who was in charge of Stalin's security and maintenance, but others!**

Moreover, since August 1951, Ignatiev, a representative and protege, was in charge of it. party of partocrats and personally Khrushchev.

After all, this is a cliché: Beria, through his people, poisoned Stalin, etc. But Stalin was surrounded by Ignatiev's people! And it was Ignatiev who first cut off Kuzmichev from the guards of Stalin, and then Vlasik.

And Ignatiev, in the last months of Stalin's life, isolated them - those two people who were best acquainted with the organization of Stalin's guard and with the people who guarded him. Otherwise, Vlasik and Kuzmichev could either pay attention to strange moments and unreliable people in the guards themselves, or give someone else a qualified expert assessment of what is happening. They interfered with this, being at large, both to Ignatiev and his "customers".

Pavel Sudoplatov recalled that at the end of February 1953, a few days before Stalin's death, he noticed "growing uncertainty" in Ignatiev's behavior.

Valuable evidence!

Sudoplatov also reports that after the death of Stalin, Beria sought the arrest of Ignatiev, but did not receive support from the Presidium of the Central Committee. Sudoplatov connects Beria's initiative with the participation of the MGB in the case with doctors, but clearly

misses. One way or another, Ignatiev was forced to conduct this business, which was under Stalin's control.

Beria wanted to arrest him, obviously in connection with the desire to investigate the death of Stalin. And he immediately ran into such resistance that even Beria had to retreat.

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The death of Stalin did not plunge his comrades-in-arms into deep sorrow. However, only Khrushchev needed her from the top leadership. Nikita Khrushchev could not be loyal to Stalin for several reasons.

A former Trotskyist (and Trotskyism is like syphilis - you can only heal, but not cure), he was not close to Stalin's party politically.

The father of a son doubtfully missing at the front, he could not forgive Stalin (who himself lost a worthy son in the war) for refusing to participate in the fate of his beloved child. Molotov told F. Chuev about Khrushchev's hatred of Stalin in connection with this refusal, and the former deputy head of the 9th department of the KGB, Major General M.S., wrote a lot about it. Dokuchaev in his book "Moscow. Kremlin. Security".

But the main thing was that Khrushchev understood: if Stalin nevertheless makes Beria the pre-council of ministers, then Beria, already during Stalin's lifetime, will quickly disavow partycrats chattering like Khrushchev and replace them with working socialist technocrats like Beria himself and his associates. And then, already during Stalin's lifetime, the fate of Nikita Khrushchev would be unenviable.

Therefore, it was necessary to remove Stalin first - physically. Then it was necessary to deal with Beria - first politically, and then - physically. And these purely selfish interests of Khrushchev overlapped very well with the policy of the West and the Golden Elite of the World towards the USSR, which began to take shape after the end of World War II and which led the USSR to collapse.

Chapter 34

HUNDRED TWELVE DAYS...

STALIN is dead...

And I had to live without it.

How?

To a certain extent, this was answered by the joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 6, 1953. The very fact of such a joint meeting was extraordinary, but

and the reason was the same. The meeting took place the day after the day of Stalin's official death and authorized "a number of measures to organize the party and state leadership"...

On March 15, the 4th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR opened, which approved decisions taken on 6 March and gave them the force of law.

Voroshilov replaced as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Shvernik, "recommended" by the chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Malenkov became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, his first deputies were Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich.

A number of current "historians" of that era, describing the first days of mourning, see Beria's cunning move in that he, they say, was the first to propose to elect Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and he, in gratitude, named Beria's name first, proposing candidacies of his first deputies. And this de ensured Beria's primacy among equals.

But all such explanations are from the evil one, although in order to fully understand this, I had to spend the evening over the Pravda file for 1953. And from the newspapers it is clear that the 4th session was opened by the chairman of the Moscow Council, Yasnov, and then Khrushchev was the first to speak, proposing to elect Voroshilov Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces. And it was a purely "technical" performance. The next speech by Beria, who proposed to appoint Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was the same.

I think that a week before the session, on March 6, Beria's proposal about Malenkov, expressed in the circle of top leadership, was also quite "technical", without a hint of intrigue.

Yes, in fact, who else could actually head the Council of Ministers then, except for Malenkov or Beria? And who else could Malenkov offer as the "workhorses" of the Council of Ministers instead of Beria, who, even under Stalin, was the main such "horse" in the top leadership? Another thing is that Malenkov could immediately offer Beria instead of himself, but that would be too much for him. Intrigue is not intrigue, but am

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the battles now, after Stalin's departure, began to stick out at Malenkov.

And he doesn't have one...

Beria had no ambitions - he had ideas and initiatives. But more on that later. And now I repeat that in Stalin's time, his inner circle was not accustomed to intrigue and fight for power, because then the authorities gave not so much "pies and donuts" as "bruises and bumps." And even the late Stalin, contrary to the assertions of "political scientists", deliberately did not push his foreheads against any of his comrades-in-arms - allegedly in order to maintain his position. And it was not in Stalin's nature that this was the case, and not in the spirit of the then authorities. And besides everything else, Stalin's position was then so strong and unshakable that ...

In short, it's clear...

The reader should remember the Moscow historian Yuri Zhukov, the author of the book "Another Stalin". In 2007, another of his books was published, continuing the first one, Stalin: Secrets of Power. And just like the first, it produces a dual impression. Covering the period from 1939 to 1954, Zhukov reports a lot of interesting and new information, relying most often on previously closed archives. At the same time, he clearly maintains his old thesis: everything vile, corrupting and destructive in the USSR is the result of the activity of a decaying and often self-serving partocracy, which neither Stalin nor ... Malenkov could cope with after Stalin's death.

In general, I have not the slightest need to argue with this thesis - I myself have been convinced of this for a long time. But Yu. Zhukov, with no less consistency, explains everything by intrigue and clannishness, but one cannot agree with this in any way, if we mean most of Stalin's inner circle, and above all, Beria!

In addition, many details are surprising ... Alas, in Zhukov's book one comes across a strange mixture of the principle of approaching sources. Either Doctor of Sciences Zhukov relies on "iron" archival data, or he almost uses rumors. Yu. Zhukov's approach to describing the last pre-war and first war days of 1941 looks especially strange. Almost all initial impulses for mobilization

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Zhukov attributes the ideas of the top leadership to the organization of the war, including the idea of the State Defense Committee, to Molotov, who allegedly also involved Malenkov and Beria in the action. And the last one is already 30

June 1941, with the living People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov, he leads Zhukov's "state security".

Allies allegedly needed Molotov insofar as, as Yu. Zhukov claims, "it was necessary to remove from power (it is written! - S.K.) or very significantly limit the powers of not only Voznesensky, Zhdanov, but also Stalin. Moreover, Molotov, allegedly "more than anyone else versed in the Kremlin's behind-the-scenes intrigues, perfectly understood the danger of such an enterprise, knew that he could not do anything alone" ... That's why he turned to Beria and Malenkov.

Molotov, Malenkov and Beria look to Zhukov as a kind of triumvirate who played in the first days of the war in relation to the supposedly bewildered Stalin the role of foremen of the Cossack "kosh", who say to the elected ataman: "Take power, son of a bitch, while it is given to you!" Zhukov claims that the fact that there were "desperate people" in the narrow leadership "surely encouraged Stalin, finally brought him out of prostration (even so! - S.K.) ..."

I hope that I have sufficiently introduced the reader to the schedule of Stalin's first military week and to some general chronology of those days, so that, to put it mildly, Zhukov's wrong could be seen quite clearly. Let me remind you that in the first six days of the war, only the working time of Stalin, which General Gorkov "selectively" reported, amounted to a total of 55 hours, for which several dozen people were taken ... Good "prostration"! Yes, a little later, a moment of approximately daily depression with Stalin most likely took place. But this is with that load - purely physical, not to mention psychological, and it is not surprising.

That is why I dwelled on Y. Zhukov's description of the beginning of the war in such detail because I want to once again note the following: such an unlawful approach leads Y. Zhukov to explain the processes in the period shortly before Stalin's death and shortly after his death, nothing more than exclusively "intrigues "of different" groups ". multiway

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Y. Zhukov also explains the behavior of Lavrenty Pavlovich with intrigues and a thirst for power, and not with fundamental considerations.

However, having in mind not only Yu. Zhukov, I will object that although the intrigues among the top leadership came with the departure of Stalin, their nature is maliciously distorted, and the scale is inflated. Of course, on the whole, the changes in the personal composition of the leading group and the redistribution of responsibilities that occurred on March 6, 1953 were affected both by the objective needs of the situation and by personal sympathies or antipathies. And, intertwined, objective and subjective factors programmed, alas, yes, the appearance in the future in the top management of some businesslike "blocs".

So, it was quite logical that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security were again merged into one Ministry of the Interior under the hand of Beria. But then Molotov again became Minister of Foreign Affairs instead of Vyshinsky, who replaced Molotov in March 1949. Such a "renaissance" of Molotov was more or less justified, but the fact that Vyshinsky was now moved to the post of First Deputy Minister with the appointment to hell in the middle of nowhere - Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN, was already a manifestation of personal antipathy. By the way, Molotov, not having the nature of a burnt intriguer, could be one of the first to be drawn into intrigues, for a number of reasons.

Bulganin replaced Marshal Vasilevsky as Minister of War, who was moved to first deputies, and Marshal Zhukov, returned from the Urals, was appointed second deputy.

The ministries of foreign trade and trade were merged, and the minister again

became actually retired by that time from the affairs of Mikoyan. For him, Stalin's death also turned out to be a political renaissance, which I would call, alas, a political renaissance now.

Saburov, a connoisseur of economics, was transferred from the chairmen of the State Planning Commission to the ministers of the super-Ministry of Mechanical Engineering formed from several ministries, and Grigory Kosyachenko, who did not recommend anything before or after himself, took his place. In 1950, Andreev, the authorized representative of the Central Committee for Gosplan, wrote about Kosyachenko in an official report to the Central Committee in 1950: *"Comrade. Kosyachenko... in poly 654*

From a theoretical point of view... he is a mild-mannered person, he does not show any activity in eliminating shortcomings in the work of the State Planning Commission, as an organizer who is completely useless... Comrade Kosyachenko does not enjoy authority among the members of the State Planning Commission and the staff of the apparatus, not a single party meeting passes without serious criticism (this is due to times of "terry, according to the assurances of" democrats ", totalitarianism"! - S.K.) addressed to him ... "

As for the party leadership, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee was abolished, but ... the Presidium itself was actually abolished. It, as I have already said, "shrank" to the size of the liquidated Bureau of the Central Committee and even smaller! Now the Presidium was made up of its members Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Pervukhin, and candidate members Shvernik, Ponomarenko, Melnikov, Bagirov.

The secretariat of the Central Committee also sharply "shrank" and turned gray: 1) Ignatiev (former MGB, "Moor", already on April 28, 1953, removed from the Central Committee); 2) the "theorist" Pospelov and 3) Shatalin (this one will still come across to us).

About Khrushchev, the joint resolution stated the following:

"Recognize it necessary that comrade. Khrushchev N.S. concentrated on work in the Central Committee of the CPSU, and in connection with this, release him from the duties of the first secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU.

That is, Khrushchev became the secretary of the Central Committee. So far - "just" a secretary. How did this "schedule" come about?

To assess the situation, I will perhaps use a quote from an essay by Konstantin Simonov, placed in the 1991 political publishing house "Anti-Beria". For all the libelousness of this essay, something can be gleaned from Simonov, at that time a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU:

"Why was Beria interested in Malenkov becoming Stalin's heir precisely in the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Stalin's post in the Secretariat of the Central Committee would be taken by a person, from Beria's point of view, of a secondary scale - Khrushchev, whose personality and character Beria never figured out

until your day

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fall? And it's very simple. Beria's idea was to ensure that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and his deputies played the main role in the leadership of the country ... "

Two pieces of evidence are valuable here: 1) Beria really thought in the spirit of Stalin's ideas about the changing role of the party; 2) the man with a double soul was not Beria, but Khrushchev ...

And Simonov did not understand one more thing; he, wanting to denigrate Beria, brought here an argument in his favor! After all, Simonov called the motivational reasons for the activity of Lavrenty Pavlovich not selfish, but state considerations!

Simonov, however, correctly determined that the "nerve" of the situation was set not by the Malenkov-Khrushchev or Malenkov-Beria line, but by the Khrushchev-Beria line. So many lies are heaped around the relationship between the last two figures (the starting points of which were set by Khrushchev himself right at the plenum of the Central Committee after

Beria's arrest) that I don't have the opportunity to explain it in detail now. However, something - for illustration - must be communicated to the reader. For example, it is considered commonplace that it was Beria who initiated the revision of the "Mikhoels case" or the "doctors case". In the collection of the Democracy Foundation "Lavrenty Beria. 1953" documents are filed in such a way that Beria really looks like a liberator of doctors from unfair accusations. On April 1 (first), 1953, he signed (but hardly written) a note to the Presidium of the Central Committee "on the rehabilitation of persons involved in the so-called case of pest doctors" dated him. But here is what he writes in his book "Moscow. Kremlin. Protection "General Dokuchaev, a person aware:

"After Stalin's death, having released doctors from investigation and declaring an amnesty mainly for criminals, Khrushchev (emphasis added everywhere by me. - S.K.) appeared before everyone as a hero who is remembered with gratitude, exalted and raised to the shield as a great democrat." ..

Dokuchaev is by no means a supporter of Beria. Moreover, he does not disdain obvious lies addressed to him, arguing, for example, that "at the end of the forties, a wave of Berievism resulted in the so-called "Leningrad case" ...", that "Beria

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hated Stalin, wanted to get rid of him as soon as possible..." and so on. But the more valuable is the information of this high rank of the Brezhnev-Gorbachev KGB!

And here is Khrushchev himself at the "Anti-Beria" plenum:

"If we take late questions - doctors, this is a shameful affair for us, this is a linden ... I consider it a shameful affair with doctors ... We, the members of the Presidium, spoke to each other several times, I spoke (emphasis added here by me. - S.K.) Lawrence..."

So, the initiative in the case of doctors came, most likely, from the Khrushchevites. And there are interesting details about this ... After the arrest of Beria, a certain Shatalin came to the Ministry of Internal Affairs - as the first deputy minister, while remaining secretary of the Central Committee. It was he who was instructed to seize the papers of Lavrenty Pavlovich, which were immediately destroyed by the decision of Stalin's former associates.

Shatalin at the "Anti-Beria" plenum spoke a lot of vile things about Beria (I will cite something in due time), but he said this about the "doctors' case":

"... take the case of doctors. This, I think, is even a general opinion that the right decision was finally made, but why was a communiqué of the Ministry of the Interior needed, why was it necessary to decline this case in the press, and so on. Why did it need to be published? This was done in order to elevate himself - that's what kind of contender he is ... "

That is, according to Shatalin, it turned out that Beria was not very involved in the rehabilitation of doctors, more, they say, cling to ... Moreover, he created an advertisement for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and created himself in the press

The last one was a direct slander! Shatalin, like **all participants in the Plenum**, could not help but know that the "communiqué of the Ministry of the Interior" and "the declination of this case in the press" were needed because on April 3, 1953, the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee "On the falsification of the so-called case of doctors" was adopted. pests", paragraphs 2 and 7 of which read:

"2. Approve the attached text of the message for publication in the central press.

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7. This resolution ... to be sent to all members of the Central Committee of the CPSU ... "

To all members of the Central Committee of the CPSU!

And now the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Shatalin from the plenary rostrum blatantly lied in the eyes of **all** members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and not a single member of the Central Committee of the CPSU expressed the slightest surprise (I'm not talking about indignation).

But maybe he initiated Beria's communique - for self-promotion. No, the text of the communiqué was quite dry, and in the press this matter, in general, was not "inclined". In any case, the hype was useless.

There is a LOT of obscurity in the story of the 1953 amnesty that stuck in the teeth. General Dokuchaev relates it to Khrushchev's initiative, but it is often stated that it was allegedly "thanks to Beria" that an uncontrollable muddy wave of bandits allegedly poured into the country, etc.

But on March 26, 1953, Beria proposed amnesty for about 1,000,000 people *from* among very specific categories of prisoners. Namely: convicted for up to 5 years; convicted regardless of the term of punishment, for official, economic and some military crimes; women with children under 10 and pregnant women; minors under the age of 18; elderly men and women and patients suffering from severe incurable ailments.

At the same time, the "layout" of the million meant by *Beria* included:

- Convicted for officials, etc. crimes (chairmen of collective farms, foremen, heads of enterprises, etc.) - 30,000 people;
- women - pregnant women and with children, up to 400,000 people;
- elderly, terminally ill and minors, respectively, 238,000; 198,000 and 31,181 people.

In total, this gives almost 900,000 people who are unlikely to be capable of some kind of unbridledness immediately upon release. Moreover, all of them ended up in the Gulag system not under People's Commissar Be

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rii, and under Minister Kruglov. And the LP proposed both, in principle, to soften the criminal legislation in terms of economic and other less dangerous crimes, and to show mercy in relation to that part of specific prisoners who did not pose a danger due to the very nature of crimes not related to violence against people.

Could such a contingent of the liberated give rise to some kind of powerful "wave of violence"? Personally, I doubt it, although there could have been some excesses, and here's why ... Beria submitted a note from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee as a *working* document, which did not require legal polishing of the wording. And a day later, on March 21, 1953, without consulting the Prosecutor General's Office, the Ministry of Justice and other things, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Voroshilov and Secretary of the Presidium Pegov signed an amnesty decree. Their haste (obviously prompted by Khrushchev) led to a number of costs - not so significant, as I guess. One way or another, Beria is not to blame for them, and the topic of the amnesty of 1953 is still waiting, as they say, for its researcher.

Beria had a lot of really *his* initiatives in all spheres of life. And now it seemed that the top leadership of the country could not get away from the activity and ideas of the most active member of this leadership. After all, for a long time he grasped everything better than others, and even better and deeper than Stalin - if it was not a question of the theory of social processes.

Beria had his own, and optimal for society, views on business priorities.

He was quicker than other colleagues to navigate those specific issues to which he was related, and he decided everything without unnecessary verbiage, ridiculed by both Lenin and Mayakovsky. At the "Anti-Beria" plenum, his former deputy on the Special Committee Zavenyagin, in condemnation of Beria, reported: "And when we dealt with any issue, he said: stop, to hell with this business, you are the organizers."

Zavenyagin further asked: "How can work be organized without understanding the essence of the matter?" Not realizing that Be

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Riya understood the essence of the matter, but precisely *as an organizer*. Otherwise, Zavenyagin, reporting to Beria on the progress of certain works, would not finish each time: "I ask for your instructions ..."

If Zavenyagin played it safe like that, he was a reinsurer, and this is position is not the best. If Zavenyagin really needed instructions, did he have the moral right to blaspheme Beria's organizational style?

Beria, better than any other head of state from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, also knew the problems of the national economy. Here only Kaganovich, Saburov and Pervukhin could act on equal terms with him, but the first one was already quite middle-aged, and the last two had a lower state status than Beria, and did not have his influence.

He knew well the promising areas of scientific and technical progress.

Had an accurate view of a rational foreign policy. And yet it is true understood the pressing problems of domestic politics.

In addition, accustomed to saving from childhood, he always and in everything demanded savings from everyone with whom he worked - not a penny, but thoughtful. And this also distinguished him from all the other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

But, doing a huge amount of work, he, in comparison with others, was less in public view. Such were his occupations. Who, say, in the country knew that atomic weapons were Beria?

Before the war, Kaganovich held public rallies of leaders of various industries, and Beria always dealt only with the top management of these industries.

In pre-war youth there were millions of "Voroshilov shooters", but tens of thousands became Beria's snipers in the war. And Lavrenty Pavlovich was less known in the country than Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Khrushchev ... But on the other hand, he knew the country itself, its

possibilities.

I think for a long time he wanted, perhaps a little naively, that Comrade Stalin would finally appreciate him in full measure and make him his successor. Beria, after all, was more suitable for this than anyone else.

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Of course, over the years, he could not help developing a demeanor that at first glance looked overly self-confident. But how could he manage to do so much in different areas if, as they say, he "bred turuses on wheels"? He could say in his hearts, on the phone, that is, in fact, face to face, to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Georgia and at the same time the Minister of Food Industry of the GSSR Bakradze: "You are a cannery, not a politician", or to the general of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who gave in to party bosses: "You are an official in uniform", but this just spoke of a rare ability to give an accurate and juicy assessment when he said how he printed it.

He was always quick in word and deed. Moreover, the word was in place, and the deed was "on the case." And now he could count on the rapid advancement of his ideas, because only he - out of the entire composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee - had them.

Their!!!

But almost immediately he ran into the same opposition of the partocracy, which he so wanted to overcome, but even Stalin could not.

Shepilov's grandson, journalist and orientalist Dmitry Kosyrev, reports things that are amusing both in style and in meaning. It turns out that Shepilov believed that "for

the throne (rarely incorrect expression! - S.K.) of Stalin was seized by two of the bloodiest Stalinist executioners - Beria and Khrushchev. The one who managed to shoot first won. Well, this phrase alone characterizes both the grandson and

grandfather.

The grandson further exclaims: "Khrushchev is Stalin's executioner! Is it possible? Regarding Beria, the grandson has no doubts: "executioner." Certification as the executioner of Khrushchev's grandson is embarrassing. But in vain! Just Nikita Khrushchev was a bloody executioner, if not in the literal sense of the word, then in the political sense - completely! This is confirmed by his provocative, executioner policy when he was the first secretary of the Moscow city committee, and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine.

And Beria?

He was not involved in the central repressions of 1937-1938 - as Khrushchev-level figure. Coming at the end

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1938 in the NKVD, reduced the volume of repressive policy to the historically necessary (not to blame him with the Katyn fake or deportations!). And from January 10, 1946, Beria had no relation at all to the repressive special services as a figure influencing their policy. Yes, in fact, since 1943, its capabilities and functions in this regard have been minimized after the separation from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR into separate departments of the People's Commissariat of State Security, headed by Merkulov, and counterintelligence SMERSH, headed by Abakumov.

True, Beria is credited with supervising the special services after the war, but I remind you: **from March 1946 to February 1949, the organs of justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security were supervised primarily by the secretary of the Central Committee, a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee and at the same time the head of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee Comrade. A.A. Kuznetsov! The same one, "Leningrad", "victim of Stalinism" ...**

On September 17, 1947, Kuznetsov's powers were also confirmed by the Politburo Resolution "on monitoring the work of the Ministry of State Security" (agenda item 218). Moreover, the decision was made on the basis of Molotov's note.

And Kuznetsov's influence was so great that he could achieve the dismissal of Merkulov, a longtime associate of Beria, from the post of minister. And the crimes of Kuznetsov (since we are talking about *the crimes* of that period) are attributed to the NKVD of Beria, although Beria did not **supervise the organs of the State Security at that time!** Isn't it time for the gentlemen "democrats" if not the honor to know (if there is none, then there is nothing to know), then at least the measure?

And now about the one who - using Shepilov's terminology - "managed shoot first...

Consider the situation. Suppose Khrushchev and Beria really *seized* power at the "throne" ...

One is prone to laziness, rude, weak as an organizer. He does not know how and does not want to dispose of people to himself. In addition, the protection of the country's leadership is both outside his competence, and (after Ignatiev left the post of the Ministry of Internal Affairs after Stalin's death) outside of his influence. This, of course, is Khrushchev.

The second is energy itself, an excellent organizer, knows how to select and encourage personnel, and from March 1953 headed

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There is an agency responsible for the protection of the country's leadership. This, of course, is Beria.

If both expect to "shoot first", then which of them is the first and shoot? The answer is perhaps obvious. However, Beria did not "shoot".

Did not have time?

Nonsense! If he expected to "shoot", then why did he have to delay? After all, he would not have to remove the entire "old guard", but only Khrushchev. He's

with him, according to Shepilov, *grabbed ...*

And since Beria did not "shoot", it is clear that he was not going to seize the highest power! He, in the simplicity of his soul (yes, yes !!), assumed that one of two options was being implemented.

First option...

If Beria is formally second or third, then in any case he will be recognized as an informal leader - due to his obvious intellectual and business superiority over the others.

Second option...

For the same reason mentioned above, after some time, colleagues will still transfer even formal leadership to him. He himself thought he deserved it. And there is evidence of this. Already after the end of the "anti-Beria" plenum of the defeated Beria, Poskrebyshev also decided to bite, submitting the text of his failed speech to the Central Committee (this did not help Alexander Nikolayevich, and he was soon sent to retire).

Acquaintance with this document convinces that Stalin held Poskrebyshev not for the mind, but for the memory. As a result, pouring dirt on Beria and his tub of dirt, Poskrebyshev said a lot of things that, with a correct look at what was reported, testified in favor of Beria as a statesman and a person! Here is one of these passages of Stalin's former secretary:

"Beria tried in every possible way to occupy Comrade during his lifetime. Stalin, the place of the first deputy comrade. Stalin according to the Council of Ministers, believing that he alone is the real successor to Comrade. Stalin.

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When the decision to approve Comrade. Bulganin as the first deputy comrade. Stalin according to the Council of Ministers (in April 1950. - S.K.), then Beria was very dissatisfied with this decision, characterizing Comrade Bulganin as poorly prepared and unable to cope with this work ... "

Firstly, since Poskrebyshev knew about Beria's dissatisfaction with Stalin's decision (!) in real time, then what kind of "servility" of Lavrenty Pavlovich to the "leader", about alleged fear of him, can we talk about? And how many lies about this! And was Beria wrong in assessing Bulganin?

And secondly, didn't Beria have the right to be sincerely offended by Stalin, who never saw the obvious solution? And he did not see, perhaps not because Beria was slandering someone, but because *someone* was slandering *Beria* before Stalin.

Beria clearly did not know how to pretend (please do not confuse it with the ability to create, in the interests of the cause, an idea of himself that is different from the true one!). But Khrushchev mastered the art of pretense to perfection. And since Stalin did not know how to pretend (please do not confuse it with the ability to create an idea of himself that is different from the true one in the interests of the cause!), Khrushchev could circle it around his finger.

It was with Churchill that Stalin always kept his eyes open and the gunpowder in the powder flasks dry. But Mykyta had *his own* ... And not only for Stalin, but also for Beria. Yes, both Stalin and Beria, like any other workers, were somewhat indestructible idealists and believed in their comrades in the party and the leadership of the country. Because Beria and Khrushchev believed. In any case, despite all the doubtfulness of the circumstances of Stalin's death, it is unlikely that Beria could suspect a direct betrayal of the interests of the cause by one of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

In 1998, in No. 5 of the journal New and Contemporary History, Professor Naumov asked the question: "Was there a conspiracy by Beria?" And even the "historian" - "democrat" could not give an affirmative answer to this question in the light of the first "discovered"

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then documents. But he reports a lot of interesting things about Khrushchev's anti-Beria conspiracy.

Such a "servant of all masters" as Fyodor Burlatsky, Khrushchev's close referent, writes directly about this. Burlatsky refers to the memoirs of his patron, who immediately after Stalin's death "sunk into the consciousness that the first thing to do was to remove Beria" ... And here I believe both Khrushchev himself and Burlatsky.

And Beria...

Yes, if Beria, having returned to the united Ministry of Internal Affairs, had been a cynic and an intriguer, then from the very first days he would really have been preparing a coup and, I repeat, would have carried it out quickly and efficiently. And he did it in such a way that outwardly it would not look like a coup. It's just that Khrushchev would suddenly, say, fall ill ... And soon he would be buried with honors in Red Square.

And the presiding minister Malenkov would suddenly die of a nervous shock after the death of such an outstanding leader of the Soviet people. The sequence of "great losses" could, however, be reversed.

Why not assume such a development of events - if Beria was already a "recognized cannibal and intriguer" striving for sole power? And then the acting chairman of the Council of Ministers Beria, with the help of, say, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee Pervukhin, Saburov and Mikoyan, would quickly convene a plenum of the Central Committee, having previously notified all those expelled from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the 1952 model that he intends to again expand the Presidium to the previous limits. And the same 47-year-old ex-member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, secretary of the Central Committee Mikhailov, who at the July plenum spoke about the "vile, provocative activities of the enemy of the party and the people of Beria," would praise Comrade Beria for his attention to young promising cadres. And it would have been in a hat, which only Beria wore from all the then leadership.

Beria did nothing of this, however, even after Khrushchev was dismissed by Khrushchev, the partyocrat Shepilov bent his own: "Khrushchev's great merit is that, on his initiative, Beria was neutralized - a terrible man whose hands are covered in mud and blood."

And it is clear why - Shepilov was a charmer personality

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noah, but politically dishonest. Beria did not seek to charm anyone, but he had the honor. And that's why he and Shepilov were antipodes, but Shepilov was "of the same blood" with Khrushchev. Professor Naumov wrote that after the arrest of Beria, "officials were no longer afraid of arrest, which under Stalin was possible for each of them at any moment. The party-Soviet nomenklatura began to feel freer and act more uninhibited"...

I place the responsibility for the truth of the statement regarding the threat of arrest "at any moment" solely on V. Naumov, but about the nomenclature that has dissolved the belt, I completely agree with him, but with one clarification regarding very, alas, many: "... more relaxed in the satisfaction of selfish interests. Moreover, Naumov let something slip without noticing it, but I will draw the reader's attention to his mistake ... Professor Naumov said that *the party-Soviet nomenklatura* began to feel freer, but there was also the *national economic nomenclature*. And it was she who, after the arrest of Beria, on the contrary, was emboldened by incompetent "partocrats" clamped down.

Need an example?

Please! Moreover, this is evidence of a person who is not located to Beria, the famous rocket scientist B.E. Chertok. In his major work *Rockets and People*, he reports that Minister Ustinov, having taken up rocket

affairs, by 1949 he understood all the "absurdity" of the structure of the leading research institute of the industry - NII-88, but did not dare to reorganize, since the "omnipotent" apparatus of the Defense Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks headed by Ivan Serbin, who had the nickname "Ivan groznyj".

Without Serbin's sanction, no changes, incentives, etc., were possible, and Chertok recalls that he had the opportunity to see for himself more than once: the ministers of this partocrat were "afraid" and "never risked" arguing with him.

But in the nuclear and air defense industries, everything was, according to Chertok, fundamentally different, and he even reports with some sadness that where Beria was in charge, all personnel decisions, for example, were made by Vannikov,

coordinating

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them with Kurchatov and presenting Beria for approval. And the "small apparatus of Special Committee No. 1" prepared draft decrees on appointments that Beria gave Stalin for signature.

Chertok, knowing "atomic" life from the outside, is not accurate in everything, and already Beria's "personnel" resolutions cited in my book show that Beria did not give this most important side of the matter to anyone. But in general, Chertok described the situation correctly. And if so, one asks: did the leaders not *of the party committees* of factories, institutes, design bureaus of the defense industries, but their directors, chief engineers and chief designers "feel freer and act more relaxed" after the "executioner" L.P. Beria was replaced by Serbian party crat?

It would be a waste of time to ask such questions to Shepilov, who "joined" them in the heat of the moment. Shepilov died in 1995, and if he had been a person, and not a political nonentity, he would have snatched from life the right to publicly curse Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and capitalization with his teeth! Teeth, threatening public self-immolation on Red Square! And he "denounced" Beria to the end, although all the Gorbachevites and Yeltsinoids were not worth (and are not worth!) One piece of glass from his broken pince-nez ...

ZATO "LP" BERIA was not only the largest state figure, but also a benign person! And here is another example of this. Stalin died. The "near", Kuntsevskaya dacha was left without an owner, or rather, without the main tenant (the dacha was state-owned!). And, of course, the question arose - how to dispose of it? In the collection "And Shepilov, who joined them," Candidate of Historical Sciences Alexander Shefov reports:

"After the death of Stalin, Beria, bypassing the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU, made a decision according to which the security of the dacha was dispersed (? - S.K.), and their functions were transferred to watchmen from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in fact, since March 53, employees of all *special services became employees of the united Ministry of Internal Affairs*. - S.K.). In May, the dacha was given to the Ministry

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health care of the USSR to accommodate a children's sanatorium there.

What is the style of A. Shefov! "Bypassing the secretaries of the Central Committee", "the guards were dispersed" ...

Yes, unlike the current "free Russians", Lavrenty Beria did not hide behind collective irresponsibility. And he did not spend the people's money and the strength of experienced operatives on air protection. After all, when the head of state lived at the dacha, it was an object of special importance and a KGB security company was required there. And now it was possible to get by with "watchmen".

Moreover, Shefov managed, as it were, to reproach Beria even by the fact that they wanted a dacha give to the kids, because then he says:

"After the arrest of Beria, the question of the dacha "Middle" again arose, and it was decided

transfer to the Central Museum of V.I. Lenin as a branch in order to create a museum of I.V. Stalin."

The hint is clear - Khrushchev, who "neutralized" the "monster" honored Stalin, but the "monster" Beria did not honor the memory of the leader. So he thrashed him. "Logic" worthy of Eliza Doolittle, not yet educated by Professor Higgins.

But the fact is that Shefov is in favor of Beria, dear reader! Is not it? On the one hand, what is this Stalin Museum on the far outskirts of the capital? On the other hand, it is very suitable for a children's sanatorium. Yes, and the memory of Stalin would have been honored in the best and most humane way.

Today, some of the liberals claim an "objective" approach to the "phenomenon of Beria." For example, Oleg Khlevnyuk, editor-in-chief of the Gorbachev-Fund magazine Svobodnaya Mysl, in issue 2 of 1995 of this magazine published an article "Beria: the limits of historical "rehabilitation". I will return to it later, but the name speaks for itself.

And such Khlevnyuks and Naumovs are now inclined to consider Beria as a "pragmatist", allegedly striving for the depoliticization and deideologization of Soviet society. This, of course, is nonsense!

Beria was a convinced Bolshevik ... How often, I

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expecting the nature of the Bolshevik party, today they see in it a party of exclusively destroyers of the old world. Even Elena Prudnikova is convinced: "Extreme oppositionists, fighters against the regime, that is, by psychological type, destroyers gathered there, there were very few creators there" ...

Alas, this is nothing more than a delusion, skillfully formed in the last fifteen years... But the party anthem "The Internationale" said: "We will destroy the whole world of violence to the ground, and then..."

This "then" is overlooked, and then it goes: "... we are ours, we will build a new world"! So, sorry, the Bolshevik Party was a party of builders, which is why its ideas attracted Beria, a builder by nature, immediately after the fall of the autocracy.

Before February 1917, the Bolshevik Party had up to 60,000-80,000 members, and most of them were neither professional revolutionaries nor "extremists", but there were many conscious and developed workers in this party. Actually, the entire intellectual, so to speak, color of the working class of Russia was Bolshevized by 1917.

As for the goals of the Bolsheviks, I will refer to the opinion of Lauren R. Graham, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, whom I have already quoted once. He wrote in 1987 that the original promise of the Russian Revolution to those who supported it was **rational leadership of society**, and that the Bolsheviks saw the 1917 revolution as a decisive breakthrough towards social change, which was the key to progress. As you can see, here we are talking exclusively about creation, and even on an unprecedented scale. Not a single capitalist concern could have given Beria the opportunity to create on the scale that he acquired in the service of Soviet Russia! No wonder he, in a conversation with the head of the Council of Ministers, Pomaznev, proudly remarked about the high-rise building of Moscow University that "this building is equal to the capital of Dupont and other American billionaires."

And this directly echoes the line of Vladimir Mayakovsky: "The Soviets have their own pride! To the bourgeoisie

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ev look down" ... Yes! From the height of the Mikhail Lomonosov Moscow State University!

No, Beria was a convinced Bolshevik. But, being a smart person and business, he understood that:

1) society is ideologically strong not when it wears portraits of "leaders" at demonstrations, but when these leaders live "alive" in the name of those ideas that they proclaim, that is, they do not roll around mountain resorts and do not chase money, but are constantly busy with development problems society;

2) the strength of the political system in the mode of its normal, and not extreme, functioning is determined by the level of optimization of its economic basis and the level of scientific, technical and technological development of the productive sphere as the basis for the growth of the welfare of the people;

3) a multinational state is united when the policy of the central government really knocks out the ground for nationalists for any of their propaganda efforts.

In this sense, Beria was indeed a pragmatist and began to act in this direction immediately after Stalin's death. His initiatives were impressive both for their potential and coverage of all, in fact, aspects of society.

He had specific proposals in the field of: a) public administration, b) economics, c) defense policy, d) domestic national and national policy, e) foreign policy.

In the SPHERE of public administration, he took a clear course towards the transfer of the center for managing economic and economic activities, including large-scale defense projects, from the Central Committee to the Council of Ministers. Actually, all the most promising defense work was already carried out within the framework of the activities of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, but the rest ...

Different views on the priorities of power appeared already at Stalin's funeral. Then three people performed at the Mausoleum: Malenkov, Beria and Molotov. All three speeches were enough

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similar in a very colorless officialdom - there were no special passions and bright places in them.

However, Malenkov over and over again used the formula "Communist Party and the Soviet Government", Molotov also emphatically used the formula "Soviet State", practically without mentioning the party, and Beria spoke even more insistently about the "Soviet Government", without denying, however, the party the right to to be "the leading force in Soviet society."

The leader is not the leader and guide. And Beria's emphasis on the Soviet government was eloquent enough. Moreover, this was exactly what Stalin led to. After all, even during Zhdanov's lifetime, in response to the latter's remark that the party congress had not been held for a long time, he said approximately the following: "That the party ... The party has turned into a meeting of hallelujahs." And then Stalin admitted that the war proved that there were fewer anti-Soviet elements in Soviet society than "we were reported" ... And then Stalin suggested: "We must repent" - before the people, of course.

Silence was his answer, only Zhdanov and Voznesensky supported him (it cost nothing to the latter, he did not organize repressions). However, if Beria also supported Stalin, then this could not get into later memoirs - even oral ones.

It was possible to repent publicly only when Stalin was alive - this would add respect and authority among the people both to him and the party. To repent after his death would mean indirectly undermining this authority. Khrushchev later did so, without repenting, of course, but blaming everything on the "tyrant" Stalin, but what can be taken from a party crat, except for duplicity and falsifications?

Beria preferred to correct distortions and mistakes with deeds. However, the political reform of the organization of the life of society was a difficult long-term task. But in the economic sphere, Beria's new initiatives

appeared immediately and clearly. He always thought big, his managerial decisions now and then "cost" millions, tens, hundreds of millions of rubles. On the other hand, he always demanded to spend no more than necessary. And especially

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this feature of his was clearly manifested already six days after his appointment as the first deputy of the presovmin.

On March 21, 1953, Beria sent a note to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with proposals to stop the construction or liquidate 20 large facilities, the construction of which "in the near future is not caused by urgent needs of the national economy." Everything was explained by the fact that from the beginning of the 50s Stalin succumbed to a certain gigantomania, and this affected the development of a number of ambitious projects. For example, in September 1950, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers on the construction of the Main Canal of the Amu Darya was adopted -

Krasnovodsk, on irrigation and watering of the lands of the southern regions of the Caspian plain of Western Turkmenistan, the lower reaches of the Amu Darya and the western part of the Karakum desert.

At first, the cost of the Great Turkmen Canal was estimated at several billion rubles, but then it turned out that it would really be necessary to spend thirty billion. With projects like the Main Turkmen Canal in mind, Beria wrote:

"The termination or liquidation of some construction projects is also advisable due to the fact that these construction projects require a significant amount of metal, building and other technical materials, equipment, as well as labor ... I consider it necessary to stop or completely eliminate construction ... with a total estimated cost of 49, 2 billion rubles..."

This includes the Volga-Ural gravity canal, the railway tunnel under the Tatar Strait from the mainland to Sakhalin, and the Chun-Salekhard railway. Igarka, and the Kirov chemical plant ...

And economic Beria internal political. And when On March 17, in a note to the Council of Ministers, he proposes: links

"... to transfer from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the jurisdiction of other ministries the main production and economic departments, construction departments, industrial enterprises with all the industrial and construction departments included in them, office premises, subsidiary farms, scientific

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sk and design institutions, with material resources ... "

"Other ministries" are the ministries of metallurgical coal-fired power industry, industry, electrical industry, communications, sea and river building materials industry, oil industry, chemical industry, agriculture and procurement. And

And among the organizations and enterprises transferred to the sectoral ministries: the Main Directorate of the Gold-Platinum Industry, the Norilsk Combine of Non-Ferrous and Rare Metals, Stalingradgidrostoy, Kuibyshevgidrostroy, an amber plant in the Kaliningrad Region ... And others, and others, and others ...

Does this look like the actions of a power-hungry and selfish person who dreams (as in L. Mlechin's false libel) of driving the entire country into the GULAG?

Ministers Tevosyan, Zasiadko, Pervukhin, Yudin, Baibakov, Tikhomirov, Beshchev,

Shashkov, Orlov, Kozlov receive huge new values, personnel, resources in their departments, but... But new responsibility too... Including responsibility for the fulfillment of those planned national economic tasks of 1953, for which the Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible.

And it didn't make everyone happy.

Historian Yuri Zhukov in his book "Stalin: Secrets of Power" sees in such reforms of Beria, however, some kind of tricky double bottom - they say, Beria simply got rid of "unnecessary worries and responsibilities." Well ... Someone sees stars in a puddle, and someone sees only muddy water.

And the Minister of the Interior, **Beria, also refuses the Gulag** - Minister of Justice Gorshenin takes it into his own hands. On March 28, 1953, at the suggestion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the transfer of labor camps and colonies from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to the Ministry of Justice of the USSR" was adopted. Only special camps and prisons remain behind the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where "especially dangerous state criminals sentenced to imprisonment: spies, saboteurs, terrorists" were kept.

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Christians, Trotskyists, Rightists, Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Anarchists, Nationalists, White émigrés..."

Dear reader! How much has been written about the "sadist" Beria, who revels in omnipotence in the "slave empire of the Gulag." In the "materials" of the "investigation" on the "case of Beria" there is an alleged confession of Sergei Goglidze that Beria allegedly "gave instructions to beat those arrested *before being shot*!" And what remains of this lie after such a step by Beria?

But Lavrenty Pavlovich also initiated and achieved the adoption of the resolution of the Council of Ministers "On the abolition of passport restrictions and sensitive areas"!

On May 13, he submits a voluminous note to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, where, among other things, it was said:

"T. Malenkov G.M.<...>

At present, in the Soviet Union, passport restrictions apply to 340 sensitive cities, localities, railway junctions, as well as to the border zone along the entire border of the country with a width of 15 to 200 kilometers ...

Thus, if you look at the map of the USSR, you can see that the whole country is full of secure cities and various restricted areas where it is forbidden for citizens with a criminal record and who have served their sentences to live.

Under the current situation, citizens who have served their sentences in places of detention or exile and thereby atoned for their guilt before society continue to experience hardship and are doomed to ordeal ... "

If this text is cited without a message of authorship, then the note "democrat" will most likely define it as a "samizdat" of that time, exposing the "oprichnik" Beria. And this is a note from the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Comrade L.P. Beria to the highest party "Areopagus".

And on May 20, 1953, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a resolution was adopted that approved the draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, developed by Beria and removing passport restrictions.

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And this is a "monster", "sadist", "geek", "ghoul", "devil"?

Moreover, after Beria's former associates, "even more closely rallied around the Central Committee of the CPSU", dealt with him, on January 21, 1954, by a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, the entire GULAG from the USSR Ministry of Justice was transferred back to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, our "arms covered in blood up to the elbows" are becoming more and more crazy, having reached the "mark" of three hundred thousand annual violent

Society to this day counts deaths for Lavrenty Pavlovich.

But Beria not only knew the price of human blood and therefore always tried to get by with a minimum of it when it was impossible to do without it. Beria was also economical in spending the wealth of the state. He organically did not tolerate extravagance, and after the most necessary expenses for the Atomic Project, including the development of thermonuclear weapons, were made, he began to demand that the leaders of the nuclear weapons complex engage in savings.

During the period of "storm and onslaught" the nuclear scientists were given funds and materials in the amounts in which they requested them. At one time, the country sat without medical thermometers - the Atomic Project needed mercury. Now Beria demanded to fit into the estimates. And this, too (!!!), will be blamed on him at the "Anti-Beria" plenum by none other than Zavenyagin! And the "democrats" and "Russian" "researchers of the mechanisms of political power in the USSR" explain - following the participants of the "anti-Beria" plenum - such activity of Beria solely by the desire to create cheap popularity for himself and facilitate the seizure of power.

And at the same time, the same "democrats" denounce the exorbitant appetites of the Soviet military-industrial complex. But the principle "money loves an account", which was not implemented in his activities, wanted to instill in the military-industrial complex Lavrenty Pavlovich!

LAST large, quite systematically developed, but never
Beria's realized idea was the intention to reorganize the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

After Lavrenty Pavlovich was arrested, "ob

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General Strokach, who was demoted by him to the post of head of the regional department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Lviv region, accused the LP of saying, addressing Meshik, at one of the meetings after his return to the Ministry of Internal Affairs: "We need good workers, Chekists, and not such people who can only chatter from the stands: "Lenin-Stalin."

The typical partocrat Ignatiev flooded both the central and peripheral offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with such "workers". And now Beria was cleaning the "Ignatiev" "stables". For example, he was later blamed for the mass recall of legal foreign intelligence residents from abroad. But very many of them did not know not only the language of the host country, but not a single foreign language at all!

Yes, many things needed to be changed.

The draft "Regulations on the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR" was helped to develop by the Minister, General Boris Obruchnikov. This was a long-term deputy head of special services for personnel (from 1941 to 1952 and from 03/12/53 to 07/03/53 in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and from 07/05/52 to March 1953 in the MGB).

July 3, 1953 - as a staff member (in both senses) of Beria -

Obruchnikov will lose his post, and on March 5, 1954, on the day of the anniversary of Stalin's death, he will be fired at the age of 49 from the Ministry of Internal Affairs "due to the facts of discrediting the State Security authorities" (in 1955, the title of "lieutenant general" will also be deprived). After the arrest of Beria, Obruchnikov retreated from him, but he knew the matter, and therefore the final project for the reorganization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was carefully worked out.

And - impressed.

Having got rid of production activities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, according to Beria's plan, was to become an effectively functioning integrated law enforcement agency for the protection of state and public security, the protection of the state borders of the USSR, the protection of public order, the fight against criminality, while maintaining firefighting duties.

security, registration of acts of civil status, state geodetic control, etc., including "performance of special tasks of the government of the USSR."

The list of all the tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs occupied almost the entire Russian alphabet from the letter "a" to the letter "f", and was not forgotten

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the task of "selecting, training and retraining operational personnel, educating the entire personnel of the Ministry in the spirit of selfless devotion to the cause of the Lenin-Stalin party, honesty, truthfulness and high discipline" ...

Such a Ministry of Internal Affairs could, in its natural development, become a structure that very effectively serves the interests of society, something like the Rabkrin, which never became a serious force, whose active work Lenin dreamed of. Sergo Beria can rarely be regarded as a source of reliable information, but I believe him when he claims that his father "as a specialist ... believed that the Ministry of Internal Affairs should ... inform ministries and departments, help them in solving certain specific questions."

Sergo Beria writes:

"Having enormous potential, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republics could become analytical bodies and work in the interests of the national economy. The party apparatus, which always knew everything, never gave a complete picture of what was happening. And the Ministry of Internal Affairs was capable of such an objective analysis.

"You don't have to chase with a gun, but think with your head," my father said.

This is very similar to the truth, because it is reasonable. However, the very first false official accusation that was made against Beria was "an attempt to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the party."

Moreover, the fact that the party placed itself *above the people* was not a crime in the eyes of Beria's accusers. And that's what happened more and more often. The election of a specialist as a released party secretary was increasingly perceived by him and those around him not as a new level of duties, but as a new level of rights - best case scenario. And in the worst (and increasingly frequent) case, a new level of privilege.

For such a "party" secretary and his apparatus, honest information "upstairs" about shortcomings and failures was impossible. And for whom such information was not only a direct obligation, but also did not threaten with trouble? Of course, for local "authorities". At the same time, the fact

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I did not receive such information publicly - which was also important.

Beria did not appreciate the talkers from the Central Committee, but this does not mean that he did not understand the significance of the party and the role of its Central Committee. The falsity of Beria's accusation of ignoring the Central Committee is already evident from the fact that Beria immediately reported to the Presidium of the Central Committee about the situation in Lithuania, Belarus, and Western Ukraine, which, on his instructions, was collected and provided to him by local Chekists! And on all three "national" notes, decisions of the party organ were adopted - we will soon see this.

But after the arrest of Beria, his notes were removed from the minutes of the Presidium of the Central Committee! The victorious party of partocrats did not need either the "analytical" Ministry of Internal Affairs of Beria, or L.P. Beria.

Mikoyan at the July plenum will accuse Beria of all sins, starting with double-dealing in Musavat Baku (although Mikoyan knew that this was not so). However, Mikoyan unwittingly said an interesting thing (I quote from an uncorrected transcript of his speech):

"When he (Beria. - S.K.) spoke on Red Square over the coffin of Comrade Stalin, then after his speech I said: in your speech there is a place to

guarantee every citizen the rights and freedoms provided for by the Constitution. This is not an empty phrase in the speech of a simple speaker, but in the speech of the Minister of the Interior it is a program of action, you must fulfill it. He me

answered: I will fulfill it ... "

The LP did indeed make such a statement with the highest public tribune of the state. And he really began to fulfill the promise!

Khrushchev in early July 1953 accused Beria of dividing the people's commissariats of internal affairs and state security before the war - they say, it is clear that one should have one ministry. And on February 10, 1954, he himself will allocate a separate State Security Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs . And was it by chance that the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council on the organization of the KGB was marked on March 13, 1954?

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But why weren't Beria's ideas, his notes, proposals rejected? What, Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers were afraid of him? Of course not! It was just that these notes were so accurate that it was impossible to dismiss them. At least as long as the suggester was around, in top management.

Moreover, Beria did not ignore the Central Committee of the CPSU in those cases when officially, according to the existing situation, the sanction of the Central Committee was required. So it was, for example, in the matter of personnel appointments in the Ministry of Internal Affairs - Khrushchev at the plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953 slandered him in this as well. Not to mention the fact that without the consent of the Central Committee, no appointments could have taken place, Beria, the next day (!) After his last arrival at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, sent a note to the Secretary of the Central Committee, Khrushchev:

"In connection with the merger of the bodies of the former MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, I ask you to approve the ministers of internal affairs of the republics, the heads of the regional and regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the list of names and positions follows. - S.K.).

In the future, it may be necessary to make some changes in this composition, regardless of this, the comrades represented must be approved.

L. Beria.

The list of newly appointed includes hundreds of names, but we have to confirm it - Ignatiev heavily clogged the MGB with party functionaries, and now Beria was returning personnel security officers, who had previously been relegated to second and third roles, to the leadership of the special services. And, accordingly, expelled incompetent workers. So, Beria immediately got rid of the typical "partocrat" Epishev (he later, heading the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army from 1962 to 1985, would caricature all the political work in the Armed Forces), taken by Ignatiev as deputy for personnel.

And so on...

"Companions" had to agree with Beria - his proposals were businesslike, specific and well-reasoned. But latently Beria started them all like

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I understand annoying. Before they had time to breathe deeply the air of freedom from responsibility to the strict "uncle" Comrade Stalin, and then his equal, *Lavrenty*, climbs and climbs with unpleasant truth, with troublesome proposals, stirs up, pushes, makes you think and decide ...

And this is just the beginning!

Well, how could Lavrentiy Beria and his old "cadre" Pavel Meshik, who was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine instead of Timofey Strokach, like the leadership of Ukraine, if on May 8, 1953, Beria sends another note to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, prepared according to Meshik. And May 26, 1953

The Presidium of the Central Committee adopts a strictly secret resolution "On the political and economic state of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR."

Later, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Kirichenko at the "Anti-Beria" plenum will accuse the "political provocateur and adventurer" Beria of the fact that the note was allegedly drawn up "according to dubious agents without deep knowledge of the state of affairs on the ground."

Kirichenko will argue that "Ukrainian (? - S.K.) ... peoples are a single family and there are no Western Ukrainians and Eastern Ukrainians in it ... "

First, why then did the plural appear in Kirichenko's speech? Secondly, life itself proved that Beria was right: instead of fighting nationalism, the Khrushchevites simply drove this disease inside ... At first - in the underground of bunkers - "cache", and then - in the "underground" of souls. And today we are reaping the results of the hypocrisy of the Khrushchevs and the Kirichen women...

WHAT ABOUT the note by Beria-Meshik, at that meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, during which it was considered, there were both Kirichenko, and the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Melnikov, and Malenkov, Khrushchev, Korotchenko, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Ukrainian figures Korneichuk and Korniets ... And if Beria was wrong, there would be someone to explain it. However, the note, as always with Beria, hit "on the mark"! Here are some extracts from the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee on it:

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"The Central Committee of the CPSU notes that the political situation in the western regions of Ukraine continues to be unsatisfactory. <...>

In just three months of 1953, military censorship confiscated about 195,000 letters addressed abroad from the western regions of Ukraine, which contain negative statements about the actions of local authorities (as we can see, these and other data are not of undercover, but of completely official origin. — S.K.)...

The serious dissatisfaction of the population of the western regions of Ukraine is caused by the facts of the gross distortion of the Leninist-Stalinist national policy there ... almost all leading positions in the party and Soviet bodies are occupied by workers sent from the eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR and other republics of the Soviet Union. So, for example, out of 311 leading officials of the regional, city and district party bodies of the western regions of Ukraine, only 18 people are from the western Ukrainian population.

Particularly painful is the perception by the population of Western Ukraine of the indiscriminate distrust of local cadres from among the intelligentsia. For example, out of 1718 professors and teachers of 12 higher educational institutions in the city of Lvov, only 320 people belong to the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia...

It is necessary to recognize as an abnormal phenomenon the teaching of the overwhelming majority of disciplines in higher educational institutions of Western Ukraine in Russian. For example, at the Lvov Institute of Trade and Economics, all 56 disciplines are taught in Russian..." and so on.

The nationalists in Western Ukraine were a tough, brutal and real force, but eight years after the end of the war, the fight against them could only be effective if political methods prevailed. Khrushchev, Melnikov, Kirichenko fancied themselves politicians. So they would go to Lvov and would have conversations with the intelligentsia there, would convince

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by her word, and the "Western" masses by their deeds. But the same Melnikov did not want to stick his nose into Lvov. Not to mention Khrushchev.

And what about Beria?

And could the "executioner" and "sadist" declare—as he did—that "the senseless use of repressions (in Western Ukraine. — S.K.) only causes

public discontent?

I draw the reader's attention to the wording "stupid use of repressions"... Repressions in the region where a pioneer from an orphanage could be hanged on his red tie were necessary. But - not *stupidly* total, but targeted, sensible!

Pavel Sudoplatov, who knew nationalism like the back of his hand, after Stalin's death was involved by Beria in the preparation of analytical notes with a detailed analysis of the mistakes of party organizations and state security agencies in the fight against the nationalist underground in Ukraine and Lithuania. And Sudoplatov later wrote that Beria believed: locals should be put in leadership positions, and visitors should be appointed as deputies. "... He was concerned about the problem of educating a new generation of national intelligentsia, for whom socialist ideals would be truly close," Sudoplatov reported in 1997.

Socialist! This alone proves not just the pragmatism of Beria, but his Bolshevik pragmatism!

The situation in Lithuania was also difficult - the "forest brothers" were as active there as Bandera in Ukraine. And on May 16, 1953, Beria submits to the Central Committee a note on Lithuania, which was prepared by General Sazykin, who came to Lithuania on his behalf almost incognito, Sazykin collected a lot of specific data, and they were deadly for the Lithuanian leadership! In the Vilnius Regional Committee, out of 16 heads of departments and sectors, there are only 3 Lithuanians; out of 22 lecturers of the Central Committee and regional committees of Lithuanians 6; out of 87 heads of district departments of the MGB - 9; out of 85 heads of regional police departments - only 10; out of 92 directors of state farms, only 27 are *Lithuanians*; out of 132 directors of MTS - 53 ...

Office work in the Lithuanian language is absent in the republic (!!!), and this "distances power from the masses."

And the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU again has to consider
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to accept this note and at the same meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on May 26 to adopt a resolution on Lithuania as well - after discussing the note by Beria-Sazykin with the participation of the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania Snechkus, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania Gedvilas, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan.

And these are the results of mediocre "work" not only by Snechkus, but also

Chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for Lithuania in 1944-1946 Mikhail Suslov.

Snechkus and Gedvilas arrange a personal meeting with Beria, and Snechkus asks him to help score "all transmissions of enemy stations in Lithuanian". And Beria replies that he is preparing proposals to eliminate the "blockage" that already exists.

"What kind of help is this in liquidating the bourgeois nationalist underground?" - Snechkus shrugged at the July 1953 plenum. But Beria's answer is the answer of an ideological person, a Bolshevik, who understands that ideas must be fought with deeds and ideas. The enemy is making propaganda - make counter-propaganda. The enemy pokes in the eyes of people with your mistakes and shortcomings - fix them!

Khrushchev, Snechkus, Brezhnev, Andropov with their "jammers" achieved exactly the effect that the West needed. And they resorted to "jammers" because they did not know how to work in the name of the masses, nor to convince the masses.

But Beria knew how!

And "tov. Snechkus, **nine years** after the restoration of Soviet power in Lithuania, out of 13,000 Lithuanian communists (a considerable force for a republic with a population of 2.7 million people - if they are communists!) Could not select 75 people for the positions of heads of district police departments - in total - That! Not

managed to grow 65 directors of state farms from national cadres ...

When Pyotr Kondakov, Minister of the Interior of Lithuania, could not clearly answer Beria's questions about the state of the apparatus of the Central Committee and the regional committees of the Communist Party of Lithuania and found it difficult to characterize their secretaries, Beria got angry and told Kondakov that he was not a minister, but an official in uniform assigned to work does not provide and will be released.

Beria was right here too! And he managed to remove Kondakov on June 23 - with the appointment of the head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

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Bryansk region. And what is significant - after Beria's "exposure", the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania did not bother to return such a "valuable" "cadre" expelled from it by Beria to the republic.

Sniežkus at the July plenum falsely stated that the underground "president" of Lithuania, illegally elected in 1949 as chairman of the presidium of the "Union of Struggle for the Liberation of Lithuania", Captain Zemaitis was caught "without the help of Beria."

In fact, Zemaitis (whom Abakumov and Ignatiev could not catch for 9 years) was captured alive on May 30, 1953 in his underground bunker in a forest near Kaunas as a result of an intelligence-Chekist operation carried out by a joint task force of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian SSR and the 4th Directorate Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. And Beria immediately orders Zemaitis to be delivered to Moscow and has a long conversation with him, using the Deputy Minister of the Interior of Lithuania Martavichyus as an interpreter. And he offers Zemaitis to head an already *dummy* nationalist organization.

The Soviet security officers worked out the technology of such operational measures to perfection long ago: the operations of the 20s "Trust", "Syndicate" ... And Beria himself in the OGPU of Transcaucasia knew how to do this well (recall his actions to decompose the Georgian bourgeois-nationalist underground). Moreover, this approach was not only effective, but also humane - why destroy it if you can use it?

And Beria analyzes the state of affairs already in Belarus - after all, there are also "special", western, regions there. And even in Belarus, not everything is all right, and there are disproportionately few indigenous Western Belarusians in the power structures. And on June 12, 1953, the Presidium of the Central Committee, with the participation of Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Beria, adopts a strictly secret resolution on the Byelorussian SSR, by which, among other things, the 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPB Nikolai Patolichev (another "note" party crat) is released from his responsibilities.

And in place of Patolichev, a 39-year-old party is recommended

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active worker Mikhail Zimyanin, who worked in Belarus from 1940 to 1953 and had just been transferred to the Foreign Ministry.

But the implementation of the paragraph of the decree on Patolichev was delayed until the arrest of Beria, and he remained in the republic until 1956, then "switching" to foreign affairs, and from 1958 to foreign trade, having created the USSR in the MVT by the time he retired in 1985 (at the age of 77) a powerful apparatus of the future marauders of socialism ... It is clear that at the July "anti-Beria" plenum, Patolichev gets the floor and reports that "the cunning and dangerous enemy of the party and the state" Beria was preparing a complete replacement of all cadres of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus with Belarusians "up to the district policeman included.

That's what he said, the bastard, - "to the district policeman"!

What is significant! At the "Anti-Beria" plenum, Khrushchev declared:

"After all, here are these notes on Ukraine, on Latvia (Khrushchev made a mistake, it should be "on Lithuania." - S.K.), on Belarus. It's a fact that they are not collected through regional committees,

not through the central committees, they are collected through the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, although these materials are all available in the Central Committee ... "

Okay, so be it! But why, then, those questions that the Presidium of the Central Committee considered on the initiative of Beria, were not posed before the Presidium secretaries of the Central Committee, the same Khrushchev? After all, Beria spoke the case, according to his notes, the decisions of the same Presidium were adopted!

But Khrushchev's reservation was not accidental, because on June 12, 1953, the Presidium of the Central Committee adopted a resolution not only on Belarus, but also on Latvia, and the unflattering note on Latvia was submitted to the Presidium of the Central Committee by none other than ... Khrushchev!

That is, at the plenum, Khrushchev seized himself, and both as one of those who set Beria's notes in motion, and ... the author of the note on Latvia. Where a horse with a hoof, there is a cancer with a claw. Therefore, Khrushchev "also" poke his head into national problems. And then he blamed everything on Beria.

According to the "logic" of the party bureaucrats, Lavrenty Pavlovich, however, should not have been involved in national politics.

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After all, the Ministry of the Interior was not "instructed" to do this, as Mikhail Suslov liked to say.

But Beria, as a statesman, as a responsible and civil person, **as a person, and not an inkwell**, finally, could not be inactive when he saw that he could do something. But he could! After all, even formally he was now the second person in the state, and in terms of his personal and business qualities, he was undoubtedly the first.

And in his one hundred and twelve days after Stalin's death, he worked as always so hard that it's not easy for me to even tell about his activities - no matter how short the story is, it still turns out to be voluminous. And still there is no convenient reason to touch on the topic of Beria's alleged "love affairs", therefore, I will not touch on it for now. I will only note: if I still fail to wedged this topic into my narrative, then it is unlikely that the LP had time for those "glamors" that the secretary of the Central Committee Shatalin so willingly and vilely attributed to him at the July plenum of 1953, and only then - everyone who was not too lazy to slander Beria, "hanging" on him dozens of only failed mistresses, allegedly sent to him for intransigence through the stage. But I will not fail to touch on these insinuations.

But I will not dwell on the position of Beria in the "Yugoslav", "Korean", "Hungarian" and other issues. I'll just say that for all of them, in fact, Beria was right. As for the "Yugoslav" issue, the irony of history was also expressed in the fact that in 1957 Khrushchev accused Molotov of blocking the improvement of relations with the same Tito, an attempt to establish relations with whom in 1953 Khrushchev and Molotov filed as Beria's crime.

I will confine myself to one "Hungarian" quote from Beria's "bunker" letter to Malenkov, where he wrote:

"Suggestions about Nagy Imre should not have been made by me or someone else, but you had to do it, and then I jumped out idiotically, in addition, along with the correct remarks, I allowed liberties and swagger, for which, of course, I should be warmed up tightly."

Beria was referring to the meeting of the delegations of the USSR and Hungary, which took place on June 12 1953 in Moscow. The living tone of this qi

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theta speaks for itself. Moreover, this was written by a man who was unexpectedly thrown from the pinnacle of power into a concrete basement. And in this position he thought about the case, oh

power, and not about their own skin!

Doesn't this speak of the very high spiritual and human qualities of our hero? As evidenced by them, the fact that on June 15 Beria turned to the Presidium of the Central Committee with a note on a sharp restriction of the rights of the Special Conference under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. But if Lavrenty Pavlovich were the sadist, the maniac that his haters portray him as, then the extrajudicial right to dispose of human destinies and lives would be especially attractive and pleasant for him.

BERIA, as always, was busy with many things at once, but far from Russia something happened that forced him to urgently get ready for a long journey - on June 16, a mass strike of construction workers began in East Berlin. It quickly grew into a powerful demonstration, and the next day strikes and demonstrations began in 14 more cities of the GDR ... Rostock, Leipzig, Magdeburg were seething ... In Berlin, the Government House was seized. During June 16-20, 430 thousand people took part in strikes, more than 330 in demonstrations.

thousand.

Such events do not arise from scratch and do not begin on their own. Undoubtedly, unrest began on the direct orders of the West, but their root cause lay in the stupid behavior of the leadership of the GDR and the USSR. After the formation of the GDR, the course towards building socialism was thoughtlessly taken there, and on July 8, 1952, Moscow and Berlin (Vostochny) even decided to force it.

Forced cooperation in agriculture, a starvation resource regime for medium and small private capital (big was nationalized), an irrational tax policy, the deprivation of private entrepreneurs and freelancers of food cards, an excessively repressive policy - this is what fueled the widespread discontent of the Germans. From January 1951 to April 1953, 447,000 people fled to West Germany, including over 120,000 in the four months of 1953 alone.

thousand
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Human. The data are taken from the annex to the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 2, 1953 No. 7576-rs, so you can trust them.

Facts are stubborn things, and although Soviet leaders were often stubborn, they were no more stubborn than facts. After all, they all then went through the school of Stalin. Therefore, it was clear that the policy needed to be changed. At the "Anti-Beria" July plenum, Malenkov admitted:

"We had to soberly face the truth and admit that without the presence of Soviet troops, the existing regime in the GDR is not stable. The political and economic situation in the GDR is currently extremely unfavorable."

And so, shortly before the June events in Germany, a serious discussion flared up in the Kremlin. The majority was inclined towards a temporary rejection of the construction of socialism, Molotov agreed only to the rejection of forced pace.

Beria's position was, as always, deliberate - it was not for nothing that his secretariat received an order from him to find an expert on the economy of the countries of people's democracy. Therefore, the "German" document of the USSR Council of Ministers of June 2, 1953 was meaningful and specific - quite in the style of Beria. This style also consisted in the fact that when developing complex specific problems, the LP determined the general direction, and left the development of measures and recommendations to the experts. Accordingly, the analysis of the situation, given in the appendix to the order of the Council of Ministers, revealed a good knowledge of German realities (for example, there are even recommendations on the line of conduct in relation to ordinary members of the Junge Gemeinde youth religious organization, etc.).

Therefore, the recommending part was reasonable:

- curtail collectivization, limiting itself to societies for the joint cultivation of the land;
- to make car rental stations a lever of influence on the village;
- abandon the policy of crowding out medium and small

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private enterprises and, on the contrary, provide them with loans, raw materials, energy carriers;

— to revise the five-year plan of the GDR in favor of a wider development industry group "B" for the production of consumer goods;

- take measures to strengthen the rule of law and eradicate bare administration in all spheres of German life, including in relation to the church and the clergy;

- set the task of political struggle for the restoration of the national unity of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty.

In the ideology of this approach, one can feel the exact pragmatism that was characteristic of the clever LP. And the real "foreign political" Beria was just as far from the image of a "monster" and "executioner" as the real "internal political" Beria was from him.

Moreover, in terms of the idea of a united Germany, he had a certain authoritative like-minded person, although he could no longer support Beria. I mean, of course, Stalin. On April 7, 1952, he signed a draft note of the USSR government to the US government on the issue of a peace treaty with Germany, which he corrected. Earlier, in a note sent on March 10, 1952 to the USA, Great Britain and France, the USSR proposed to work out a peace treaty "with the direct participation of Germany in the person of the all-German government" after free all-German elections with a guarantee of the subsequent neutrality of Germany (that is, non-inclusion of the united Germany into NATO). The Soviet note ended like this:

"The issue is currently being resolved. Will Germany be restored as a single independent peace-loving state, part of the family of the peace-loving peoples of Europe, or will the split of Germany and the threat of war in Europe connected with it remain in force? The West did not need a neutral Germany, and the split, on the contrary, intensified. At the same time, the leaders of the Communist Party of Germany were much more determined than even Molotov, and the increase undertaken by the government of the GDR

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output standards was the immediate cause for unrest.

One has to face the assertions in the literature that both the strikers and their Western "curators" were inclined to believe that the Russians did not support the Ulbricht government and that the strikers would not be suppressed with weapons.

I don't know how anyone could have guessed that. Any government, if it were formed with the influential participation of the leaders of the unrest of 1953, would not just be anti-socialist (that would be half the trouble), but - anti-Soviet. Therefore, there could be no thought of any detached Soviet position in the presence of Soviet occupation troops in Germany! And once the unrest began, they had to be eliminated quickly, before the Anglo-Americans and the French had a chance to intervene.

Well, Beria knew how to do this too - if he was objectively forced to do so. As I have emphasized more than once, he was not naturally cruel, but life taught him to be - if necessary - as *tough* as the situation required. From childhood, he taught himself to save in everything. And he treated the shedding of blood with the same care: if necessary, then one must be ready to shed it, however

everything must be done to shed it as little as possible in case this cannot be avoided.

A number of sources claim that on June 18, Beria went to Germany in person. But this is not documented - oddly enough. Although the fact of the departure of the First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR outside the state, it would seem, should be easily established. However, Beria's biochronicle is a special thing, here we can always face fraud. What can be considered reliable is that his people were then sent to Germany, including the 3rd

including Zoya Rybkina-Voskresenskaya, as well as chief
(counterintelligence) department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Goglidze.

However, I am inclined to believe that Beria was in Germany for some time, which is indirectly confirmed both by the decisiveness of actions in a situation where it was already necessary to act decisively, and by her relative bloodlessness.

As early as June 17, the commandant of the Soviet sector, General May
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op Dibrov, by his order, introduced martial law in Berlin. Troops were brought into Berlin, Leipzig, Halle, Dresden, Frankfurt an der Oder, Gera and Potsdam. Fire to kill was opened in exceptional cases, but in the end about thirty people were killed and about four hundred were wounded. General Sudoplatov wrote in his memoirs, however, that "thousands of people" died. Although thousands did not die.

Beria's principled position on Germany was as follows: the Soviet Union hardly needs an unstable socialist GDR, completely dependent on our support, and it would be better to go for a united democratic bourgeois Germany, but on favorable terms for us. It was a promising approach! And it was wrong to consider it as a kind of betrayal of our friends in the GDR. In reality, the process of even negotiations on unification, and even with our initiative, would have been multi-stage, but we could win at every stage and provide a number of guarantees both for East Germany and for ourselves.

We could leave united Germany only after the conclusion of a peace treaty. But according to his conclusion, the allies also *had* to leave Germany. Moreover, by becoming the initiators of the unification, Russia would also ensure the loyalty of all sane Germans. And instead of the burdensome financing of socialism in the GDR, we would, on the contrary, receive considerable benefits from the development of economic ties with Germany, for Russia it is traditional

useful and important.

There was one more moment ... The thermonuclear era was about to begin, and few politicians in the world knew this as well as Beria. And this gave the power, focused on internal development at the expense of its own resources, previously impossible opportunities to exclude external encroachment on it. With a correct view of the thermonuclear factor, the threat of external aggression against Russia was quickly reduced to virtually zero, and the military presence of the USSR in Germany, in the center of Europe, from a long-term point of view, no longer had a decisive impact on our military security. In addition, we now had a "buffer" along the line "Poland-Czechoslovakia-Hungary-Romania". So there was a good geopolitical potential in Beria's position.

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However, the "German", like all the other "post-Stalinist" ideas of Beria, failed to materialize.

"But what about the fact that today we have a single Germany?" - perhaps someone will ask. Indeed, one sometimes has to read that Beria de in the "German question" (and in the rest too) was almost a forerunner

Gorbachev. Oh no! The unrealized united Germany of Beria's model and the real united Germany of Gorbachev's example are phenomena of a completely different nature in all respects, except perhaps the contour of the state borders of the FRG that is the same in both versions.

So, if Beria went to Germany, he quickly returned to Russia. And he had only a few days left to be free. He didn't know about it, of course. But others knew. And while he is still a statesman, and not a prisoner of a concrete bunker, I will say something more than significant about his one hundred and twelve days.

On MAY 1, 1953, in Moscow, as always, columns of demonstrators marched along Red Square. And standing on the podium of the Mausoleum Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and others could admire the hundreds of their own portraits that swayed over the sea of heads. Lavrenty Pavlovich once again looked at his own replicated voyage over Red Square, but thoughts arose in him, presumably, contradictory. In any case, the very next week after the holidays, at the very first meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he made a proposal, and the members of the Presidium - oddly enough - accepted it! Yes, and it was difficult not to accept it, because the portrait veneration established in the country in some ways looked like icon veneration. And on May 9, 1953, a decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the design of columns of demonstrators and buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on the days of state festive holidays" appeared. The resolution ordered the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU to submit a draft resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers within two weeks, based on the following:

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"... refuse to decorate columns of demonstrators with portraits, as well as buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on public holidays ... cancel the practice of proclaiming appeals addressed to demonstrators from the government rostrum."

And this step of Beria cannot be regarded as an attempt to win additional popularity for yourself! The rejection of glorifying the leadership, the rejection of guiding greetings, to which the masses were supposed to joyfully shout "Hurrah!", Would add popularity and authority to the authorities, yes.

But — power in general! Who among the millions of Soviet people would have known that Beria proposed this? So Lavrenty Pavlovich thought in terms of the state here too. However, he and this proposal will soon be blamed. This will be done at the Plenum of the Central Committee by the most colorless of all the then leaders of the country - Andreev, and his accusations will be expressed in the style of a bad anecdote - we will see this again!

Lavrenty Pavlovich will also be blamed for his other brilliant idea! Looking ahead, I will tell you about it, using the uncorrected transcript of the speech of Beria's longtime colleague, Mir Jafar Bagirov, at the same "anti-Beria" plenum of the Central Committee in July 1953. Then the 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Bagirov, also betrayed Beria, calling him a chameleon, the worst enemy of the party and people, a double-dealer and a scoundrel (this did not help Bagirov, and he survived Beria only for three years: he was arrested in March 1954, shot in May 1956). And on July 3, 1953, Bagirov said:

"Bagirov. ... Beria calls me and says: "You know that I am preparing a question about orders." I tell him: "How do you cook this?" He recovered and says: "We want to establish new orders." I think the issue of orders is not an easy issue ... This is part of the functions of the Central Committee of the party, the government (as if Beria was not the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

- S.K.), this is a question of politics, how can he prepare this question.

Pegov. Moreover, this is not the business of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ... "

Here I will interrupt the quotation in order to notice: how vividly in the remark of Nikolai Pegov, who lived a long and gray

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the life of an apparatchik, that mediocre, clerical attitude to business was manifested, which received its classical conclusion in the famous phrase of another all-Union seriatin - Suslov, who said: "We were not instructed" ...

From the words of Bagirov himself it followed, as we have already seen and will see again, that the personal irresponsibility of the "leaders" gradually began to triumph in the country - they spoke of the Central Committee as a living being, which must always utter "We" ... You involuntarily recall Beria's question to Kalmykov and Raspletin: "Who held the pen?" about their answer: "We wrote" ... I also remember how the question of the discouraged hero of the sketch Arkady Raikin: "Who sewed the suit?" he was also answered: "We." Alas, this universal "WE-changing" then already became

ubiquitous.

And Bagirov led further:

"Bagirov. And even more so, it does not happen that even on the smallest questions ... they do not call from the apparatus of the Central Committee ... or the apparatus of the Council of Ministers. As a rule, they always say: I am calling on behalf of the Central Committee ... He has only one self.

Malenkov. What orders?

Bagirov. Orders of culture, union and republican orders of culture.

Malenkov. For what category of people?

Bagirov. For artists, theater workers.

Malenkov. For example, what orders?

Bagirov. You ask him...

Malenkov. Orders can be someone's name.

Yusupov (Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR. - S.K.). On his instructions, I received a call from his assistant Ordynytsev that Beria was making a proposal to establish two groups of orders: the first ... - union, the second - republican; then establish the orders of the great people of the national republics ... He (Bagirov. - S.K.) Nizami, the Uzbeks - Alisher Navoi ... ".

But that's great! This is smart national policy! Here is an example... Ukrainian Pavel Meshik, sent from Moscow, caused a shock at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine when

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spoke to those present in Ukrainian and advised Russians working in Ukraine, including First Secretary Melnikov, to teach it. He was supported only by the playwright Alexander Korneichuk, but Meshik was right! And he did this because he went through the school of Beria, that is, he was a person who chooses a line of behavior that is optimal for ensuring the interests of the work assigned to you.

When Meshik proudly told Sudoplatov about this, the latter remarked to Meshik that he was supposedly a fool if he "comes into conflict with the local authorities" (as if Meshik himself was not the government!).

In such an answer, Sudoplatov immediately shows the depth of the difference between him and Meshik as social figures. Meshik was a "personnel" frame of Beria, he was arrested immediately after Beria, and shot in one "case". And they were shot because both of them came into conflict with the "local" authorities -

Meshik in Kyiv, Beria in Moscow. Of course, it was easier to turn such people into cremation ashes than to respond to their proposals, to reckon with their criticism and work, work, work...

The first secretary of the Lvov Regional Committee Serdyuk (this one will also be noted among

speaking at the July plenum) chose a mansion for housing, which housed a kindergarten of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Meshik prevented and put guards there. The secretary of the Kyiv Regional Committee Shelest (the future "owner" of Ukraine) took a fire supervision boat for hunting and did not return it, and Meshik reported to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Council of Ministers of Ukraine.

People call it honesty and integrity. The partocrats stupidity and a tendency to squabble. But Beria and Meshik were people, not partocrats. By the way, the veterans of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with whom the author of the book "Who are you, Lavrenty Beria?" A. Sukhomlinov, unanimously speak of Meshik as a person dedicated to the work that he was entrusted with.

Why, and L.P. Beria was the same. And I did not expect special "carpets" from life for this. And therefore, he did not understand how others could be eager for them ... So it is not surprising that on the opening day of the "Anti-Beria" plenum - July 2, 1953, the manager of the affairs of the Council of Ministers Pomaznev filed

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Malenkov and Khrushchev a memorandum-denunciation of Beria (Pomaznev really wanted to be among the speakers).

Personnel apparatchik Pomaznev accused Beria of sabotaging the "most important" cause - the preservation of party, trade union and Komsomol workers of the benefits and benefits established for the most important sectors of the national economy if they were nominated for party or Komsomol work from industry. *"This issue was considered many times and was eventually removed due to the unwillingness to solve it and the protests on the part of Beria,"* Pomaznev wrote.

Beria reasoned simply and sensibly: benefits were associated with certain work ... The head of the site at the mine received "underground" because he worked in harmful conditions, underground. But, having become, for example, an instructor of the city committee, he no longer worked underground. So what is he paying for now? No job, no benefits. Besides, what kind of ideological professional fighter for the ideas of the party is he, if he counts rubles? Moreover, when he switched to party work, he did not remain without a piece of bread, and even with butter ...

However, the "elite" more and more craved benefits, privileges, "smart" life ... One hundred and ten apartments in the section of the high-rise building being put into operation on Kotelnicheskaya Embankment received one and a half thousand applications!

Beria then ordered Pomaznev to make a certificate for each request, and then report to him. Well, of course, you bastard!

WENT the first months of life without Stalin.

April...

May...

The irritation of Beria's "colleagues" accumulated.

Khrushchev was dissatisfied with the fact that Beria did not put the apparatus of the Central Committee above the fact that this machine deserves it.

Molotov was offended by the activity of Beria in the foreign policy sphere, which he considered his diocese, although he had never been an independent figure here.

Malenkov was undoubtedly stung by the fact that he, "pre
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prime minister", lost in comparison with Beria even in his own eyes.

Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan had their own claims - not businesslike, but what difference does it make if they were ...

On June 26, 1953, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed his last government document - Order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 8532-rs on the design assignment for

construction of the SU-3 plant of plant No. 813.

SU-3 is a plant for the production of "2% tin-115", that is, without code "tricks" - a plant for the primary enrichment of uranium. And, perhaps, it is symbolic that Beria put his last state signature under the document on the construction of a new enterprise. After all, he wanted to build all his life! And he built - until June 26, 1953.

On the same day he was arrested. And immediately after him, or a little later, generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Bogdan Kobulov, Sergey Goglidze, Pavel Meshik, Vladimir Dekanozov, Lev Vlodzimirsky and Vsevolod Merkulov, who were close to him, were arrested.

The last, already inglorious stage began in the fate of Beria, and another in the fate of the country.

But, as it turned out, also in the end inglorious.

Chapter 25

ARREST ET CAETERA

TODAY there is no doubt that the initiative to eliminate Beria came exclusively from Khrushchev. Another question is how and when he decided to stage such an interrogation in front of his colleagues. And did he decide at all - if we mean the majority of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

However, a number of details suggest that the arrest of Beria was being prepared *by someone* for a very long time and cannot be recognized as a spontaneous event! And even more so, it is impossible to blame everything on the disclosure of the mythical "conspiracy" of Beria, which never even existed in the plans - neither by Beria, nor by six of his arrested associates.

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In this book, I cannot devote much space to the question of the role of the "golden elite of the West" in the events of those days, and I will simply express an integral conclusion: at least from the second half of 1952, there were already primary agents of Western influence in Khrushchev's entourage. They deftly exasperated Khrushchev's bile, played on his ambitions, and on a sense of fear, and on his hurt pride. They also provoked and provoked Khrushchev into active actions, first against Stalin, and then against Beria.

For Khrushchev himself, these actions were the key to his personal enduring prosperity at the heights of power. It was important for the Golden West and its agents to thwart the possibility of Russia's sustainable development. I think this is one of the reasons why immediately after the arrest of LP, his further fate began to grow not just with rumors, but with deliberately created myths, as well as forgeries, falsifications and provocations.

Therefore, the only reliable date and fact in the series of those days can only be considered the date and fact of the arrest of Beria himself. And, for example, to say when his other associates were arrested, I personally will not risk it. I won't risk it either because I am convinced that there are so many forgeries in the "case" of Beria and in the "investigative cases" of those who were allegedly tried with him that these multi-volume works should be regarded as a complete fake - through and through.

It is believed that almost immediately after the arrest of Beria, Bogdan and Amayak Kobulov were arrested on June 27. The Minister of State Security of Ukraine Meshik was allegedly arrested on June 30th. Allegedly in Kyiv ... But here is a book by Andrey Sukhomlinov - the only one who wrote about Beria who had access to his investigative file - "Who are you, Lavrenty Beria?". The author is a professional lawyer, and I will refer to him more than once. So, Sukhomlinov cites a facsimile of the protocol of the personal search of Meshik Pavel Yakovlevich dated June 30, 1953,

held "in the premises of the internal prison of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR" at 23:50 on June 30 by Major Moiseev P.M. in the presence of the deputy head of the internal prison Talanov D.A.

So, on June 30, Meshik was already in Moscow. But he still needed it in Kyiv arrest and transfer to Moscow! Zna

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chit, Mexic was arrested between 26 and 29 June. However, the search was carried out "on the basis of an order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR No. A-109 dated June 30." Sukhomlinov cites a facsimile of the warrant itself, signed by Deputy Minister Ivan Serov. And there is an entry: "The warrant was presented to me *on July 1, 1953 at one o'clock. 02 min. 45*" and Meshik's signature. It turns out that in Kyiv Meshik was arrested illegally? And even in Moscow, they first searched, and only then presented an arrest warrant.

The arrest warrant for Meshik states that he was issued to Major K.N.

Vladimir Georgievich Dekanozov, a longtime colleague of Beria both in the Transcaucasus and in the NKVD of the USSR, who worked a lot in the foreign affairs department, and at the time of Beria's arrest, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Georgian SSR, according to the profile of the arrested person, was arrested on June 30, 1953. However, the reason for the arrest is not an arrest warrant, but a decision on the choice of a measure of restraint by the USSR Prosecutor's Office dated July 3, 1953.

The picture of the arrest of the head of the 3rd department (military counterintelligence) of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sergei Goglidze, is also cloudy. The questionnaire of the arrested person was compiled in the Butyrka prison of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, apparently on June 27, 1953. At the same time, A. Sukhomlinov reports that the materials of the criminal case do not disclose "how Goglidze was arrested on the night of June 26 to June 27 in the GDR" and how he was taken to Moscow. Goglidze was detained allegedly on the basis of warrant No. A-98, which chronologically could not be issued earlier than warrant No. A-92 for the arrest of Bogdan Kobulov, marked on June 27 and signed by the new Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Kruglov. It turns out that Krugloye only signed the arrest warrant in Moscow on June 27, and on the night of the 27th Goglidze was already arrested in Germany. So, could he have been arrested on the warrant allegedly on the basis of which he was arrested?

According to the memoirs of General Sudoplatov, he learned about the arrest of Beria, Bogdan and Amayak Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik at a meeting with the new Minister Kruglov in the middle of the day on June 27 ...

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It's all strange...

The decision of the USSR Prosecutor's Office on the choice of a preventive measure for Goglidze is also dated July 3, 1953 (as in the case of Dekanozov). And the first interrogation of Goglidze was allegedly conducted by Deputy Chief Transport Prosecutor G. Terekhov, State Counselor of Justice of the 3rd class, on July 2 (without indicating the time of interrogation in the protocol, which was a serious deviation from the procedure).

Andrey Sukhomlinov, himself an experienced prosecutor (in 2007 he turned 60, as I understand it), drew attention to all these inconsistencies, but explains them by the negligence of those who conducted the investigation.

I think that the matter is not only in negligence, but also in that huge amount of falsification, without which the "case" of Beria would not exist. Too much had to be manipulated, backdated, etc., and it was hardly possible to do without overlays even with special care. Although there was no thoroughness - here you can completely trust the evidence on this subject of the same

Sukhomlinov.

In addition, all arrest documents were signed by the new Prosecutor General of the USSR, Khrushchevite Roman Rudenko. They were urgently replaced in this post by Grigory Nikolaevich Safonov, who was on good terms with Beria and was even considered "Beria's man." Rather, however, he was just an honest man. Sukhomlinov, referring, among other things, to the testimony of the former First Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR N.A. Bazhenov, writes that Safonov was soft, good-natured, unassuming, completely devoid of ambition and bureaucratic ambition. Bazhenov testifies that in the early 60s, Safonov, demoted to deputy head of a department in the RSFSR Prosecutor's Office, was the most diligent and conscientious worker in the department, and he was then about sixty.

And if we judge Beria by "his man" Safonov, not forgetting also the principle: "Tell me who your friend is, and I'll tell you who you are", the personality of LP is illuminated with an additional good light.

The appointment of the Prosecutor General of the USSR is the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but Safonov was illegally relieved of his duties at the meeting

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Denmark of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on June 29, 1953. At the same time, Rudenko was appointed in his place. Thus, that socialist legality, which Beria allegedly violated, was "restored".

Rudenko and gave a formal sanction for the arrest of Beria - he gave it on July 8, a week and a half after the actual arrest. And such a delay, perhaps, is indicative not only from a legal point of view. Even Rudenko was obviously afraid for some time that events might go in a direction unfavorable for the Khrushchevites. But after the end of the Plenum of the Central Committee, which lasted from July 2 to July 8, 1953, was successful for them, the Khrushchevites grew bolder.

Moreover, I think it was all the easier to officially sanction on paper the arrest of Beria Rudenko, since by July 8 either Beria was no longer alive, or his extrajudicial murder was a matter of the next few days. But that's a separate issue...

The head of Beria's secretariat, Lyudvigov, was also arrested (right at the Dynamo stadium, at football) and the former head of Beria's bodyguard, Sarkisov. The latter figure is also interesting in that Beria removed Sarkisov from his post three weeks before his arrest and transferred him as deputy head of a department to the 1st Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. And there, apparently, Sarkisov would not have stayed long.

Based on this, General Sudoplatov in his memoirs suggests that either the decision to arrest Sarkisov was made by people who did not know about his resignation, or the decision was made when Sarkisov was close to Beria.

The second is not entirely excluded, but, most likely, everything is explained differently. Who is Sarkisov? Compared to the "whales" of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he is not even a crucian, but so - gudgeon. And now - he is arrested ... Is it because he was very suitable as a figure for fabricating "everyday", so to speak, "accusations" against Beria, and that was exactly how he was later used? That is, an unjust judgment was prepared in advance over Beria.

But by whom?

Khrushchev could not and did not directly deal with the development of "technical" details. But someone, it turns out, was engaged? In advance! And in a generalized portrait

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of this "someone" the ears of the "gray" are very clearly visible, or rather -

"dirty", "cardinals" of various kinds.

Much has been written about the arrest of Beria, but virtually nothing about the arrest of his associates. In all versions of the arrest of Beria, it is reported that he was arrested by the highest military on the orders of either Khrushchev or Malenkov.

And who arrested Sarkisov?

And who are Kobulova and Goglidze? Who are Meshika and Dekanozova? Who - Vlodzimirsky?

It wasn't Marshal Zhukov or General Batitsky who arrested them?

And on whose orders were these arrests made? The orders, for example, were signed by the renegade Kruglov and the Khrushchevite Serov. But who pointed out to them that it was precisely this "six" that should be arrested?

Why is clear. All six were close to Beria even in Transcaucasia, and it was their "testimony" that could denigrate Lavrenty Pavlovich, covering, in fact, all periods of his activity. But this once again confirms the presence of a well-thought-out conspiracy against Beria, the details of which, in terms of the level of thoughtfulness, simply could not belong to the unsophisticated mind of Khrushchev!

MUST inform the reader that I do not intend to pay much attention to the question of how and by whom L.P. was arrested. Beria. In the literature on this subject, you can find a dozen versions - both solid, and dubious, and completely adventurous, including the most extreme "version" of Sergo Beria, according to which his father allegedly died during the alleged storming of the mansion in which the Beria family lived.

Reliable same in the history of the arrest of Beria himself, I repeat, the fact of the arrest. And - the undoubted fact that the arrest was made on June 26, 1953.

Second in terms of extremism after the "version" of Sergo Lavrentievich, one should recognize the version according to which Beria, who was arrested in the Kremlin by a group of top military men led by Marshal Zhukov (with, most likely, the presence of General Moskalenko in it), was shot on the same day in an underground bunker MVO headquarters. Yuri Mukhin in his books claims

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No, that's how it all happened, and Beria's letters from the bunker are fake.

What can I say ... The fact that Beria was in the Kremlin before his arrest, and not at home, is confidently documented according to the latest order of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 8532-rs, signed by Beria as one of the leaders of the state, on the construction of a new "atomic" facility at plant No. 813. He could sign it only in the Kremlin and only before his arrest. And, therefore, he went to his last meeting in his life from his Kremlin office.

But where did he go?

You can also read different things in different memoirs about where Beria was arrested. However, an analysis of the documents leads to the conclusion that the arrest took place during a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

So, Beria did not die during the storming of his home residence. But how What happened before and after?

The writer Vladimir Karpov, who blindly and stupidly hates Beria, nevertheless rendered a good service to the cause of clarifying the truth about Beria, citing examples of lies in the description of the arrest given by the same person - Marshal Zhukov - in two different publications: the collection "Beria" known to us : the end of a career "(1991) and in the book" Zhukov: commander and man "(1988). Karpov gives a number of discrepancies, for example:

Bulganin called	Called Khrushchev
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went Bulganin	Came to the Kremlin to the Kremlin in one car, on the call of Khrushchev
Conversation in the meeting room	Conversation of the Presidium, in Khrushchev's office
The task of arrest	The task of arrest puts Malenkov, puts Khrushchev

Yuri Mukhin, analyzing these and other discrepancies (different authors have enough of them), concludes that everyone is lying. And they lie because Beria was immediately shot dead, and so on.

No, they lie, they lie, but for different reasons. First, lie on command criminalists as *eyewitnesses*. That is

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they lie not consciously, but due to the peculiarities of the perception of acute events by the human consciousness. But many lie and deliberately. Who - removing the blame from themselves. Who - exposing "custom" "smoke screens". Some are accustomed to lies, to double standards, to double-mindedness... A long-term habit - from July 2, 1953, from the day the "anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee began.

But no one would undertake to shoot the LP immediately after the arrest. And here I invite the reader to reflect together. Imagine mentally how things could have happened...

Here Khrushchev - alone or together with one of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee - invites Zhukov, Moskalenko to him and reports that "there is an opinion" to arrest Beria for such and such reasons and that the Presidium of the Central Committee entrusts this difficult task to them.

It can hardly be doubted that such a message should have stunned the generals, but it can hardly be doubted that they did not refuse such an assignment. After all, the highest authority was the party, and the top leadership, not the perpetrators, would be responsible for the arrest.

Zhukov's allegedly widely painted dislike for Beria (Sergo Beria, by the way, denies it) hardly played any role if only because Beria could not collect any "compromising evidence" regarding Zhukov in the forties, having nothing to do with special services. I have to remind you of this over and over again insofar as delusions on this score are very tenacious.

Let's return to the analysis of the arrest. By agreeing to its production, the generals could not insist on the obligation of an arrest warrant. On the one hand, the legal procedure for issuing a warrant would create a risk of information leakage, on the other hand, the arrest had to be carried out in the presence of the leaders of the party and government, and the very composition of witnesses to the act of arrest excluded anyone's claims to the military regarding their violation of the laws of the USSR. According to the charter, the last order must be carried out, and the person who issued this last order will be responsible for the cancellation of the previous order.

But this is true for arrest. Arrest is a reversible action: today you are arrested, tomorrow you are released. But as

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there about the execution not sanctioned by legal order? This is an action with irreversible consequences.

Zhukov, Moskalenko, Batitsky and anyone else could have arrested Beria on a verbal order from the leadership - no matter what - they could still ... But shoot him without investigation and trial, without a court verdict, without at least a direct written order?

No, no one would want to commit such a grave violation of the law. Here, at least some kind of material guarantee was required, namely, the written sanction of Khrushchev, or even several members of the Presidium. But could you give

Khrushchev's written sanction? Of course not! Therefore, Beria was arrested and after the arrest he was only isolated, and not immediately shot.

But how many "most reliable" stories and even "documents" are heaped up about this day and its evening, not worth the paper on which they are printed. And I wonder how, out of a pile of fables about that day, some lively writer has not yet concocted a screenplay for a political thriller. It would feature tank columns on the streets of Moscow, and 216 Il-28 bombers of the 56th Aviation Bomber Division, frozen on the concrete of the Migalovo airfield, under the command of Lieutenant General of Aviation Hero of the Soviet Union Dolgushin, and Dolgushin himself, painfully deciding -

whether to obey the order of the Air Force Commander of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General of Aviation Krasovsky, if he orders to bombard the Kremlin ... And how spectacular would the panoramas of the airfields in Podolsk and Kubinka look with Il-10 attack aircraft of the 5th Guards Assault Division and MiG- 15" of the 9th Fighter Air Division! Or three tank regiments of the Guards Kantemirovskaya division rushing along the Kyiv highway ...

Various authors, even such a seemingly serious historian as Yu. Zhukov, assure that everything was so. Zhukov, obviously copying someone else, also reports on the tanks of the Taman division (actually a motorized rifle division) that entered Moscow along the Kyiv highway, and ...

And it is very likely that everything could have been so if Khrushchev and Co. had decided to put on a spectacular show called "Liquidation of the Beria conspiracy."

However, in 1953 such shows were not yet in vogue, and I doubt very much that all

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the above thriller details from the "memoirs" of generals and veterans really took place. If something similar happened in Moscow on June 26, 1953, then the very next day she would be paralyzed by rumors. And they would crawl all over the country. And this was not.

No, General Krasovsky did not give an order to General Dolgushin to bomb the Kremlin, and the tanks of the Kantemirovskaya division did not block the exits from the Kremlin, which forever disgraced their once battle banners only forty years later - in October 1993, when Soviet power was shot.

I do not exclude, however, that some fuss - with combat alerts, with the withdrawal of a certain number of tanks from their locations to the roads near Moscow, etc. - took place, because it was necessary to somehow stage countermeasures against the "conspiracy".

But if the show had taken place in expanded form on the streets of the capital, then it is unlikely that the authorities would have been able to withstand such a long informational pause in the first period after Beria's arrest, which was sustained. I'll talk about it shortly, but before that, I can't help noticing this...

Dear reader! I wrote everything that was said above about the hypothetical film thriller even before I read in the weekly Antenna Tele-7 for November 12-18, 2007 about the filming of the 8-episode series The Hunt for Beria by a certain Alexei Pimanov. The premiere is to take place on March 5, 2008, on the day of the 55th anniversary of Stalin's death.

These lines of mine are being written on the night of November 17-18, 2007, and I very much assume that much of the above will be present in Pimanov's film libel, and I speak in advance of Pimanov's "work" as a libel with such confidence because the Pimanovs are nothing but libels, do not "create" and cannot "create".

AND NOW about what the informational break et caetera was like (and so on and so forth)...

The author of the book "Bandits of the times of socialism" Fedor Ibatovich Razzakov

claims that it was Beria who stood "at the origins of the de-Stalinization of Soviet society, contributing to the fact that the name of Stalin gradually disappeared from the pages of the mass press." To justify this, it is absolutely inconsistent

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Razzakov counted the number of references to the name of Stalin in the editorials of Pravda and stated that from the end of May 1953 until the end of June, when Beria was arrested, there was only one reference to Stalin. But, they say, after the arrest of Beria, in the first week alone, Stalin's name was called 12 times.

This statement by Razzakov prompted me to study Pravda's annual volume for 1953! So, Fedor Ibatovich considered it not quite right, although the number of references to Stalin, compared with January-March 1953, for the period he "calculated" really decreased sharply. This is a fact that deserves the closest attention and study, but did Beria influence the line of printing? In this specific sphere he never was and could not be because of the fundamental difference between his direct nature and the flexible natures of the "fighters of the ideological front of the Central Committee."

In Pravda, after the mourning of March 1953, editorial and ideological articles did not personally mention any of the current top leaders - the concept of "collective leadership" was heavily used. Moreover, in such advanced Pravda, for example, as the leading ones for May 11, 1953, Urgent Tasks of Komsomol Organizations, for June 22 - The Power of the Soviet System, Stalin really is not mentioned, which is hard to believe, even with a newspaper sheet in front of eyes. However, most of the advanced of that period are purely industrial, so to speak, in nature, and it was hardly necessary to commemorate Stalin in connection with the problems of field crops or animal husbandry. In addition, Beria, with his enormous workload, had only worries about immediate "de-Stalinization" to think about.

After the arrest of Beria, the increase in the number of references to Stalin in the editorials of Pravda was visible to the naked eye, but here the "collective leadership" laid a straw for itself in a crisis situation. A month later, after the "Anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee, the name of Stalin in Pravda is again rarely mentioned, to the point that on December 21, 1953, the first birthday of Stalin, celebrated without him, Pravda did not remind the country in a single line, How important is this day! It would seem incredible! But -

fact.

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Returning to the topic of the arrest, I will inform you that with Razzakov's "submission" I have established one more interesting fact. Not only in the first week after the arrest of Beria, but in general for the period from June 27 to July 10 (tenth !!) I, to my greatest surprise, never saw the name of Beria in Pravda!

He was arrested, as the reader remembers, on Friday, June 26th. However, neither on the 27th, nor on the 28th, nor on the 29th, nor on June 30, nor on July 1, nor on July 2 - on the opening day of the Plenum of the Central Committee, about the beginning and work of which the main press organ of the CPSU also kept silent, nor on all days of the work of the Plenum about the "agent of imperialism" and the "enemy of the people" Beria was not said a word!

Would such a long silence be possible if the case with the arrest of the LP had not been concocted quickly and *without noise*, so that everything went out of the blue? What if, on the day of his arrest, on the cobblestones of Red Square, tracks were clanging by no means ceremonial armored crews?

Hardly...

Only on July 10 *did it bang*: in the upper left corner of the front page of Pravda posted "Information message about the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU":

"Recently, a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist parties of the Soviet Union.

Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, after hearing and discussing the report of the Presidium of the Central Committee - comrade. Malenkova G.M. about the criminal anti-party and anti-state actions of L.P. Beria, aimed at undermining the Soviet state in the interests of foreign capital and expressed in perfidious attempts to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR over the government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, decided to withdraw L.P. Beria from the Central Committee of the CPSU and exclude him from the ranks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as an enemy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. The authors of this message did not even notice the absurdity of what was reported! With a strictly logical approach, there could be only one conclusion from the message: the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is an organ of foreign capital.

But was it up to the logic then "to the top"!

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BACK, however, at the end of the day on June 26. Sukhomlinov writes that Beria was taken out of the Kremlin at 5:30 p.m., and this is in good agreement with the overall picture of what was happening, as it seems to me. Sukhomlinov also reports that they first took the LP to the garrison guardhouse in the Alyoshinsky barracks, and on June 27 they transferred it to the bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, on Osipenko Street, 53.

On that Saturday evening, the Bolshoi Theater hosted the premiere of Yuri Shaporin's updated opera The Decembrists, which was to be attended by all the country's top leaders, including Beria. And only by the absence of his name in the newspaper reports about the visit by the leadership of the Bolshoi Theater, someone could suspect something was wrong. But by the way ... You never know the reasons for the loss of one name from the leading "clip"! A person fell ill and did not go to the performance - in total

then and there...

Alas, on June 21, Beria was no longer a spectator, but a participant in a vile "performance" in life, and the investigator of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, Tsaregradsky, who was appointed by an unknown person, fills out an arrest form for him. A. Sukhomlinov also cites a facsimile of it, and the pages of his book with facsimile reproduction of some documents on the case of Beria and his associates seem to me to be among the most valuable.

Here is this questionnaire ... It is supposed to paste a standard prison photo in front and in profile into it. But, of course, there was no prison photographer at the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, and Beria was photographed only from the front and not from the prescribed distance, so the photo turned out to be large, on it, unlike most prison photographs, the details of the face are better visible, his expression is more clearly visible and, most importantly, , glitter eyes. For some reason, Sukhomlinov considers this photo "comic", although it is certainly tragic not only because it was taken in a prison, but also because of the very "texture" - a smart, slightly - not yet deadly - tired person looks at us from it without the slightest malice and cruelty in his eyes.

The photo came out strong.

It was made a day after the arrest, and it is clear that the first explosion of feelings has already passed. And he, presumably, was ... I write "presumably", because, I repeat, the entire short period of Beria's life after June 26, 1953 is exactly recreated

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becoming hardly possible both in the main and in the details. For example, Sukhomlinov, who had access to allegedly authentic documents, reports the arrest of Beria Sarkisov, **the head** of security, although by the time Beria was arrested, Sarkisov had already been **the former** head of his security for three weeks and held the position of deputy head of a department in the 1st Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It's also unlikely to be accurate.

"the most accurate" - according to Sukhomlinov - his reconstruction of Beria's last day in the Kremlin. Sukhomlinov is clearly unaware of the last "atomic" document signed by Beria, and immediately upon arrival in the Kremlin directs him to Malenkov's office. Sukhomlinov does not take into account the fact that just the day of Beria's arrest became the day of the formation of the "atomic" Ministry of Medium Machine Building. But this author had the most favorable opportunities for clarifying the truth compared to the rest!

But some things can be considered reliable. And these are, first of all, Beria's letters from the bunker. They are genuine - very much psychologically accurate. True, prosecutor Sukhomlinov, who knows what he is writing, reports that "in the organs ... then there were investigators-"killers" and investigators-"writers" and that the latter "were such masters in literature and in presenting evidence in Russian that they even experienced editors of any publishing house would envy. This message is valuable and important, among other things, because it explains, in my opinion, where the numerous volumes of Beria's "case" came from. However, it is unlikely that the staff of the Ignatiev-Kruglov Ministry of Internal Affairs of the sample of 1946-1953 had a new Leo Tolstoy or Anton Chekhov. Smoothly concocting "testimony" is one thing ... But in order to write letters from the bunker, one had to either have an outstanding literary talent, combined with knowledge of many details of the activities of the country's top leadership for many years, or ... Or be Beria .

General Batitsky was responsible for the protection of Beria at the headquarters of the Moscow Military District. In the collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953" it is reported that his notes relating to the conditions of writing the first letter have been preserved in the archives. *"WITH. secret. In the Central Committee of the CPSU. Personally, Comrade Malenkov G.M. Received at 19.20 27.6.53. Batitsky" and "4 sheets of paper were issued. 2 sheets return*

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teal, torn 1 sheet, 1/2 sheets used, 1/2 sheets remained on hand. Batitsky.

There were three letters in total. However, in accordance with Batitsky's note, the first letter was received by him from Beria at 19:20 on June 27, while the first letter published in the above-mentioned collection of documents is dated June 28 (the same date is also visible on the facsimile of the letter in A. Sukhomlinov). So what did Batitsky get "at 19.20 on 27.6.53" - a letter written on / 2 sheets, published in a "1 collection of documents and reproduced by Sukhomlinov, or something else? It is possible that there were four letters, but the first was subsequently destroyed. On the evening of June 27, Beria's psychological state was such that he could write something especially uncomfortable for the creators of the image of the "bloody executioner" and "monster".

One way or another, we have three published letters from Beria: dated June 28, dated July 1, and dated (presumably) July 2. With the second letter, dated July 1 - the most extensive - the reader is already familiar, I quoted it at the beginning of the book and further.

As for the first, dated June 28, it is rather concise and written in confident handwriting, practically without blots and mistakes, the lines are even: *"To the Central Committee of the CPSU, Comrade Malenkov*

Dear George.

I was sure that from that big criticism at the presidium I would draw all the necessary conclusions for myself and be useful in the team. But the Central Committee decided otherwise, I think that the Central Committee acted correctly. I consider it necessary to say that I have always been infinitely devoted to the party of Lenin-Stalin, to my homeland, and was always active in work. Working in Georgia, in Transcaucasia, in Moscow, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and again in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he gave everything he could to work, tried to select personnel for business qualities, principled comrades devoted to our party. The same applies to the Special Committee, the First and

The second main department dealing with atomic affairs and guided missiles. The same position of the Secretariat and assistants in the Council of Ministers. I ask comrades Malenkov, Georg

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gia, Vyacheslav Molotov, Klementy Voroshilov, Nikita Khrushchev, Lazar Kaganovich, Nikolai Bulganin, Anastas Mikoyan and others, if anything happened during these fifteen years of great and intense joint work. Dear comrades, I wish you all great success for the cause of Lenin and Stalin, for the unity and solidity of our Party, for the flourishing of our Glorious Motherland.

*George, please, if you consider it possible to have a family (wife and old mother) and Sergo's son, whom you know not to be ignored.
Lavrenty Beria.*

The tone of this letter, as we see, is not tearful and not pleading, and Beria, as it were, even says goodbye to his colleagues. His "I ask... let them forgive..." is not a humiliated request for forgiveness of a naughty schoolboy, but something psychologically reminiscent of a request for forgiveness on Forgiveness Sunday: "Forgive me, Russian people, and I forgive you" ... The last words about the family once again confirm that this is how it was in Lavrenty Pavlovich's soul.

Yuri Ignatievich Mukhin, based, in particular, on the fact that the letter mentions not the Presidium of the Central Committee, but the Central Committee ("The Central Committee decided otherwise ...", "I think that the Central Committee acted correctly ..."), concludes that the letter it was not Beria who wrote, but there is nothing suspicious in such a mixture of two concepts - for Beria, for his colleagues, and for the rest of the members of the Central Committee, the Presidium of the Central Committee was the "Central Committee". No, it was written and signed by Beria.

There was no answer, and then LP writes a new letter, the second, the very sight of which speaks of growing stress and which begins with the words: "During these ..." And here we have to stop!

In the collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953" the text looks like this: *"During these four difficult days for me, I thoroughly thought through everything that took place on my part in the last months after the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU ..."* and etc.

However, A. Sukhomlinov's book contains a facsimile of all three letters, and on page 29 it clearly reads: *"During these **three** difficult days for me, I thoroughly thought ..."*, and then initially it was *"all my actions*

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both at work and in relation to comrades...", then clarifications are inscribed on top: *"personally for you and some comrades..."* and *"...everything that has taken place on my part in recent months..."*, and also: *"... after the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU."* There are other discrepancies as well. In the collection we read: *"do not fail ... without Comrade Stalin ..."*, and the facsimile shows that Beria originally wrote: *"do not fail ... after Stalin's death ..."* Either Sukhomlinov cited a draft (the type of facsimile was precisely is such), or the publishers of the letter in the collection of documents have given only its final text without taking into account inserts and amendments ... Then the discrepancy in the number of days becomes clear (the draft version was started in three days, and the white version was completed in a day).

I draw the reader's attention to these details insofar as they were not previously noted in the sources (as far as I know), although they were important enough for analyzing the psychological state of Lavrenty Pavlovich in those days. But one way or another, on July 2, the Plenum of the Central Committee began, which we will talk about later, and which Beria hardly knew about, just as the whole country did not know about it until July 10.

It is clear that everyone was not up to the prisoner of the bunker, and Beria writes a new letter, the last one:

"To the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Pervukhin, Bulganin and Saburov. Dear comrades, they want to deal with me without trial or investigation {after 5 days of imprisonment without a single interrogation}, I beg you all not to let this happen, I ask you to intervene immediately, otherwise it will be too late. You have to notify me directly by phone.

Dear comrades, I urgently beg you to appoint the most responsible and strict commission for a strict investigation of my case, headed by Comrade Molotov or Comrade Voroshilov. Does a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee really not deserve to have his case carefully examined, charged, demanded an explanation, interrogated witnesses. From all points of view this is good for the cause and for the Central Committee. Why do it the way it is done now, they put me in the basement, and no one finds out or asks anything. Dear then

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comrades, perhaps the only and correct way without trial and clarification of the case against a member of the Central Committee and his comrade after 5 days of imprisonment in the basement execute him.

Once again I beg you all, especially T.T. who worked and (this "and" is only in facsimile in Sukhomlinov's book, but is absent in the collection "Lavrenty Beria. 1953." - S.K.) with comrade Lenin and comrade Stalin, enriched with extensive experience and wise in resolving complex cases comrades Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan. In the name of the memory of Lenin and Stalin, I beg you, I beg you to intervene and intervene immediately, and you will all be convinced that I am absolutely pure, honest, your faithful friend and comrade, a faithful member of our party ... "

The letter repeats the word "I beg" several times, but this is not a cowardly plea for mercy, but a call for justice and objectivity. Alas, objectivity in relation to Beria even then turned out to be more than a rare commodity. Not often look at him objectively and many of his contemporary biographers. So, Boris Sokolov in the controversial book "Beria: the fate of the all-powerful people's commissar" wrote a lot of seemingly kind words about his hero, but it is stipulated that Beria hardly belongs to the category of people "to make life

from whom"...

Why not? It can be attributed to this small human category! Moreover, if we abstract from the tone of Sokolov's book, in it itself one can find enough facts that refute this assertion of its own author. I think that Boris Vadimovich, like many others, is being let down by a kind of sluggish intellectual anti-communism, which makes even smart people dumber than they are. Perhaps that is why, in assessing the letters from the bunker, Sokolov showed amazing spiritual blindness, writing: "Placed after his arrest in the bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, Lavrenty Pavlovich bombarded (? - S.K.) colleagues with letters in which he begged to be spared him . "

No, Beria did not ask to be spared - in his letters there is not even a word of this. After all, he knew that he was clean before himself, before the party and the state. He asked to intervene for that,

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to get to the bottom of the situation. He insisted on objectivity. I think that the publishers of the letter in the collection of documents about Beria, not by mistake, released one union "and" in the fragment "and *with comrade Lenin and comrade Stalin ...*" There were four people like that in the Presidium of the Central Committee, Beria lists them a little lower by name. Only they **remembered the lively** style of both Stalin and Lenin. But, alas, they did not take their style.

And Beria continues:

"Besides strengthening, the power of our Country, and the unity of our Great Party, I had no thoughts.

I supported my Central Committee and my Government no less than any other comrades and did everything I could. I affirm that all charges will be dropped if you only want to investigate this. What a rush, and a very suspicious one at that.

I ask T. Malenkov and Comrade Khrushchev not to persist, would it be bad if they rehabilitate them.

Again and again I beg you to intervene and not destroy your innocent old friend.

Your Lavrenty Beria.

Above, I have taken in curly brackets the only insert in the letter, added from above, and the underlining belongs to Beria himself, and this last detail once again proves the authenticity of the letter: the LP highlighted the key points in the documents in this way, and the phrases "I affirm that all charges will be dropped , if you want to investigate it. What a hurry, and, moreover, very suspicious " he, also out of old habit, also outlined

on the fields.

No, this letter was not written by an intriguer. The intriguer, among other things, would understand that it is impossible - not my God! - somehow reproach those on whom his fate depends, and even blame them with suspicious haste. Yes, from one such statement one can see a sincere person, therefore prone to vehemence, but - HONEST!

This letter has another feature that is characteristic of Beria. Sincere and false letters of repentance were written to the Central Committee and to Stalin more than once, but, perhaps, only Beria

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put the question in the way an honest and intelligent person should put it. He not only declares that he is not guilty, but asks and even demands (by the very tone of the letter) to investigate the charges against him. And behind such an approach one can see an experienced professional, a Chekist, an investigator who knows all aspects of life and is aware that the situation is complicated, and since he has already lost the trust of his comrades, he can only be restored by carefully analyzing everything.

Alas, it was not a loss of confidence, but the fact that Beria frightened the "comrades" with the prospect of such work for the benefit of the state, which they, for various reasons, no longer wanted to do. They needed "deserved" laurels, and not the restless Lawrence.

This is what determined everything.

ANDREY Sukhomlinov, in his book about Beria, is generally disloyal to him (I'll talk about this later) and therefore could write the following:

"Everyone who saw Beria in those days (meaning the period after Stalin's death. - S.K.) notes that he was excited and active ... Even in communication with members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he suddenly switched to "you" . And according to the recollections of colleagues, during telephone conversations in their presence, Beria deliberately ... ridiculed and humiliated members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, working mainly "for the public."

Alas, such, to put it mildly, biased approach to Beria is typical of many who write about him. But what is wrong with a person being active, if he is smart at the same time? And all the members of the Presidium addressed each other with "you" - this follows at least from Khrushchev's statements at the "Anti-Beria" plenum and from other speeches at it (for example, Bulganin) ...

The "revealing" "memoirs of colleagues" are either Sudoplatov's memoirs, or the result of a political correction of his memoirs. And there is as much truth in them as in the stories about Beria's rudeness towards colleagues.

Sukhomlinov writes about Beria and so:

"He should lie low, like Khrushchev, not reveal before

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time of his intentions, but he went to power for too long and lost

caution before the last push..."

Well, what do we have here? Is there much sense and truth in the statement, for example, that Beria de "was going to power for too long"? What does it mean? The supreme power belonged to Stalin for a long time, and while Stalin was healthy, no one, including Beria, disputed it either openly or secretly, at least in his own thoughts. As for Beria's self-assessment of his potential, he did not hide it from anyone, including Stalin, that he considers himself the only worthy successor to Stalin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

But Sukhomlinov accurately defined the nature and essence of Khrushchev! Khrushchev hid for a long time, and now, when the lion was dead, the jackal jumped, sinking poisonous teeth into his victim ... Already in 1989, his son-in-law Adjubey made such an involuntarily revealing confession to his father-in-law:

"Having defeated Beria, Khrushchev immediately pulled ahead ... Khrushchev even outwardly changed a lot, became more confident, dynamic ... Otherwise, even Khrushchev's guards began to behave more arrogantly ..."

To disguise the initiative role of Khrushchev in the elimination of Beria for everyone who does not want historical truth is not only beneficial, but urgently necessary. For example, in 1998, in issue 5 of the New and Contemporary History magazine, Vladimir Naumov, a well-known doctor of historical sciences, professor, executive secretary of the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions under the President of the Russian Federation, reported:

"As Malenkov admitted at the July 1953 plenum of the Central Committee, the question of what to do with Beria arose on June 12, after discussing at the next meeting his notes prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the decisions of the Central Committee Presidium adopted on the basis of the information contained in these notes. Separate negotiations with individual members of the presidium continued for more than a week. The organizers of the talks were Malenkov and Khrushchev... By June 26, all members of the Central Committee Presidium, except for Beria, knew about the nature of the upcoming meeting. In fact, it was a conspiracy of the presidium

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Central Committee against one of its members. All the elements of the conspiracy were evident: strict conspiracy, secret preparation of a list of charges, elaboration of the script, distribution of roles, behind-the-scenes negotiations of the participants in the events, the formation of an armed group of generals and officers who were entrusted with the arrest of Beria "...

I really want Professor Naumov to pass off what happened on June 26, 1953 as a collective conspiracy, although the only thing that was collective at that time was the complicity of the members of the Presidium to the main and only true conspirator - Khrushchev.

I don't know what Malenkov "admitted at the July 1953 plenum of the Central Committee", but in the 1999 collection of documents "Lavrenty Beria. 1953", where Malenkov's report is given, nothing like that reported by Naumov is said! And what fun! The same Naumov is one of the compilers of this collection, on page 410 of which it is said that the falsification of what happened at the plenum began already at the first stage of preparing a verbatim report. Moreover, in the uncorrected transcript of the plenum given in the collection, Malenkov's report is not at all - it is given only according to that official verbatim report, the falsification of which Naumov himself admits.

Wonderful are Thy deeds, O Lord, but where are they to the deeds of Thy lustful and deceitful creatures!

Moreover, Naumov in the mentioned article writes like this: "Regarding this meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee (at which Beria was arrested. - S.K.) there are many versions based not on facts, but on conjectures. But there are two reliable evidence..."

What are these testimonies?

And here are some: "One of them belongs to Khrushchev ... There is also evidence of a group of generals and officers of the Moscow Military District who were attracted by Bulganin and Khrushchev to arrest Beria ..."

Well, the testimony of Nikita Khrushchev, who "sent" Stalin to drink after the start of the war to the "near" dacha, can be accepted as reliable only by those who really want it or who benefit from it.

As for the "evidence" of the generals, then, without accepting yes

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but taking into account the obvious lies of these "evidence", proved even by such an anti-Berian as V. Karpov, it should be noted that Zhukov and Co. appeared in the meeting room of the Presidium of the Central Committee only at the moment of arrest, therefore, they could not know about the previous circumstances and the course of the meeting .

And such here. "Historians", like Professor Naumov, are trying to instruct their fellow citizens, who, from the likes of the *Naumovs* , already go beyond reason! By the way, I must inform the reader that Naumov's conjectures regarding "Malenkov's confessions, the development of the script, the distribution of roles, the formation of a military group," etc. almost textually reproduced (without reference to the source) in his book and Sukhomlinov - on pages 14 and 15.

But what cannot be denied is that the irritation against Beria among his colleagues was growing, and it broke out very revealingly at the July plenum. Here, for example, is the transcript of Voroshilov's speech:

"Voroshilov. ... Especially he unbelted ... after the death of Comrade Stalin ... He is always and always the first, he offers everything, he foresees everything, he knows everything, he always commands! So it was, comrades? (Addresses the members of the Presidium.)

Voices from the presidium: "Yes, that's right."

Or Khrushchev, making a remark during Mikoyan's speech:

"Khrushchev. It may seem that we ... sat and trembled in front of him. There were many cases when we were good at giving and making decisions. And then it seems that we were sitting and looking at him ... "

Someone's obvious superiority (even if not emphasized) is intolerable for mediocrity. And by the summer of 1953, almost the entire Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU turned into a collective mediocrity, unable, in modern terms, to cope with the challenges of the time.

And, frankly, I can't say that Stalin himself, with all his genius, could have coped with them - without Beria - for eighty years.

Professor Naumov is trying to attribute anti-Stalinism to Beria on that
on the grounds that his notes, including "natio 719

nal", denounced the "orders that reigned under Stalin". A few pages further on, Naumov, having forgotten, already calls Beria a "Stalinist oprichnik", whose rehabilitation "is out of the question." No, Beria was a student of Stalin, but, like any intelligent student, he already bypassed the teacher, because he had to go further. And it was the local leaders—Khrushchev and Melnikov with Kirichenko, Ponomarenko and Patolichev, Snechkus and Gedvilas, and not Stalin—that were to blame for the perversions of national policy. If it was Stalin, then why, even after his death, the pressing questions were raised not by the republics, but by Beria?

Someone may object to me: "Why didn't Beria come up with his initiatives during Stalin's lifetime, if it wasn't about Stalin?" But that's it,

that by 1952, Stalin was to a large extent "played" by the environment. And this environment, in the event of an increase in Beria's activity, could collectively shut up the "activist" simply from the instinct of self-preservation. Not by intrigue, but by collective ostracism. Which, in fact, was later done.

On the other hand, how do you know? Perhaps something similar to what Beria proposed should have been the subject of attention of that mysterious Troika, which Stalin did not have time to send on a big journey?

Yes, even without Stalin, Beria was inconvenient for his colleagues. However, even Molotov could hardly plot the arrest and **liquidation** of Beria.

An obvious myth - and the alleged hidden rivalry between Beria and Malenkov. What does it mean to compete? It means trying to be better than someone else. However, Beria, as a statesman, was head and shoulders above Malenkov, and he did not need to compete with Malenkov. So there is no need to talk about rivalry here, although Malenkov's hidden **envy** of Beria cannot be ruled out. But even envy did not program hatred - from envy to

hate is a long way off.

However, there is no truth in the statement, for example, Sudoplatov, that Malenkov and Beria were allegedly "in a relationship of trust." Either the aged general, or the political correctors of his memoirs did not see the absurdity of such a statement - if George Maximilia had a relationship

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novich and Lavrenty Pavlovich were confidential, no one would have arrested Beria! Another thing is that of the entire composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Beria objectively could not help but have the closest relationship with Malenkov. And, even without much affection for a colleague, Malenkov could not help but see his strong
for the cause of qualities.

But it does not prevent us from getting acquainted with the confession of another colleague of Beria:

"After all, Beria and I walked together, walked arm in arm ... Beria and I had different periods ... of relations, but the best period of my relationship with him, such - do not spill, do not stretch - this is after the death of Comrade Stalin . If I haven't called him for a day, he already calls and asks why you don't call. You say that there was no time, there were things. "And you call..."

This colleague is Khrushchev. And he said this at the July 1953 plenum. But why did Khrushchev suddenly admit to the party plenum in such close friendship with the "enemy of the people" that he himself exposed? Or maybe it was the other way around? Maybe it was Khrushchev who called Beria - in advance creating a "background" for future accusations?

All this means that a lot of various accusations have piled up against Beria over the decades in the literature, but their primary source is materials of two large-scale and coordinated events to demonize Beria - the "anti-Beria" July 1953 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the "investigation" on the "case" of Beria. Their result: an official shorthand report on the plenum and 39 volumes (plus 4 Special folders of the Central Committee) of the "investigative file".

And in both cases we are dealing with a historical falsification.

Let's ask ourselves the question again - so who from the very beginning was plotting the physical liquidation of the LP? Bulganin's speech at the July plenum contained the following passage:

"Bulganin. ... Comrades, the exposure of Beria ... in particular, the completion of this exposure and the arrest of Beria itself was a difficult and risky business. And here we must pay tribute to comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev and *Molotov*

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(*stormy applause*) who organized this business well and brought it to end...

Khrushchev. There is one amendment: and you do not exclude yourself from this.

(Applause.)

Bulganin. I am very grateful to you, Nikita, for this remark and declare to you and all other comrades that I did what every decent (? - S.K.) member of the party should have done ... "

But Nikolai Alexandrovich, who subtly knows how to keep his tail to the wind, here only flattered from now on the main rulers of nomenklatura souls. And Khrushchev flattered him in return - both in gratitude for facilitating the arrest, and in order to better soil Bulganin in the mud of his conspiracy against Beria, in which Malenkov and Molotov, of course, did not play an active role.

True, the same Yuri Zhukov uncritically reproduces a crafty hypothetical version of the supposedly not just leading, but completely proactive anti-Beria role ... Malenkov! Like, he allegedly independently agreed with Kruglov, Serov, Zhukov and Moskalenko, and only then put Khrushchev (!), Bulganin and Mikoyan before a choice: either they support the upcoming arrest of Beria, or their immediate arrest right in Malenkov's office.

For all the anti-historicity and absurdity of such a version, as we see, it is in circulation even in the academic environment. So let's take a closer look...

AS INFORMED in 1998 in the previously mentioned article by Professor Naumov, "a document has recently become available to researchers that is of key importance for the reconstruction of not only the events of June 26, 1953, but also partially reveals the process of preparing members of the Presidium of the Central Committee for the removal of Beria." This document is a rough recording of Malenkov's speech at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and it was published in the collection "Lavrenty Beria. 1953".

This is indeed a draft, and the draft is no doubt authentic - its content speaks so accurately about the essence of the situation that only Malenkov could be the author of the notes.

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And from these records it is clear that from the point of view of Malenkov, agreed, presumably, with Khrushchev and Molotov, Beria's main sin was that he ... became the Minister of the Interior.

Just!

In order for the reader to be convinced of this for himself, I will give in the most essential fragments of the text of Malenkov's draft, which begins like this:

"The enemies wanted to place the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the party and the government.

The task is to place the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the service of the party and the government, to bring these organs under the control of the party.

The enemies wanted to use the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for criminal purposes.

The challenge is to eliminate any possibility of repetition

(highlighted by me. - S.K.) *of such crimes ... "*

Who does Malenkov mean by enemies?

Beria?

But then he would have written like that - this is a draft of the theses of an extremely confidential speech.

However, from the last phrase it can be understood that Malenkov does not mean Beria, but his predecessors in the pre-war OGPU - the NKVD. That is, first of all, Yagoda. Acquaintance with Malenkov's speech at the July plenum finally convinces of the legitimacy of such a statement - he said there, among other things, the following: "... in the history of our country there have been more than once attempts by enemies who have made their way into the organs ... to undermine the leadership of the party ... "

As for Beria himself, Malenkov further writes in his theses:

"... The bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs occupy such a place in the system of state

apparatus where there is the greatest opportunity to abuse power.

The task is to prevent the abuse of power...

2. The post of the minister of internal [morning] affairs at comrade [comrade] B[eriy] - he is from this post controls the party and

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government [.] This is fraught with great dangers if it is not corrected in time, now ... "

That is, "Comrade B[eriy]" is not a conspirator, not a restorer of capitalism, not an enemy of the people and an agent of international capital, but only a potential source of "great dangers", and even then not for the state, but for its leaders. But even this is Malenkov's assumption, and not his statement of a fait accompli. The first point of accusation is this:

"1. facts - Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia

Are these measures necessary?

What happened, how did you understand?

The Ministry of Internal Affairs corrected the party and the government

The Central Committee is in the background ... "

Everything is clear here - we mean the "national" resolutions of the Presidium of the Central Committee known to the reader. They caused an ambiguous reaction in the republics - someone began to go too far in the other direction. But if you are the leaders of the country, and not officials, then explain and act in such a way that everyone understands everything the way you understand it! And having understood, they would have acted accordingly.

As for the claims about the initiatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - this is an obvious communist swagger, hated by Lenin. A smart person or party, if someone corrects them (that is, corrects mistakes or shortcomings), should only be grateful for this. One thing is being done, the general one, isn't it? But Malenkov's "complaints" make it clear that Beria's "guilt" was not in an erroneous position, but in an active position.

The third and fourth points were accusations of inconsistency in the line of conduct with the Hungarians and in Germany, of "suppression of the collective." Malenkov writes:

"What kind of collective is this?

Permissiveness - end it.

We need a monolithic team, and we have it!" and so on.

Particularly interesting is the fifth point:

"5. How to fix:

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a) Ministry of Internal Affairs - give a post to another (Kruglov) + Central Committee of the Department of Security [ana] - Central Committee "

From morning to evening, don't take a step without control! Our guards are for each one separately, to those who are guarded (without denunciations)

T[comrades] are not sure who is eavesdropping on whom and

b) From the post of deputy [Council of Ministers of the USSR] - to dismiss the appointment of min[istr] of the oil[yan] industry

After!

c) Special [ial] Committee [et] - in the Ministry [of] Saburov and Khrunichev

d) The Presidium of the Central Committee - on major issues, decisions - under the signature of the secretary, Chairman ... "

From the theses of paragraph 5 it clearly follows that the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, taken as a whole, did not intend to arrest Beria. Take him out of the leadership circle and remove him from the Ministry of Internal Affairs - yes! True, there is an unclear "Later!" in the notes, but it can in no way be deciphered as a plan to eventually eliminate LP and physically ... Rather, this should be understood as a promise of a chance

for the subsequent partial forgiveness...

So, in the light of Malenkov's draft, the arrest of Beria at a meeting in the Kremlin looks like a pure initiative solely by Khrushchev. Konstantin Simonov was a member of the "anti-Beria" plenum. As a writer, he noticed something correctly and later wrote this:

"Khrushchev spoke about how Beria was caught ... at the plenum. The word "caught" most accurately corresponded to the nature of Khrushchev's story, his temperament and that **passionate pleasure** (emphasis mine. - S.K.), with which he told about all this.

From his story ... it followed that it was he, Khrushchev, who played the main role in capturing and disarming this large beast. It was quite obvious to me when I listened to him that Khrushchev was the initiator of this capture ... because he turned out to be more insightful, more talented, more energetic and more determined than the rest. A with

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on the other hand, this was facilitated by the fact that Beria underestimated Khrushchev, his qualities, his deep natural, purely muzhik cunning, his common sense and his strength of character, and, on the contrary, considered him to be that round-faced gray-footed fool whom he, Beria, the master of intrigue, easier than ever to wrap around your finger. Khrushchev, in his speech, not without triumph, spoke about what kind of fool Beria considered him to be ... "

Simonov wrote many talented lines in his life (especially poetry), but he did not meet high human standards, not rising above the general dullness of the post-Stalinist ruling elite. And this was reflected in his overestimation of Khrushchev.

No, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was not a conspirator, nor was he an intriguer. And he fell victim to Khrushchev due to the fact that he was by nature - in the final analysis - an idealist, albeit a practical one. And Khrushchev was a spiritual lackey, sincerely not understanding how one could not be mean, if it was profitable. Khrushchev was a boor who had long imagined himself, but had to hide this conceit for decades. He was a scoundrel, ideally capable of moral and political mimicry, with a really tenacious cunning. He really was energetic, knew how to talk with the people, was diligent and knew how to portray devotion to the cause - due to which he kept himself.

But if the post-Stalin situation had received a constructive development, then Beria would have stood at the head of the country. And Khrushchev would hardly have held on for long even in the positions of one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. Therefore, in addition to the collective conspiracy of part of the Presidium of the Central Committee to **remove** Beria (I do not exclude this), he conceived another, his own monoplots to **eliminate** Beria. And in this conspiracy of his, all the rest turned out to be only weak-willed accomplices at the stage of arrest and active accomplices at the stage of the Plenum of the Central Committee.

Here is what General Sudoplatov writes:

"Khrushchev's position in the leadership put him in an exceptionally advantageous position of alternate blocking with any influential member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. names

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but he, feeling Molotov's wounded ambitions (fu! - S.K.) Beria in foreign policy, plotted initially against Beria, and then against Malenkov.

This opinion is interesting, although far from being true in everything. Let's say, how should one understand "... with any influential member of the Presidium of the Central Committee"? Which of the members of the Presidium was really influential, except for Khrushchev? Only Malenkov - as chairman of the Council of Ministers, and also - Beria.

Molotov? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a power department, and could one speak of Molotov as an independent entity?

Bulganin? Although the Minister of War, but really in the troops of serious influence does not have.

Kaganovich? Voroshilov? Mikoyan? No, no, no, if you mean everyone in separately.

No one in the post-Stalin Presidium of the Central Committee had the personal moral and intellectual influence on their comrades-in-arms that Lenin and Stalin had. Except Beria. But Khrushchev really had the possibility of blocking with any member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, except, again, one - Beria, because all the rest, like Khrushchev himself, gradually passed into the party of partocrats. And Beria remained in Stalin's party.

In Stalin's party, intrigues did not ensure high positions - Stalin did not tolerate intrigues. In the emerging party of Khrushchev's partocrat, intrigues became an integral feature of the "inner-party" life of the highest bosses of this party. Those who mastered the art of intrigue survived - like Khrushchev himself, like Mikoyan. Those who did not master this art left "the circle" - as members of the "anti-party group": Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich ...

Among other things, Khrushchev deftly played on the fear of colleagues before the possibility of Beria's harsh power. After all, the fear of a high-ranking official to lose his chair is a terrible thing that can give rise to terrible things. And after Stalin's death, the leadership position no longer threatened to turn into a dock for anyone, and no one wanted to lose it, regardless of whether its owner could objectively claim it.

Khrushchev's intrigues achieved their goals - in the top leadership

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All children were opposed to Beria in one way or another. But I do not rule out that Khrushchev did not even involve Defense Minister Bulganin until June 26 in discussing the idea of arrest. But he enlisted the assistance of Moskalenko, who was well known to him, and also Ivan Serov in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

According to some reports, the agenda of the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on June 26 included the question of the Moscow Military District. Colonel-General Pavel Artemyev, commander of the Moscow Military District, close to Beria, was diverted to the command and staff exercises of the Moscow Military District in Kalinin in those days. And Khrushchev could ask Bulganin to invite a number of military men to the Kremlin with the inclusion of Moskalenko in this group.

But of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Khrushchev most likely did not consult with anyone on the issue of the possible arrest of Beria. He simply prompted Malenkov and others to hold a meeting "on Lavrenty," which is allegedly taking away more and more will and power.

However, it is possible that on the very last day before the meeting, Khrushchev could scare his colleagues with false "data" about, say, Lavrenty's intention to arrest everyone at the premiere of Shaporin's "Decembrists". At the same time, without going into details, he negotiated with the military loyal to him and disloyal to Beria, not very picky in terms of honor, but ready to take on the arrest itself.

It is also understandable why Khrushchev turned to the generals. First, by involving them in his personal conspiracy "in the dark" (after all, he probably presented the case to them in such a way that there was an oral sanction of the Presidium of the Central Committee for arrest), Khrushchev, nevertheless, tied the military and their minister Bulganin with complicity. And thus he guaranteed himself support - in which case, the army.

Secondly, the appearance in the Kremlin of a group of senior military officers was not suspicious - you never know what was the matter ... They summoned a meeting of the Council of Ministers to the Presidium or there, so they go!

Thirdly, the very fact of the appearance of the generals in the meeting room could not but produce the effect Khrushchev expected on the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Let's try to imagine the psychological picture of what is happening.

There is a meeting, and Malenkov (as agreed) coolly "rolls" on Beria. The atmosphere is quite understandable

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hot. And suddenly armed generals enter the hall with a resolute look. What could Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and others think? The first thought is not even "why are they here?", but **"who are they after?"**. After all, apart from Khrushchev (and, possibly, Bulganin), no one knows about the upcoming appearance of the generals. And everyone, of course, is utterly upturned!

Everyone is pulled up, except for the one who initiated this parish. Only calm Khrushchev - now he controls the situation. And only he knows about it.

Beria is informed of the arrest. And in shock from this, not only Beria himself, but the rest - except for Khrushchev. But now the psychological state is qualitatively different. The question "for whom?" dropped. And everyone starts to instantly figure out if this is a way out of the situation? Lavrenty can really take on the first role soon, and he is an energetic and tough guy ... And he will bother, and they won't wear portraits, and in general ... So once the word has been said, let them take him away .

And then we'll see.

Khrushchev's calculation was accurate - for this, neither Russian grammar nor higher mathematics was required to know. And having got rid of Beria as a real force, it was not difficult for Khrushchev to convince his colleagues that it was necessary to get rid of him altogether - if there were no serious objections from the Plenum of the Central Committee, which should be convened as soon as possible.

A separate book could be written about this "anti-Berian" plenum, but I will have to limit myself to one chapter, informing the reader in advance that a careful analysis of *both* transcripts of the July Plenum (genuine, uncorrected, and included in the official verbatim report, falsified) in itself may give rise to doubts about Beria's crimes.

At that time, so many bad things were said about him, who until a week ago was actually the first person in the state, that an objective analyst cannot help but doubt the sincerity and truthfulness of the "accusers". They were not truthful... As for sincerity, things are more complicated here. Perhaps all the speakers were quite sincere in expressing their joy at the fact that they got rid of Beria. But this joy was very reminiscent of the joy of school

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ditch about the cancellation of the lesson due to the illness of the teacher. "Hooray! shout the young fools. - We are free!"

Yes, I note, free... From new knowledge... From the work of the mind and soul... And in the end, from the chance to grow up as people...

However, not youths gathered in the meeting room of the plenum, and they rejoiced over a more serious occasion - the last person who was able to force the nomenklatura to work not for the sake of their own advancement and prosperity, but in the name of the state and the people, was eliminated from the history of the country.

Chapter 26

THE PLENUM OF THE CC WITHOUT A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CC AND THE "INTERVIEW" WITHOUT UNDER INTEREST

THE NEXT day after the arrest of Lavrenty Pavlovich, June 27, 1953

year, Khrushchev signed a letter from the Presidium of the Central Committee to members and candidate members of the Central Committee and members of the Central Audit Commission on the convening of the Plenum of the Central Committee with the proposal "be sure to come to participate in the work of the Plenum." And on the scheduled date - July 2, 1953, the plenum began.

Today, when a huge amount of work has been done to destroy a great power, begun at that plenum, it is possible to tell a part of the truth about its essence with a circulation of 1000 copies. And in the introduction to the well-known reader of the collection "Lavrenty Beria. 1953. Documents published by the Democracy Foundation, you can read:

"The image of a bloody executioner, an agent of international imperialism, a careerist, an intriguer and a power-lover, a boor and a complete libertine, Lavrenty Beria, **created by collective efforts at the July (1953) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee**, has not undergone any significant changes since then ... "

The emphasis in this quote is, of course, mine. And in fact, dear reader, this one quote from a document of limited (circulation) familiarization is enough to declare: "That Beria, who has long been familiar to everyone, is a slanderous invention of **his** detractors!"

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The Democracy Foundation does not hide the following:

"The falsification of what happened at the plenum began already at the first stage of preparing the verbatim report, when the authors of the speeches edited the uncorrected transcript of their speeches ..."

As you can see, with a circulation of 1000 copies, half a century after the crime you can recognize the fact of total falsification of the appearance of Beria.

In other words, dear reader, there was neither a bloody executioner, nor an agent of international imperialism, nor a careerist and intriguer, nor a boor, nor a complete power-lover and voluptuary... No way!

There was a man ... Not an angel, but not a villain either. Certainly not a villain.

The villain, and the classic, insidious, dressing up in innocence, was Nikita Khrushchev. And it was he who, realizing that from now on he was the master of the country and the support of the nomenklatura, at this plenum simply revealed in that first role that he wrested from life in a matter of days. For the first time, he tasted the sweetness **of higher** power and did not particularly control himself, so sometimes emotional phrases escaped from him, according to the "intellectual" level and stylistic construction, worthy of the lips of the unforgettable "Gregory" Efimovich Rasputin: "Such an adventurer!", "Wow, what a scoundrel! » and so on.

Especially the feeling of Nikita's triumph manifested itself, perhaps, in the following words:

"... An intriguer and, most importantly, that he considers everyone to be fools, he thinks that he is a great intelligence officer, he understands everything ... He thinks that he is a great intelligence officer, he understands everything ... but not such simpletons turned out to be like him thought". Khrushchev rejoiced and lied, lied and rejoiced. And, rejoicing, sometimes blurted out about what he shouldn't have talked about. Thus, in a corrected, typographically published verbatim report on the plenum, intended for distribution to members of the Central Committee, candidate members of the Central Committee and members of the Central Committee, as well as to the regional committees, regional committees and central committees of the Communist Parties of the national republics, he allegedly uttered the following text:

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"Recently, he (Beria. - S.K.) entered the Presidium of the Central Committee with a proposal for special meetings. We haven't discussed this issue yet. We decided to imprison Beria first, and then discuss it. **Beria made a proposal on the rights of a special meeting** (highlighted by me. - S.K.) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. What is a special meeting? This means that Beria arrests, Beria interrogates and Beria

judges."

And the reader had legitimate grounds to be indignant at the "power-hungry" Beria, seeking to continue to "arrest, interrogate and judge."

However, in reality, Khrushchev blurted out the exact opposite, that follows from the uncorrected transcript:

"It is interesting with what proposals he entered the Presidium. We have not discussed them yet, we did not have time, we decided to plant him earlier, and then discuss. He made a proposal that **the Special Conference should be liquidated** (emphasis mine. — S.K.) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Indeed, this is a shameful thing. What is a Special Meeting? This means that Beria arrests, interrogates and Beria judges.

Like this.

But how was the Special Meeting (OS) really? For the first time, "in connection with the end of the war", Beria allegedly proposed to sharply limit the rights of the OS in a note addressed to Stalin dated October 1, 1945.

Let me remind you that in 1938 the Special Council of the NKVD was deprived of the right to sentence to capital punishment with the right to make a decision on imprisonment for up to 8 years. Only on November 17, 1941, the State Defense Committee again gave the OS the right to sentence to death.

Now Beria, as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, himself, on his own initiative, proposed limiting the OS to the right to sentence to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 8 years with confiscation of property. Such is the "executioner" and "sadist".

Stalin then did not accept Beria's proposal, and after Beria's departure from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Special Conference was additionally vested with the right to exile to an indefinite settlement, to imprison in special camps for 20 years of hard labor those who had escaped from a permanent place of settlement, etc.

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Moreover, all this happened at the time of the supervision of the special services by Malenkov and the "Leningrader" Kuznetsov! They didn't bother Stalin with proposals like Beria's.

But, say, Khrushchev, in a note to Stalin in February 1948, proposed extrajudicially, according to public verdicts from rural gatherings, to evict outside the Ukrainian SSR (in fact - to exile) "harmful elements". This proposal was implemented in the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of June 2, 1948, and the idea was quite reasonable. But from a systemic point of view, it looked just like ... the idea of the OS: when measures must be taken, but it is difficult to take them in court, then it is reasonable to take them in a special order.

One way or another, during the life of Stalin, the question of the fate and rights of the OS was not resolved. And so, on June 15, 1953, Beria again raised this issue, proposing "to limit the rights of the Special Conference ... allowing it to consider cases that, for operational or state reasons, cannot be transferred to the judiciary, and to apply penalties ... no more than 10 years of imprisonment...

or links.

Khrushchev now blamed Beria for this, and also distorted that Beria was "arresting" ... Beria could be arrested only with the sanction of the prosecutor (it was Khrushchev who arrested him without a sanction!).

From the original transcript of Khrushchev's speech, one can also extract additional confirmation that the termination of the "doctors' case" was initiated not by Beria, but by Khrushchev, who said this: "If you take late questions - doctors, this is a shameful thing for us, this is a linden ... »

That's how it is, but the shame was not in the arrest of doctors who were undoubtedly guilty of many sins, but in the fact that such businessmen, dubious in all respects, were entrusted with protecting the health of state leaders. And cover up

this shameful fact was beneficial primarily to Khrushchev.

IN GENERAL, the plenum opened with a speech by Malenkov, but it could not set the right tone for the court - the Chairman of the Council of Ministers spoke without passion, sluggishly. And perhaps that is why there are no transcripts of his speech in the archives. Even

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the edited and anti-Beria strengthened text of it in the official report is not impressive: the strongest expression that Malenkov found for Beria is "adventurer".

So, from a systemic point of view, Khrushchev's speech became the real starting point of the three-day action. I say "three days" because the plenum, which formally lasted from July 2 to 7, actually had a two-day break on Saturday and Sunday, July 5 and 6. And on July 7, everything ended in a couple of hours without speeches (only the cheered up Malenkov delivered a lengthy concluding speech, where, by the way, he briefly but unequivocally condemned Stalin's "personality cult").

With his speech, Khrushchev set the tone for the entire "work" of the plenum, and already at the beginning he made it clear that no one should be embarrassed either in terms of the choice of expressions or in terms of fabrications - as long as they were addressed to Beria.

And Khrushchev was understood by everyone ... About the one who effectively fought the counter-revolution in the 20s and 30s, who invested a lot of effort in the development of the Soviet Transcaucasus, in the restructuring of the NKVD of the USSR, in repelling German aggression and ensuring Victory, about , who took on huge responsibility for the uranium and missile problems, and after Stalin's death showed himself to be the most active, enterprising and understanding of the essence of the era as a state leader, not only a single kind, but minimally objective word was said at the plenum ...

However, no, Molotov said this:

"... He did a great job, he worked talentedly in organizing a number of economic events ...", but he immediately slipped a slip:

"...but listen, we also use pests, we make them work..."

However, in the official report on the plenum, this part of Molotov's speech looks more politically correct.

"One cannot deny his organizational abilities, which affected the organization and conduct of a number of economic events ..." Yes, Molotov, like Malenkov, did not immediately manage to rise

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to the required "degree" of denunciations, and at the beginning of the speech he even admitted:

"When on March 9 (after the death of Stalin. - S.K.) the Supreme Soviet met, I called Beria in a comradely way. We were still comrades back then..."

However, then Vyacheslav Mikhailovich gained momentum and said: "Since Beria arrived in Moscow (that is, since August 1938. - S.K.), the atmosphere has deteriorated: they stopped holding plenums, the congress dragged on for 13 years ... He poisoned the atmosphere, he intrigued ... "

So, as early as March 9, 1953, the "scum" and "stink bug" Beria (the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR was honored with such expressions) was a comrade for Molotov. But at the same time, even before the war, Molotov knew that Beria was an intriguer, poisoning the atmosphere of friendly comradeship that prevailed in Moscow before Beria arrived there ...

Yes, marvelous, marvelous, O Lord, are not Your works, but the works of Your creatures!

Khrushchev's speech became a tuning fork, and everyone else tuned in to it ... Moreover, the coordinated tone of the speeches of less leading comrades (a level below a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee) suggests that they are in the apparatus

Khrushchev's Central Committee, if they were not provided with the relevant theses, then they were not deprived of detailed "valuable instructions" ... And was it possible to prepare all this three, in fact, three days before the start of the Central Committee Plenum.

No, perhaps not everything was so simple with the arrest of Beria and the conspiracy against him, as with the conspiracy against Stalin. And it wasn't even Khrushchev here, perhaps, who was the true spring of intrigue ... Perhaps, here we need to talk about those agents of influence, whose number in Russia since the post-Petrine times has only multiplied, who did not disappear in Russia after the revolution and who successfully survived the Great Patriotic War, having found a "second wind" in the atmosphere of the "cold war" of the West against the USSR.

Let's return, however, to the conference room in the Kremlin ... Among the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, in addition to Malenkov, Khrushchev and Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Voroshi spoke at the plenum

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fishing ... Four years will pass, and all of them (as well as Pervukhin and Saburov), excluding Mikoyan and, of course, Khrushchev, will oppose Khrushchev's voluntarism. And they will immediately receive the label of "anti-party group". And Khrushchev, with the assistance of the nomenklatura, will carry out a new coup d'état. And he will deal with former colleagues, but without their physical liquidation. The living Beria "was dangerous even when deposed - he was a person. And here are the rest...

To one degree or another, many other "accusers" of Beria will end up ingloriously: the first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee Andrianov, the first secretaries of the Communist Parties of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan Mirtskhulava, Arutnov and Bagirov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Georgia Bakradze, the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CPSU Mikhailov and Shatalin, the Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov.

Some will soon be dismissed, others will be sharply demoted, Bagirov will be arrested and shot. Especially cool Khrushchev will "thank" the peasant son of Sergei Kruglov.

The deputy of Beria and Kruglov for personnel, General Obruchnikov, at the party asset of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, held after the arrest of the minister, blamed, in addition to Beria, a number of generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Sudoplatov, Eitingon, Reichman), but only decades later Sudoplatov found out that Obruchnikov repeated the speech word for word Kruglov at the plenum in the Kremlin. And this proves once again: Kruglov performed according to the scheme prescribed for him. By the way, he was so worried in those days that he lost half his weight.

Well, there were reasons for that. Unlike the Khrushchevite Ivan Serov, Kruglov had nothing to do with the conspiracy against Beria, and at the beginning of 1956 he was removed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, held third-rate positions, and in 1958 (at 51) was retired. In 1959, he was stripped of his rank of colonel general and evicted from an elite apartment to a simple two-room apartment. And in 1960 he was expelled from the party "for involvement in political repression." After that, Kruglov lived extremely poorly, was in poverty, and in 1977, not having lived four months before his seventieth birthday, he died under the wheels of an electric train near Moscow ...

Whether by accident or by choice, who knows.

But for now, July 1953 was standing over the Kremlin ... Neither

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Kruglov and the speakers already mentioned, neither the Ukrainian figures Kirichenko and Serdyuk, nor the Lithuanian Snehkus, nor the "Belarusian" Patolichev, nor the "atomic scientist" Zavenyagin, nor the ministers Malyshev, Tevosyan and Baibakov, nor the member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Andreev, said anything specific, incriminating Beria as an anti-state figure. General Sudoplatov later recalled that the speeches by Malenkov and the new Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Shatalin (about him - a little later) on the party activists of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with an explanation of the reasons

Beria's arrest "for the professionals gathered in the conference room sounded naive and childishly helpless" ...

"Eitingon, Raikhman (generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. - S.K.) and I," Sudoplatov wrote, "they immediately realized that there was no Beria conspiracy, there was an anti-Beria conspiracy in the country's leadership ... "

Doctor of Sciences and Professor Vladimir Naumov, well-known to the reader, in the collection "And Shepilov, who joined them," states:

"One of the prominent and, one might say, omnipotent figures (in fact, at any historical moment, only one figure can be **omnipotent** , and not several, by definition. - S.K.) surrounded by Stalin was Beria. However, by 1953, the state security agencies had collected such a dossier, such a number of documents compromising him, which was more than enough for the arrest and physical elimination of (? - S.K.) Beria.

So, no sensational compromising **before**. no **documents** were announced at the plenum! No one! There were plenty of unfounded accusations, but there was no documentary evidence of at least one of them. But it was actually a party trial of a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. But the defendant himself was absent.

But, you ask, why? Why was Beria not taken to the plenum? It would seem that everything, as they say now, is "captured". There is a new leadership in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and it demonstrated "loyalty to the Central Committee", and Ivan Serov participated in the conspiracy

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Khrushchev. The army is on the alert and on the side of the Khrushchev Central Committee. No one is trying to free Beria. So why not put this condemned "adventurer", "schemer" and "scoundrel" before the menacing eyes of the party plenum in order to finally and irrevocably be convinced of the legitimacy of such harsh and unexpected measures in relation to the second, in fact, face of the state?

The answer is obvious: very many of those gathered in the meeting room of the plenum, and above all the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, one way or another knew Beria from joint work and in the depths of their souls could not help but realize that they were all head and shoulders below the LP in their ability to work and control crisis situations. . And if he was "alive" in the "dock", then everything could quickly fall into place! And it is very possible that some of the presidium would have to move to this bench right here.

After all, the speech of the same Khrushchev was so inconsistent, chaotic and unprovenly false that Beria would not have cost anything to refute Nikita. And also - and all the other "accusers". And among the participants of the plenum there were not only partocrats, but also quite a few people of action.

THEREFORE, Khrushchev in his speech took, if not the bull by the horns, then the donkeys by the ears, immediately and abruptly. From the very first words, he defined Beria as "adventurers" and "great intriguers", accused him of working for the Musavatists, vaguely and confusedly referring to long-standing suspicions of "i.e. Kaminsky, "and then stated:" Dexterity, impudence and arrogance are the main qualities of Beria. Well, and then in general

"let's go"...

There is no way to give all the examples of Khrushchev's "logicality", but perhaps one will suffice. Here are two fragments of the original transcript of his speech, separated from each other by no more than five minutes.

This is what was said at the beginning:

"Comrades, Comrade Malenkov reported to the Central Committee of the Party, as members of the so that the preservation of the unity of the collective members of the Presidium should Presidium be cherished - the unity ... was transferred to the entire Central Committee ... "

And shortly after that:

"You, dear comrades, keep in mind that Beria achieved his goal during the life of Comrade Stalin, he achieved disunity between the members of the Bureau of the Central Committee ... So what was "above" during Stalin's lifetime - "disunity" or "unity of the collective" ? And what were the members of the Presidium worth as individuals if they could be quarreled with each other by intrigues and sow discord among them? Are they Bolsheviks or operetta prima donnas?

By the way, it was in Khrushchev's speech that the term "camp dust" was used ... And I very much guess that the writers of libels about Beria transferred from this speech into the lexicon of the "bloody executioner" invented by them these infamous and hardly Khrushchev himself who came to word mind.

It should be noted that the speakers at the plenum were chosen not stupidly - according to a completely understandable principle. What good things could be said about Beria by Serdyuk, Patolichev, Kirichenko, Snechkus, or the Orientally flexible Bakradze, Mirtskhulava, Ketskhoveri, Arutinov, who "suffered" from him?

The first secretary of the Lvov Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Serdyuk, referring to the note by Beria and Meshik, said:

"We wanted to portray that there is no Soviet power in the western regions. During the day, it is still supported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and at night, the OUN (OUN, Bandera's "Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" - S.K.) completely rule ." But later he said:

"At the hands of nationalists, the worst enemies of the Ukrainian people, about 30,000 party workers, Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies, soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army, party-Soviet and collective farm activists died in Ukraine." After all, these are post-war data ... And they proved that Beria was right: Soviet power in the western regions still does not have a strong status, and there is only one sure way out -

recognize this fact and use primarily political rather than forceful measures to change the situation.

About how the freshly minted "atomic" minister Vyacheslav Malyshev, previously a relatively minor figure in the uranium problem, slandered LP -

I already wrote. But his colleague in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
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To the Special Committee Avraamiy Zavenyagin, a major figure in the uranium project.

Even before him, Malenkov, referring to the "atomic" activities of the LP, did not say a word noted his contribution to the success of nuclear work, but stated:

"... and here he isolated himself and began to act, ignoring the Central Committee and the government in the most important questions of the work of the Central Committee. So, without the knowledge of the Central Committee and the government, he decided to organize an explosion of a hydrogen bomb. Is it necessary to speak about the significance of this fact?

We are talking about our first thermonuclear bomb RDS-6s, which Malenkov publicly boasted a month later, on August 5, at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He then said: "The American imperialists are frightening us with a superweapon—the hydrogen bomb. But we should not be scared, we not only know the secret of the hydrogen bomb, but also created it.

Moreover, the test took place only on August 12, 1953, and success was not automatically guaranteed. That is, Malenkov once again confirmed that he, unlike Beria, was an amateur in specific atomic issues, who should not be allowed to get information about them ahead of time, even if Malenkov was formally admitted to them. However, in any case, Beria was the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the only one from the top leadership capable of competently resolving issues in the nuclear sphere. So what kind of ignoring the Central Committee and the government could we talk about?

However, Malenkov and Zavenyagin lied at the plenum - about the preparation of the test

the same Malenkov was well informed for a long time and did not express any objections. On March 8, 1952, Zavenyagin sent a letter to the head of KB 11, General Zernov. The letter, in addition to the usual heading "Top Secret (Special Folder)", also had an additional heading "Keep on a par with the cipher. Only personally, "and Zavenyagin wrote in it:

"In pursuance of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 827-303ss / op of February 26, 1950, I propose:

a) by May 1, 1952 (underlined and italicized fit from hands. - S.K.) to make according to the principle

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tip proposed by Comrade Sakharov A.D., the product *RDS-6s* with a small multi-layer dressing on ordinary magnesium (this is how lithium was coded in the correspondence. - S.K.) with the addition of 5 conventional units of yttrium (a radioactive isotope of hydrogen - tritium. - C.K.) and in June 1952 to test this product to verify and refine the theoretical and experimental foundations of the *RDS-6s* ... " etc.

And Malenkov read especially important resolutions of the Council of Ministers, so the test of the *RDS-6* with a surprise for him could not be. Zavenyagin, repeating Malenkov's accusation, added to it:

"We have prepared a draft government decision. He (Beria. - S.K.) ... took it with him to read ... After two weeks, he invites us and begins to look at the document. I read it. He apparently read it at home and begins to correct it. Comes to the end. Signature - Chairman of the Council of Ministers Malenkov. Strikes it out. Says it's not required. And puts his signature. So what?! Beria sometimes signed resolutions and orders of the USSR Council of Ministers even under Stalin. And it is quite clear that now he could simply be offended as a human being: Malenkov had more than an indirect connection with nuclear development, and the decision should be signed to him? No, you bastards!

Although, most likely, Lavrenty Pavlovich was guided here by state considerations. After all, the draft resolution on testing our first atomic bomb *RDS-1* was not signed. Stalin considered that this was not worth doing due to the possible failure of the tests. And Zavenyagin carried:

"I, comrades, worked with Beria for quite a few years and had the opportunity to observe this man. From the very beginning, the main quality of Beria was striking - this is contempt for people. He despised the entire Soviet people ... he considered the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee to be simpletons, whom he could at any moment take into a fist and isolate. And he himself turned out to be a simpleton, a blind sheep ...

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For Beria, there was nothing sacred ... A very negative quality of Beria was the suppression of the initiative. If you come forward with any proposal, they will immediately cut you off, put you in your place: here is an inventor found ... "

But from the point of view of understanding the issue, getting to the heart of the matter, I would say that he was a stupid (? - S.K.) person. Without flattery (n-yes! - S.K.) I can say to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee: any member of the Presidium of the Central Committee understood the issues much faster and deeper and could figure it out than Beria ... Due to his stupidity, he could not delve into the matter ... "

Moreover, Zavenyagin also accused Beria of bureaucracy, stating that "he fenced himself off from people, it happened, for weeks, months he did not accept workers subordinate to him." But the workers subordinate to him, including Zavenyagin, almost every week, together with Beria, took part in meetings of the same Special Committee ...

Zavenyagin did not shy away from juggling specific details, for example, blatantly attributing to Beria a lack of attention to the use of atomic energy in the navy: they say that Zavenyagin and Vannikov two years ago this

the question was raised, but it "was not resolved ... stale."

And here is V.A. Makhnev dated March 25, 1950, according to a letter from the Minister of the Navy, Admiral I.S. Yumashev in the name of L.P. Beria dated March 21, 1950

of the year:

"1. ... the proposal of Comrade Yumashev (to start developing a uranium engine for submarines) will be considered by the Special Committee when deciding on a plan for research work on the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes and for engines (the draft plan provides for the development of such an engine) ... "

On the front side of the sheet of litter: *"It was decided positively. An experimental ship is being developed. V. Makhnev "*, and on the back of the sheet: *" Comrade reported. Beria A.P. 27.III 50 V. Makhnev.* And in the light of this, it is not clear whether Zavenyagin deliberately slandered LP, or whether he knew his business so "well" that

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did not know about the development of "object number 627" - our first nuclear submarine?

But Malenkov could not have been unaware of it, because on April 18, 1953, he, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1087-445ss / op "On the approval of the tactical and technical specifications for the experimental object No. 627". An approved TTZ is always the result of a lot of preliminary work. And it began with the participation of Beria, and ended, alas, without him ("object No. 627" was launched on August 9, 1957).

Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the following fragment of the transcript of Zavenyagin's speech:

Zavenyagin. ... He had a habit after the death of Comrade Stalin ... to play a game of economy: money is needed, it is necessary to save, to develop industry, culture, to help agriculture, but there are questions in which we could not afford excessive savings. It is necessary to develop capacities in the field of atomic energy ... Beria says: "To hell, you are throwing a lot of money, fit into the five-year plan ... fit into what you have."

Malenkov. This business will have to be controlled, because there is money spent without control.

Zavenyagin. It is definitely..."

It is interesting here, firstly, how instantly Zavenyagin dodged without hitting the "stream" ... He wanted to bite Beria, and Malenkov, not distinguished by such a quick reaction, actually confirmed the correctness of LP. And Zavenyagin, like a weather vane, immediately agrees, although Malenkov said something directly opposite to what Zavenyagin expected to hear. But even more interesting is this moment in essence. In the first period of "Sturm und Drang," the nuclear scientists were indeed given everything they asked for. And this actually corrupted many, with which Beria already began to fight in the early 50s and was right about that! The main production capacities of the nuclear industry had already been created, and now it was necessary to optimize its activities as much as possible.

And at the same time, it was necessary to develop rational military and military-political approaches to the problem of nuclear weapons. Alas, after the elimination of Beria, and even with his hands

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military, Khrushchev was to a large extent a hostage of the marshalling, and instead of optimizing the state's defense activities on the basis of the rational use of the nuclear weapons factor, we got an arms race fueled not only by the obvious external threats of the West, but also by marshal-general's short-sightedness and ambition.

Sometimes the accusations against Beria at the plenum were simply

absurd. So, Khrushchev said:

"Comrades, you know that for several years Comrade Malenkov has been assigned to oversee agriculture. Beria demonstrates his outward friendship, inseparable, inseparable from comrade Malenkov, ruining agriculture, bringing this economy to the last degree. I can't stand it any longer: there is no milk, there is little meat. They announced the transition from socialism to communism, but we do not sell flour. And what is communism without hot cakes, to put it bluntly ... "

The Bureau of Agriculture, headed by Malenkov, was formed by the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 8, 1947, that is, six years before Stalin's death. But in July 1953, Beria was accused of not having hot cakes. N-yes...

Mikoyan also spoke a lot about Beria's "sabotage" in agriculture, although from his lengthy speeches it was not clear - what does Beria have to do with it? Even if he had a different point of view from the rest on, for example, the purchase prices for potatoes or meat, then after all, he did not solve these issues alone, and he was not in the first place. And Mikoyan even added a herring to Beria's accusations... I, dear reader, am not joking! Here is the transcript (not corrected, this nonsense was removed from the official report):

"Mikoyan. ...Or take a catch of herring. Our catch is twice as large, and there are fewer herrings for sale than under the tsar. Under the tsar, 280 thousand were imported instead of bread. We press, we press, but the fish industry does not give any more.

Here even Khrushchev could not stand it:

"Khrushchev. We may get the impression that we

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indeed sat and trembled before him. There were many cases when we were good at giving and making decisions. And then it seems that we were sitting and looking at him..."

So one asks: who prevented you from "giving in the teeth" every time when, in the enlightened view of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee so praised by Zavenyagin, the "stupid" Beria was wrong?

Alas, reading the transcript of the plenum, I want to paraphrase the famous Krylov's line like this: "You are to blame for the fact that we want power" ...

But it was not only a matter of striving to preserve power and privileges! Both wounded ambitions and mediocrity took up arms against Beria at that plenum. At times, almost comical (if it were not for the blood) looked, say, the speech of the colorless "old Bolshevik" Andreev.

Immediately declaring that Beria is an enemy of an "unusual type", "an old provocateur, old adventurer", Andreev went all out:

"All of us, old Central Committee members, and even new ones, know what a warm friendship was between Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov ... But then Beria appeared in Moscow - and everything changed radically ... Comrade Molotov began to be subjected to undeserved attacks from Comrade Stalin..."

Everyone knows what Comrade Voroshilov is, what is his share in our Party, and everyone knows about the close friendship between Comrade Stalin and Voroshilov. With the advent of Beria, the situation completely changes, Comrade Voroshilov is wiped out, in fact, for some time without work. This is the work of Beria ... "

Beria "appeared" in Moscow in August 1938. Molotov from 1931 to 1941 was the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR. Only in May 1941, on the eve of the most important events, did Stalin take over the Council of People's Commissars, but Molotov remained in the Council of People's Commissars as person No. 2. In May 1939, Molotov was appointed to the most important post of People's Commissar

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foreign affairs. In November 1940, Stalin trusted him to negotiate with

Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berlin. With the outbreak of war, Molotov became Stalin's deputy in the State Defense Committee.

Good attacks!

Voroshilov ... Until May 1940, he was the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, removed not on Beria's slander, but on the basis of the results of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, but after that he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. With the outbreak of war, he was commander-in-chief of the North-Western direction, who later resigned to second and third roles not because of Beria's intrigues, but because of "service mismatch." But was the ex-member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the "old Central Committee member" Andreev, really, if it was necessary to flatter the current members of the Presidium of the Central Committee?

He surpassed himself, "exposing" Beria's initiative on portraits "leaders". In the transcript it looks like this:

Andreev. I believe that it was not without his influence that the decision was made, which we read in the protocols, to hold a demonstration without portraits, not to hang portraits (here, Andreev, no longer involved in the highest secrets of the leadership, hit the nail on the authorship of Beria! -

S.K.). Why? On what basis? The people should know their leaders by their portraits, by their speeches. It was the wrong decision.

From the Presidium of comrade Voroshilov. Wrong decision.

Andreev. It was a concession to the enemy.

From the Presidium of comrade Kaganovich. Andrei Andreevich, this decision was cancelled. (Stormy applause)..."

The people should know their leaders not by portraits, but by deeds! /For the leader of the working people, this is an elementary truth, but ... But what is there! Are lengthy comments needed here?

Andreev also owns the next funny one (if it weren't for blood) assessment of Beria's activities:

"He certainly did a great job *sometime*"...

And you immediately remember the chorus of the Brezhnev era: "If someone somewhere sometimes they don't want to live honestly ... "

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IF you carefully analyze and documentary refute all the insinuations against Beria, expressed only at that plenum, you will get a separate book. Therefore, I will confine myself to just one more fragment of the transcript, which cannot be dispensed with in any way.

Immediately after the arrest of Beria, Secretary of the Central Committee Shatalin was appointed concurrently as First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. It was Shatalin who was entrusted with the search of Beria's office in the Council of Ministers, and here is what is reported about his alleged results in the transcript of Shatalin's speech at the evening meeting on July 3:

"Shatalin. Carrying out this task, looking through the contents of the safes... we came across things and objects unusual for office rooms. Along with the documents, we found in large quantities all sorts of, how can I call it, attributes of the women's toilet. Here are brief (! - S.K.) excerpts from the inventory, which I want to announce. I remind and repeat that this is in the office in the Council of Ministers, here: ladies' sports suits, ladies' blouses, ladies' stockings of foreign companies - 11 pairs, women's silk combinations - 11 pairs, ladies' silk tights - 7 pairs, cuts for ladies' dresses - 5 cuts, silk handkerchiefs, handkerchiefs of foreign companies, silk children's slips, some other children's things, etc., a whole list (in the official report, "a total of 29 serial numbers" were added. - S.K.) . I think that what I have published (published. - S.K.), has already

enough. We have found numerous letters from women of the most intimate, I would say, vulgar content. We also found a large number of objects of a male libertine. These things speak for themselves, and, as they say, no comments are required ... "

One can imagine with what hidden interest the plenum listened to these alleged "revelations". Yaroslav Hasek, the creator of the immortal good soldier Schweik, wrote about the "zealots" of public morality, who, however, go to public toilets to read obscene graffiti on the walls.

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And here there are so many "underwear" at once, but not dirty, but silk! Yes, at the Plenum of the Central Committee!

Shatalin, with the experience of a skilled "fighter of the ideological front," added rotten "strawberries" and added:

"Nevertheless, for greater credibility of this side of the matter, I will read the testimony of a certain Sarkisov, who worked for Beria for 18 years ...

This is what this same Sarkisov showed: "I know of Beria's numerous connections with all kinds of random women ... I know that through a certain citizen S. (let me not mention my last name) Beria was acquainted with a friend of S ...

In addition, I know that Beria cohabited with Maya, a student at the Institute of Foreign Languages ... Beria also cohabited from 18-20-summer girl Lyalya. She gave birth to a child from Beria, with whom she lived in the country (in the official report it is added: "at the former dacha of Obruchnikov." - S.K.).

While in Tbilisi, Beria cohabited with citizen M., after cohabitation with Beria, M. had a child ...

I also know that Beria cohabited with a certain Sophia ...

At the direction of Beria, I started a whole list of women with whom he cohabited. (*Laughter in the hall.*) Subsequently, I destroyed this list (in the official report, it is added: "at his suggestion." - S.K.). However, one list has been preserved, this list contains the names, phone numbers of 25-27 such women. This list is in my apartment in the pocket of my tunic "... (in the official report it is added: "The list Sarkisov is talking about has been found, it contains 39 women. - S.K.) ".

But that's not all! Shatalin, quoting Sarkisov, further strengthened the effect:

"A year or a year and a half ago, I (Sarkisov. - S.K.) definitely found out about Beria's *connections* with prostitutes ... He had syphilis, he was treated by a doctor at the polyclinic of the Ministry of Internal Affairs such and such. Signature - Sarkisov.

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Then came the summary:

"Here, comrades, is the true face of this candidate, so to speak, for the leadership of the Soviet people. And this dirty pug dared to compete with our party, with our Central Committee. This most filthy man tried to bring discord into the ranks of our Presidium," etc.

Psychologically, Shatalin's speech became a kind of peak in the "work" of the plenum. And yes, it was somewhere in the middle. And it was not for nothing that Khrushchev announced a 15-minute break *right after it ended*. "Party comrades" should have been given the opportunity right there, on the basis of warm impressions, to discuss what they heard and gossip on the topic - what kind of "objects of a debauched man" did Comrade Shatalin find in Lavrenty's safe?

The protocol of the interrogation of Sarkisov on July 1, 1953, ended at 23:00, is cited by A. Sukhomlinov. Sarkisov was interrogated personally by the Prosecutor General of the USSR Rudenko (as it is written in the protocol, although Rudenko became one in

constitutional order only a month after the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) and assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor Bazenko. And from the protocol it is clear that Shatalin quoted Sarkisov's testimony inaccurately. For example, a fragment about an alleged venereal disease looks like this: *"A year or a year and a half ago, Beria's wife, in a conversation with me, said that as a result of Beria's connections with prostitutes, he was ill with syphilis. He was treated by the doctor of the polyclinic of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Yuri Borisovich, I don't remember his last name."*

Professional lawyer A. Sukhomlinov evaluates this protocol as follows:

"If the investigator had brought me such a record of the interrogation of one of the witnesses in the case, then this investigator would have flown out of my office overnight (I draw the reader's attention to the overly energetic vocabulary of the servant of justice. - S.K.) . I picked up some pieces and fragments, didn't really find out anything, didn't set control questions ... "

But after all, the interrogation of Sarkisov was not an investigative action! Already from "record" of his first "interrogation" and from another 749

From Sarkisov's testimony, it is clear why the guard was arrested. The poorly educated Sarkisov was ideally suited to attraction as quickly as possible to concoct the primary "compromising evidence" on Beria. Later I will cite his "revelations", and now I will again refer to A. Sukhomlinov:

"Approximately the same is the case with. Beria's disease - syphilis. This has not been documented. There are no medical documents, case histories and protocols of interrogations of medical workers..."

But what was the truth to the secretary of the Central Committee Shatalin, if Khrushchev decided to make a libertine out of Beria, accurately calculating that this would provide the effect he needed more reliably than Beria's accusations of provocateurism and so on ... So it happened, by the way, - when the materials The Central Committee read about Beria later at closed party meetings, then ordinary party members for decades remembered, first of all, those places where it was said about the many women of the decomposed "enemy of the people."

Actually, to this day, the image of not so much the "executioner" as the "sexual maniac" of Beria is driven into the consciousness of the masses.

Prosecutor Sukhomlinov devoted an entire chapter to this topic in his book, "Sexual Crimes of Beria." Actually, he had to put the second word in quotation marks, because the author of the book himself documents, with legal analysis, proves that there were no crimes.

"Were there women?" the reader may ask. So, there were no women. And in order not to return to this topic, I will say something about it now - before we move on to the "investigation" in the "case" of Beria.

The same Sukhomlinov reports that Antonov-Ovseenko writes about a list of more than two hundred women "represented to the judicial presence", and ironically adds that some people raise this number to seven hundred (!). At the same time, in fact, according to A. Sukhomlinov, in the materials of the criminal case there is only "Sarkisov's list". And already this circumstance - regardless of the authenticity of the list - allows you to dismiss as slanderous all the stories about the unfortunate schoolgirls that Beria was hunting for on the street.

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tsakh of Moscow, looking out for them from the "black crow". It is one thing to keep records of mistresses, and another thing to record victims of violence. No one keeps such lists, and even through a bodyguard!

Sarkisov's list cannot include more than thirty-nine women, and those who knew why they were required, that is, in these cases (even if

they were) there is no need to talk about rapes. In the official indictment, by the way, Beria was charged with only one rape of a certain Lyalya Drozdova, and A. Sukhomlinov substantively shows that this accusation against Beria was not sewn with dirty white threads.

And what fun! On page 112 of his book, Sukhomlinov (!) allegedly from the words of Beria's daughter-in-law Marfa Peshkova-Beria reports that Beria allegedly had an affair with the young beauty Lyalya Drozdova, from whom Beria allegedly had a daughter. But in the "her" "statement" about the alleged rape of her by Beria, clearly dictated to this Lyalya by the Rudenkovites, dated July 11, 1953 (facsimile on pages 242-243), nothing is said about her daughter. However, on page 227 of Sukhomlinov's book, it is reported that when the mother of this Vali-Lali was interrogated, she "reported" that "Valentina became pregnant from Beria, but she was placed in the Kremlin hospital, where she had an abortion." You look at all this and think: "Did Sukhomlinov himself proofread his book after he wrote it?" Very much she, his book, is distinguished by such inconsistencies. Yes, it is understandable

the author and the reader's interest wanted to arouse the "objectivity" and novelty of the material, and did not want to deviate far from the image of the "monster" of Beria. And the task of acquiring capital and maintaining innocence is not an easy one.

With Gorbachev's "drive to power", it became fashionable, and often commercially profitable, to shake the dirty linen of history. However, mass "memories" and interviews of the former "tyrant's concubines" never appeared... Such claims were made by a few old women, although most of those women who were 20-30 years old in 1953, in the 90s were alive. But even the most persistent in encroachments on staying in the bed of Beria Ni

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on Chermenskaya-Alekseeva (I'll tell you about it later) is unlikely to be there.

But these "hundreds" appeared after the destruction of Beria in the speeches of the highest state figures. So, on May 6, 1954, the Prosecutor General of the USSR Roman Rudenko spoke at a meeting of the activists of the Leningrad party organization about the "exposing" of another "enemy of the people" - the former Minister of State Security Abakumov, and the name of Beria in Rudenko's speech sounded almost more often than the name Abakumov himself. The faithful Khrushchevite did not disdain the following gossip:

"The former head of Beria's security, arrested by Sarkisov, testified: "I reported to Abakumov about the moral decay of Beria. In 1948 or 1949, I came to his office and told him that I no longer wanted to work in Beria's guard. Abakumov asked why I didn't want to work there. I said that I was asking to be transferred to some other place, because. Beria is debauched. Abakumov asked: "Does he have many women?" I replied: "Hundreds! In every lane, on every street..."

So, there were neither hundreds, nor even dozens of "sexual victims" of Beria. When at the highest, read, state level they allow themselves to accuse a person in such a manner ("... in every alley, on every street ..."), then I allow myself to say: "Not in one alley and not on one street! » And when they talk: "Hundreds ...", I will object: "And there were no units!"

By the way, when Rudenko referred to Sarkisov, the former guard was already in a psychiatric hospital. It seems that his emotional Caucasian nature could not cope with the psychological burden of the moral betrayal of his boss.

Regarding the mythical "Sarkisov's list", it has long been noted that Rudenko's investigation team, it seems, simply used the real list of girlfriends of the long-arrested ex-chief of Stalin's security, General Vlasik. "Vlasik's List" was compiled as a result of

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there is an investigation of Vlasik's sins that took place. And then he (the list) was useful for discrediting Beria. And if someone in real time saw the similarity of the two lists, it was always possible, sorry, to disown the critics by the fact that Vlasik and Beria used the same

funny girls.

Unlike "ideologically consistent party members" and "democrats", I have little interest in the "sexual theme" in the life of Lavrenty Pavlovich. And in order to close it in my book, I will cite extracts from an interesting article by T. Koridze, published in Nos. 1-2 of the Tbilisi newspaper "7 DGE" for July 28, 1990 and reprinted in September 1990 by the Kiev newspaper "24 hours" in translation P. Zgonnikova.

The article is called "I never interfered in the affairs of Lavrentiy ... and is a recording of a conversation with 86-year-old Nina Teimurazovna Beria Gegechkori, who then lived "in the vicinity of a big city on the banks of the Dnieper, on a green street, in an ordinary Khrushchev apartment" ... »

It is, in my opinion, a historical document of great power and great persuasiveness. Nino Beria, even at the age of 86, as T. Koridze writes, retained traces of her former beauty, clarity of memory and thoughts. What she said relates to the theme of the mythical "women of Beria" only in a small part, but below I will give a lengthy quote from this article - the material is worth it!

"We lived in Baku for one year, then returned to Tbilisi... We lived in poverty. Time it was like living like a human being was ashamed, they fought with wealth.

In the 31st year, Lavrenty was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia. Before him, Kartvelishvili worked in this post, who beat off the wife of one official. True, later, when Kartvelishvili was removed, she went to another.

Lawrence was constantly busy with work. There was almost no time for the family. He worked very hard. Now it is easy to criticize, but then there was a real struggle. The Soviet government had to win. Do you remember what Stalin wrote about the enemies of socialism? These enemies really existed ... Stalin wanted to make a big and strong state, and he did it ... "

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The intonation here is very sincere, authentic - this is a person speaking, much experienced and wise. He speaks about himself and about his time:

"We moved to Moscow at the end of 1938. By that time, the repressions of the 37th had already ended. When they write about my husband, for some reason they forget about it. It's easier this way: there is a person who can be blamed for everything ... But I'm sure that once an objective history will be written, and then everything will fall into place. I will not live to see that time, but you will definitely live, you are young.

I have never interfered in my husband's business affairs. The then leaders did not devote wives to their affairs, so I can't say anything about it. The fact that he was accused of high treason is, of course, demagoguery - he had to be accused of something. In 1953 there was a coup. They were afraid that after the death of Stalin, Beria would not take his place. I knew my husband: he was a man of practical mind and understood that after Stalin's death it was impossible for a Georgian to become the head of state. Therefore, he probably went to meet the person he needed, such as Malenkov ... " Malenkov, of course, was needed by Beria not in personal interests, but because Beria hoped to create a truly effective leading "tandem" "Beria-Malenkov" in the interests of Russia. However, Malenkov, alas, did not think as broadly as his active colleague. Of the two, only the LP was a real, that is, an active and decisive Bolshevik, and it is significant how accurately Beria's widow assessed the events of 1953 in 1990:

"In June 1953, my son Sergo and I were suddenly arrested and placed in different prisons. At first we thought that there was a coup d'état and anti-communist forces seized power.

I was in Butyrka. Every day the investigator came and demanded that I testify against my husband. He said that "the people are outraged by the crimes of Lawrence." I answered him that I would never give information - neither bad nor good ... "

As for "women," Nino Beria said this about it:

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"One day the warden told me that 760 women admitted that they were Beria's mistresses (thanks to A. Sukhomlinov, we know that the warden was lying. - S.K.). An amazing thing: Lavrentiy was busy working day and night when he had to make love with a legion of these women ?! In fact, everything was different. During the war and later, he headed intelligence and counterintelligence. These women were his collaborators, informants, and only had direct contact with him. Lawrence had a phenomenal memory, and he kept in mind everything that concerned his official relations with these women. And then, when they were asked about the relationship with the boss, of course, everyone said that they were his mistresses. And what were they to do? Recognize the charge of undercover subversive work?

This explanation, by the way, is quite plausible! Moreover, it is also understandable why there are no materials about this "legion" in the investigative file. It was advantageous for Rudenko and Co. to somehow "light up" the very fact of Beria's contact with hundreds of women, presenting it as "debauchery." But there was no need to record the names and personal data of operational employees and proxies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

No, Lavrenty Beria was not a womanizer by nature, and because of his special official position, and because of the maximum workload. By the way, People's Artist of the USSR Lydia Smirnova, already in her old age, with a smile, dismissed gossip that she was Beria's mistress. True, another actress, T. Okunevskaya, attributed this to herself, which A. Sukhomlinov also innocently believed. However, acquaintance with the excerpt from Okunevskaya's "memoirs" quoted by him convinces us that we are dealing only with the "high society" dreams of an exalted lady with an exaggeratedly developed fantasy.

In 2004, "Notes of a Mistress" by a certain Nina Alekseeva Chermenskaya were also published, with a not very encouraging indication: "Literary record and compositional construction of Igor Minutko." The former actress of the operetta and song and dance ensemble of the NKVD at first glance may indeed seem like a plausible version of the subject.

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LP's hobbies ... She was very similar to the young Nino Gegechkori, her name is the same ... Getting acquainted with her "notes", "compositionally built" by Igor Minutko, at first I even doubted: maybe this is really LP's hobby - not just another, but the only , reminiscent of youth and beckoning to the past? But after reading it, I decided: "Hardly", .. And the point is not even in the numerous and obvious actual "punctures". In general, the whole story of Chermenskaya does not fit into the fate of LP.

Doesn't fit!

How does not fit not only into his fate, but in general into the framework of plausibility, the story of another candidate for a mistress, already incognito - "Citizens K., housewives." He was heard, recorded and told to fellow citizens by the writer Kirill Stolyarov in his book "Executioners and Victims" ... Like, once Beria allegedly came to this "passion" directly from Red Square, immediately

after Zhdanov's funeral. Allegedly, he called her when "sounds of mourning melodies could still be heard from the square" ... And in response to her perplexed questions, he allegedly answered: "When you encounter sadness, you strive for the living" ...

Stolyarov, without questioning this story (of course - we are talking about the "executioner" Beria!), Further "profoundly" remarks: "... The innocence of citizen K. - a separate topic ... But Beria's attitude towards Zhdanov ... "etc. But after all, the conscientiousness of the "well-known publicist" citizen K. Stolyarov is also a separate issue, and it will have to be touched upon. I would like to know how K. Stolyarov imagines this?

The orchestras are still playing mournful melodies, a fresh mound has just grown over Zhdanov's grave ... Comrade Stalin, who has grown stern, says to his comrades-in-arms something like: "Well, well, comrades! He rest in peace, and we'll go, commemorate the servant of God Andrei according to the old Russian custom ... And then Comrade Beria sideways, sideways, tries to move to the side, and to Comrade Stalin's perplexed question, somewhat guiltily answers something like: "Yes, I, Comrade Stalin, when I come across a sad one, I strive for a living one ... So you already go to the wake, and I'd rather go to the women ... "

Is this how citizen K. Stolyarov imagines this?

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There is a photograph, most likely from the very beginning of the 50s ... On it, Beria was taken with his wife and his secretaries Ludwigov and Ordynstev. Charming, perfectly preserved form Nino Beria half-embraced her husband and looks at him with a completely loving look. Normal women do not look at adulterous husbands with such eyes!

Fans of memoirs can, of course, remind me, for example, of Kora Drobantseva-Landau, who not only calmly treated her husband's permanent infidelities, but just didn't make a bed for his adventures in her own bedroom ... However, can this Kora be considered a normal woman? How, by the way, is Landau himself a normal man?

Here, perhaps, on this I will complete this topic.

Returning to the plenum, it must be said that its final chord was a resolution that marked the beginning of a long-term process of demonizing the image of Lavrenty Beria.

And as a result, the place of a member of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Central Committee, Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor and laureate of the Stalin Prize was replaced by a "ghoul", "sexual maniac" and "executioner", who "hands in blood" either up to the elbow, then

whether on the shoulder ...

The ATMOSPHERE of the July plenum of the Central Committee was reproduced - taking into account the scale - in various Moscow institutions and organizations associated with the activities of Beria, including - and in KB-1 of the newly formed Ministry of Medium Machine Building. This atmosphere was well described by Grigory Kisunko, familiar to us. And at the same time, he again did not understand that, in fact, he gave additional psychological arguments to whitewash the hated Beria. And Kisunko said the following:

"The head of KB-1 Elyan, the former director of the famous artillery factory, who gave the front more guns than the entire industry of fascist Germany, became one of the "protoges of Beria", which became one

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of the leaders in the creation of the nuclear industry, and then in the creation of the Berkut system.

While I was finishing my vacation (Beria's arrest took place when Kisunko

rested with his family in Sochi. - S.K.), a stormy party meeting took place in KB-1, at which, as I was told, they branded not so much the enemy of the people Beria as his henchmen, who were called G.Ya. Kutepova (deputy head of KB-1, familiar to us from the leadership of TsKB-29 of the NKVD, whose chief designer was the arrested Tupolev. - S.K.), P.N. Kuksenko, A.S. Yelyana...

Elyan got the most. I recalled insults when he punished for dirt and disorder in the workshops, for defects in products, damage to tools and equipment, for drinking, and all this was attracted by the ears to the fact that he -

Beria's henchman. Someone even remembered Elyan that he did not provide a sanatorium ticket to "our talented scientist Grigory Vasilyevich Kisunko", who, because of this, wanders somewhere as a savage in Sochi (in fact, as Kisunko writes, he refused the ticket offered by Yelyan, deciding to go exactly as a "savage" with the whole family. - S.K.) ... "

Ah, dear reader, how the departmental infamy of this "party meeting" in relation to Yelyan reflected in miniature the infamy committed at the highest party-state level in relation to Beria! And how tragically similar were the motives and motives for "denunciations" and "exposures" in both cases!

Beria was not given the opportunity to respond to the insinuations addressed to him, but I think if he could say something, his answer would be systematically similar to Yelyan's answer, transmitted by Kisunko:

"In his speech, Amo Sergeevich passed by demagogic hysteria, said that KB-1 is performing important government tasks, and not Beria's tasks. And here we are not Beria's proteges, but put on this business by the party and the government. The duty of our team is to fulfill these tasks with honor."

Yelyan was a really bright figure, he was good

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known to Stalin. During the war, this is what happened once: People's Commissar Ustinov crashed on a motorcycle and ended up in the hospital (Ustinov was a passionate motorcyclist, and even after the war a motorcycle with a sidecar was carried by plane, on which he moved around the training grounds and "objects"). Stalin, enraged by Ustinov's "boyish trick" (the definition is absolutely accurate and well-deserved by Ustinov), called VC Yelyan to receive the people's commissariat. But Yelyan replied that with Ustinov alive, he could not accept the people's commissariat.

This story characterizes both Yelyan's adherence to principles and the nature of Stalin himself, who did not bring down his anger on Yelyan, but understood and appreciated the honesty of his act. And now they openly defame him, and Kisunko, not realizing that he was writing about Beria, about Stalin, wrote about Elyan:

"At the sharp turns of social life, decent people always find themselves defenseless against swindlers, hunters of ranks, titles and positions, and now Kuksenko and Elyan find themselves in such a position."

"And Beria in 1953," I will add.

"And Stalin in the year 1956," I add again.

Psychologically, the fate of Yelyan after the arrest of Beria turned out to be connected with the fate of Beria so obviously that the reader needs to get to know her to the end, moreover, from the lips of Grigory Kisunko, who hated Beria:

"It soon became known about the appointment of Yelyan to the position of chief mechanic of one of the factories near Moscow. There, this talented engineer, connoisseur and organizer of production, Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Stalin Prize, major general of engineering and technical service, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR will be responsible for ventilation in the shops, non-standard equipment and rigging.

But Elyan will not fulfill his new duties for long. Three will follow

severe stroke, after which for many years ... he will be doomed to exist in complete helplessness and immobility, with the complete absence of the functions of consciousness, thinking and memory.

Elyan will be buried without military honors, polo

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women with his military rank of major general. Giving honors will be prohibited by the head of the department of the Central Committee of the CPSU I.D. Serbin. A small group of people will follow the coffin of Amo Sergeevich, who will have time to notify relatives and friends ... "

And it was highly symbolic! In the rapidly and progressively developing USSR, headed by such outstanding managers as Stalin and Beria, people like Amo Elyan were able to appreciate and were able to

maximize their potential.

In the USSR, headed by an outstanding opportunist, party functionary Khrushchev, such as Amo Yelyan, turned out to be unnecessary and forgotten.

Stalin and Beria needed proactive and extremely honest employees who knew how to work.

Khrushchev and the partocratic Co. needed performers who knew how to serve, who were ready to do anything for the sake of a career and personal gain, for the sake of the nomenklatura "envelope". In such an atmosphere, direct renegades, direct agents of the influence of the West, got the opportunity to develop and advance.

And the country, directed by the partocracy and agents of influence along the path of systemic and moral degradation, and then material degradation, could not help but end up in decay, decrepitude and death.

And NOW, we must at least briefly dwell on the investigation into the case of Beria and a group of his associates, which ended on December 24, 1953, with the publication in Pravda of the message "In the Supreme Court of the USSR."

It reported on the consideration on December 18-23, 1953 by the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR "a criminal case on charges of Beria L.P. and others," the "crimes" of Beria and the other six defendants were listed, a death sentence was announced, and it was printed in bold: "**The sentence was carried out.**"

One of the most accurate sources of information about the conduct of the investigation today must be considered, perhaps, the book of A. Sukhomlinov. It cites volumes of the criminal case (there were 39 in total), protocols of interrogations of V. Merkulov, S. Goglid

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ze, B. Kobulov, V. Dekanozov, P. Meshik and L. Vlodzimirsky.

A detailed analysis of A. Sukhomlinov's book is beyond the scope of this book, but my working analysis of it leads - in my opinion - to an integral conclusion about the **total falsification** of the investigation. Moreover, as I understand it, the falsification went in two main directions: 1) the fabrication of absolutely or partially forged documents without the participation of those under investigation, and 2) knocking out the necessary testimony from six persons under investigation (why out of six, and not out of seven, including Beria himself, I will explain later).

Yes, prosecutor Sukhomlinov abundantly cites the "testimony" of six, and often their inconsistency with the truth is established even without comparison with reliable facts of Beria's biography or the history of the country - it is established by a purely logical analysis of the "testimony" themselves. However, I will not bore the reader with numerous examples, but will give only a few. Here, for example, is an extract from a letter from Vsevolod Merkulov, who has not yet been arrested, to the Central Committee,

written by him (or maybe not written) at the end of July 1953:

"Beria had a strong, imperious character. I have known him since 1923, when he was deputy chairman of the Cheka of Georgia. He was then only 24 years old, but ... he aspired higher (in fact, then and later he aspired, as we know, to study. - S.K.).

In general, he considered all people below him, especially those to whom he was subordinate at work ...

I have repeatedly observed Beria in the game of chess, volleyball. For Beria in the game (and I think in life) it was important to win at all costs ... at any cost, even dishonestly. He could, for example, like Nozdryov, steal an opponent's piece from the chessboard in order to win. And such a "victory" satisfied him.

The general culture and literacy of Beria, especially during his work in Tbilisi, was not high. Beria

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then I literally could not write a few lines stylistically correctly ... "

At least in part, this text belongs, perhaps, to Merkulov - one can feel both the style and the literary acumen that Merkulov possessed. But it is literary! After all, the same Sukhomlinov writes about, I emphasize, *the young* Beria:

"A modern psychologist ... should note that Beria's thought is stated correctly, logically and briefly ... Knowledge of the Russian language, general development and literacy are good, handwriting is developed ... 20-year-old Beria makes few spelling and grammatical errors. True, he is fond of capital letters (then many were fond of them. - S.K.) ... "

As you can see, Merkulov (or maybe the "editor" from the Rudenko group) "creatively" combined the truth ("strong, domineering character") in the letter with obvious fiction ("could ... like Nozdrev ...", etc.). However, after the July plenum, in which Merkulov was a participant and even entered the list of those wishing to speak, the former LP ally could "break down". Vsevolod Merkulov, as I understand it, was completely sincere in those letters addressed to Beria, where he wrote about the desire to work under the leadership of the LP and only the LP ...

And here is another example... Sukhomlinov, referring to the "atrocities" of the repressions of 1937 in Georgia, uncritically quotes the testimony given to the "investigation" in 1953 by the former political censor of the newspaper Zarya Vostoka, Vasina, who was arrested on December 7, 1937 and spent two years in prison month:

"... my suffering can in no way be compared with the torture that Sariya Lakoba was subjected to... An entire book could be written about her torment... Sariya was a beautiful woman with magnificent hair. Once, when she returned from interrogation, I saw that half of her hair was torn out ... Saria said (emphasis added hereinafter by me. - S.K.) that Tvalchrelidze, Krimyan and Savitsky dragged her by the hair, broke her jaw. .. The next time she was brought back from interrogation with broken ribs..." and so on. A *broken jaw* narrator is how much I

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I understand, in medical practice something unprecedented. In an effort to pile up as many "bloody details" as possible, Vasina and the "writers" from Rudenko's group did not notice that they had written something like: "The lighthouse goes out, then goes out" ...

Moreover, if such arbitrariness reigned in the NKVD of Georgia, then how did Vasina, a witness to his wild manifestations, survive (and even soon be released)? As, it should be noted, and Saria Lakoba herself.

Sukhomlinov's book contains supposedly genuine facsimile reproductions of Beria's orders and visas about the arrests in 1937. But comparison

the authentic handwriting of Beria and his signature with the handwriting in which the "bloody" orders, resolutions and signatures under them are written, suggests that the "writers" from the Rudenko group did not even bother to forge the "executionary" "visas" and Beria's signature in one manner.

And here is what is recorded in the protocol of interrogation of Vladimir Dekanozov dated September 9 1953 (p. 185 of Sukhomlinov's book):

"Question: For a number of years you worked together with Beria and, under his leadership, were promoted in the service or on his recommendations. How can you characterize it?

Answer: Even during my work in the Cheka-GPU, I had a negative opinion about Beria as a person. Even then, he showed himself as an ambitious, hypocrite, intriguer and careerist

... he started intrigues against those persons who worked as chairman of the Transcaucasian GPU ... I remember that Pavlunovsky denounced Beria of intrigue against him, and Pavlunovsky announced this to Beria right at a meeting of department heads, where I was also present .. .

Despite the fact that Pavlunovsky was a good worker, he was still recalled, and Beria was appointed chairman of the GPU of Transcaucasia ... "etc.
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On page 419, Sukhomlinov cites a letter from Pavlunovsky himself to Stalin. Here it is (spelling and syntax preserved):

"To the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Stalin From Beria

In 1926 (the original was a typo. "In 1936." - S.K.) I was appointed to Transcaucasia Chairman Zak GPU.

Before leaving for Tiflis, Comrade Dzerzhinsky, the head of the OGPU, summoned me to his office and briefed me in detail on the situation in Transcaucasia. Immediately, Comrade Dzerzhinsky informed me that one of my assistants in Transcaucasia, Comrade Beria, worked with the Mussovatists in the Mussovat counter-intelligence. Let this circumstance in no way embarrass me or put me on guard against comrade Beria, since comrade Beria worked in counterintelligence with the knowledge of the responsible comrades. Transcaucasians and what does he, comrade Dzerzhinsky and comrade Sergo Ordzhonikidze, know about it.

Upon arrival in Tiflis ... I ... went to Comrade Sergo ... T. Sergo Ordzhonikidze informed me that Comrade Beria really did this work on behalf of party workers and that he was well aware of this, t Ordzhonikidze, comrade Kirov, comrade Mikoyan and comrade Nazaretyan. Therefore, I must treat Comrade Beria with full confidence, and that he ... completely trusts Comrade Beria.

During the two years of work in Transcaucasia, Comrade Ordzhonikidze told me several times that he highly appreciated Comrade Beria as a growing worker, that Comrade Beria would develop into a big worker and that he, Sergo, reported such a description of Comrade Beria, etc. Stalin.

About two years ago, Comrade Sergo once told me in a conversation, but you know that right-wing deviators and other riffraff are trying to use the fact that he worked in Mussovat counter-intelligence in the fight against Beria, but nothing will come of it .

I asked Comrade Sergo if Comrade Stalin knew about this. Comrade Sergo Ordzhonikidze replied that Comrade Stalin knew about this and that he, too, had spoken to Comrade Stalin about it.

Candidate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Pavlunovsky on June 25, 1937.

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Would Pavlunovsky have written about Beria in 1937 (obviously responding to some request from Stalin) if he had publicly accused Beria of intrigue ten years earlier?

This letter, stored in the archive of the President of the Russian Federation, finally kills immediately

several insinuations about Lavrenty Pavlovich, and at the same time proves that either: 1) Dekanozov's "testimony" is false, or: 2) he slandered Beria under the strongest pressure from the investigation.

And now I will tell you why I mentioned earlier about six, and not seven (including Beria), under investigation. I am sure that the false testimony of Dekanozov (and other associates of Beria) is explained not only by the pressure of the investigation, but also by the fact that Dekanozov, like the other five of his comrades, knew for sure that Beria was not alive, that nothing would save his good name ... And the hope for indulgence in the case of "cooperation" with the Rudenko group remained.

Yes, I am sure that Beria was killed without trial and without investigation, hardly later than mid-July 1953. And not much later than the end of the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which ended on August 8, 1953

of the year.

I came to this conclusion at the very beginning of my work on the book, and acquaintance with the book by A. Sukhomlinov (already at the end of the work) finally strengthened me in this conviction, because the most valuable testimony of its author, an honored lawyer of Russia, who studied the materials of the investigation, is, in my opinion, the following:

"According to the law, the case must be investigated comprehensively, completely and objectively ... according to the law, confrontations are held to collect and subsequently evaluate evidence. There is nothing complicated here. All the more accused in one city. Guards are taken, two interrogated persons are seated in the office opposite each other, and they are asked control questions in turn. A protocol is being drawn up ... So, **in the case of Beria, there were no confrontations at all** (emphasis mine. - S.K.). Such an investigative action for Rudenko simply "did not exist" ... "

A. Sukhomlinov sees in this only a neglect of the investigative norms due to the prejudice of the verdict, but for me **the absence of confrontations with Beria is**

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the last convincing evidence that Beria was unjustly and vilely murdered.

And you can't conduct a face-to-face confrontation with a dead person!

Until a certain moment, physically eliminating Beria was still dangerous for the Khrushchevites ... What if someone at a plenum or at a session of the Supreme Court would dare to raise the issue of hearing Beria himself. But after the final public auto-da-fé at the session of the Armed Forces, on the contrary, it was dangerous to leave Beria alive! The mere fact that a living Beria could ruin the whole "case", besides being a moral support for "accomplices", forced Khrushchev and Rudenko to take immediate action.

However, the murder of Beria could not have happened earlier than the above dates. So for some time he sat in the MVO bunker.

And there is - in my opinion - a convincing indirect confirmation. But first I will make a small introductory remark.

I don't know about anyone, but I believe in the value of small details. It is difficult for falsifiers to take them into account, but they are important for an inquisitive researcher. No wonder it is believed that a liar most often "pierces" on trifles! But, on the contrary, small details are often very conclusive, because a trifle is easy to see, and therefore not easy to hide.

So, this is a hint. And I want to tell you this ... In No. 41 for 2000 of the weekly "Independent Military Review", on page 8, in the heading "Notes on shoulder straps", Alexander Shchelokov's article "Styrysm with big stars. (The fight against hazing

in the army, one must begin with the eradication of commander's rudeness.) "

The article was about the troubles of the modern army, about the public commanding mat, already firmly rooted in the Soviet Army. And as one of the examples, the author of the article, among others, cited the one that I inform the reader without any abbreviations.

"My colleague and friend military journalist Alexei Kotenev," wrote A.

Shchelokov, who himself gave the army

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service assigned to an officer for a quarter of a century, - he told about a case that he himself witnessed. General (later - Marshal) Pavel Batitsky, who in 1953 provided security for the bunker in which the arrested Lavrenty Beria was kept, spent the day and night at the guarded facility. And then one day he was informed that Beria had refused food and was on a hunger strike. Batitsky became furious. He went to the bunker. Heavy steel doors opened before him. Batitsky, with nervous steps, descended the stairs into the womb of the underground command post of the Moscow Military District, and his deep commanding roar resounded under the arches:

- Beria, f ... your mother! If you don't eat, I'll put you in chains!

Later, Kotenev admitted that Batitsky's threat made an impression even on him, who was not a prisoner at all... Especially the threat to "put him in chains", the meaning of which was linked only with the distant past. Why exactly this idea came to the general's mind is hard to say. But even Beria did not dare to continue the hunger strike.

And how Pavel Fedorovich knew how to frighten his subordinates with obscene words hardly needs explanation.

I don't think that the episode with Batitsky was inserted by A. Shchelokov into the article (or told to him at one time by A. Kotenev) with the aim of clever strategic misinformation, designed to support the version that Beria was not shot during the arrest. No, this is just that small detail that allows us to conclude: Beria was indeed kept in the bunker of the MVO headquarters.

But how long was he kept there?

The official version - until the end of December 1953. However, I repeat, I am convinced that Lavrenty Pavlovich was shot before the fall of 1953.

It was risky to deal with him right away - you never know how everything could turn around. But everything ended happily (for the conspirators). At the plenum, no one demanded to hear Beria, the planned "nationwide condemnation" at the very least, but took place - the July numbers

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"Pravda" is full of relevant reports and photographs "from the field."

Beria does not know about this, but after his last letter he realizes that it is useless to write. And he's attempting a hunger strike. Alas, Batitsky's behavior shows that this step did not give the desired effect. However, the hunger strike attempt can be dated to the tenth of July.

So the session of the Supreme Soviet passed... And, too, without a hitch for Khrushchev and the Presidium of the Central Committee. Rudenko and his investigative team were already working with might and main with the arrested Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky (Merkulov was arrested later), and it was necessary to break them down as quickly as possible and force them to be involved in the process of total discrediting of Beria. The death of Beria here could have been, and certainly became, the decisive factor that provided Rudenko with the desired behavior of the accused.

Actually, the absence of face-to-face confrontations with Beria was for him

arrested associates, each of whom was an experienced investigator himself, is clear evidence that the LP is no longer alive. Perhaps the defendants were even shown the corpse of Beria or his photographs. And after that...

Well, after that it was possible to receive from five persons under investigation, and later - and from the sixth (Merkulov) any "confessions" ...

About the alleged participation of Beria and themselves in torture, beatings, butchery, about the alleged reprisals against those who were objectionable during the repressions in the Transcaucasus and in Moscow, etc.

A. Sukhomlinov's book is full of such "evidence", and about some of them even its author, who does not deviate far from the "democratic" interpretation of Beria, remarks: "All this is nonsense!" Regarding the materials of the "case" of Beria, he says this:

"90 percent of the case itself does not consist of original documents and protocols, but of typewritten copies certified by the major of the administrative service of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office (Main Military Prosecutor's Office. - S.K.) Yuryeva. <...> In short, not a criminal case, but solid copies ... "

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However, the entire protocol of the court session on this "case", as testifies A. Sukhomlinov - "not the first copy."

ADDITIONALLY, the conclusion about the murder of Beria in the summer of 1953 - before the start of the investigation into his "case" - is also convincing by the analysis of the facsimile reproduction in A. Sukhomlinov's book of documents related to the execution of sentences in December 1953.

The order on the "execution" of Beria and the act on his "execution" on December 23, 1953 at 19:50 are documents **separate** from the order on the execution of Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goglidze, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky and the act on their execution on December 23, 1953 year at 21:00.

Both orders were signed by the chairman of the Special Judicial Presence, Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev. But if the order to "execute" Beria is addressed to "the commandant of the special judicial presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Colonel General Comrade. Batitsky P.F. ", then the order to shoot the rest was addressed to "the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Colonel-General Comrade. Kruglov S.P.

The same is true with acts of execution. The act on the "execution" of Beria, dated December 23, 1953, was signed by Batitsky (allegedly the executor) and the Prosecutor General of the USSR Rudenko and General of the Army Moskalenko who were allegedly present at the same time. This trinity was firmly tied with participation in the "case" of Beria since the end of June 1953, and only they could be trusted with the December "participation" in the "execution" of the long-dead LP.

And **the real** execution of the LP comrades-in-arms, still alive by December 1953, could be entrusted to the people of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Moscow Region, who carried it out. They were First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs K. Lunev, Deputy Chief Military Prosecutor D. Kitaev, commander of the armored forces of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General A. Getman, Lieutenant General Baksov from the Air Defense Headquarters and a certain Major General Sopilnik ...

It is significant that if the death of six is really str

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lyannyh in December, a person is certified in the act by the signature of a doctor, then in the act of the "execution" of Beria, such a signature is absent.

There is no act of cremation of the corpse of Beria, although there is such an act regarding the rest - actually shot in December.

A. Sukhomlinov explains all these inconsistencies by the fact that "there was no need to transport him (Beria. - S.K.) to another place of execution" and Batitsky de "with pleasure" shot Beria right in the bunker (where, for exclusion

It's up to you, but there's something wrong...

Of course, in fact, Beria or was already secretly, without trial and without guilt shot - as soon as Khrushchev and Khrushchev
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The Shchevites realized that the members of the Central Committee had "surrendered" their colleague unconditionally and shamelessly, or that his execution - after the end of the session of the Supreme Court - was a matter of the next few days. But now I'm talking about the legal side of things.

Officially, the investigation into the Beria case was completed in December 1953, and about this, as well as about his "execution" on December 23, at the end of 1953, an extremely short message appeared in all central newspapers. But already on August 15, 1953, it was put into typesetting, and on September 5, 1953, a verbatim report on the fifth session of the USSR Armed Forces was signed for printing. And soon any Soviet citizen, having paid 7 rubles, on pages 144 and 223 of this report could read the speeches of the deputies V.M. Bakradze and A.I. Mirtskhulava (who also spoke at the Plenum of the Central Committee). Only the two of them, as fellow countrymen of Beria, were entrusted with the "high honor" to "condemn" him from the deputy rostrum.

And here is a deputy from the Kutaisi constituency, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR Bakradze (in his heart he once called Lavrenty Pavlovich a "canner") said:

"The entire Soviet people, including the Georgian people, met with exceptional unanimity and gratitude the timely and decisive measures ... to eliminate the criminal ... actions of the bourgeois renegade Beria. This sworn enemy of the party and the Soviet people, in carrying out the tasks of the imperialists, wanted to undermine the foundations of Soviet society, destroy the Communist Party, destroy our socialist state and bring the Soviet people under the yoke of capitalism. The spy of international imperialism, Beria, with his harmful "patronage" caused enormous damage to the Georgian people ... "and

etc.

Mirtskhulava spoke in the same vein... After such an "indictment", was it worth translating the paper into protocols of "interrogations" and wasting the investigators' time?

Alas, none of those who prepared the fifth session of the SC asked this obvious question. Having done away with Beria physically, the Khrushchevites sought to end him as best they could.

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even more politically. And the highest representatives of the Soviet government, the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, "surrendered" their colleague-deputy just as unanimously as the highest representatives of the party, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and members of the Central Committee of the CPSU, did a month ago.

Double-mindedness and incompetence triumphed along both lines. And now the country, moving, it would seem, up and up, to the "tops of" communism ", on actually began the ascent to the fall.

At the same time, the "Anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1953 became the starting point for the beginning of the process of the death of the State. Then, at the plenum, Khrushchev for the first time took the entire Soviet party state elite as accomplices in crime. And after she allowed Khrushchev to deal with his outstanding and competent representative, with the leader best able to ensure the further socialist development of the country, after that all of them: Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Vasilevsky, Zhukov, Konev, Zavenyagin, Malyshev, Tevosyan, Kosygin, Pervukhin, Ponomarenko, Bagramyan, Shtemenko and others, and others, and others, how people and personalities ran out!

And they knew it!

Yes, I'm sure: without admitting it to each other, in the depths of their souls they could not

not to realize that, left without the strict eye of Stalin and having received the opportunity to discuss any acute issues on an equal footing, on "you" (which in recent years even Molotov did not allow himself with Stalin), they are in the second - after Stalin's death - a critical moment in history instead of a business-like, Bolshevik approach to the crisis, the countries found a bureaucratic, partocratic approach.

Something incomprehensible happened to their colleague and leader. Perhaps this leader of theirs spoiled a lot of nerves and blood in the past, but they, after all - each in his posts - spoiled the nerves and blood of a considerable number of his subordinates, and not always - for the cause. So how could it be overthrown without first looking into the eyes of the one who was being thrown down?

But that's just it, that they all - as a certain community of people - **were afraid** that Beria will look straight into their eyes. Boya

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They hoped that they, and not him in this case, would have to look away.

Never before the July Plenum of the Central Committee in 1953, at plenums, party conferences and congresses of the Bolsheviks, an atmosphere of such total and frank hypocrisy and false "unanimity" reigned. For the first time, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was held in such an atmosphere.

And this fact testified that after the death of Stalin, a rapid degeneration of the elite and its degradation began. If earlier - at the very least - she lived in the interests of the cause and was guided at least in a number of cases by considerations of principle, then from now on the striving to maintain her *post has become dominant*. For now he was associated not so much with responsibility as with benefits, with the notorious "envelope" - that is, a monthly unaccountable amount issued to the highest stratum of the party-state nomenklatura up to the regional level. The minister, with a salary of 5,000 rubles, had an "envelope" containing 9,000 rubles, while the chairman of the regional executive committee, with a salary of 4,000 rubles, had 5,000 rubles. (The salary of a qualified engineer or worker was approximately 1,000-2,000 rubles.)

On the initiative of Beria and Malenkov, in April 1953, these "envelopes" and benefits for a number of categories of the nomenklatura were eliminated. However, back in 1947, under Stalin, in general, for all categories, for example, closed distributors of industrial goods under the structures of the MGB were abolished.

Now the "envelope" returned. And its preservation now depended not so much on business qualities, but on whether you were ready to play the tune to please your superiors (and, above all, Khrushchev).

Stalin not only allowed objections *to himself*, he even encouraged them. Stalin is not endured (and here it is - up to and including anger) **incompetent** objections.

Khrushchev did not need objections **as such**. And the more competent someone's objections were, the more chances the obstinate had to fly out of the leading "clip". Not to Kolyma, but only as an ambassador somewhere to Mongolia or as a trust manager to Asia, but ... But no one wanted to pay such a price for adherence to principles.

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Not daring to listen to Beria at the plenum, the members of the Central Committee proved that its Central Committee as the competent leading organ of the party had come to an end. And in the depths of their souls, I repeat, they could not but understand this.

OF COURSE, Khrushchev understood that they understood this. That is why he pushed so boldly towards ever greater power and towards his own cult of personality. Immediately after the murder of Beria, a ditty went for a walk around the country, put into circulation by no means, as I understand it, not by folk art:

And the traitor Beria lost his trust,

And the chairman, Malenkov, kicked him.

With all the outward simplicity, this mini-libel is done quite professionally, which allows me to doubt its true folklore origin. However, Chairman Malenkov appeared here only "for rhyme." In fact, the kicks were now more and more often handed out by "Secretary Khrushchev." But he could do this only with the support of the "silent" nomenclature majority, to whom the cult of Khrushchev was in every respect

beneficial.

Already on September 7, 1953, the next plenum of the Central Committee ended like this (I quote from the transcript):

Malenkov: So, that's over with. The agenda has been exhausted, but the Presidium

The Central Committee has one proposal.

The Presidium of the Central Committee proposes, comrades, that Comrade Khrushchev be appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee. Do you need clarification on this case?

Voices: No.

Malenkov: No. We vote. Whoever is in favor of appointing Comrade Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, please raise your hands. Please drop it. Are there no objectors?

Voices: No.

Malenkov: So, the work of the plenum is over. I announce the meeting closed."

Everything happened, as we see, in passing... But it was by no means prepared *by someone* in passing ! After all, the accomplished bestowal

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lo in the hands of Khrushchev (that's just - Khrushchev whether?) all the fullness of the highest power!

In order for the reader to be convinced that more than one author of this book looks at those events the way he does, I will refer to the assessment of the historian Yuri Zhukov, who states that the election of Khrushchev as the first secretary led to the return to power of the most conservative circles of the "broad leadership" and the return to them of all the privileges taken away in the spring of 1953. Now the Secretariat of the Central Committee, writes Zhukov, "could ... afford frankly incompetent, but decisive judgments on all issues without exception, for example, the opinion of M.A. Suslova and N.S. Khrushchev about the constructive (!! - S.K.) shortcomings of the recently created potato planter ... "

I will only clarify that all this was the result of the elimination of the strong-willed competent Beria, who did not tolerate incompetence from anyone and therefore knew well the limits of his own competence. Relatively competent, but relatively weak-willed, Malenkov could not resist Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites. And now careerists with sycophants, coupled with agents of influence gaining secret strength, could freely create a formal personality cult to "dear Nikita Sergeevich."

They created a cult.

There was no personality.

Therefore, around this all-Union mediocrity - both at the level of top leadership and at the level of leadership below - there were also no personalities (except for "personalities" of the dark). "Surrendering" in July 1953 Beria, their comrade, of the enormous merits and huge scale of which they were well aware, all the leaders of the country - I emphasize this again - ceased to be individuals. Even those who, unlike Khrushchev, were them under Lenin and Stalin.

And that's the only reason Khrushchev was able to hold the second largest "sign" action three years later. At the same time, it seemed to him that its essence was in strengthening his

provisions. However, in fact, it was conceived (not by Khrushchev, of course) as a new and important step in discrediting and preparing the collapse of socialism and the USSR. I mean the 20th Congress, at which the elite "surrendered" Stalin already.

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Lenin in one of his works cited a Russian proverb: "The first is a stake, the second is a falcon, and the rest are small birds" ... And so it happened! "Surrendering" Beria in 1953, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, it was already easier to hand over Stalin in 1956.

After that, Khrushchev did not have to make much effort to topple them with the help of a decaying elite. And only then such "little things" as responsibility for the cause, personal modesty, ideals, decency, concern for the country and its future went into "splash".

The "party" of the partocrats never lived on such "little things" even under Stalin. Yes, even under Lenin. This circumstance was well revealed, among other things, in the behavior of the members of the "party" of the partocrats in the summer of 1941, during the evacuation into the interior of the country. The members of the Bolshevik Party then went ahead of those going on the attack, and the members of the "party" of the party occupants ran ahead of those retreating to the rear ...

But Stalin did not give this "party" a move, and it existed in spite of him. When his daughter Svetlana, having arrived during the war from Kuibyshev to Moscow to her father, told him by the way that she was studying in evacuation in a separate school for the children of the leadership, Stalin could not restrain himself, and he burst out: "Oh, damn caste..."

And after the destruction of Beria and the consolidation of Khrushchev's power, the "damned caste" of partocrats began to grow rapidly and develop in full accordance with the life goals of their First Secretary, "dear Nikita Sergeevich" Khrushchev. Reason has now been replaced by the "collective reason" of the Central Committee, which has established itself in a "monolithic unity".

However, the English historian and philosopher Thomas Carlyle long ago expressed an idea, the verbal expression of which would do well to be cast in bronze and hung over the entrance to all public buildings:

"I don't believe in the collective intelligence of ignorant individuals."

Lavrenty Beria therefore "lost the confidence" of his colleagues in the highest state power, because, compared to them, he *simply* had reason - without regard to the Central Committee.

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It can be said in another way: the manager Beria was more than competent in matters of managing society, but the functionary Khrushchev and his ilk were not. I have already spoken about this, but now I would like to approach the question from a different angle, drawing on the experience of the developed West.

The "Parkinson's Laws" discovered in Britain long ago entered the intellectual treasury of mankind, stating that: 1) an official multiplies subordinates, but not rivals; 2) officials work for each other.

Around the same era, Murphy's Law was discovered in the United States with many consequences and additions to it. The main postulate looked like this: "If any trouble can happen, it happens," and one of the main consequences: "Things left to themselves tend to get worse."

The science of analysis of serious management problems by supposedly jocular methods gained its final completeness only after the formulation, again in the USA, of the "Peter Principle" and the creation of "hierarchology" along with "merfology". The Peter Principle tells us, "In a hierarchy, each individual tends to rise to his own level of incompetence." It follows, by the way, that the main work is done by someone who has not yet reached his level of incompetence and, therefore, is competent in his field.

By the way, by the beginning of 1953, Stalin, perhaps, had reached his level of incompetence, and this was manifested both in the fact that he succumbed to the deceptions of Khrushchev, and in the fact that he did not reinforce Beria with the status of a successor. Although...

Although, if we recall the "Troika" sanctioned by Stalin, headed by the LP, it cannot be ruled out that Stalin was already "ripening" to such a decision - which additionally forced Khrushchev and the forces behind him to rush.

So, Beria was competent. And even - supercompetent! And what did that mean? Peter came to the following conclusion:

"In most hierarchies, overcompetence is taken as a greater evil than incompetence ... Overcompetence is often the basis for dismissal, because it undermines the hierarchy and thereby violates

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em the first commandment of hierarchical existence: the hierarchy must be preserved...

Another way that an organization can use to protect itself from the destructive (for the hierarchy, not for the cause. - S.K.) influence of the super-competent is their isolation.

So, this is also said about Lavrenty Beria. His colleagues in power had many reasons for his elimination, but not the least of them was the fact that among the top leadership only Beria after Stalin's death was competent enough and even super-competent in order to provide solid paths for the further development of the country.

And what is the supercompetence of a state leader? This is, first of all, the ability to select competent and even super-competent (that is, extremely active) personnel for all responsible positions in the system of managing society, the state, and the economy. There would be no place for mediocrity and careerists in such a system! So Beria, with his super-competence, undermined the nomenklatura hierarchy and was subject, from her point of view, to "dismissal".

The nomenklatura simply could not help but use Beria to protect itself from the destructive influence of Beria in any other way than "isolation". She took advantage of it, and was able to do this, among other things, because she was led in such actions by the systemic antipode of Beria - the super-incompetent and ignorant, but energetic Nikita Khrushchev.

A COMPETENT solution in the interests of the development of socialism in the USSR and its victory on a global scale would be the gradual transfer of the entire power from the party to the state. That is, in the political sense, the transfer of political power to bodies of Soviet power elected by the whole people, and in the economic and technological sense, the transfer of management rights to the bodies of economic executive power, consisting of scientific and technical specialists, and responsible to the bodies of Soviet power.

Such a decision would provide the already won

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such victories for the Allied Soviet Socialist State a strong, stable great future.

Such a country would be led by communists, but *communists-specialists!* Communists by conviction, and specialists by special education and professional experience.

But what would the ignorant and incompetent Nikita Khrushchev do and who *would he be* in such a society that has reached a new level of development? Someone from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, to one degree or another, could be at least someone in such a country controlled by communist specialists. It is not for nothing that Malenkov, who almost graduated from Moscow Higher Technical School in the 1920s when he fell from the heights of power, was the director of the hydroelectric power station in Ust-Kamenogorsk, the director of the thermal power plant in Ekibastuz ... And there are many

engaged in self-education and who knew the economy perfectly Kaganovich - manager of the Soyuzasbest trust in Asbest, Sverdlovsk region. Kaganovich had, by the way, a particularly high potential as a competent economic leader on a nationwide scale.

There would be a place for Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan... Even Bulganin, not to mention Saburov and Pervukhin.

But Khrushchev?

Who could he become? Collective farm chairman? No! In the new hypothetical country of Beria, candidates for chairmanship would not be brought from the district committee, but would be sought among educated agronomists or livestock breeders. And in such a country, there would hardly be a collective farm that, of its own free will, would take Nikita as its chairman. After all, unlike Beria, he did not know how to do anything! And he didn't know anything.

Head, they say, had a good one? So in Rus' it is not uncommon. Especially in Soviet Rus', in the Soviet Union. By the beginning of the 50s, we had enough not only good, but also well-educated heads. No, there would be no place for Khrushchev in the Soviet Union like Beria.

Therefore, Khrushchev did everything to remove and politically discredit both Stalin and Beria. The discrediting of Beria was organized in such a multi-layered manner that in August 1953, valuable agents of Soviet intelligence in the West were tasked with identifying alleged cash.

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whose secret connections with W. Churchill and the British secret services.

Such assignments from Moscow made the Center look stupid and distracted agents from really important intelligence tasks, but this is how the Khrushchevites set up yet another false political "beacons". Khrushchev knew, of course, that Beria did not and could not have any connections, but tasks were set. For what? Yes, to show - if not to the broad masses, but to a narrow circle of intelligence officers, that there was a "boy", that it was really unclean with Beria - after all, Comrade Khrushchev himself sets the task. By such an action, Khrushchev at the same time insured his leading reputation - they say, I removed Beria not because I hated him, but because he turned out to be politically suspicious in terms of renegade.

Perhaps someone will have a question for the author: "Was Khrushchev a conscious - like Gorbachev and Yeltsin - a renegade and a political degenerate?" Well, my answer is: "I don't think..." York, ciphered: *"Just before leaving, give these imperialists a punch in the face."* This is not for the press - this is from a sincere rejection of the "bourgeois". Although, of course, not from a great mind.

However, even Khrushchev had the sense at one of the plenums of the Central Committee to end his speech with the words: "What are you all about Stalin and about Stalin! Yes, all of us together are not worth the Stalinist city ... "As you can see, Khrushchev sometimes had a certain understanding of his historical place - not like the current" holders of power "who are not even worth Khrushchev's city ... But Khrushchev was not enough for more .

President Reagan's aide Elizabeth Dole once said, either jokingly or seriously, "The president doesn't want men and women around him who can only go along. If the president says no, we all say "No".

Madame Dole - I don't know how much she understands this herself - formulated the life credo of self-seekers of all times and all peoples under any political system. So

now, if Khrushchev and his ilk did not assent to Stalin only when he said "no", then Beria and his ilk (he was not the only one who was a competent person surrounded by Stalin) could say "no" and "yes" to Stalin - because they could competently substantiate their position. And Stalin, being at the top of the hierarchy, did not tolerate incompetence. Competence was respected, welcomed and promoted. Therefore, he nominated Beria.

BACK IN 1924, when the serious confrontation between the competent Stalin and the incompetent Trotsky was just beginning, Stalin in his work "The Foundations of Leninism" defined the Leninist style as a combination of Russian scope with American efficiency. And Beria very accurately fit this definition. Moreover, the opportunity to live in just such a style was for him the main pleasure and reward. After all, a person who knows how to work is first of all nice to work! If, of course, his work is adequately evaluated. And the notorious "workaholic" has nothing to do with it. Beria was not a "workaholic", but he saw the meaning of life without any lofty words in work.

Earlier, I quoted one of Beria's letters to Malenkov from the bunker, warning the reader that I had removed a certain phrase from it, which I will quote later. Now the time has come for that, and I'm putting it in context in bold:

"Comrades Pervukhin and Saburov said that I had a privileged position during Comrade Stalin's lifetime. This is not true, Georgy, you know this better than others, other members of the Presidium know this too. In fact, when I worked in Transcaucasia, and then in Georgia, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and comrades Stalin strongly supported and helped in my work. And the work went well, and personally I was delighted ..."

Enjoy, dear reader!

What a precise and characteristic word for a man of action! Yes, it alone proves that the letters from the bunker are genuine, that Beria wrote them! How can a cold artisan-falsifier not only know, but even guess that one can be **delighted** with such a life when you have higher than the top of your business, duties and responsibilities?

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Not when you're scouring auctions and buying personal Rubens or Renoir... Not when you're playboy on a personal yacht with "beauty queens"...

Not when he managed to break the "bank" in Monte Carlo, and not when you "hang out" at an elite "party", but when Comrade Stalin personally can summon you to the Kremlin office at any time of the day or night and say: "Lavrenty! How do you feel about it if we entrust you with..."

And you, excited by a new big and difficult task, anticipating a new job, answer with delight: "I take it, Comrade Stalin! We will do everything on time!" And then you go into the night, which will soon give way to the morning... And this new morning will paint the walls of the ancient Kremlin with a gentle light.

No, today's "naughty people from Courchevel" and Kremlin fans of tennis and skiing have no such sensations! You can't buy this for any amount of money! You can only deserve it!

Work.

And work not for himself, not for "uncle" (Sam), not for the "golden clan", but for a great free state that lives in the name of the people and is created by a free people.

Thomas Edison once stated:

"My only desire is to work ... I do not need the usual pleasures of the rich. I don't need horses or yachts, I don't have time for all that. To me

need a workshop.

One intelligent scientist once joked, defining modern science as a way to satisfy curiosity at the expense of the state. And this joke has share of truth.

So, any major - not only in terms of position, but also in terms of personal scale - a politician, a major statesman in Stalin's USSR had almost unlimited opportunities to satisfy his thirst to do business! Unless, of course, you know how to make it, and not imitate it.

For such a politician, the entire Soviet Union became a "workshop" where one could work on a better - smarter and more interesting - life for people! And only in the Soviet Union, a naturally prominent politician got the opportunity to work with enthusiasm!

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Like Beria.

That is why if he had headed the country, then this *delight* of creation would have become the nerve of the entire social life of Russia. After all, leadership competence a great thing, especially in relation to Russia. To paraphrase Stalin, it is appropriate to say here: "The leader decides everything." Of course, if he leader, that is, does what meets the needs of the era.

And the needs of the era were met by the complete emancipation of the initiative and potential of new socialist professionals devoted to the common cause. And only L.P. could have done this after Stalin. Beria.

Here is what Academician Yevgeny Tarle wrote about Napoleon more than half a century ago:

"In front of him were mountains of old regime debris and a mass of new ones ... a lot of started and unfinished, started and abandoned, started and taken back; Everything seemed to be in chaos and ferment...

Bonaparte began by organizing a new government... The poet Goethe correctly said about Napoleon: for Napoleon, power was the same as a musical instrument for a great artist. He immediately put this instrument into action as soon as he had time to take possession of it.

Beria was not subject to the "Bonapartist" complex, but some analogy can be drawn here. As soon as the "instrument" of power fell out of the hands of the great ruler, Beria raised this "instrument", hoping that his comrades in the "orchestra" would recognize, if not the formal, then the informal right of the LP to the leading party. He after all had on this right as no one else!

The former long-term deputy head of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, which ensured the security of the country's top leadership, Major General Dokuchaev recalled that in private conversations, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger admitted that he did not understand three moments in the history of the Soviet Union: first, how he was able to defeat fascism ; second, how he was able to build the atomic bomb so quickly; and third, how he was able to bring Gagarin into space.

All this is reminiscent of the bewilderment of the Chief Bourgeois in

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Gaidar's fairy tale about Malchish-Kibaltchik: "Why, Malchish, did Forty Kings and Forty Kings fight with the Red Army, fought, fought, but only crashed themselves?"

The "military secret" of the powers "surrendered" to the bourgeois at the turn of the 80s and 90s, the heirs and successors of those who in July 1953 "surrendered" Lavrenty Beria in order to soon "surrender" the case of Stalin. But this is so, by the way! Now, remembering Kissinger's question, I want to say the following... It is indicative that in all three key moments in the history of the Soviet Union, which caused the astonishment of the US Secretary of State, Beria's role was outstanding! His personal

the contribution turned out to be paramount both in ensuring the Victory, and in solving the uranium problem, and in the formation of the Soviet rocket industry!

I do not want to say that Soviet Russia owes its three most outstanding achievements to Beria - they were provided by new people of a new era. However, the fact that Beria was at the forefront of state work in all three cases is a fact!

WHAT did he think in those days when he was sitting in the bunker?

What did you think the first night?

In the second?

In the third?

His letters from the bunker allow to some extent to answer this question as follows: "He thought about many things, but ultimately he thought about the affairs of the state, and thought about them because he had not separated himself from them for a long time."

Afterword

Prosecutor Sukhomlinov's BOOK begins like this: *"How many times do we hear, and we ourselves say: "God forbid" ... warning the interlocutor so that he does not suspect us of some unseemly deed. So, I also want to say:*

"God forbid," so that someone would think that I took up the pen in order to justify, whitewash, rehabilitate, simply put, wash Lavrenty Beria from human blood ... "

I am finishing my book. And now, knowing about Beria immeasurably more than I knew about him six months ago, I can say that I took up the pen primarily in order to understand what kind of person Beria was. The fact that he possessed the talent of an excellent, major organizer, I, having worked in the arms business for thirty years, knew for a long time. But did he also have human talent?

So, now, knowing much more than I knew, I declare that I wrote this book in order to justify, whitewash, rehabilitate and, simply speaking, wash Lavrenty Pavlovich from the dirt that flooded him.

In May 2000, the Chief Military Prosecutor, Colonel-General of Justice Demin, appealed to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation with a request "to recognize Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich, Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich, Dekanozov Vladimir Georgievich, Kobulov Bogdan Zakharyevich, Goglidze Sergey Arsenievich, Meshik Pavel Yakovlevich and Vlodzimirsky Lev Emelyanovich unrehabilitated."

And exactly two years later, on May 29, 2002, the Military Collegium issued a ruling, signed by the chairman

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judge A. Ukolov and Judges Y. Parkhomchuk and A. Petrochenkov. The verdict of the special court presence of December 23, 1953 in relation to Dekanozov, Meshik and Vlodzimirsky was changed, and their actions were re-qualified so that the people shot in 1953 were sentenced in 2002 to 25 years in prison.

Regarding the rest, the Military Collegium granted the request of Demin and recognized Beria Lavrenty Pavlovich, Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich, Kobulov Bogdan Zakharyevich, Goglidze Sergey Arsenyevich not subject to rehabilitation.

Well... Such figures as Lavrenty Beria condemn and rehabilitate the court not of people, but the court of history... And sooner or later he will rehabilitate LP Beria! And I hope that my book will serve both the cause of the future complete rehabilitation of Beria and his era, and the cause of gaining by my contemporaries and fellow citizens a true view of the great past of their Motherland.

Only by gaining a correct view of this past can we secure a historical future. I understand that I have now written something banal for many, but there's nothing to be done: twice two equals not five, but four, despite the banality of this truth.

I deliberately did not avoid publicism in my research, and here's why ... Just as a publicist who does not have deep knowledge of the era he is evaluating is incapable of anything but unconvincing high-flown chatter, so is a historian trying to drape his civil failure with "academicism", who is afraid of the element of publicism in his work, is not able to give a true scientific picture of the era. After all, every era is created by living people, acting in it or ... Or, alas, inactive.

In conclusion, it must be said that in the last fifteen years alone, dozens of books, magazine and newspaper articles have been written about Beria. And for a complete critical analysis of even what was at my disposal (and, I must say, there was a lot), a book twice as large would be needed,

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than this one - and it's not so small anymore. Therefore, in fact, many documents of that era about Beria's participation in the organization of the post-war economy, and libels, such as, say, Valery Boldin's "Red Sunset", and the anti-Beria fabrications of the American Harrison Salisbury in his book "900 days. Siege of Leningrad", and memoirs by Larina Bukharina, and books by Amy Knight, Boris Sokolov "Beria. The fate of the all-powerful (yes! - S.K.) People's Commissar", and a number of other books, and a number of Internet assessments "of Beria, for example, by Peter Wagner and Rudolf Pikhoya. I could not pay due attention to the correct interpretation of the personality of Lavrenty Pavlovich by Alexander Bushkov or the line "Beria - German nuclear specialists" ... And the same book by A. Sukhomlinov could be disassembled in more detail, since its analysis - contrary to the intentions of its author, it is useful precisely from the standpoint of the rehabilitation of Beria ...

But about one study that I have not yet mentioned (and, unfortunately, known to me so far only from the cover), it is impossible not to say. Back in 1998, the publishing house "Rusich.Olimp" published N. Rubin's book "Lavrenty Beria. Myth and Reality. On the Internet, it is annotated as follows:

"This book is a fascinating historical study on the personality of the infamous Lavrenty Beria. Reconstructing the events, based on documents and testimonies of contemporaries, the author argues that L. Beria was not at all the cruel and bloody executioner that he has traditionally been considered to be for many years now. The author sees in the figure of L. Beria one of the most talented and far-sighted figures of the Stalin era, and considers the crimes attributed to him to be largely an invention of his rivals in the struggle for power (for which Beria personally, however, did not fight. —

S.K.). Comparing the traditional accusations against Beria with the real facts of his life, the author shows how and why each of these accusations arose, leaving readers to decide for themselves how convincing his version is.

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As we can see, no matter who undertakes an objective analysis of Beria, he immediately departs from traditional clichés. As for the last sentence of the above annotation, the reader always - without needing the permission of the author - makes his own judgment about his work. He will also bear it with regard to my efforts, but that's another story. I have undertaken them, and that is enough for me...

But there is something else I need to say.

THE FAMOUS writer Alexander Bushkov asked himself: "There must be some explanation for the fact that Beria, in fact, was assigned to the place

which in most religions is occupied by an evil spirit, a demon, Satan..."

And in this one question - even without an answer - there is more intelligence and feeling than in all the writings of the "democratic" researchers of Beria.

But what is the answer here?

Actually, not in the last analysis, so that the reader could answer such a question himself, I wrote this book.

But in order for the exact question of Alexander Bushkov to have the most complete answer, let's estimate - which figures in the modern history of Russia should be recognized today as the most "iconic"?

The first, of course, is Lenin.

The second is Stalin.

And the third is Beria!

What was Lenin in the history of Russia?

By 1917, only the external short-term debt of the Russian Empire was equal to three pre-war budgets ... What would this lead to after the end of the First World War?

"Russia," wrote the American B. Hopper in the 1930s, "probably would have been mortgaged to foreign banks." Yes, it would be so! Rossiya, a magazine of Anglo-Russian financial circles, wrote in May 1918: "What we are witnessing in Russia is the beginning of a great struggle for her immeasurable resources of raw materials."

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The London financial news in November 1918 thought similarly: "Events are increasingly taking on a character that indicates a tendency to establish an international protectorate over Russia in the image and likeness of the British plan for Egypt. Such a turn of events would immediately turn Russian securities into the cream of the international market."

This is what the great Russian patriot Ulyanov-Lenin led Russia away from. And he gave the peoples of Russia a chance for freedom and happiness.

Further, Russia and its peoples were led to freedom and greatness by Stalin. And what is Stalin? Stalin is the task of "catching up and overtaking!". It was not for nothing that in his time machines of the DiP series were produced. But above all, Stalin is the task of forming that new man, whose mass appearance was to become the main factor in the victory of socialism in Russia.

And Beria?

And BERIA is the second largest figure after Stalin in the epic of building socialism and turning bast-bast Russia into an advanced powerful state with huge development potential. Yes, not Molotov, not Kaganovich, not Ordzhonikidze, but Beria!

Already before the war, Beria, as Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, began to assume an increasingly significant part of the concrete leadership of state work. The war finally showed its significance, even formally placing Lavrenty Pavlovich in 1944 in second place in the structure of the then supreme power.

And then it became completely clear that Beria was the Chekist, the head of the special services, out of state necessity, but he was the organizer of national and economic work by vocation, in fact, by talent.

Alexei Vasilyevich Toptygin, who died untimely, did not have time to hold in his hands a printed copy of his book "Unknown Beria", published in 2002. I highly appreciate his work - to recreate the objective historical image of Beria Toptygin

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did a lot. However, he himself, perhaps, did not fully understand the essence of the LP. In

In any case, in the afterword to his book, Topygin suddenly begins to reflect on the fate and personality of Beria in comparison with the fate and personalities of ... SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler and the "Grand Inquisitor" of the CPC and the PRC Kang Sheng. Was it even worth posing the question like that?

Topygin, however, writes:

"Kang Sheng is often called the Chinese Beria. **I don't know how fair this comparison is** (emphasis mine. - S.K.). Beria, objectively speaking, was not a hero in white clothes, but his services to the state, which he faithfully served in various fields, certainly cannot be compared with either the cold-blooded killer G. Himmler or the bloodthirsty demagogue Kan Sheng " .

But Topygin, as we see, does not have an unambiguous assessment. But any attempt to somehow compare LP with Himmler and Kang Sheng is objectively illegal in itself! Illegal if only because it is impossible to imagine Himmler or Kang Sheng succeeding outside the field of the special services. And Beria can not only be imagined - he, in addition to his really brilliant and of great importance for the state activities in the special services, made an outstanding contribution to the overall economic and state development of the country. And his national efforts turned out to be, undoubtedly, much more significant and significant than purely Chekist ones, with all the undoubted scale of the latter!

The two gloomy figures of German and Chinese history are incomparable with the figure of the LP and purely human. Nevertheless, A.V. Topygin did not dare to take a completely clear position in relation to his hero, in the penultimate paragraph of the afterword only informing the reader that "Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was an intelligent person, a talented organizer in both good and evil" ...

My position is strictly defined: the evil deeds of Beria, as well as the evil deeds Stalin, exist only in malicious and

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malicious myth-making of those for whom a mighty, independent, global, prosperous Russian state is evil in general.

In 1917, for the future of such a power, Lenin had no alternative. Then the time of Stalin came... Kalinin, in his suicide letter addressed to "In the Politburo to Comrade Stalin" and written no later than June 3, 1946, stated:

"Illness and the expectation of death did not dull my interest in the fate of our country, especially in the near future. The main element of its provision, in my deep conviction, is the leadership of Comrade Stalin.

From the day of Lenin's death, I firmly personified my policy and behavior in the person of Comrade Stalin. It was not personal relationships or motives that pushed me to this, but a deep conviction that only he would cope with the difficulties of both the state and the party order ... I did not consider other applicants serious ... "

It is hardly necessary to add something to this statement of Kalinin.

And just as Stalin, in the period of his maturity, was the uncontested leader of the country, who alone was capable of leading it to success, so too the summer Beria by 1953 was objectively the only one of Stalin's comrades-in-arms capable of ensuring complete success for the cause of Lenin-Stalin. That is, the cause of the final, indestructible flourishing of Russia by no one and nothing.

So that this truth could not acquire the credibility of a fact, Beria was destroyed. Otherwise, a year or two would have passed, and it would have become clear to everyone: Lavrenty Pavlovich should be at the head of the country.

And since everyone who took part in one way or another in the destruction of Beria,

turned out to be criminals in relation to the existing state system, that is, they turned out to be state criminals, then in order to hide this, Beria had to be presented in the eyes of modern

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Mennikov and especially the descendants of the "knight of demons", "the key of all fetters", "barbarian, villain" and "executioner".

After the physical destruction of Beria, it was necessary not to delay a single day, in real time, to begin the process of his complete demonization. And only by convincing both Russia of the 1953 model of the year and future generations that Lavrenty Beria is an "executioner", "monster", "fiend", "ghoul", "pervert", "sexual maniac", "sadist", "molester", "Satanail", the nomenklatura could count on some historical laurels.

What is there - "laurels"! The main thing was that now it was possible to be calm, knowing that no one would seriously disturb the higher partocratic swamp, covered with a greasy duckweed of well-being, with fresh ideas and constant initiatives.

Moreover, Beria had not only to be eliminated as a disturbing factor, as the current supreme state leader - for this it would be enough to do with him what Khrushchev soon did with the "anti-party group" and Shepilov "joined it". No, Beria had to be completely wiped out of life - in order to stop at the root of anyone's inclinations to pursue a sincere, enterprising and active, domestic and foreign policy.

In Stalin's policy there were sometimes excessive rigidity and cruelty, there were sometimes serious mistakes in it (for example, the call to burn forests at the beginning of the war, etc.), but there was never hypocrisy and falsehood in it! And with the coming to power of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites, this falseness at the highest levels of the party state power was intensified more and more, becoming total by the time of Gorbachev!

However, all that the post-Stalinist nomenklatura could afford in relation to Stalin was to belittle his role and greatness, smearing his name and deeds in the dirt of the 20th Congress. But even the "democrats" were unable to achieve the task of total demonization of Stalin. One posthumous assessment of Stalin by Churchill spoiled the whole game for them. You can't put Sir Winston in the red-browns.

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But with Beria, this "trick" was a success. And at one time it seemed - forever.

And yet the wind of history is the wind of history... It is capable of sweeping away any heaps of dirt and debris from outstanding figures.

And sweeps.

Stalin did almost everything he was supposed to do. He accepted post-Tsarist Russia with a plow, and left it with an atomic bomb. You can't say here more precisely and shorter than Churchill, Sir Winston was still able to find *a word*.

Stalin did not do one thing or did not have time to do it - he did not leave a country that was vast and rich in talents worthy of his successor. Perhaps Stalin hoped to see him in the dual, so to speak, figure of Kuznetsov and Voznesensky, but both of them turned out to be from a small, alas, breed. Alone with each other and with their closest associates, they dreamed not of how best to *build communism* in Russia, but of how they would *rule* Russia after Stalin.

Upon learning of this, Stalin experienced, as I understand it, something like the feelings of Taras Bulba, who learned about Andriy's betrayal. Stalin acted like Taras! He gave birth to them... He killed them, like Taras Andria.

And a competent successor was nearby - Beria. Stalin did not understand this, but

Beria without Stalin was doomed. And in the end, the country entrusted its fate to a clever, narrow-minded, unprincipled and ignorant intriguer. And is it only to him - after all, "Nikita", like any other, standing in the highest power, was "played" by the environment. Just as incompetent as he is, and in some part - anti-Soviet and pro-Western.

The task of Beria as Stalin's successor should have been and would have become the task of gradual, supported by the development of the masses, the democratization of society, the task of developing all the creative forces of the people, the task of granting victorious socialism in the country all the rights not to the nomenklatura, but to the people. Not functionaries, but professionals. Beria and already his successors should have been and could strengthen even once

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build socialism, and not betray it, like Khrushchev and his successors.

Beria could lead the ever-increasing and flourishing Soviet Union for years, say, up to sixty-five or seventy, that is, he could meet the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet power at the head of the country. And it would be a completely different country, different from the one that really took place!

I think that his Soviet Union would not have had such a huge number of "habitants" in the outside world that Khrushchev bred, and then - Brezhnev. Beria's Soviet Union would not have poisoned its state body with petrodollar injections. In his Soviet Union, the "fifth column" of Gorbachevs and Yeltsinoids could not have formed. And in its Soviet Union, any negligent leader, according to the Constitution, would be responsible for his work not to the bureau of the city committee, but to the labor collective, which would have the right to return such a negligent leader to a "primitive", non-leading state.

In short, his Soviet Union would confidently enter the 21st century as a decisive factor in the world social process. And not only would Russia have a completely different look and a completely different place in the world, but the world itself would have a completely different look!

This is what the Khrushchevites-partycrats, Gorbachevites, the Yeltsinoids-"democrats", the world plutocracy and the world aristocracy of Beria - albeit for different reasons - could not forgive either during his lifetime, and even more so after the grave.

They could not forgive the fact that he was able, together with the people, to bring Russia to such a level of development when the fate of the people would no longer depend on a handful of people who imagine themselves to be an "elite", but on a massive intellectually and spiritually competent core of society. When the guiding and guiding force of society would be not the "collective mind of the Central Committee", but the public mind.

THIS BOOK was prefaced by a quote from Carlyle: "I don't believe in the collective intelligence of ignorant individuals." Well, I, the author of this book, don't believe in him either. But I ask myself

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and the question to everyone: "Is it possible to believe in the collective mind of comprehensively developed individuals?"

As for me, I confidently answer: "Yes!"

And we - Russia, the world - have yet to acquire this mind. Unless, of course, we want to live on the planet, and not die on it in our own spiritual and material impurities.

Beria was not a genius - like Lenin, like Stalin. He was just super-competent. Among other things, he was killed and this - in full accordance with the principle of Peter. And he was also ruined by a naive belief in a good beginning in people, in colleagues. The thought could not fit in his head that just out of envy, out of "selfishness" one could erect such a MONSTERIOUS

slander and stab him in the back with a dagger.

Over the decades of ever-increasing and growing power, an initially vile and vile person by the age of fifty would finally turn into a complete boor and callous scoundrel. And Beria in 1950, in the rank of vice premier, member of the Politburo, head of the Special Committee, in the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, finally could, for the first time in his life, seeing a chubby Russian guy, a simple sergeant, immediately ask why his teeth hurt?

No, dear readers, it's up to you, but such a person could not be bad man!

MY book is finished.

I part with my hero and say goodbye to the reader.

A glorious and high-profile era is left behind - battles, struggles, construction sites, defeats and victories ...

Life...

Great Life of the Great Country.

She came to life again in my thoughts, lay down on paper, and so it remained on it. And you and I, dear reader, are left face to face with the vile of not the partocratic, but the oligarchic regime, a hundred times more disgusting and destructive than the partocratic. We remain one on one with the vile of the regime is no longer just snickering

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competence -. as under Khrushchev, under Brezhnev, under Andropov and Gorbachev, but with the vile of a regime of triumphant super-incompetence.

Are we alone?

For now, yes...

But maybe it's time to unite somehow? Unite to form collectively the collective mind of competent individuals. And then we will understand that only by correctly evaluating what has been done by our predecessors, we ourselves become people capable of our own accomplishments, conditioned by the challenges of the time.

May 28 -

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Kremlev ("Arzamas-16").

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